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I 
job 
BOBTAIL BENCH MEMORANDUM 
No. 82-276 
Dirks v. SEC 
Jim March 21, 1983 
I. Question Presented 
Did the CADC err in finding that a recipient of nonpublic in-
formation concerning ongoing fraud within a corporation violates the 
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws by transmitting 
that information to other persons, including persons who may use it 
in making investment decisions, when there is no element of misap-
propriation in transmitting or using the information? 
2. 
I I. .Facts 
Petr was an officer of a registered broker-dealer. He special-
ized in providing investment advice about the insurance industry, 
primarily to institutional investors. Petr was not directly compen-
sated for his advisory services, but benefited when those whom he 
advised directed their brokerage business to the firm by which he 
was employed. 
In March 1973, petr received information from a for~r employee ----""'. ., . - - -
of Equity .Funding Corp. of America, the securities of which were 
traded on the NYSE, to the effect that the assets of that co. were 
vastly overstated as the result of fraudulent internal corporate 
practices. As a result, petr examined and analyzed publicly avail-
able data, sought confirmation of what he had been told from 
in the investment community, and solicited information from then 
present and past officers and other employees of the co. While petr 
was investigating the matter, he was in contact with a number of 
investors and analysts with whom he candidly discussed the progress 
of his investigation and the information he had obtained. Some of 
those to whom he spoke sold their Equity .Funding securities. 
III. Proceedings Below 
A. SEC. The SEC charged petr with violating the antifraud 
provisions of the federal securities laws based on his selective 
revelation of information about Equity .Funding before making some 
general public disclosure. .Following an administrative hearing, the 
SEC found that petr had "tipped" nonpublic information concerning 
Equity .Funding in violation of these provisions. It observed that 
"Dirks received the information from inside corporate sources. .From 
y... h WAA..JL sl-~ 3. 
the nature of the information, the inference must have been obvious 
that his sources had received it during · the course of their corpo-
rate duties, and that the company intended that it should be kept in 
confidence." The SEC added: 
In tipping potential traders, [petr] breas hed a duty w~ch ~J~ 
he had assumed as a result of knowingl y rece1v1ng conf1- ~ 
dent i a i info r mation from [Equity Funding] insiders.... ~ 
Such a tippee breaches the fiduciary dut1 which he assumes ~? 
from the insider when the t i ppee know i ng y transmits the • 
information to someone who will probably trade on the 
basis thereof. 
e v:r The SEC reached that co~~ ion even though it recognized that 
5~~~i~ informants~ntitled to disclose the [Equity Funding] 
~~d in or~~ring it to light and its perpetrators to 
~ .j}; '!b"y.;;e spite its finding of a violation, the SEC imposed only 
ensure on petr. It observed that "[i] t is clear that [petri /J,...r-
played ~~rtan:_ role in bringing [Equity Funding's] massive s; 6C 
fraud to light, and [that] .•• he reported the fraud allegation to ~~~~ 
[Equity Funding's] auditors ~d sought to have the information 
~in The Wall Street Journal." 
~ B. CADC. The CADC entered a judgment without accompanying 
~~opinion, denying "for the reasons stated by the Commmission in its 
~· opinion" petr's petn for review of the SEC's censure order. The 
..,(-
.. . -~judgment stated that petr "breached his duty to the Commission and 
~ ~~c not to ~use insider information and that he was com-
pensated for so doing." Judge Tamm dissented from the judgment. 
Subsequently, the CADC issued an opinion 
5 ~ 
~~ Wright. Judge Robb concurred in the result, and Judge Tamm dissent-
LYP· 
written by Judge 
ed; neither filed a separate opinion. Judge Wright stated that 
petr's censure should be affirmed on the theory expressed by the SEC 
X:-' C:./IJJ-L ~~A, ·~~~ 
k Plu_ ~Y- . '"._1 !./ 
4 . 
that petr and his tippees had assumed the "disclose-or-abstain" ob-
ligations of their insider sources. Judge Wright added that, as an 
employee of a broker-dealer, petr breached ethical duties not to 
assist his "clients [in] dump[ing] fraudulent securities on an unin-
formed public." 
IV. Summary of the Parties' Contentions 
A. Petr. The CADC's holding is inconsistent with the Court's 
decision in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (POWELL, 
/ 
J.). In Chiarella, this Court held that under the antifraud provi-
sions of the securities laws a duty to disclose nonpublic informa-
a relationship between the person assessing 
and those purchasing or selling the securities. 
This Court held that such a duty does not arise as a result of the 
mere possession of such information. Even the dissenting Justices 
in Chiarella agreed that mere possession of such information may 
give rise to a duty of disclosure only where it is illegally ob-
tained, id., at 243 (BURGER, C.J., dissenting), or where it is not 
legally available to others in the investment community, id., at 251 
(BLACKMON, J., dissenting). 
"Tippee" liability exists only where the recipient of the in-
formation improperly acquires it through a breach of a corporate 
insider's duty to the company and thereby himself acquires duties as 
a participant in the breach. See 445 U.S., at 230 n. 12. The SEC 
conceded, however, that petrs' sources breached no duty iri talking 
to him. Nor did petr misappropriate or illegally obtain the infor-
mation from the co. 
5. 
Indeed, rather than violating a duty to Equity Funding or its 
shareholders, or to the market in general, petr's activities brought 
' 
to light a massive fraud at Equity Funding and informed the market 
of the true state of affairs at the co. But for petr's efforts, the 
fraud might well have gone undetected altogether. By misapplying 
controlling precedent, the CADC reached a result that is entirely 
contrary to public law enforcement policy and that will have a sub-
stantial negative impact throughout the securities industry. The 
SEC's suggestion of a duty to disclose and its "disclose or refrain" 
rhetoric may make sense where those in possession of the informa-
tion, such as corps. or managers of corps., are in a position to 
make disclosure on behalf of the co.; but applying the "disclose or 
refrain" rhetoric to an outsider like petr who is investigating al-
legations of management fraud which will never be voluntarily dis-
closed by the management and who cannot persuade the press to pub-
lish a story will result only in discouraging independent investiga-
tion of such allegations. 
B. SEC. Petr inherited the duty of the source of his informa-
tion, Secrist, not to defraud purchasers of Equity Funding securi-
ties. Secrist had a duty to disclose the co.'s true condition to 
investors before trading with them. That duty rests upon the 
common-law fiduciary relationship between a corp. insider and the 
stockholders of the corp. rather than upon the separate and distinct 
duty of the insider to the corp. to preserve the confidentiality of 
corp. information. 
At common law, an officer or director is "a quasi trustee" of 
the shareholders in his transactions in the shares of the co. He is 
6. 
required to inform his shareholders of the corp.'s true condition 
before trading with them in the corp.'s , stock, and his failure to do 
so is fraud. See Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 435 (1909). The 
character of the information, whether a legitimate corp. secret or 
evidence of crime, is irrelevant to this disclosure duty. 
Because corp. officers and directors are forbidden by their 
trust relationship from using undisclosed corp. information to the 
disadvantage of their shareholders, they may not give such informa-
tion to outsiders for the same improper purpose. "Tippees" who 
knowingly participate with the insiders in such a breach of fiducia-
ry duty are "as forbidden" from taking advantage of shareholders as 
the insiders themselves. The disclosure obligation of tippees rests 
upon the disclosure obligation of the insider to individual share-
holders rather than any duty of silence or loyalty to the corp., and 
therefore the corp.'s right to preserve information as a secret is 
not a prerequisite to the tippee's liability. 
V. Discussion 
The parties dispute whether the information constituted "mate-
rial facts" for purposes of the disclose-or-abstain rule, but the 
CADC, the SEC, and the ALJ all so held, and there is no reason to 
view this material as otherwise. I recommend assuming the material-
ity of the "facts" for the purposes of this case. Furthermore, the - ----------------...... ---------------
SG is correct that Judge Wright's alternative theory of liability 
based on petr's status as a registered broker-dealer is not before 
the Court under SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947). 
H 
Thus, the narrow question before the Court is whether a tippee 
of inside information on fraudulent conduct within a corp. violates 
the federal securities provisions 
personal gain. In Chiarella, the 
- ~~.J.~~7.a__ . I 
~ ~
by usingt?tfie 1 nformation for his  
Court . assu~ , at least for pur-
poses of analyzing Chiarella's case, that there is a federal ban on 
insider trading, largely because Chiarella apparently did not argue 
~
1,) 
that there is not such a ban. I read your opinion as carefully not -
~holding '~hat there is such a ban, and I tlhi~ you~uld say here 
,..-
that there is none. A considerable distortion of language underlies 
any holding that trading in a market without issuing a press release 
is "fraud" or "deceit." If an insider is selling, the market for 
the stock will move down--the direction the stock should be going; 
if the insider is buying, the market will also move in the appropri-
ate direction. And although the business-property rationale re-
stricts insider trading when secrecy is necessary to preserve the 
value of information to the firm that created the knowledge, this 
~ rule would mean that insider trading should be permitted to the ex-
tent the firm that created the information desires such trading. In 
l 
other words, if insider trading is undesirable to shareholders and 
to firms, why do not firms voluntarily curtail the practice? See 
Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 Va. L. Rev. 
1, 45-47 (1980). Finally, §16 of the Securities Exchange Act has a -provision explicitly dealing with some insider trading, and it is 
not a disclosure rule at all. One could argue, with fair support 
-------~--------------
the structure of the statute, for ad-
dressing insider trading. Se Insider Trading, Secret 
Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 
1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 309, 317-320. I would think that you would find 
this latter approach attractive. 
~------------~ 




Despite the above, there may be reasons to impose a federal 
"disclose-or-abstain" obligation on insiders who are in an inherent-
ly unequal information position with shareholders, and you may feel 
obligated to do so after writing Chiarella. Assuming a federal ban 
on insider trading, the Court's theorv supporting such a ban must be 
that Congress intended in 1934 that any fraud "touching" a sale of 
securities is unlawful under federal law, even if the fraud had 
nothing to do with the existence or price of the sale. It is a 
"fraud" for insiders to trade on material inside corp. information ~ 
that might have some effect on the market price of the corp.'s 
shares. Because it is a fraud, thev have a dutv not to trade on 
this information without disclosure. 
This fraud rule inevitably would lead to a rule banning all 
dealing on the basis of special knowledge, but for the fact that the 
Court has backtracked by stating that a trader must disclose only 
when he has a "duty" to do so. The Court announced in Chiarella 
that duties do not arise simply from unequal possession of informa-
..... 
tion, 445 u.s., at 228 n. 10; they come, rather, from prior dealings --
of the trader as a fiduciary, id., at 229, from a "relationship of 
trust and confidence," id. Chiarella had no duty to those from whom 
he bought, because he had no prior dealings with them. 
It is not clear to me what the Court meant by duty, but the SEC 
uses it in a conclusory way: People who ought not to trade have a 
duty not to do so. This case, in my opinion, shows the absurn lim-
its to which the SEC's "duty" not to trade on inside information has 
been extended. The SEC's position is that "Dirks--standing in [the --
former employees'] shoes--committed a breach of the fiduciary duty 
9 0 
which he had assumed in dealing with them, when he passed the infor-
mation on to the traders." 
The SEC's "duty" is the common-law duty that an officer or di-
rector has to his shareholders: He is required to inform his share-
--------~.........____. ........, 
holders of the corp.'s true condition before trading with them in 
the corp.'s stock. As I noted before, it takes some stretching to 
call this fraud; rather, the duty must rest on some notion of --fairness--that it is unfair for one person to trade with another 
unless the two are equally knowledgeable about the subject of the 
deal. As the briefs point out, however, the Justices of this Court 
!
unanimously agr~d in Chiarella that there is no general duty to 
make disclosure before trading with or tipping material nonpublic 
information. 
Even assuming that insiders should not trade on inside corp. 
information, I think it is an open issue whether federal securities 
law bans tippee trading. The Court seems to have left ' open the sta-
tus of "tippees" in a footnote. See id., at 230 n. 12. I would end 
the case on this basis: the antifraud provisions of the federal se-
curities laws were not meant to impose a duty on tippees to disclose 
or abstain. When the firm is entitled to secrecy, the person who 
passes out a tip is the wrongdoer. He can be penalized appropriate-
ly, by his employer if not the courts. But when the release of in-
formation was not wrongful--and certainly the former employees of 
Equity Funding did no wrong in telling petr about the fraud--~re 
is no justification for barring the use of the information. 
It is not necessary, however, to create here such a broad rule 




there little wrong with trading on inside information in most cases, 
here it is beneficial. This case presents a classic example of a 
situation where the legal rules should not penalize someone for in-
vestigation. Assuming that insider trading is bad, it is necessary 
here to reward investigation. As Professor Easterbrook stated in 
commenting on this case: 
[Petr] did everyone a service. The sooner frauds are 
discovered--and the more costs a defrauder bears in defer-
ring disclosure--the fewer frauds there will be. [Petr] 's 
efforts were costly. He had to have a network of con-
tacts, many of which would never pay off. (After all, 
most employees have no news of similar importance to dis-
close.) The investigation following the tip was costly 
too. While courting contacts and following up leads, 
[petr] could not sit around soliciting clients' trades and 
earning commissions. The ability to pass secret informa- / 
tion to clients enabled [petr] to profit from his investi-
gation, which redounded to everyone's benefit. 
1981 S. Ct. Rev., at 337. See Scott, Insider Trading: Rule lOb-5, 
Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. Leg. Stud. 801, 818 (1980) 
("Weakest of all is the case for applying an antitrading rule to a 
situation where some outside person or firm has invested in obtain-
ing, not mere trading foreknowledge, but socially useful informa-
tion. [T]he SEC's Equity Funding position is a boon to the success-
ful commission and prolongation of corporate fraud. It is to be 
hoped that it will not survive Chiarella."). 
VI. Summary 
I recommend that the Court reverse the judgment of the CADC. I 
would find that petr had no duty to disclose or abstain. This "no 
duty" could be grounded on a rule that: (i) there is no federal ban 
on insider trading; (ii) there is no federal ban on tippee trading; 
or (iii) there is no federal ban on tippee trading where the tippee 
uses socially useful information, such as knowledge of fraud. 
lfp/ss 03/21/83 
82-65 Dirks v. SEC 
In Chiarella, the Court's opinion said: 
"On who fails to disclose material information • 
• . cornrni ts fraud only when he under a d..l.l.t.Y_ to 
do so. And the dury- to disclose arises when a 
party has information 'that the other party is 
entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other 
similar relation of trust and confidence between 
them.'" 
(This is SEC language from its opinion in Cady, 
Roberts), 445 u.s., at 228. 
" • liability [under lOb-5] is premised upon 
a duty to disclose arising from a relationship 
of trust and confidence between parties to a 
transaction." p. 230. 
"[a ] of corporate insiders ..• have 
a duty not to profit from the use of insider 
information that they know is confidential, and 
know or should know it carne from a corporate 
~ insider". (This is a quote from fn. 12, p. 230, 
taken from a CA2 opinion.) 
Chiarella, reversed CA2 because of two defects 
in its reasoning: 
"First, not every instance of corporate 
unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity under 
§10 (b). Second, the element requireGt to make 
silence fraudulent - a dut~ t Q <Ji s Qlose - is 
absent in this case. No-du y could arise from 
petitioner's relationship with the sellers of 
the target company's securities. • • . He was 
not their agent, he was not a fiduciary, he was 
not a person in whom the sellers had placed 






82-276 Dirks v. SEC (All dates are 1973) 
March 7 following phone call preceding day 
from Secrist, a former employee of Equity, Dirks met for 
three hours with Secrist who described the fraud in 
detail. Secrist said regulatory agencies had failed to 
act on charges made by other Equity employees. 
(Note: Petitioner's brief, p. 8, says that of 
the eight specific allegations of fraud, three were 
essentially correct and the remainder false). 
March 12 - Dirks telephoned Herb Larson, San 
.Francisco bureau chief of the W/S Journal. He did not 
reach Larson, but left a message. Also on the 12th, Dirks 
advised an officer of the Boston Company (a client) of 
what he had heard from Secrist. 
March 15-16 - following a further conversation 
with Dirks, Boston sold $1.2 of Equity securities (the 
first sales) . 
., ... 
2. 
March 19 Dirks reached Larson, the W/S 
Journal's San Francisco chief, and told him the Secrist 
story. Larson agreed to have a reporter investigate. 
March 20 Dirks, in Los Angeles, met with 
Harper, a former Vice President of Equity, who said only 
that he was highly suspicious of Equity's books. 
Following his talk Hooper (Harper), Dirks again 
got in touch with Boston, and it sold some additional 
Equity securities. 
- ~-~~ rvr- Equity, who called the allegations preposterous in light 
March 21 - Dirks met with Goldbloom, Chairman of 
~ ~f all the regulatory bodies that had checked Equity's 
books. Goldbloom and other Equity employees told Dirks 
~ k that insurance examiners from three states had found no 
~~~ng doin:~so on the 21st, Dirks met personally with 
~wf 
~ 
Blundell of the Journal. 
March 23 - by this date, Dirks had spoken to one ~ M IJ'I<-- :z:; -
V{D tbH(1 current and six former Equity employees, all of whom 




that held Equity securities. Dreyfus checked some of its 
own sources, and sold Equity securities on March 26. 
March 26 - Dirks advised another holder that 
liquidated its Equity securities. 
But also on the same day, March 26, Dirks again 
got in touch with Blundell and urged him to publicize the 
fraud charges. He met with Blundell for several hours. 
March 27 - meanwhile the stock exchange - since 
March 22- had been hearing rumors, and on March 27 it 
halted trading. 
April 2 the Journal finally published an 
article, and three days later Equity petitioned for 
bankruptcy. 
* * * 
Note: The foregoing summary does not indicate 
the full extent of Dirks' investigation - that included 
talking to Equity's accounting firm that merely passed on 
to Equity what Dirks had said. 
lfp/ss 03/21/83 
82-276 Dirks v. SEC 
The parties' positions in this case are as 
follows: 
The SEC 
Secrist - even though a former employee - had a 
duty to disclose the company's true condition to investors 
before trading with them. This is the common law 
fiduciary relationship between a corporate insider and the 
stockholders of the corporation. This is a separate duty 
from that of an insider to the corporation ~ to preserve 
confidential information. 
The SEC's brief (p. 17) states that "Dirks 
inherited the duty of Secrist not to defraud purchasers of 
Equity's securities" (emphasis added). 
The SEC distinguishes Chiarella on the ground 
that here, Secrist was an insider of Equity and had a duty 
that Chiarella did not have. Nor did Chiarella "inherit" 
any duty from an insider. 
The SG's Position: 
This is an interesting case because the United 
States (SG) disagrees with the SEC. 
lfp/ss 03/21/83 
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/ 
2. 
The SEC, relying on Chiarella, argues that its 
principles "establish that petitioner had no duty to 
disclose or abstain from trading or tipping. He was not a 
fiduciary with respect to the security holders of Equity 
funding. He was a complete stranger to those investors. 
He took no action, directly or indirectly, that would 
induce them to repose trust or confidence in him." p. 10. 
Dirks "engaged in no dishonest conduct that 
would justify the imposition upon him of the duties of a 
constructive trustee". 
It is important to recognize, as apparently the 
SEC and CADC recognized, that: 
"Petitioner's informants (Dirks and numerous 
others) acted lawfully when they imparted their 
information to him, and petitioner used that 
information in precisely the manner that his 
informants expected." 
My view in this case: 
It is not easy to identify any wrongdoing in 
this case. 
Surely Secrist, and others who gave Dirks 
information, were not wrongdoers when they reported fraud. 
They had unsuccessfully attempted to interest the 
California Commission. 
It is important to ask, therefore, what fraud -
or breach of duty - can Dirks be charged with? He was not 
an insider. He acted far more responsibly than reasonably 
could have been expected of him. He could have simply 
conveyed the initial information to clients of his firm. 
Instead, he made a remarkably thorough investigation, 
including repeated efforts to persuade the Wall Street 
Journal to disclose. Moreover, he had been told by 
Secrist that the regulatory authorities in California 
refused to investigate. 
In these circumstances, it defies credibility to 
say that Dirks became a "fiduciary" with a duty not only 
to stockholders of Equity but also to prospective 
purchasers of Equity's securities. 
What, one may ask, should Dirks have done? ___... 
Arguably, he should have gone directly to the SEC. But 
initially, he had no idea whether the information was 
correct. Indeed, in the end only some of Secrist's 
specific allegations proved to be true. Dirks endeavored 
to have the Wall Street Journal investigate. And even 
after he had talked to Equity's top executives and to its 
.... 
accountant, he had no confirmation of the information. He 
pursued the investigation. 
As the brief for the United States says: 
"The Commission's erroneous imposition of 
liability in this case has serious consequences 
for federal law enforcement, which frequently 
depends upon private initiative to uncover 
criminal conduct .... Petitioner accomplished 
what regulatory authorities were unable to do". 
p. 11 
* * * 
Tailpiece: 
The Wall Street Journal reporter, Blundell, was 
nominated for a Pulitizer Prize for his coverage of the 
Equity funding scandal, while petitioner was charged with 
violating the antifraud provisions of the federal 
securities law." P. 8. 
........ 
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job 03/22/83 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Jim 
Re: Dirks v. SEC, No. 82-276 
I still have considerable doubts that federal securities law 
should ban any insider trading. You asked me, however, to set forth 
a theory for upholding insider liability and tippee liability to the 
extent necessary to protect the ban on insider trading. You also 
indicated that you wanted to reverse the judgment in this case. 
I am convinced that there is no satisfactory compensatory rationale 
for regulating insider trading. There is no evidence that insider 
trading causes direct harm to investors or, even assuming that it 
does, that the extent of injury warrants the costs of regulation. 
The Court then must create its theory around indirect harm. Delay 
in publication to permit insider trading appears to be infrequent 
and short-lived, thus insider trading has little or no effect on the 
allocational efficiency of the market. 
Market confidence is probably the more promising rationale. 
Insider trading indirectly injures investors by reducing their 
welfare. The Court could support its ban on insider trading by 
stating that the 1934 Act was intended to promote fairness in market 
transactions, and insider trading, by permitting one party to gain 
an unfair advantage over other parties, is contrary to this purpose. 
I have doubts, however, whether this rationale survives your opinion 





opinion in Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 u.s. 462 (1977). Your 
opinion in Chiarella also casts this rationale into disfavor. 
Your concern, I think, is with the status of defts in rule lOb-
5 cases. In Texas Gulf Sulpher, the defts were forbidden to trade 
on nonpublic information because they were officers and oirectors. 
The courts have unanimously held that corporate officers and 
directors are subject to insider trading restrictions. Tippees 
acquire the same status derivatively because their ultimate 
information source is a bona fide insider. 
This unanimity concerning trading by insiders must be based on 
a belief that abstention from insider trading is a condition of the 
agency relationship between management insiders and the corporation. 
Insider trading is, in many respects, simply a form of secret 
compensation. There is also a moral side to this compensation: 
Insider trading is indulging one's self-interest to the point of 
dishonesty. Professor Dooley has characterized the agency rationale 
well: 
Any agency relationship is characterized by a 
divergence between the interests of the principal and the 
agent. Accordingly, the agent's self-interested actions 
may reduce the principal's welfare, as in the cases of 
shirking, overconsumption of perquisites, or 
misappropriation. If it could be accomplished without 
cost, a principal would prefer that his agents behave 
selflessly and never deviate from pursuit of the 
principal's interest .... Thus, serious consequences 
generally attach when an agent embezzles even a modest sum 
of money because this behavior manifests a willingness to 
deviate too far from generally accepted standards of 
conduct in the pursuit of self-interest. Persons 
exhibiting these tendencies are "dishonest" and not to be 
trusted. 
Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 Va. L. Rev. 
1, 40-41 (1980). Thus, insider trading is in the same line as 
3 • 
"payola." We do not expect fiduciaries ' to engage in such 
activities. {_ ~~9(~/-.Jv ~.a.vj 
In the end, I think this is the real objection to insider 
.1\ 
trading. The shareholders cannot complain that the insider 
misappropriated something that belongs to them because the value of 
the information to the corporation is, if anything, only to keep it 
secret: that the insiders are glad to do. Although shareholders 
might prefer to reduce the direct compensation of agents who profit 
on inside information, they are more likely to object to the 
practice on the ground that those who do it are too little concerned 
with the corporation's welfare and too willing to act dishonestly to 
gain advantage. 
Presumably, to the extent there is this "dishonesty," outside 
investors can appropriately discount their valuation of companies in 
which insiders trade, but investors, of course, presumably cannot 
distinguish between companies that trade on inside information and 
those that do not (I emphasize "presumably" because §16(a) requires 
some disclosure for some managers). This distinction is difficult 
to make not only because insider trading is difficult to detect, but 
also because the opportunities for insider trading are dependent on 
the fortuitous occurrence of significant events and are therefore 
distributed randomly throughout the market. Accordingly, the 
rational outside investor assumes that every investment of 
comparable risk presents the same risk of insider trading. If one 
assumes that outside investors prefer but cannot identify the 
securities of those companies that forbid insider trading, the 
practice can be perceived as involving a loss of welfare. There is 
4. 
a loss of market confidence. Arguably, this assumption satisfies 
the legal requirements of §lO(b) because it presupposes both 
investor injury (loss of welfare) and deception (a dishonest act 
that induces investors to enter into or remain in a relationship 
that they would prefer to avoid). Because insider trading is 
perceived to be morally reprehensible, some corporate managers will 
also find it repugnant and will refuse to engage in it. These 
"ethical" managers will bear the agency costs of insider trading, 
but derive no utility from it, because, as I noted earlier, it is 
~o distinguish shares of companies that present the risk 
of insider trading from those that do not. Because it is, however, 
~ 
in their self-interest reduce the risk to do so, ethical managers 
~ 
will seek to reduce the agency costs of insider trading by incurring 
bonding costs to signal the market of their abstention from the 
practice. By increasing the marginal costs of insider trading by 
attaching legal sanctions to it, this cost is diminished. In other 
words, the cost of insider trading is shifted to companies that 
permit such activity, and the costs of policing the activity are 
borne by society rather than the individual firm. 
Enhancing th~u~~lationship by reducing agency costs (7 
is the only justification I can see for regulating insider trading 
under the existing statutory scheme. The legal rules that the Court 
should develop, assuming it wishes to enter this area, should be 
consistent with that principle, and not the many others that are 
offered. 
II 
What rules could be developed from this priniciple of fiduciary 
~' 
duty on the part of insiders. Your opinion in Chiarella is a good 
5. 
first step: a duty to disclose or abstain must be premised on a 
fiduciary relationship. Directors and officers are easy, of course. ----The tippee's status is more problematical: he does not have a 
fiduciary relationship with the company or its shareholders. 
Recognizing that your rule endangered tippee law, you specifically 
reserved the question of tippee liability in n. 12, and your ._ '--
'--
footnote is instructive as to what to do in this case: 
"Tippees" of corporate insiders have been held liable 
under §lO(b) because they have a duty not to profit from 
the use of inside information that they know is 
confidential and know or should know came from a corporate 
insnfer.~ •• The tippee's obligation has been viewed as 
arising from his role as a participant after the fact in 
the insider's bre~ of a fiduciary duty. -
That second sentence does considerable damage to the SEC's case 
against Dirks. If, as the sentence suggested, an alleged tippee --------. 
like Dirks violates Rule lOb-5 only when his source breaches a 
fiduciary duty, the Dirks' liability ~ould depend on a finding that 
the former Equity Funding employees who told him of the fraud 
b h d th ' b~o 1 ' h ' 1 +-H d-...h 4 ~ · :,eac e • ~r ~ncy re at1ons 1p w1,.tu "'t e corporat1on. -
Thus, the "duty" issue in this case is simple: 
A basic principle of Chiarella is that duties to disclose 
or abstain do not materialize from thin air; they grow out 
of relationships of trust and confidence. A complete 
outsider like Dirks has no independent relationship with 
the company and its stockholders, so it would seem that he 
cannot be guilty himself of a violation of the disclose-
or-abstain rule unless he is implicated in a breach of 




Chazen, "'Dirks' Presents Unique Corporate, Social Issues," Legal --- ~ 
Times 14, 18 (March 14, 1983). Dirks should not be considered a
participant after the fact in a breach of fiduciary duty by his 
informants. Employees who help uncover a corporate scandal breach 
6. 
no agency relationship or duties to the company by simply disclosing 
such wrongdoing. 
A breach of a fiduciary relationship is not the end of the 
inquiry. In Chiarella, you noted that in Cady, Roberts & Co. the 
SEC emphasized the duty to disclose or abstain arose from the 
existence of a relationship and "the unfairness of allowing a 
corporate insider to take advantage of that information by trading 
without disclosure." This same rule should, of course, apply to 
tippees, because their fiduciary duty is purely derivative. Often 
the tip and trade are the functional equivalent of trading on the 
inside information by the insider followed by a gift of the profits 
recipient. To make out a tipping case against an insider, it 
to prove that the insider exploited confidential 
in violation of his fiduciary duties to the corporation. 
lOb-5 claim ~gainst an alleged tippee would have to 
based on the theory that he knowingly assisted the insider in 
exploiting the confidential information, i.e., that he was an aider 
and abetter. This view of tipping is consistent, I think, with your 
statement in Chiarella that the tippee's obligation to refrain from 
trading arises from "his role as a participant after the fact in the 
insider's breach of fiduciary duty." 
~~..., In this case, there was ~ "exploitation" by the insiders. 
~ ~~· informants received no monetary benefit for revealing Equity 
~~ Funding's secrets, nor did they have any apparent desire to make a 
~ ~ of valuable information to Dirks. The informants may have had 
~ a duty not to trade on inside information without disclosure, but 




duty to the company by disclosing, their conduct did not have one of 
the essential elements of breach of the agency relationship: the 
,. ~--~ I • 
~.:z:------
We both The situations we are 
u 
concerned with are where ~ecurities analysts interview employees ~·~~ ...... = o::==' = =- -  ~ 
seeking information: is there liabilty? If the breach of an n<~ c~-
employee's duty alone is enough to establish tippee liability, t~ 
securities analyst will be chilled from using any of the information 
he gets. If, on the other hand, ~xploitation of confidential 
'':'\ 
information by insiders is a prerequisite to tippee liability, 
----------~-------------------~--------------------
securities analysts will be encouraged to seek information from 
corporate employees. I will not emphasize the obvious benefits of 
protecting the information-gathering duties of a securities analyst. 
There is no reason to treat securities analysts much different 
from reporters in general. To allow the use of material nonpublic -----
information under the limited circumstances that I have suggested 
will not harm public confidence in the securities markets. Dirks 
has no special access to confidential information. As long as he 
does his job, he is ok; when the insider tries to use the analyst -
1 1 1l for his benefit, that is when there is breach of the agency 
reratTOnship. 
_J~~ As set forth above, tippee liability depends on the purpos; 
p~- the insider's disclosure. The subjectivity of this approach is 
0 f '=:::-" 
~ (i) the relationship between the informant 
and the recipient (did the informant expect something in return?); 
(ii) who initiated the disclosure. The informants initiated the 
disclosure here, but they could have little or no expectation of 
? ... 
benefit from the disclosure. A strong 'nonfinancial motive for 
providing the information would almost always be determinative. 
There are hard cases: 
1. Cocktail party conversations. Bragging by corporate 
executives, or loose talk, is not enough to create any financial 
benefit for the insider. I would say dissemination of that 
disclosure would not create any tippee liability. 
8. 
2. Top executive/security analyst. This conversation may 
involve hard-to-detect favoritism, but where it is to build up the 
corporation's good will, I guess I see nothing wrong with it. I 
would think liability requires some personal incentive on behalf of 
the insider (personal exploitation). 
In summary, an insider would always be liable for insider 
trading. A tippee would be liable where he acted as a confederate 
with the insider to exploit inside information. Thus, liablity for 
tippee trading requires the presence of two elements: (i) fiduciary 
duty (some relationship with a insider); and (ii) exploitation that 
benefits the insider. The scienter requirement, of course, protects 










82-276 Dirks v. SEC 
MEMO FOR CONFERENCE: 
This case has wide ramifications for the 
securities markets. As has been evident since Texas Gulf 
Sulphur came down in 1968, the questions arising with 
respect to tippee liability have resulted in increasing 
litigation and uncertainty. It is evident - as evidenced 
by the oral arguments - that no limiting principle has 
been identified. The chain of 1 iabil i ty appears to be 
endless. 
Necessity of a duty 
We made an important point in Chiarella. It did 
not involve a tippee, but it did establish that liability 
cannot be imposed in the absence of a fiduciary duty to 
disclose before trading. The only reference in Chiarella 
to tippees is in fn. 12. The critical sentence in this 
note says: 
"The tippee's obligation has been viewed as 
arising from his role as a participant after the 
fact in the insider's breach of a fiduciary 
duty." 
Thus, where the tippee becomes a "partie ipant after the 
fact", he shares whatever duty the insider breached by 
·. 
conveying the information. This analysis makes Dirks' 
case easy to decide. His liability depends on a finding 
that the former Equity Funding employees of which 
Secrist was only one - who disclosed the fraud, breached 
' 
their fiduciary duty to Equity Funding. 
But even the SEC concedes there was no such 
breach of duty. None of these employees profited by 
disclosing fraud. They acted strictly in the public 
interest. Therefore, Dirks ~~as not a participant after 
the fact in anyone's breach of duty. 
Two Categories of Cases 
Deciding this case without identifying a general 
principle would accomplish very little. 
Let me make clear the -type o!f--situatio~to which 
the principle would be applied. This case does not 
involve a Texas Gulf Sulphur situation where an officer or 
director of a corporation himself trades on inside 
information for personal gain. Nor do we have an insider 
-who to benefit a friend- discloses inside . information 
on which the friend profits. The law is fairly well 
settled with respect to these straightforward cases. 
The much broader, underlying problem in this 
case concerns the necessity of information being made 
available for the health of the securities markets. In 
this case, the SEC's opinion stated: 
"In the course of their work, analysts actively 
seek out bits and pieces of corporate 
information not generally known to the market 
for the express purpose of analyzing that 
information and informing their clients who, in 
turn, can be expected to trade on the basis of 
the information. The value to the entire market 
of these efforts cannot be gainsaid: market 
efficiency in practice is significantly enhanced 
by such initiatives to ferret out an analyze 
information, and thus the analyst's work redowns 
to the benefit of the investors." 
If we sustain its opinion in this case 
securities analysts will be far less liable to "ferret 
out" information. They will be concerned constantly with 
the uncertainty of law suits, with juries determining 
whether the information circulated was confidential and 
should not have been disclosed. 
Thus, broadly speaking, there are two general 
types of situations: ( i) the Texas Gulf Sulphur type 
cases; and (ii) the secu r i t i es market typ e c ases in which 
both corporate e xecut ives an <'I analysts provide 
information. 
.... 0 
for the latter ~situation: A tippee's liability 
should depend on the purpose or intent of the insider's 
disclosure. 
Thi s is in one sense a subjective 
rule. But I t hin k it is a principled and practical one. 
The question of "purpose" 
determined - as it is so often in the 
These include: 
(intent) will be 
e..-/l ~~ ~frz-L, 
law~ byV th~ f~ 1[ 
~..w ... ts~ • 
( i) The relationship between the insider and 
the recipient (e.g., the analyst)~ what were their 
respective purposes? Particularly, did the insider expect 
to profit himself or to benefit a friend rather than to 
inform the market generally? 
( i i) Who initiated t ,he disclosure? Typically, 
I 
the analyst seeks out the corporate executive - this is 
commonplace. Equally commonplace, executives brief large 
meetings of analysts. The circumstances of the disclosure 
are relevant - as in this case. 
It must be remembered that the recipient of the 
information becomes a fiduciary only derivatively: that 
·. 
is) if there has been a breach of duty by the insider. 
This we established in Chiarella, and this is not denied 
by the SEC. 
Of course, there will be close cases, but 
deciding them is the way judges make a living. 
lfp/ss 03/23/83 
82-276 Dirks v. SEC 
MEMO FOR CONFERENCE: 
This case has wide ramifications for the 
securities markets. As has been evident since Texas Gulf 
Sulphur came down in 1968, the questions arising with 
respect to tippee 1 iabi li ty have resulted in increasing 
litigation and uncertainty. It is evident - as evidenced 
by the oral arguments - that no 1 imi ting principle has 
been identified. The chain of liability appears to be 
endless. 
Necessity of a duty 
We made an important point in Chiarella. It did 
not involve a tippee, but it did establish that liability 
cannot be imposed in the absence of a fiduciary duty to 
disclose before trading. The only reference in Chiarella 
to tippees is in fn. 12. The critical sentence in this 
note says: 
"The tippee's obligation has been viewed as 
arising from his role as a participant after the 
fact in the insider's hreach of a fiduciary 
duty." 
Thus, where the tippee becomes a "participant after the 
fact", he shares whatever duty the insider breached by 
conveying the information. This analysis 
case easy to decide. His liability depends 
that the former Equity Funding emplovees 
makes Dirks' 
on a finding 
of which 
Secrist was only one - who disclosed the fraud, breached 
their fiduciary duty to Equity Funding. 
But even the SEC concedes there was no such 
breach of duty. None of these employees profited by 
disclosing fraud. They acted strictly in the public 
interest. Therefore, Dirks was not a participant after 
the fact in anyone's breach of duty. 
Two Categories of Cases 
Deciding this case without identifying a general 
principle would accomplish very little. 
Let me make clear the type of situation to which 
the principle would be applied. This case does not 
involve a Texas Gulf Sulphur situation where an officer or 
director of a corporation himself trades on inside 
information for personal gain. Nor do we have an insider 
- who to benefit a friend - discloses inside information 
on which the friend profits. The law is fairly well 
settled with respect to these straightforward cases. 
.. · 
The much broader, underlying problem in this 
case concerns the necessity of information being made 
available for the health of the securities markets. In 
this case, the SEC's opinion stated: 
"In the course of their work, analysts actively 
seek out bits and pieces of corporate 
information not generally known to the market 
for the express purpose of analyzing that 
information and informing their clients who, in 
turn, can be expected to trade on the basis of 
the information. The value to the entire market 
of these efforts cannot be gainsaid: market 
efficiency in practice is significantly enhanced 
by such initiatives to ferret out an analyze 
information, and thus the analyst's work redowns 
to the benefit of the investors." 
If we sustain its opinion in this case 
securities analysts w i 11 be far less 1 iable to "fer ret 
out" information. They will be concerned constantly with 
the uncertainty of law suits, with juries determining 
whether the information circulated was confidential and 
should not have been disclosed. 
Thus, broadly speaking, there are two general 
types of situations: ( i) the Texas Gulf Sulphur type 
cases; and (ii) the securities market type cases in which 
both corporate executives and analysts provide 
information • 
A Rationale 
I suggest the following principle or rationale 
for the latter type situation: A tippee's liability 
should depend on the purpose or intent of the insider's 
disclosure. 
This is in one sense a subjective 
rule. But I think it is a principled and practical one. 
The question of "purpose" (intent) will be 
determined - as it is so often in the law - by the facts. 
These include: 
(i) The relationship between the 
the recipient (e.g., the analyst); what 
insider and 
were their 
respective purposes? Particularly, did the insider expect 
to profit himself or to benefit a friend rather than to 
inform the market generally? 
(ii) Who initiated the disclosure? Typically, 
the analyst seeks out the corporate executive - this is 
commonplace. Equally commonplace, executives brief large 
meetings of analysts. The circumstances of the disclosure 
are relevant - as in this case. 
It must be remembered that the recipient of the 
information becomes a fiduciary only derivatively: that 
.·· 
is if there has been a breach of duty by the insider. 
This we established in Chiarella, and this is not denied 
by the SEC. 
Of course, there will be close cases, but 





TO: Jim DATE: May 2, 1983 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
82-276 Dirks v. SEC 
You are to be commended for completing a draft 
opinion so promptly, particularly with everthing else you 
have had to do. Although the "bottom line" in this case 
has been easy for us, sorting it all out in an opinion is 
not easy. 
I begin with some general observations. One 
that will not surprise you is that the opinion is too 
long, and with more footnotes than I like. In comments 
below, I indicate where some cutting can be done. As you 
rework the draft I hope you will find other opportunities. 
As you know by now, I do not like to write "textbooks" or 
"articles" as Court opinions, nor cite every marginal 
primary and secondary authority. In this case 
particularly where rationales differed among the Justices 
we may have more than the usual difficulty in getting a 
Court. I therefore want to say no more than a lean and 
tightly reasoned opinion would include. 
2. 
I now make some observations on each of the 
Parts of the draft. 
Part I 
Apart from an occasional marginal suggestion on 
the draft, this looks fine. 
Part II 
Much of this seems unnecessary, as indicated in 
my marginal notes and editing. I would start with Cady, 
Roberts, and move directly to the present situation -
eliminating marginal material and repetition. 
It is not clear to me that Cady, Roberts simply 
restates the common law rule. At the beginning of Part 
II, I gather that the "majority" rule was to the contrary. 
But compare n. 7 on p. 8 and n. 9 on p. 10. I do not 
think we need to get into this. 
Part III (pp. 13-17) 
This looks good to me, subject to my editing and 
occasional inquiry. It may be that we could eliminate a 
few sentences that are unnecessary to the flow of the 
reasoning. I did not specifically identify any. 
3. 
Subpart III-A (pp. 18-23) 
Apart from minor editing and a couple of 






however, for you to draft 
discussion (bottom of p. 
a 
21 
through 23) of the market role of professionals, and the 
weighing of advantages and disadvantages. I agree with n. 
19 (p. 21), but suggest you cut back materially n. 20 and 
n. 22. For the most part what we are talking about is not 
seriously questioned. Perhaps there is some helpful 
language even in the SEC's brief. 
The difficulty is in drawing the line between 
the proper disclosing and use of information and that 
proscribed by the Securities Acts and rules. As you know, 
it is customary for management of listed companies to 
convey supplemental information (some people call in 
"chumming" the market) to analysts. This is done 
primarily in two ways: talks to, and questions and answer 
sessions with, large groups of analysts - in effect, open 
meetings. Similarly, information not available through 
required filings with the SEC often is given at 
stockholders meetings where most of the stock is 
4. 
represented by proxies, and news coverage may be scant and 
uninforming. The more difficult type of information 
gathering - difficult in terms of line drawing for our 
purposes - is where the analysts will visit corporate 
headquarters and confer with senior officers. The analyst 
is likely to be a specialist in the particular business. 
When he returns to his firm, often he will circulate "buy" 
or "sell" recommendations to clients and persons whom the 
firm would like to have as clients. These recommendations 
are backed up by a report on the interview. The line 
drawing problem is one that impacts directly on both the 
corporate officers and the analysts. Neither can be quite 
sure when the "line" is crossed. 
The foregoing is an important truth to be 
mentioned in our opinion. I do not disagree with what you 
have said, but would like for you to cut it back some. 
Rely primarily on what the SEC itself and others have 
said, but include the "line drawing" problem as one the 
Commission and courts should bear in mind. 
The importance of our opinion will lie primarily 
in preventing too zealous scrutiny of information obtained 
by professionals as above described. There will be few 
5. 
cases where the analyst uncovered fraud of market 
significance. 
Subpart III-B 
This brief section of the draft (pp. 24-27) is 
critical to our opinion. I have done some editing. All 
of us will have to look at every word with care. We have 
little or no authority for the rule we create, but this 
perhaps is why we took the case. I suppose you have used 
the best points made by Chazen. I thought his article was 
on target. 
Part IV 
I have no trouble with Part III, pp. 27-30. 
Part V 
Although well written, try reducing it 
substantially. We do not want to philosophize any more 
than is directly relevant to the case. 
* * * 
A couple of points not mentioned above: 
1. In n. 18, p. 19, you refer to the Commission 
having said that a tipee need not have "actual knowledge" 
of a breach of duty of the tipper. I would be inclined to 
6. 
leave this out. I do not wish to encourage the Commission 
to infer knowledge or claim constructive knowledge __ on 
suspicion. Elsewhere in the opinion, I think you deal 
with this adequately. 
2. Consider whether it would be helpful to have 
a definitional footnote near the beginning of the opinion. 
The draft now uses interchangeably 
"stockholder/shareholder", "corporation/company" and 
"SEC/Commission". Perhaps it would suffice if we used the 
word shareholder consistently, leaving use of the other 
terms as you have them. As a former editor-in-chief of a 
law review, what do you think? 
* * * 
Jim, do not feel any pressure to rush to a 
second draft. Unless the assignments (expected this 
afternoon) impose unexpectedly heavy burdens on all of us, 
I think you can concentrate on the quality of the opinion 





Memorandum to Jim and LFP: 
The purpose of this memo is to consider the 
structure of our opinion. 
There is no problem with Parts I and II. They 
are excellent. I am primarily interested in a close look 
at the structure of Part III. From p. 10 to p. 14, Part 
III sets forth very well the analytical background 
andprinciples that are to be applied, with emphasis on 
Chiarella's holding that the tippee's duty is merely 
"derivative", and therefore there must be a breach of duty 
by the tipper. I have suggested a revision of the 
concluding paragraph (p. 14) in my rider A for that page. 
Subpart III-A (p. 14-19) may need some 
restructuring. It commences, properly, with the SEC's 
position. I have a question, indicated in the margin on 
p. 15, as the quote from respondent's brief (?) seems to 
state our rule rather than the SEC's. Apart from this, 
pp. 14-16 are quite good in stating and rejecting the 
SEC's open-ended rule that mere possession knowingly of 
material nonpublic 
obligation. 
information creates a fiduciary 
2. 
Commencing on the last line of p. 16, the draft 
devotes the remainder of Subpart III-A to a demonstration 
of the undesirable consequences of the SEC's rule. This 
is emphasized also in notes 19-21. Incidentally, I would 
omit n. 22. 
It seems tome, subject to discussion with Jim 
that this is not the proper place in the opinion for 
addressing the consequences of the SEC's position. 
Perhaps it would be better to move this into the final 
substantive section of the opinion (i.e.Part IV). 
If this move were made, we would end Subpart 
III-A at the bottom of p. 16. Having rejected the SEC's 
rule, we would move directly to the substance of what is 
now Subpart III-B (p. 19-23). This is where we try to 
articulate a standard of liability. It is the most 
important part of the opinion. In a separate rider, I 
have tried a revision that focuses on scienter a 
familiar concept in lOb-5 law. (Am I missing something 
IV applies our reasoning to the facts of 
does it very well. For reasons I will 
now would omit reliance on Chazen. 
I. 
3. 
Part IV (p. 26) is not particularly helpful in 
its present form. It seems to me, subject to discussion, 
that we could move to this part the substance of what we 
now have on pp. 17 and 18 with respect to the consequences 
of the SEC's position on market efficiency. This would 
give us a stronger ending to the opinion. 





This will be a rough "shot" at revising some of 
the language in our critical Subpart III-B (p. 19). 
B 
As we have shown, a tippee's liability is 
derivative from a breach of duty by the insider tipper of 
which the tippee has notice. Thus, in order to make out a 
tipping case against an individual, it is first necessary 
to establish that the insider disclosed confidential 
information in violation of his fiduciary duty to 
shareholders. It is then necessary to show that the tipee 
had notice of such a violation. These can present 
difficult factual issues. At the outset, it must be 
determined whether the information was both confidential 
and material, questions that arise in every tipping case. 
When these are answered affirmatively, the question 
remains whether the disclosure itself constituted a 
violation of duty. It is clear under our Rule lOb-5 cases 
that liability is imposed only when one acts with scienter 
(cite cases). There would be no breach of duty where 
corporate executive inadvertently or even negligently 
disclosed the information relied upon. The critical 
2. 
question, therefore, is whether there was an intent or 
purpose to disclose material nonpublic information to one 
who could trade on the information to the detriment of 
shareholders. 
but this is 
courts. There 
Ascertaining intention may be difficult, 
a familiar question often confronted by 
are facts and circumstances that often 
justify inferences of wrongful purpose. For example, 
there may be a relationship exists the insiderand the 
recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or 
an intention to benefit the recipient. Also, such an 
inference may arise where the disclosure was made at the 
initiative of the insider rather than by the recipient 
tipee. 
Where a breach of fiduciary duty by the insider 
is established, liability may be imposed on the tipee only 
when he has notice of such a breach. See supra, at 
Again, this is a question of fact that must be resolved in 
light of all relevant circumstances. A securities 
analyst, making a study of a particular corporation that 
includes interviews with its officers, acquires 
information that may form the basis of a market letter to 
clients. This is a typical situation, and customarily 
involves participants who understand their 
' . 
3. 
responsibilities and adhere to them. But there are cases, 
of course, where the facts -- and inferences reasonable 
drawn from them -- demonstrate the requisite scienter on 
the part of both the tipper and the tipee. This is not 
such a case. 
(Jim: If we adopt the foregoing approach, you 
will have to write it out more carefully, and with 
appropriate documentation. I would avoid, however, 
unnecessary elaboration. This subpart III-B would be 
followed by your Part IV with limited changes. For 




To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Jim 
Re: Dirks v. United States, No. 82-276 
In my opinion, Mark has been very helpful in his editing and 
has done an excellent job. You will see some new thoughts and some 
old thoughts formerly discarded, but I think this represents our 
collective judgment on how to write this opinion. I do not comment 
on the editing in great detail, but include Mark's drafts for your 
use. 
I did want to respond specifically to two notes you wrote to 
me on the third draft. First, Prof. Loss wrote his book before 
Cady, Roberts, although his supplement came out in 1969. Second, 
please examine n. 25 with care. I hope that the new material there 
addresses your concerns. 
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Friday, May 20, 1983 Santa Fe International Lobbyist to Plead 
Guilty in Insider-Trading Options Cdse 
By RoBERT E. TAYLoR 
Staff Reporter of THEW ALL STREET JOURNAL 
WASHINGTON-Lobbyist John M. Nu· 
gent agreed to plead guilty to a charge of 
aiding illegal trading based on inside infor-
mation about the October 1981 takeover of 
Santa Fe International Corp. by Kuwait Pe-
troleum Corp. ' 
Mr. Nugent, who resigned May 5 as a 
vice president of Timmons & Co. a lobbying 
firm here, will enter his -plea in federal 
court today, according to his lawyer, War-
ren L. Miller. Mr. Nugent, 39 years old, has 
been cooperating with government investi-
gators in the case since January, and is "the 
key to breaking the case wide open," Mr. 
Miller said. In a news release, the U.S. at-
. torney's office here called the case "the 
most significant insider trading case ever,'-' 
and said more court actions are expected. 
Santa Fe International isn't related in 
any way to Santa Fe Industries Inc. 
The government, in papers filed with the 
charge against Mr. Nugent, indicates that at 
least nine Washington, D.C., stockbrokers 
and one of their clients made more than 
$900,000 by trading options on Santfi Fe 
stock. The government contends that their 
purchases resulted from Mr. Nugent's tip. 
And the papers say that the continuing crim-
inal grand jury investigation is focusing on 
whether some of the brokers gave false tes-
timony or attempted to obstruct the inquiry 
into the case by the Securities and Ex-
change CommiSsion and the grand jury it-
self. / 
In its court papers, the government 
claims Mr. Nugent learned of the planned 
takeover Sept. 28, 1981, the. day Santa Fe's 
lawyers here in the process of retaining 
Timmons to lobby Congress and the Reagan 
administration in Javor of ·the expected 
merger. 
According to the government, Mr. Nu-
gent told a friend, Thomas A. Peacock, a 
vice president for government and public af-
fairs of International Coal Refining Co., 
which is a subsidiary of Wheelabrator-Frye 
,In its court filing, the government said 
Mr. Tatusko told SEC investigators that he 
overheard some unidentified men talking 
about a planned takeover of Santa Fe in a 
Washington bar. In sworn statements to the 
SEC, other brokers said they either didn't 
know the source of the tip, or that It was 
only a vague rumor, the papers said. The 
government said some brokers supported , 
Mr. Tatusko's story, and one claimed he 
was at the bar when Mr. Tatusko allegedly 
overheard the tip. ' t ' 
The government also said Mr. Pe?-cock 
supported the bar-tip cover story by swear-
ing that he invested after Mr. Tatusko told 
him of the tip. But the SEC staff contends 
that Mr. Peacock couldn't have visited Mr . 
Tatusko's offices on the morning of Oct. 1 to 
get the tip, as he claimed. 
According to the charges, Messrs. Pea-
cock, Tatusko and nine other brokers bought 
options Oct. 1 for a total of $8,687. Trading in 
the stock was halted Oct. 2 for an announce-
ment of the takeover proposal. After trading 
resumed, the government said, the brokers 
sold their options, mostly on Oct. 6, for a to-
tal of $911,039. 
This was only a part of the alleged Santa· 
Fe insider trading. The SEC has charged 
other people with making i insider-trading 
profits of $8.5 million on investments of less 
than $540,000. I · 
Mr. Miller said his client Mr. Nugent "re-
alizes he made a serious mistake" when he 
"accidentally told a friend," Mr. Peacock, 
about the planned takeover. According to 
the government, Mr. Nugent concedes "he 
wanted to do his friend a favor by giving 
him a tip about a good stock prospect;" but 
Insists he had no intention of sharing in the 
profits. Mr. Miller claims Mr. Nugent even 
refused an offer from Mr. Peacock to buy 
some shares for Mr. Nugent, 
According to Mr. Miller, his client testi-
fied falsely before the SEC only after others 
had done so, "to protect his family, his job 
and a person he thought at the time . was a 
close friend." · 
' Inc. Mr. Peacock then told his broker, Ste' . !--------~'--------:: 
ven R. Tatusko, at the Washington firm o( 
Bellamah, Neuhauser & Barrett Inc., the 
government claims, and Mr. Tatusko passed 
the tip to eight other brokers at the -firm and 
one at a second brokerage house. · 
Michael R. Klein, Mr. Peacock's attor-
ney, said he couldn't comment on the allega-
tions. "That is the subject of discussions be-
tween us and the government," he said. 
Mr. Tatusko and Winthrop Securities 
couldn't be reached for comment. 
Frederick J. Bellamah, a senior partner 
in the firm, said he would question whether 
any of his brokers knew they were trading 
on inside informaton. "I'm convinced in my 
own mind that nobQdy in this firm knew this· 
was valid informaton," he said. "It was a 
tip or a rumor to them." Mr. Bellamah said 
none of the firm's brokers knew the infor-
mation came from Mr. Nugent. He said 
some of them may have known that Mr. 
Peacock was a source of information, but 
noted that Mr. Peacock wasn't connected to 
Santa Fe. 
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No. 82-276 Dirks v. SEC 
Dear Lewis, ~~ 
I am sorry that I have not gotten back to ~· 
on this case. I assure you that my delay was occasioned 
more by the chaos of May than by anything in your draft! 
Let me say that I think that you have done a fine job 
with your opinion, and with some changes that I do not think 
will affect your basic approach, I am prepared to join it 
even though I originally preferred another approach. My 
view was that irrespective of the limits of any proscription 
on insider and tippee trading, the information tipped by 
Seer ist and Dirks in this case could not have come within 
that proscription because it was information concerning a 
crime, rather than a legitimate corporate matter. Although 
the nature of the information might not matter to the 
affected shareholders, I had thought that when the social 
and economic good was weighed against possible shareholder 
harm, the balance tipped in favor of dissemination of 
evidence of a crime. I was very concerned not to send any 
signal that would discourage future "detective" work on the 
part of those interested in uncovering corporate fraud. 
As I understand your view, it focuses on the purpose of 1 
the insider in communicating to the tippee, and not on the 1 
character of the information that is communicated. Unless 
the insider acts from an "improper purpose" in communicating 
the information, the insider does not breach its fiduciary 
duty to the shareholders of the corporation. If the tippee 
does not have some independent fiduciary duty not to trade, 
then he is insulated from liability for further tipping or 
trading because he cannot be an after-the-fact participant 
in the insider's breach of duty. The key is the motivation 
of the insider, and from p. 15 of your draft, it appears 
that motivation is measured by the subjective good faith of 
the insider. 
I have two imary difficulties with the approach as it 
now stands. Firs , I am concerned that the opinion not be 
read to preclu our later holding that information about a 
crime cannot be inside information. I realize that your 
.. 
2. 
footnote 23 may be read as reserving this question, but I 
would feel more comfortable with an exelici t statement to 
this effect, appended to the end of footnote 23. Perhaps ~'j.u.k4. 
you could add something like: "We do not decide whether the} ./_j /_ 
information communicated was 'material,' or whether ~4~~z-~~~~ 
information concerning corporate crime is properly 
characterized as 'inside information.' " This will make 
clear that the Court does not hold that there is insider and 
tippee liability depending on purpose even if the 
information communicated concerns crime. 
My(ico~nd='xHff icul ty goes to the "e_urpose" test that 
you set ~~- !4-lG of the draft. As lt now reaas, the 
fact-finder is required to determine the subjective state of 
mind of the insider, and liability may be imposed only when 
the insider has an improper purpose, or the tippee has some 
independent duty not to trade. Although there may be rules 
of thumb, e.g., the one you suggest concerning relationship 
between the parties, that are used to help determine 
subjective intent, it nevertheless appears that the focus of 
the inquiry is subjective motivation. Your focus on j ~~-
subjective purpose is consistent with, and very much like, ct-
your approach in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 u.s. 185 ~r 
{1976), although that opinion is not cited in your draft. ~ 
The subjective purpose requirement is an inherently 
difficult determination to make. It requires that the 
tippee "predict" what is going on in the mind of his tipper. 
Although the SEC currently requires a tippee to make an 
assessment about whether information is material, that 
assessment requires only that the tippee determine whether 
"there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable 
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to 
vote." TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 
{1976). I would imagine that most tippees have a better ) j · 
"feel" for whether a shareholder would consider information ~ 
important than whether an insider subjectively possesses a 
prohibited purpose. In addition, the purpose test might 
prohibit the dissemination of the information in this case. 
If Secrist's motivation was proven to be a desire for 
vengence against Equity Funding, and if the SEC determined 
tnat this was a prohibited purpose, Secrist and Dirks would 
violate the securities laws. 
It seems that the "purpose" discussion rna be omitted ~ '?-1...c:l 
without altering your bas1c approach. T en the focus wou d 
be on whether Secrist breached a fiduciary duty. Rather 
than offering a general discussion of purpose, one could say 
3. 
that Secrist simply owed no duty not to relate information}~ t.4.J 
concerning fraud (even if the information were considered 
"inside information" under TSC). Since Secrist could not owe ~ 
a fiduciary duty, there was no duty for Dirks to inherit. 
to retain a broader a roach, it might be 
ene 1 , rather than purpose. That is, 
you suggest that if the insider benefits from his tipping, 
that may show improper p urpo se . As I read Santa Fe 
Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 u.s. 462 (1977), In re Cady, 
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), and In re Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933 (1968), 
the focus is more on whether the insider derives a direct or 
indi >ect. J:>enefit from his disclosure, a rlo that benefi t is 
pr i mar il:y o f' a pecuniary nature. An emphasis on benefit 
differs from your approach only insofar as it establishes a 
more objective indicia of liability. If, as a factual 
matter, the insider did not benefit from his disclosure, 
then I am not inclined to be concerned with a further 
inquiry into his motivation. I am not sure about what will 
be gained from an inquiry into intent, but from my past 
experience on the bench, I know that a great deal of time 
will be lost! 








82-276 Dirks v. SEC 
'' 
Dear Sandra: 
I have now had an opportunity to get back to I'i rk.s 
in light of your letter. AA you know, with your approval 
and min~, Gary and Ji.m Browninq have workec'f out some changP.s" 
that I hnvn reviewed this morning. 
~hey have ~one well. It seems to me that your 
sugqestions have been incorporatPd into the opinion clearly, 
and that they "fit" vPry well. 
Tn a more ~undamental sense, T am qrat~ful to you 
for suggesti0ns that ! think are quite constructive. 
'· 
I wiJJ need to keep the ot~er "joins", hut cannot 
there wil.l be. any obtection. 
Sincerely, 
.:rustic£> O'Connor: 
lfp/ss ,., 4' 
,, 
t-'f.-;.c"*' ,.;-:~'-Cl!Ju•.--·· · 
, . 
John: 
As vou have been good enough to ioin me in this 
case, · r write this note to say that the only changes in this '' 
second draft (other than stylistic) have resulteti from my 
conversations with Sandra. 
<)., Th·e reasoning of the opinion is not chanqed. Sa~-::­
dra ihought my r~ference to the "purpose" of the insider ~ 
(see pp. 15-17 of first draft) \'las unnecessarily subjective. · 
She prefers using the more objective term: "benefit" to the 
insider, direct or indirect (see po. 17, 18 seconn draft). 
As the Chief has not voted, Sandra's vote 
will ~ssure a Court. I al.so heliev~ the change~ are 
constructive. 
J.\, 
! 'l •. 
I am circulating the second draft, and will assume 
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JUSTICE BLACKMUN~enti{,~ ( ~~ .Jitw..;.- ~ ~) 
A'he Court today tak~ s still an~e m~ \ the pro-~·,c~ ~~
tections provided investors by §lOi b) of the . ~ec}l riti~Exchange 
''-13 (l/-/18~~ ~~k'") 
Act of 34. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 u .• 222, 246 
(1980) (dissenting opinion). The device employed in this case 
engrafts a special motivational requirement on the fiduciary duty 
doctrine. This innovation excuses a knowing and intentional 
violation of an insider's duty to shareholders if the insider 
does not ?Ct from a motive of personal gain. Even on the ex-
traordinary facts of this case, such an innovation is not justi-
fied. 
I 
As the Court recognizes, ante, at 11, n. 17, the facts here 
are unusual. After a meeting with Ronald Secrist, a former Equi-
ty Funding employee, on March 7, 1973, App. 226, petitioner Ray-
1see, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 
u.s. 723 (1975); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 
(1976); Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); 
Chiarella v. United States, 445 u.s. 222 (1980); Aaron v. SEC, 
446 u.s. 680 (1980). This trend frustrates the congressional 
intent that the securities laws be interpreted flexibly to pro-
tect investors, see Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 
u.s. 128, 151 (1972); SEC v. Cap1tal Ga1ns Research Bureau, Inc., 
375 u.s. 180, 186 (1963), and to regulate deceptive practices 
"detrimental to the interests of the investor," S. Rep. No. 792, 
73d Cong., 2d Sess., 18 (1934); see H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d 
Cong. , 2d Sess. , 10 ( 1934) • Moreover, the Court continues to 
refuse to accord to SEC administrative decisions the deference it 
normally gives to an agency's interpretation of its own statute. 
See, e.g., Blum v. Bacon, 457 u.s. 132 (1982) • 
. ' 
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mond Dirks found himself in possession of material nonpublic 
information of massive fraud within the company.2 In the Court's 
words, "[h]e uncovered ••• startling information that required no 
analysis or exercise of judgment as to its market relevance." 
Ante, at 11, n. 17. In disclosing that information to Dirks, 
Secrist intended that Dirks would disseminate the information to 
his clients, those clients would unload their Equity Funding 
securities on the market, and the price would fall precipitously, 
thereby triggering a reaction from the authorities. App. 16, 25, 
27. 
Dirks complied with his informant's wishes. Instead of 
reporting that information to the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC or Commission) or to other regulatory agencies, Dirks 
began to disseminate the information to his clients and undertook 
his own investigation.3 One of his first steps was to direct his 
2unknown to Dirks, Secrist also told his story to New York 
insurance regulators the same day. App. 23. They immediately 
assured themselves that Equity Funding's New York subsidiary had 
sufficient assets to cover its outstanding policies and then 
passed on the information to California regulators who in turn 
informed Illinois regulators. Illinois investigators, later 
joined by California officials, conducted a surprise audit of 
Equity Funding's Illinois subsidiary, id., at 87-88, to find $22 
million of the subsidiary's assets missing. On March 30, these 
authorities seized control of the Illinois subsidiary. Id., at 
271. 
3In the same administrative proceeding at issue here, the 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Dirks' clients--five 
institutional investment advisors--violated §17(a) of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §77q(a), §lO(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 u.s.c. §78j(b), and Rule lOb-5, 17 CFR 
§240.10b-5, by trading on Dirks' tips. App. 297. All the cli-
ents were censured, except Dreyfus Corporation. The ALJ found 
that Dreyfus had made significant efforts to disclose the infer-
Footnote continued on next page. 
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associates at Delafield Childs to draw up a list of Delafield 
clients holding Equity Funding securities. On March 12, eight 
days before Dirks flew to Los Angeles to investigate Seer ist' s 
story, he reported the full allegations to Boston Company Insti-
tutional Investors, Inc., which on March 15 and 16 sold approxi-
mately $1.2 million of Equity securities. 4 See id., at 199. As 
he gathered more information, he selectively disclosed it to his 
clients. To those holding Equity Funding securities he gave the 
"hard" story--all the allegations; others received the "soft" 
story--a recitation of vague factors that might reflect adversely 
on Equity Funding's management. See id., at 211, n. 24. 
Dirks' attempts to disseminate the information to nonclients 
were feeble, at best. On March 12, he left a message for Herbert 
Lawson, the San Francisco bureau chief of The Wall Street Jour-
nal. Not until March 19 and 20 did he call Lawson again, and 
outline the situation. William Blundell, a Journal investigative 
reporter based in Los Angeles, got in touch with Dirks about his 
mation to Goldman, Sachs, the purchaser of its securities. App. 
299, 301. None of Dirks' clients appealed these determinations. 
App. to Pet. for Cert. B-2, n. 1. 
4The Court's im£ lj cit suggest i on that Dirks' did not gain 
by this selective d l:Ssemination of advice, ante, at 2, n. 2, is 
inaccurate. The ALJ found that because of Dirks' information, 
Boston Company Institutional Investors, Inc., directed business 
to Delafield Childs that generated approximately $25,000 in com-
missions. App. 199, 204-205. While it is true that the exact 
economic benefit gained by Delafield Childs due to Dirks' activi-
ties is unknowable because of the structure of compensation in 
the securities market, there can be no doubt that Delafield and 
Dirks gained both monetary rewards and enhanced reputations for 
"looking after" their clients. 
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March 20 telephone call. On March 21, Dirks met with Blundell in 
Los Angeles. Blundell began his own investigation, relying in 
part on Dirks' contacts, and on March 23 telephoned Stanley Spor-
kin, the SEC's Deputy Director of Enforcement. On March 26, the 
next business day, Sporkin and his staff interviewed Blundell and 
asked to see Dirks the following morning. Trading was halted by 
the New York Stock Exchange at about the same time Dirks was 
talking to Los Angeles SEC personnel. The next day, March 28, 
the SEC suspended trading in Equity Funding securities. By that 
time, Dirks' clients had unloaded close to $15 million of Equity 
Funding stock and the price had plummeted from $26 to $15. The 
effect of Dirks' selective dissemination of Secrist's information 
was that Dirks' clients were able to shift the losses that were 
inevitable due to the Equity Funding fraud from themselves to 
uninformed market participants. 
II 
A 
No one questions that Secrist himself could not trade on his 
inside information to the disadvantage of uninformed shareholders 
and purchasers of Equity Funding securities. See Brief for Unit-
ed States as Amicus Curiae 19, n. 12. Unlike the printer in 
Chiarella, Secrist stood in a fiduciary relationship with these 
shareholders. As the Court states, ante, at 5, corporate insid-
ers have an affirmative duty of disclosure when trading with 
shareholders of the corporation. See Chiarella, 445 U.S., at 
227. This duty extends as well to purchasers of the 
corporation's securities. Id., at 227, n. 8, citing Gratz v. 
- 5 -
Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (CA2), cert. denied, 341 u.s. 920 
(1951). 
The Court also acknowledges that Seer ist could not do by 
proxy what he was prohibited from doing personally. Ante, at 12; 
Mosser v. Darrow, 341 u.s. 267, 272 (1951). But this is precise-
ly what Secrist did. Secrist used Dirks to disseminate informa-
tion to Dirks' clients, who in turn dumped stock on unknowing 
purchasers. Secrist thus intended Dirks to injure the purchasers 
of Equity Funding securities to whom Secrist had a duty to dis-
close. Accepting the Court's view of tippee liability, 5 it ap-
pears that Dirk's knowledge of this breach makes him liable as a 
participant in the breach after the fact. Ante, at 12, 19; 
Chiarella, 445 u.s., at 230, n. 12. 
B 
The Court holds, however, that Dirks is not liable because 
Secrist did not violate his duty; according to the Court, this is 
so because Secrist did not have the improper purpose of personal 
gain. Ante, at 15-16, 18-19. In so doing, the Court imposes a 
new, subjective limitation on the scope of the duty owed by in-
siders to shareholders. The novelty of this limitation is re-
flected in the Court's lack of support for it. 6 
5 I interpret the Court's op1n1on to impose liability on 
tippees like Dirks when the tippee knows or has reason to know 
that the information is material and nonpublic and was obtained 
through a breach of duty by selective revelation or otherwise. 
See In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 641 (1971). 
6The Court cites only Professor Brudney to support its 
rule. Ante, at 16, quoting from his article, Insiders, Outsid-
Footnote continued on next page. 
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The insider's duty is owed directly to the corporation's 
shareholders.? See Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary 
Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 5 
(1982); 3A W. Fletcher, Private Corporations §1168.2, pp. 288-289 
(1975). As Chiarella recognized, it is based on the relationship 
of trust and confidence between the insider and the shareholder. 
445 u.s., at 228. That relationship assures the shareholder that 
the insider may not take actions that will harm him unfairly. 8 
ers, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities 
Laws, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 322, 348 (1979). Ironically, Professor 
Brudney's quoted statement appears in the context of his asser-
tion that the duty of insiders to disclose prior to trading with 
shareholders is in large part a mechanism to correct the informa-
tion available to noninsiders. Professor Brudney simply recog-
nizes that the most common motive for breaching this duty is 
personal gain; he does not state, however, that the duty prevents 
only personal aggrandizement. Id. , at 3 45-348. Surely, the 
Court does not now adopt Professor Brudney's access-to-
information theory, a close cousin to the equality-of-information 
theory it accuses the SEC of harboring. See ante, at 8-10. 
7The Court correctly distinguishes this duty from the duty 
of an insider to the corporation not to mismanage corporate af-
fairs or to misappropriate corporate assets. Ante, at 5, n. 9. 
That duty also can be breached when the insider trades in corpo-
rate securities on the basis of inside information. Although a 
shareholder suing in the name of the corporation can recover for 
the corporation damages for any injury the insider causes by the 
·breach of this distinct duty, Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 
498, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912 (1969); see Thomas v. Roblins Indus-
tries, Inc., 520 F.2d 1393, 1397 (CA3 1975), insider trading 
generally does not injure the corporation itself. See Lange-
voort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-
Chiarella Restatement, 70 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 2, n. 5, 28, n. 111 
(1982). 
8As it did in Chiarella, 445 u.s., at 226-229, the Court 
adopts the Cady, Roberts formulation of the duty. Ante, at 5-6. 
"Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal 
elements; first, the existence of a relationship giving 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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The affirmative duty of disclosure protects against this injury. 
See Pepper v. Litton, 308 u.s. 295, 307, n. 15 (1939); Strong v. 
Rap ide, 213 U.S. 419, 4 31-434 ( 1909) ; see also Chiarella, 4 45 
u.s., at 228, n. 10; cf. Pepper, 308 u.s., at 307 (fiduciary 
obligation to corporation exists for corporation's protection) • ~ 
/ ·~c 
The fact that the insider himself does not benefit ~ the _" _______ ---...____.. _______ "-?_ 
breach does not eradicate the shareholder's injury. 9 Cf. Re-
access, directly or indirectly, to information intended 
to be available only for a corporate purpose and not 
for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the 
inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advan-
tage of such information knowing it is unavailable to 
those with whom he is dealing." In re Cady, Roberts & 
Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961) (footnote omitted). 
The first element--on which Chiarella's holding rests--
establishes the type of relationship that must exist between the 
parties before a duty to disclose is present. The second--not 
addressed by Chiarella--identifies the harm that the duty pro-
tects against: the inherent unfairness to the shareholder caused 
when an insider trades with him on the basis of undisclosed in-
side information. 
9without doubt, breaches of the insider's duty occur most 
often when an insider seeks personal aggrandizement at the ex-
pense of shareholders. Because of this, descriptions of the duty 
to disclose are often coupled with statements that the duty pre-
vents unjust enrichment. See, e.g., In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 
40 S.E.C. 907, 912, n. 15 (1961); Langevoort, 70 Calif. L. Rev., 
at 19. Private gain is certainly a strong motivation for breach-
ing the duty. 
It is, however, not an element of the breach of this duty. 
The reference to personal gain in Cady, Roberts, for example, is 
appended to the first element underlying the duty which requires 
that an insider have a special relationship to corporate informa-
tion that he cannot appropriate for his own benefit. See n. 8, 
supra. It does not limit the second element which addresses the 
injury to the shareholder and is at issue here. See ibid. In 
fact, Cady, Roberts, describes the duty more precisely in a later 
footnote: "In the circumstances, [the insider's] relationship to 
his customers was such that he would have a duty not to take a 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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statement (Second) of Trusts §205, Comments c and d (1959) 
(trustee liable for acts causing diminution of value of trust); 3 
A. Scott on Trusts §205, p. 1665 (1967) (trustee liable for any 
losses to trust caused by his breach) • It makes no difference to 
the shareholder whether the corporate insider gained or intended 
to gain personally from the transaction; the shareholder still 
has lost because of the insider's misuse of nonpublic informa-
tion. The duty is addressed not to the insider's motives,lO but 
to his actions and their consequences on the shareholder. Per-
sonal gain is not an element of the breach of this duty.ll 
position adverse to them, not to take secret profits at their 
expense, not to misrepresent facts to them, and in general to 
place their interests ahead of his own." 40 S.E.C., at 916, n. 
31. This statement makes clear that enrichment of the insider 
himself is simply one of the results the duty attempts to pre-
vent. 
lOof course, an insider is not liable in a Rule lOb-S ad-
ministrative action unless he has the r~quisite scienter. Aaron 
v. SEC, 446 u.s. 680, 691 (1980). He must know or intend that 
h~uct violate his duty. Secrist oEv1ously knew and intend-
ed that DirKs woula cause trading on the inside information and 
that Equity Funding shareholders would be harmed. The scienter 3 7 (' 
requirement addresses the intent necessary to support liability; 
it does not address the motives behind the intent. -
11The Court seems concerned that this case bears on insid-
ers' contacts with analysts for valid corporate reasons. Ante, 
at 10-11. It also fears that insiders may not be able to deter-
mine whether the information transmitted is material or nonpub-
lic. Id., at 14-15. When the disclosure is to an investment } 
banker -or some other adviser, however, there is normally no · 
breach because the insider does not have scienter: he does not 
intend that the inside information be used for trading urposes 
to t e s d anta e o s are o ers. ore ver, e 1ns1 r in \ 
good faith does not believe that the information is material or Cf 
nonpublic, he also lacks the necessary scienter. Ernst & Ernst 
v. Hochfelder, 425 u.s. 185, 197 (1976). In fact, the scienter 
requirement functions in part to protect good faith errors of 
this type. Id., at 211, n. 31. 
--- Footnote continued on next page. 
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This conclusion is borne out by the Court's decision in 
Mosser v. Darrow, 341 u.s. 267 (1951). There, the Court faced an 
analogous situation: a reorganization trustee engaged - two 
employee-promoters of subsidiaries of the companies being reorga-----------------
nized to provide services that the trustee considered to be es-- ________...,.. 
sential to the successful operation of the trust. In order to 
secure their services, the trustee expressly agreed with the 
' - --
employees that they could continue to trade in the securities of 
"--_____..., .....___ ---
the subsidiaries. The employees then turned their inside posi-
L-
tion into substantial profits at the expense both of the trust 
and of otner holders of the companies' securities. 
The Court acknowledged that the trustee neither intended to 
nor did in actual fact benefit from this arrangement; his motives 
were completely selfless and devoted to the companies. 341 U.S., ----at 275. The Court, nevertheless, found the trustee liable to the 
estate for the activities of the employees he authorized. 12 The 
Should the adviser receiving the information use it to 
trade, it may breach a separate contractual or other duty to the 
corporation not to misuse the information. Absent such an ar-
rangement, however, the adviser is not barred by Rule lOb-S from 
trading on that information if it believes that the insider has 
not breached any duty to his shareholders. See Walton v. Morgan 
Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796, 798-799 (CA2 1980). 
The situation here, of course, is radically different. 
Ante, 11, n. 17 (Dirks received information reqyiring ~nQ ~nalysis 
"as to its market relevance"). Seer ist divulged the fn"formation 
for the precise purpose of causing Dirks' clients to trade on it. 
I fail to understand how imposing liability on Dirks will affect 
legitimate insider-analyst contacts. 
12The duty involved in Mosser was the duty to the corpora-
tion in trust not to misappropriate its assets. This duty, of 
course, differs from the duty to shareholders involved in this 
case. See n. 7, supra. Trustees are also subject to a higher 
Footnote contrnued on next page. ~ 
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Court described the trustee's defalcation as "a willful and de-
liberate setting up of an interest in employees adverse to that 
of the trust." Id., at 272. The breach did not depend on the 
trustee's personal gain, and his motives in violating his duty 
were irrelevant; like Secrist, the trustee intended that others 
would abuse the inside information for their personal gain. Cf. 
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 506-509, 170 N.W. 668, 
684-685 (1919) (Henry Ford's philanthropic motives did not permit 
him to set Ford Motor Company dividend policies to benefit public 
at expense of shareholders). 
As Mosser demonstrates, the breach consists in taking action 
disadvantageous to the person to whom one owes a duty. In this 
L( \\ 
case, Secrist owed a duty to purchasers of Equity Funding shares. 
------------------~-------------
The Court's addition of the bad purpose element to a breach of 
fiduciary duty claim is flatly inconsistent with the principle of 
Mosser. I do not join this limitation of the scope of an insid-
e~fiduciary duty to shareholders.l3 
staodaid of care than scienter. 3 A. Scott on Trusts §201, p. 
1G50 (1967). In addition~ strict trustees are bound not to trade 
in securities at all. See Langevoort, 70 Calif. L. Rev., at 2, 
f 
n. 5. The.se differences, however, are irrelevant to the pr inci-
ple of Mosser that the motive of personal gain is not essential 
to a trustee's liability. In Mosser, as here, personal gain 
accrued to the tippees. See 341 u.s., at 273. 
13Although I disagree in principle with the Court's re-
quirement of an improper motive, I also note that the requirement 
adds to the administrative and judicial burden in Rule lOb-5 
cases. Assuming the validity of the requirement, the SEC's 
approach--a violation occurs when the insider knows that the 
tippee will trade with the information, Brief for SEC 31--can be 
seen as a presumption that the insider gains from the tipping. 
The Court now requires a case-by-case determination, thus prohib-
Footnote continued on next page. 
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III 
The improper purpose requirement not only has no basis in 
law, but it rests implicitly on a policy that I cannot accept. 
'"'\.... ? 
The Court justifies Secrist's and Dirks' action because the gen-
eral benefit derived from the violation of Secrist's duty to 
shareholders outweighed the harm caused to those shareholders, 
see Heller, Chiarella, SEC Rule 14e-3 and Dirks: "Fairness" ver-
sus Economic Theory, 37 Bus. Lawyer 517, 550 (1982); Easterbrook, 
Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the 
Production of Information, 1981 s. Ct. Rev. 309, 338--in other 
words, because the end justified the means. Under this view, the 
benefit conferred on society by Secrist's and Dirks' activities 
may be paid for with the losses caused to shareholders trading 
with Dirks' clients.l4 
iting such a presumption. 
The Court acknowledges the burdens and difficulties of this 
approach, but asserts that a principle is needed to guide market 
participants. Ante, at 16. I fail to see how the Court's rule 
has any practical advantage over the SEC's presumption. The 
Court's approach is particularly difficult to administer when the 
insider is not directly enriched monetarily by the trading he 
induces. For example, the Court does not explain why the benefit 
Secrist obtained--the good feeling of exposing a fraud and his 
enhanced reputation--is any different from the benefit to an 
insider who gives the information as a gift to a friend or rela-
tive. Under the Court's somewhat cynical view, gifts involve 
personal gain. See ibid. Secrist surely gave Dirks a gift of 
the commissions Dirks made on the deal in order to induce him to 
disseminate the information. The distinction between pure altru-
ism and self-interest has puzzled philosophers for centuries; 
there is no reason to believe that courts and administrative law 
judges will have an easier time with it. 
l4This position seems 
insider trading should be 
information to the market. 
Footnote 
little different from the theory that 
permitted because it brings relevant 
See H. Manne, Insider Trading and the 
continued on next page. 
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Although Secrist's general motive to expose the Equity Fund-
ing fr~ud w::_ lau~~e, the means he chose were not. Moreover, 
even assuming that Dirks played a substantial role in exposing 
the fraud, 15 he and his clients should not profit from the infor-
mation they obtained from Secrist. Misprision of a felony long 
has been against public policy. Branz burg v. Hayes, 408 U.s. 
665, 696-697 (1972); see 18 u.s.c. §4. A person cannot condition 
his transmission of information of a crime on a financial award. 
As a citizen, Dirks had at least an ethical obligation to report 
the information to the proper authorities. See ante, at 13, n. 
20. The Court's holding is deficient in policy terms not because 
it fails to create a legal norm out of that ethical norm, see 
ibid., but because it actually rewards Dirks for his aiding and 
abetting. 
Dirks and Secrist were under a duty to disclose the informa-
' __...., -
tion or to refrain from trading on it. 16 I agree that disclosure 
Stock Market 59-76, 111-146 (1966); Manne, Insider Trading and 
the Law Professors, 23 Vand. L. Rev. 547, 565-576 (1970). That 
position, which sits at the opposite end of the theoretical spec-
trum from the much maligned equality-of-information theory, has 
never been adopted by Congress or ratified by the Court. See 
Langevoort, 70 Calif. L. Rev., at 1 and n. 1. The theory rejects 
the existence of any enforceable principle of fairness between 
market participants. 
15The Court uncritically accepts Dirks' own view of his 
role in uncovering the Equity Funding fraud. See ante, at 11, n. 
17. It ignores the fact that Secrist gave the same information 
at the same time to state insurance regulators, who proceeded to 
expose massive fraud in a major Equity Funding subsidiary. The 
fraud surfaced before Dirks ever spoke to the SEC. 
16secrist did pass on his information to regulatory au-
thorities. His good but misguided motive may be the reason the 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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in this case would have been difficult. Ante, at 13, n. 20. I 
also recognize that the SEC seemingly has been less than profi-
cient in its view of the nature of disclosure necessary to satis-
fy the disclose-or-refrain duty. The Commission tells persons 
with inside information that they cannot trade on that informa-
tion unless they disclose; it refuses, however, to tell them how 
to disclose. 17 See In re Faberge, Inc., 45 S.E.C. 249, 256 
{1973) {disclosure requires public release through public media 
designed to reach investing public generally) . This seems to be 
a less than sensible policy, which it is incumbent on the Commis-
sion to correct. The Court, however, has no authority to remedy 
the problem by opening a hole in the congressionally mandated 
prohibition on insider trading, thus rewarding insider trading. 
IV 
In my view, Secrist violated his duty to Equity Funding 
SEC did not join him in the administrative proceedings against 
Dirks and his clients. The fact that the SEC, in an exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion, did not charge Secrist under Rule lOb-S 
says nothing about the applicable law. Cf. ante, at 18, n. 25 
{suggesting otherwise). Nor does the fact that the SEC took an 
unsupportable legal position in proceedings below indicate that 
neither Secrist nor Dirks is liable under any theory. Cf. ibid. 
{same). 
17At oral argument, the SEC's view was that Dirks' obliga-
tion to disclose would not be satisfied by reporting the informa-
tion to the SEC. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27, quoted ante, at 13, n. 20. 
This position is in apparent conflict with the statement in its 
brief that speaks favorably of a safe harbor rule under which an 
investor satisfies his obligation to disclose by reporting the 
information to the Commission and then waiting a set period be-
fore trading. Brief for SEC 43-44. The SEC, however, has nei-
ther proposed nor adopted a rule to this effect, and thus persons 
such as Dirks have no real option other than to refrain from 
trading. 
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shareholders by transmitting material nonpublic information to 
Dirks with the intention that Dirks would cause his clients to 
trade on that information. Dirks, therefore, was under a duty to 
make the information publicly available or to refrain from ac-
tions that he knew would lead to trading. Because Dirks caused 
his clients to trade, he violated §10 {b) and Rule lOb-5. Any 
other result is a disservice to this country's attempt to provide 
fair and efficient capital markets. I dissent. 
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JUSTICE BLACKMUN, dissenting. 
The Court today takes still another step to limit the protec-
tions provided investors by § 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. 1 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 
U. S. 222, 246 (1980) (dissenting opinion). The device em-
ployed in this case engrafts a special motivational require-
ment on the fiduciary duty doctrine. This innovation ex-
cuses a knowing and intentional violation of an insider's duty 
to shareholders if the insider does not act from a motive of 
personal gain. Even on the extraordinary facts of this case, 
such an innovation is not justified. 
1 See, e. g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723 
(1975); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185 (1976); Piper v. Chris-
Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U. S. 1 (1977); Chiarella v. United States, 445 
U. S. 222 (1980); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U. S. 680 (1980). This trend frus-
trates the congressional intent that the securities laws be interpreted flexi-
bly to protect investors, see Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 
U. S. 128, 151 (1972); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 
U. S. 180, 186 (1963), and to regulate deceptive practices "detrimental to 
the interests of the investor," S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 18 
(1934); see H. R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 10 (1934). More-
over, the Court continues to refuse to accord to SEC administrative deci-
sions the deference it normally gives to an agency's interpretation of its 
own statute. See, e. g., Blum v. Bacon, 457 U. S. 132 (1982). 
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I 
As the Court recognizes, ante, at 11, n. 17, the facts here 
are unusual. After a meeting with Ronald Secrist, a former 
Equity Funding employee, on March 7, 1973, App. 226, peti-
tioner Raymond Dirks found himself in possession of material 
nonpublic information of massive fraud within the company. 2 
In the Court's words, "[h]e uncovered ... startling informa-
tion that required .no analysis or exercise of judgment as to 
its market relevance." Ante, at 11, n. 17. In disclosing that 
information to Dirks, Secrist intended that Dirks would dis-
seminate the information to his clients, those clients would 
unload their Equity Funding securities on the market, and 
the price would fall precipitously, thereby triggering a reac-
tion from the authorities. App. 16, 25, 27. 
Dirks complied with his informant's wishes. Instead of re-
porting that information to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC or Commission) or to other regulatory 
agencies, Dirks began to disseminate the information to his 
clients and undertook his own investigation. 3 One of his 
2 Unknown to Dirks, Secrist also told his story to New York insurance 
regulators the same day. App. 23. They immediately assured them-
selves that Equity Funding's New York subsidiary had sufficient assets to 
cover its outstanding policies and then passed on the information to Califor-
nia regulators who in turn informed Illinois regulators. Illinois investiga-
tors, later joined by California officials, conducted a surprise audit of Eq-
uity Funding's Illinois subsidiary, id., at 87-88, to find $22 million of the 
subsidiary's assets missing. On March 30, these authorities seized control 
of the Illinois subsidiary. !d., at 271. 
3 In the same administrative proceeding at issue here, the Adminis-
trative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Dirks' clients-five institutional in-
vestment advisors-violated § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 
U. S. C. § 77q(a), § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U. S. C. §78j(b), and Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR §240.10b-5, by trading on 
Dirks' tips. App. 297. All the clients were censured, except Dreyfus 
Corporation. The ALJ found that Dreyfus had made significant efforts to 
disclose the information to Goldman, Sachs, the purchaser of its securities. 
App. 299, 301. None of Dirks' clients appealed these determinations. 
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first steps was to direct his associates at Delafield Childs to 
draw up a list of Delafield clients holding Equity Funding se-
curities. On March 12, eight days before Dirks flew to Los 
Angeles to investigate Secrist's story, he reported the full 
allegations to Boston Company Institutional Investors, Inc., 
which on March 15 and 16 sold approximately $1.2 million of 
Equity securities. 4 See id., at 199. As he gathered more 
information, he selectively disclosed it to his clients. To 
those holding Equity Funding securities he gave the "hard" 
story-all the allegations; others received the "soft" story-a 
recitation of vague factors that might reflect adversely on 
Equity Funding's management. See id., at 211, n. 24. 
Dirks' attempts to disseminate the information to 
nonclients were feeble, at best. On March 12, he left a mes-
sage for Herbert Lawson, the San Francisco bureau chief of 
The Wall Street Journal. Not until March 19 and 20 did he 
call Lawson again, and outline the situation. William 
Blundell, a Journal investigative reporter based in Los An-
geles, got in touch with Dirks about his March 20 telephone 
call. On March 21, Dirks met with Blundell in Los Angeles. 
Blundell began his own investigation, relying in part on 
Dirks' contacts, and on March 23 telephoned Stanley Sporkin, 
the SEC's Deputy Director of Enforcement. On March 26, 
the next business day, Sporkin and his staff interviewed 
Blundell and asked to see Dirks the following morning. 
App. to Pet. for Cert. B-2, n. 1. 
'The Court's implicit suggestion that Dirks' did not gain by this selec-
tive dissemination of advice, ante, at 2, n. 2, is inaccurate. The ALJ found 
that because of Dirks' information, Boston Company Institutional Inves-
tors, Inc., directed business to Delafield Childs that generated approxi-
mately $25,000 in commissions. App. 199, 204-205. While it is true that 
the exact economic benefit gained by Delafield Childs due to Dirks' activi-
ties is unknowable because of the structure of compensation in the securi-
ties market, there can be no doubt that Delafield and Dirks gained both 
monetary rewards and enhanced reputations for "looking after" their 
clients. 
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Trading was halted by the New York Stock Exchange at 
about the same time Dirks was talking to Los Angeles SEC 
personnel. The next day, March 28, the SEC suspended 
trading in Equity Funding securities. By that time, Dirks' 
clients had unloaded close to $15 million of Equity Funding 
stock and the price had plummeted from $26 to $15. The ef-
fect of Dirks' selective dissemination of Secrist's information 
was that Dirks' clients were able to shift the losses that were 
inevitable due to the Equity Funding fraud from themselves 
to uninformed market participants. 
II 
A 
No one questions that Secrist himself could not trade· on his 
inside information to the disadvantage of uninformed share-
holders and purchasers of Equity Funding securities. See 
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19, n. 12. Unlike 
the printer in Chiarella, Secrist stood in a fiduciary relation-
ship with these shareholders. As the Court states, ante, at 
5, corporate insiders have an affirmative duty of disclosure 
when trading with shareholders of the corporation. See 
Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 227. This duty extends as well to 
purchasers of the corporation's securities. I d., at 227, n. 8, 
citing Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F. 2d 46, 49 (CA2), cert. de-
nied, 341 U. S. 920 (1951). 
The Court also acknowledges that Secrist could not do by 
proxy what he was prohibited from doing personally. Ante, 
at 12; Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U. S. 267, 272 (1951). But this 
is precisely what Secrist did. Secrist used Dirks to dissemi-
nate information to Dirks' clients, who in turn dumped stock 
on unknowing purchasers. Secrist thus intended Dirks to in-
jure the purchasers of Equity Funding securities to whom 
Secrist had a duty to disclose. Accepting the Court's view of 
tippee liability,5 it appears that Dirk's knowledge of this 
5 I interpret the Court's opinion to impose liability on tippees like Dirks 
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breach makes him liable as a participant in the breach after 
the fact. Ante, at 12, 19; Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 230, n. 12. 
B 
The Court holds, however, that Dirks is not liable because 
Secrist did not violate his duty; according to the Court, this is 
so because Secrist did not have the improper purpose of per-
sonal gain. Ante, at 15-16, 1~19. In so doing, the Court 
imposes a new, subjective limitation on the scope of the duty 
owed by insiders to shareholders. The novelty of this limita-
tion is reflected in the Court's lack of support for it. 6 
The insider's duty is owed directly to the corporation's 
shareholders. 7 See Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fi-
when the tippee knows or has reason to know that the infonnation is mate-
rial and nonpublic and was obtained through a breach of duty by selective 
revelation or otherwise. See In re Investors Management Co., 44 S. E. C. 
633, 641 (1971). 
"The Court cites only Professor Brudney to support its rule. Ante, at 
16, quoting from his article, Insiders, Outsiders, and Infonnational Advan-
tages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 322, 348 
(1979). Ironically, Professor Brudney's quoted statement appears in the 
context of his assertion that the duty of insiders to disclose prior to trading 
with shareholders is in large part a mechanism to correct the infonnation 
available to noninsiders. Professor Brudney simply recognizes that the 
most common motive for breaching this duty is personal gain; he does not 
state, however, that the duty prevents only personal aggrandizement. 
Id., at 345-348. Surely, the Court does not now adopt Professor 
Brudney's access-to-infonnation theory, a close cousin to the equality-of-
infonnation theory it accuses the SEC of harboring. See ante, at 8-10. 
7 The Court correctly distinguishes this duty from the duty of an insider 
to the corporation not to mismanage corporate affairs or to misappropriate 
corporate assets. Ante, at 5, n. 9. That duty also can be breached when 
the insider trades in corporate securities on the basis of inside infonnation. 
Although a shareholder suing in the name of the corporation can recover 
for the corporation damages for any injury the insider causes by the breach 
of this distinct duty, Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N. Y.2d 494, 498, 248 
N. E. 2d 910, 912 (1969); see Thomas v. Roblins Industries, Inc., 520 F. 2d 
1393, 1397 (CA3 1975), insider trading generally does not injure the cor-
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duciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 Calif. 
L. Rev. 1, 5 (1982); 3A W. Fletcher, Private Corporations 
§ 1168.2, pp. 288-289 (1975). As Chiarella recognized, it is 
based on the relationship of trust and ~onfidence between the 
insider and the shareholder. 445 U. S., at 228. That rela-
tionship assures the shareholder that the insider may not 
take actions that will harm him unfairly. 8 The affirmative 
duty of disclosure protects against this injury. See Pepper 
v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, 307, n. 15 (1939); Strong v. Rapide, 
213 U. S. 419, 431-434 (1909); see also Chiarella, 445 U. S., 
at 228, n. 10; cf. Pepper, 308 U. S., at 307 (fiduciary obliga-
tion to corporation exists for corporation's protection). 
c 
The fact that the insider himself does not benefit from the 
breach does not eradicate the shareholder's injury. 9 Cf. Re-
poration itself. See Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Prin-
ciple: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 2, n. 5, 28, n. 111 
(1982). 
8 As it did in Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 226-229, the Court adopts the 
Cady, Roberts formulation of the duty. Ante, at 5-6. 
"Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal elements; first, the ex-
istence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information 
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the per-
sonal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness involved 
where a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavail-
able to those with whom he is dealing." In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 
S. E. C. 907, 912 (1961) (footnote omitted). 
The first element-on which Chiarella's holding rests-establishes the 
type of relationship that must exist between the parties before a duty to 
disclose is present. The second-not addressed by Chiarellar-identifies 
the harm that the duty protects against: the inherent unfairness to the 
shareholder caused when an insider trades with him on the basis of undis-
closed inside information. 
9 Without doubt, breaches of the insider's duty occur most often when 
an insider seeks personal aggrandizement at the expense of shareholders. 
Because of this, descriptions of the duty to disclose are often coupled with 
statements that the duty prevents unjust enrichment. See, e. g., In re 
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statement (Second) of Trusts § 205, Comments c and d (1959) 
(trustee liable for acts causing diminution of value of trust); 3 
A. Scott on Trusts § 205, p. 1665 (1967) (trustee liable for any 
losses to trust caused by his breach). It makes no difference 
to the shareholder whether the corporate insider gained or 
intended to gain personally from the transaction; the share-
holder still has lost because of the insider's misuse of nonpub-
lic information. The duty is addressed not to the insider's 
motives, 10 but to his actions and their consequences on the 
shareholder. Personal gain is not an element of the breach 
of this duty. 11 
Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S. E . C. 907, 912, n. 15 (1961); Langevoort, 70 
Calif. L. Rev., at 19. Private gain is certainly a strong motivation for 
breaching the duty. 
It is, however, not an element of the breach of this duty. The reference 
to personal gain in Cady, Roberts, for example, is appended to the first ele-
ment underlying the duty which requires that an insider have a special 
relationship to corporate information that he cannot appropriate for his 
own benefit. See n. 8, supra. It does not limit the second element which 
addresses the injury to the shareholder and is at issue here. See ibid. In 
fact, Cady, Roberts, describes the duty more precisely in a later footnote: 
"In the circumstances, [the insider's] relationship to his customers was 
such that he would have a duty not to take a position adverse to them, not 
to take secret profits at their expense, not to misrepresent facts to them, 
and in general to place their interests ahead of his own." 40 S. E. C. , at 
916, n. 31. This statement makes clear that enrichment of the insider him-
self is simply one of the results the duty attempts to prevent. 
10 Of course, an insider is not liable in a Rule 10b--5 administrative action 
unless he has the requisite scienter. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U. S. 680, 691 
(1980). He must know or intend that his conduct violate his duty. Secrist 
obviously knew and intended that Dirks would cause trading on the inside 
information and that Equity Funding shareholders would be harmed. The 
scienter requirement addresses the intent necessary to support liability; it 
does not address the motives behind the intent. 
11 The Court seems concerned that this case bears on insiders' contacts 
with analysts for valid corporate reasons. Ante, at 10-11. It also fears 
that insiders may not be able to determine whether the information trans-
mitted is material or nonpublic. Id., at 14-15. When the disclosure is to 
an investment banker or some other adviser, however, there is normally no 
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This conclusion is borne out by the Court's decision in 
Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U. S. 267 (1951). There, the Court 
faced an analogous situation: a reorganization trustee en-
gaged two employee-promoters of subsidiaries of the compa-
nies being reorganized to provide services that the trustee 
considered to be essential to the successful operation of the 
trust. In order to secure their services, the trustee ex-
pressly agreed with the employees that they could continue 
to trade in the securities of the subsidiaries. The employees 
then turned their inside position into substantial profits at 
the expense both of the trust and of other holders of the com-
panies' securities. 
The Court acknowledged that the trustee neither intended 
to nor did in actual fact benefit from this arrangement; his 
motives were completely selfless and devoted to the compa-
nies. 341 U. S., at 275. The Court, nevertheless, found the 
trustee liable to the estate for the activities of the employees 
he authorized. 12 The Court described the trustee's defalca-
breach because the insider does not have scienter: he does not intend that 
the inside information be used for trading purposes to the disadvantage of 
shareholders. Moreover, if the insider in good faith does not believe that 
the information is material or nonpublic, he also lacks the necessary 
scienter. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 197 (1976). In 
fact, the scienter requirement functions in part to protect good faith errors 
of this type. I d., at 211, n. 31. 
Should the adviser receiving the information use it to trade, it may 
breach a separate contractual or other duty to the corporation not to mis-
use the information. Absent such an arrangement, however, the adviser 
is not barred by Rule 10b-5 from trading on that information if it believes 
that the insider has not breached any duty to his shareholders. See W al-
ton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F. 2d 796, 798-799 (CA2 1980). 
The situation here, of course, is radically different. Ante, 11, n. 17 
(Dirks received information requiring no analysis "as to its market rele-
vance"). Secrist divulged the information for the precise purpose of caus-
ing Dirks' clients to trade on it. I fail to understand how imposing liability 
on Dirks will affect legitimate insider-analyst contacts. 
12 The duty involved in Mosser was the duty to the corporation in trust 
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tion as "a willful and deliberate setting up of an interest in 
employees adverse to that of the trust." I d., at 272. The 
breach did not depend on the trustee's personal gain, and his 
motives in violating his duty were irrelevant; like Secrist, the 
trustee intended that others would abuse the inside informa-
tion for their personal gain. Cf. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 
204 Mich. 459, 50~09, 170 N. W. 668, 684-685 (1919) 
(Henry Ford's philanthropic motives did not permit him to 
set Ford Motor Company dividend policies to benefit public 
at expense of shareholders). 
As Mosser demonstrates, the breach consists in taking ac-
tion disadvantageous to the person to whom one owes a duty. 
In this case, Secrist owed a duty to purchasers of Equity 
Funding shares. The Court's addition of the bad purpose el-
ement to a breach of fiduciary duty claim is flatly inconsistent 
with the principle of Mosser. I do not join this limitation of 
the scope of an insider's fiduciary duty to shareholders. 13 
not to misappropriate its assets. This duty, of course, differs from the 
duty to shareholders involved in this case. Seen. 7, supra. Trustees are 
also subject to a higher standard of care than scienter. 3 A. Scott on 
Trusts § 201, p. 1650 (1967). In addition, strict trustees are bound not to 
trade in securities at all. See Langevoort, 70 Calif. L. Rev., at 2, n. 5. 
These differences, however, are irrelevant to the principle of Mosser that 
the motive of personal gain is not essential to a trustee's liability. In 
Mosser, as here, personal gain accrued to the tippees. See 341 U. S., at 
273. 
13 Although I disagree in principle with the Court's requirement of an 
improper motive, I also note that the requirement adds to the adminis-
trative and judicial burden in Rule lOb-,5 cases. Assuming the validity of 
the requirement, the SEC's approach-a violation occurs when the insider 
knows that the tippee will trade with the information, Brief for SEC 31-
can be seen as a presumption that the insider gains from the tipping. The 
Court now requires a case-by-case determination, thus prohibiting such a 
presumption. 
The Court acknowledges the burdens and difficulties of this approach, 
but asserts that a principle is needed to guide market participants. Ante, 
at 16. I fail to see how the Court's rule has any practical advantage over 
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III 
The improper purpose requirement not only has no basis in 
law, but it rests implicitly on a policy that I cannot accept. 
The Court justifies Secrist's and Dirks' action because the 
general benefit derived from the violation of Secrist's duty to 
shareholders outweighed the harm caused to those share-
holders, see Heller, Chiarella, SEC Rule 14e-3 and Dirks: 
''Fairness" versus Economic Theory, 37 Bus. Lawyer 517, 
550 (1982); Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, 
Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 
1981 S. Ct. Rev. 309, 338--in other words, because the end 
justified the means. Under this view, the benefit conferred 
on society by Secrist's and Dirks' activities may be paid for 
with the losses caused to shareholders trading with Dirks' cli-
ents.14 
Although Secrist's general motive to expose the Equity 
Funding fraud was laudable, the means he chose were not. 
the SEC's presumption. The Court's approach is particularly difficult to 
administer when the insider is not directly enriched monetarily by the 
trading he induces. For example, the Court does not explain why the ben-
efit Secrist obtained-the good feeling of exposing a fraud and his en-
hanced reputation-is any different from the benefit to an insider who 
gives the information as a gift to a friend or relative. Under the Court's 
somewhat cynical view, gifts involve personal gain. See ibid. Secrist 
surely gave Dirks a gift of the commissions Dirks made on the deal in order 
to induce him to disseminate the information. The distinction between 
pure altruism and self-interest has puzzled philosophers for centuries; 
there is no reason to believe that courts and administrative law judges will 
have an easier time with it. 
14 This position seems little different from the theory that insider trading 
should be permitted because it brings relevant information to the market. 
See H. Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market 59-76, 111-146 
(1966); Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 Vand. L. Rev. 
547, 565--576 (1970). That position, which sits at the opposite end of the 
theoretical spectrum from the much maligned equality-of-information the-
ory, has never been adopted by Congress or ratified by the Court. See 
Langevoort, 70 Calif. L. Rev., at 1 and n. 1. The theory rejects the exist-
ence of any enforceable principle of fairness between market participants. 
.~ 
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Moreover, even assuming that Dirks played a substantial role 
in exposing the fraud, 15 he and his clients should not profit 
from the information they obtained from Secrist. Misprision 
of a felony long has been against public policy. Branzburg v. 
Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 696-697 (1972); see 18 U. S. C. §4. A 
person cannot condition his transmission of information of a 
crime on a financial award. As a citizen, Dirks had at least 
an ethical obligation to report the information to the proper 
authorities. See ante, at 13, n. 20. The Court's holding is 
deficient in policy terms not because it fails to create a legal 
norm out of that ethical norm, see ibid., but because it actu-
ally rewards Dirks for his aiding and abetting. 
Dirks and Secrist were under a duty to disclose the in-
formation or to refrain from trading on it. 16 I agree that dis-
closure in this case would have been difficult. Ante, at 13, 
n. 20. I also recognize that the SEC seemingly has been less 
than proficient in its view of the nature of disclosure neces-
sary to satisfy the disclose-or-refrain duty. The Commission 
tells persons with inside information that they cannot trade 
on that information unless they disclose; it refuses, however, 
to tell them how to discloseY See In re Faberge, Inc., 45 
16 The Court uncritically accepts Dirks' own view of his role in uncover-
ing the Equity Funding fraud. See ante, at 11, n. 17. It ignores the fact 
that Secrist gave the same information at the same time to state insurance 
regulators, who proceeded to expose massive fraud in a major Equity 
Funding subsidiary. The fraud surfaced before Dirks ever spoke to the 
SEC. 
16 Secrist did pass on his information to regulatory authorities. His 
good but misguided motive may be the reason the SEC did not join him in 
the administrative proceedings against Dirks and his clients. The fact 
that the SEC, in an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, did not charge 
Secrist under Rule 10b-5 says nothing about the applicable law. Cf. ante, 
at 18, n. 25 (suggesting otherwise). Nor does the fact that the SEC took 
an unsupportable legal position in proceedings below indicate that neither 
Secrist nor Dirks is liable under any theory. Cf. ibid. (same). 
17 At oral argument, the SEC's view was that Dirks' obligation to dis-
close would not be satisfied by reporting the information to the SEC. Tr. 
of Oral Arg. 27, quoted ante, at 13, n. 20. This position is in apparent 
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S. E. C. 249, 256 (1973) (disclosure requires public release 
through public media designed to reach investing public gen-
erally). This seems to be a less than sensible policy, which it 
is incumbent on the Commission to correct. The Court, 
however, has no authority to remedy the problem by opening 
a hole in the congressionally mandated prohibition on insider 
trading, thus rewarding insider trading. 
IV 
In my view, Secrist violated his duty to Equity Funding 
shareholders by transmitting material nonpublic information 
to Dirks with the intention that Dirks would cause his clients 
to trade on that information. Dirks, therefore, was under a 
duty to make the information publicly available or to refrain 
from actions that he knew would lead to trading. Because 
Dirks caused his clients to trade, he violated § lO(b) and Rule 
lOb-5. Any other result is a disservice to this country's at-
tempt to provide fair and efficient capital markets. I 
dissent. 
conflict with the statement in its brief that speaks favorably of a safe har-
bor rule under which an investor satisfies his obligation to disclose by re-
porting the information to the Commission and then waiting a set period 
before trading. Brief for SEC 43-44. The SEC, however, has neither 
proposed nor adopted a rule to this effect, and thus persons such as Dirks 
have no real option other than to refrain from trading. 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Jim 
Re: Dirks 
I have attempted in the attached footnote to restate your 
concerns in the rider that you prepared this morning. My reason for 
pause in not attacking directly JUSTICE BLACKMUN's distinction 
between "motive" and "scienter" is that we make one between 
"purpose" and "scienter." We have to use the word "purpose," in my 
opinion, to slide from the SEC's language in the older cases to the 
requirement in your case that the Cady, Roberts duty includes not 
only fiduciary duty, but a duty not to gain. Therefore, to the 
extent that JUSTICE BLACKMUN uses "motive" the same way we use 
"purpose," his distinction is somewhat helpful to us. Therefore, 
perhaps we can use his distinction somewhat to our advantage. 
The following suggested footnote would go after the citation to 




The dissenting opinion correctly draws a distinction between 
our requirement that the insider's breach must involve personal gain 
and the requirement that the insider act with scienter. See ante, 
at 8, and n. 10. As we said in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 
U.S. 185, 199 {1976), the statutory words "manipulative," "device," 
and "contrivance •••• connot[e] intentional or willful conduct 
designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or 
artificially affecting the price of securities." But not all 
conduct done with scienter violates Rule lOb-5, just as all 
fraudulent acts done without scienter also do not come within the 
ban of the federal securities laws. Rather, there must be both 
scienter and a fraudulent act. We are concerned in this case with 
those acts that are fraudulent, i. e., those that deceive or 
manipulate the market. Determination whether a particular act, such 
as trading securities or disclosing information, is fraudulent turns 
on objective criteria, such as the existence of a fiduciary duty and 
personal gain from the use of nonpublic information. The 
determination whether those acts were done intentionally by a 
particular individual, however, is inherently a subjective inquiry. 
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DIRKSB SALLY-POW 
Consider adding a note along the following lines: 
In applying Rule lOb-S, the dissent would draw a 
distinction impossible as a guide to conduct or to 
administer by courts and the SEC. It concedes that an 
insider is not liable under the Rule "unless he has the 
requisite scienter". Seen. 10, post. The dissent then 
proposes a new definition of scienter: "[T]he scienter 
requirement addresses the intent necessary to support 
liability~ it does not address the motives behin~ the 
~ 
intent." Id. Therefore, ~ Secrist "knew and intended 
that Dirks would cause trading", he possessed the 
requisite scienter regardless of what his motives may have 
been. This distinction ignores both the language of lOb-S 
. < 
and the meaning of "scienter". See Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197-199 (1976) (the language 
5 
"manipulative", "device", and "contrivance" connote 
" 
"intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or 
defraud investors •.•• ") Even the unique facts of 
this case illustrate the distinction that the dissent 
overlooks. ~ .. dd 1 ~ certa1nly 1nten e to convey re evant 
2. 
information that mangement was unlawfully concealing, and 
- so far as the record goes - he quite honestly believed 
that persuading Dirks to investigate was the best way to 
disclose the fraud. The dissent acknowledges that any 
other means of "disclosures would have been difficult", 
~t 
post, at 13, and yet would charge Secrist with a breach of 
1\ ,, 
fiduciary duty even though there was no motive toAdeceive 
or defraud investors". We recognize the inherent 
3. 
J1.-e 
difficult of detemining ~~intent or motive of an 
actor in a particular situation. Each connotes the need 
for a subjective inquiry. Courts, however, necessarily 
~ 
look to objective evidence to ascertain the ~~atato~y 
requirement , of iRtQR~ deeei~e,-rnafiip~late 0~ eefraua, 0-
The standard adopted by the Court today ~ eases of thi:s 
~ is whether the insider receives a direct or indirect 
personal benefit from the disclosure. Imperfect as this 
~~~~ 
may be it is a standard. The dissent's distinction 
) "' 
between "intent" and "motive" is without precedent and is 
standardless. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-276 
RAYMOND L. DIRKS, PETITIONER v. SECURITIES 
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1983] 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and 
JUSTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting. 
The Court today takes still another step to limit the protec-
tions provided investors by § 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. 1 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 
U. S. 222, 246 (1980) (dissenting opinion). The device em-
ployed in this case engrafts a special motivational require-
ment on the fiduciary duty doctrine. This innovation ex-
cuses a knowing and intentional violation of an insider's duty 
to shareholders if the insider does not act from a motive of 
personal gain. Even on the extraordinary facts of this case, 
such an innovation is not justified. 
'See, e. g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723 
(1975); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185 (1976); Piper v. Chris-
Craft Industries , Inc ., 430 U. S. 1 (1977); Chiarella v. United States, 445 
U. S. 222 (1980); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U. S. 680 (1980). This trend frus-
trates the congressional intent that the securities laws be interpreted flexi-
bly to protect investors, see Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 
U. S. 128, 151 (1972); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc ., 375 
U. S. 180, 186 (1963), and to regulate deceptive practices "detrimental to 
the interests of the investor," S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 18 
(1934); see H. R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Con g., 2d Sess., 10 (1934). More-
over, the Court continues to refuse to accord to SEC administrative deci-
sions the deference it normally gives to an agency's interpretation of its 
own statute. See, e. g., Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132 (1982). 
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I 
As the Court recognizes, ante, at 11, n. 17, the facts here 
are unusual. After a meeting with Ronald Secrist, a former 
Equity Funding employee, on March 7, 1973, App. 226, peti-
tioner Raymond Dirks found himself in possession of material 
nonpublic information of massive fraud within the company. 2 
In the Court's words, "[h]e uncovered ... startling informa-
tion that required no analysis or exercise of judgment as to 
its market relevance." Ante, at 11, n. 17. In disclosing that 
information to Dirks, Secrist intended that Dirks would dis-
seminate the information to his clients, those clients would 
unload their Equity Funding securities on the market, and 
the price would fall precipitously, thereby triggering a reac-
tion from the authorities. App. 16, 25, 27. 
Dirks complied with his informant's wishes. Instead of re-
porting that information to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC or Commission) or to other regulatory 
agencies, Dirks began to disseminate the information to his 
clients and undertook his own investigation. 3 One of his 
2 Unknown to Dirks, Secrist also told his story to New York insurance 
regulators the same day. App. 23. They immediately assured them-
selves that ·Equity Funding's New York subsidiary had sufficient assets to 
cover its outstanding policies and then passed on the information to Califor-
nia regulators who in turn informed Illinois regulators. Illinois investiga-
tors, later joined by California officials, conducted a surprise audit of Eq-
uity Funding's Illinois subsidiary, id., at 87--88, to find $22 million of the 
subsidiary's assets missing. On March 30, these authorities seized control 
of the Illinois subsidiary. I d., at 271. 
3 In the same administrative proceeding at issue here, the Adminis-
trative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Dirks' clients-five institutional in-
vestment advisors-violated § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 
U. S. C. § 77q(a), § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S. C. §78j(b), and Rule 100-5, 17 CFR §240.100-5, by trading on 
Dirks' tips. App. 297. All the clients were censured, except Dreyfus 
Corporation. The ALJ found that Dreyfus had made significant efforts to 
disclose the information to Goldman, Sachs, the purchaser of its securities. 
App. 299, 301. None of Dirks' clients appealed these determinations. 
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first steps was to direct his associates at Delafield Childs to 
draw up a list of Delafield clients holding Equity Funding se-
curities. On March 12, eight days before Dirks flew to Los 
Angeles to investigate Secrist's story, he reported the full 
allegations to Boston Company Institutional Investors, Inc., 
which on March 15 and 16 sold approximately $1.2 million of 
Equity securities. 4 See id., at 199. As he gathered more 
information, he selectively disclosed it to his clients. To 
those holding Equity Funding securities he gave the "hard" 
story-all the allegations; others received the "soft" story-a 
recitation of vague factors that might reflect adversely on 
Equity Funding's management. See id., at 211, n. 24. 
Dirks' attempts to disseminate the information to 
nonclients were feeble, at best. On March 12, he left a mes-
sage for Herbert Lawson, the San Francisco bureau chief of 
The Wall Street Journal. Not until March 19 and 20 did he 
call Lawson again, and outline the situation. William 
Blundell, a Journal investigative reporter based in Los An-
geles, got in touch with Dirks about his March 20 telephone 
call. On March 21, Dirks met with Blundell in Los Angeles. 
Blundell began his own investigation, relying in part on 
Dirks' contacts, and on March 23 telephoned Stanley Sporkin, 
the SEC's Deputy Director of Enforcement. On March 26, 
the next business day, Sporkin and his staff interviewed 
Blundell and asked to see Dirks the following morning. 
App. to Pet. for Cert. B-2, n. 1. 
• The Court's implicit suggestion that Dirks' did not gain by this selec-
tive dissemination of advice, ante, at 2, n. 2, is inaccurate. The ALJ found 
that because of Dirks' information, Boston Company Institutional Inves-
tors, Inc., directed business to Delafield Childs that generated approxi-
mately $25,000 in commissions. App. 199, 204-205. While it is true that 
the exact economic benefit gained by Delafield Childs due to Dirks' activi-
ties is unknowable because of the structure of compensation in the securi-
ties market, there can be no doubt that Delafield and Dirks gained both 
monetary rewards and enhanced reputations for "looking after" their 
clients. 
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Trading was halted by the New York Stock Exchange at 
about the same time Dirks was talking to Los Angeles SEC 
personnel. The next day, March 28, the SEC suspended 
trading in Equity Funding securities. By that time, Dirks' 
clients had unloaded close to $15 million of Equity Funding 
stock and the price had plummeted from $26 to $15. The ef-
fect of Dirks' selective dissemination of Secrist's information 
was that Dirks' clients were able to shift the losses that were 
inevitable due to the Equity Funding fraud from themselves 
to uninformed market participants. 
II 
A 
No one questions that Secrist himself could not trade on his 
inside information to the disadvantage of uninformed share-
holders and purchasers of Equity Funding securities. See 
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19, n. 12. Unlike 
the printer in Chiarella, Secrist stood in a fiduciary relation-
ship with these shareholders. As the Court states, ante, at 
5, corporate insiders have an affirmative duty of disclosure 
when trading with shareholders of the corporation. See 
Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 227. This duty extends as well to 
purchasers of the corporation's securities. I d., at 227, n. 8, 
citing Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F. 2d 46, 49 (CA2), cert. de-
nied, 341 U. S. 920 (1951). 
The Court also acknowledges that Secrist could not do by 
proxy what he was prohibited from doing personally. Ante, 
at 12; Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U. S. 267, 272 (1951). But this 
is precisely what Secrist did. Secrist used Dirks to dissemi-
nate information to Dirks' clients, who in turn dumped stock 
on unknowing purchasers. Secrist thus intended Dirks to in-
jure the purchasers of Equity Funding securities to whom 
Secrist had a duty to disclose. Accepting the Court's view of 
tippee liability, 5 it appears that Dirk's knowledge of this 
5 I interpret the Court's opinion to impose liability on tippees like Dirks 
82-276-DISSENT 
DIRKS v. SEC 5 
breach makes him liable as a participant in the breach after 
the fact. Ante, at 12, 19; Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 230, n. 12. 
B 
The Court holds, however, that Dirks is not liable because 
Secrist did not violate his duty; according to the Court, this is 
so because Secrist did not have the improper purpose of per-
sonal gain. Ante, at 15-16, 18-19. In so doing, the Court 
imposes a new, subjective limitation on the scope of the duty 
owed by insiders to shareholders. The novelty of this limita-
tion is reflected in the Court's lack of support for it. 6 
The insider's duty is owed directly to the corporation's 
shareholders. 7 See Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fi-
when the tippee knows or has reason to know that the information is mate-
rial and nonpublic and was obtained through a breach of duty by selective 
revelation or otherwise. See In re Investors Management Co., 44 S. E. C. 
633, 641 (1971). 
6 The Court cites only a footnote in an SEC decision and Professor 
Brudney to support its rule. Ante, at 15-16. The footnote, however, 
merely identifies one result the securities laws are intended to prevent. It 
does not define the nature of the duty itself. See n. 9, infra. Professor 
Brudney's quoted statement appears in the context of his assertion that the 
duty of insiders to disclose prior to trading with shareholders is in large 
part a mechanism to correct the information available to noninsiders. Pro-
fessor Brudney simply recognizes that the most common motive for 
breaching this duty is personal gain; he does not state , however, that the 
duty prevents only personal aggrandizement. Insiders, Outsiders, and 
Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 Harv. 
L. Rev. 322, 345-348 (1979). Surely, the Court does not now adopt Pro-
fessor Brudney's access-to-information theory, a close cousin to the equal-
ity-of-information theory it accuses the SEC of harboring. See ante, at 
8-10. 
7 The Court correctly distinguishes this duty from the duty of an insider 
to the corporation not to mismanage corporate affairs or to misappropriate 
corporate assets. Ante, at 5, n. 9. That duty also can be breached when 
the insider trades in corporate securities on the basis of inside information. 
Although a shareholder suing in the name of the corporation can recover 
for the corporation damages for any injury the insider causes by the breach 
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duciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 Calif. 
L. Rev. 1, 5 (1982); 3A W. Fletcher, Private Corporations 
§ 1168.2, pp. 28~289 (1975). As Chiarella recognized, it is 
based on the relationship of trust and confidence between the 
insider and the shareholder. 445 U. S., at 228. That rela-
tionship assures the shareholder that the insider may not 
take actions that will harm him unfairly. 8 The affirmative 
duty of disclosure protects against this injury. See Pepper 
v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, 307, n. 15 (1939); Strong v. Rapide, 
213 U. S. 419, 431-434 (1909); see also Chiarella, 445 U. 8., 
at 228, n. 10; cf. Pepper, 308 U. S., at 307 (fiduciary obliga-
tion to corporation exists for corporation's protection). 
c 
The fact that the insider himself does not benefit from the 
breach does not eradicate the shareholder's injury. 9 Cf. Re-
of this distinct duty, Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N. Y. 2d 494, 498, 248 
N. E. 2d 910, 912 (1969); see Thomas v. Roblins Industries, Inc., 520 F. 2d 
1393, 1397 (CA3 1975), insider trading generally does not injure the cor-
poration itself. See Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Prin-
ciple: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 2, n. 5, 28, n. 111 
(1982). 
8 As it did in Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 226-229, the Court adopts the 
Cady, Roberts formulation of the duty. Ante, at 5-6. 
"Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal elements; first, the ex-
istence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information 
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the per-
sonal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness involved 
where a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavail-
able to those with whom he is dealing." In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 
S. E. C. 907, 912 (1961) (footnote omitted). 
The first element-on which Chiarella's holding rests-establishes the 
type of relationship that must exist between the parties before a duty to 
disclose is present. The second-not addressed by Chiarella-identifies 
the harm that the duty protects against: the inherent unfairness to the 
shareholder caused when an insider trades with him on the basis of undis-
closed inside information. 
9 Without doubt, breaches of the insider's duty occur most often when 
an insider seeks personal aggrandizement at the expense of shareholders. 
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statement (Second) of Trusts § 205, Comments c and d (1959) 
(trustee liable for acts causing diminution of value of trust); 3 
A. Scott on Trusts § 205, p. 1665 (1967) (trustee liable for any 
losses to trust caused by his breach). It makes no difference 
to the shareholder whether the corporate insider gained or 
intended to gain personally from the transaction; the share-
holder still has lost because of the insider's misuse of non pub-
lic information. The duty is addressed not to the insider's 
motives, 10 but to his actions and their consequences on the 
shareholder. Personal gain is not an element of the breach 
of this duty. 11 
Because of this, descriptions of the duty to disclose are often coupled with 
statements that the duty prevents unjust enrichment. See, e. g., In re 
Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S. E. C. 907, 912, n. 15 (1961); Langevoort, 70 
Calif. L. Rev., at 19. Private gain is certainly a strong motivation for 
breaching the duty. 
It is, however, not an element of the breach of this duty. The reference 
to personal gain in Cady , Roberts for example, is appended to the first ele-
ment underlying the duty which requires that an insider have a special 
relationship to corporate information that he cannot appropriate for his 
own benefit. See n. 8, supra. It does not limit the second element which 
addresses the injury to the shareholder and is at issue here. See ibid. In 
fact, Cady, Roberts, describes the duty more precisely in a later footnote: 
"In the circumstances, [the insider's] relationship to his customers was 
such that he would have a duty not to take a position adverse to them, not 
to take secret profits at their expense, not to misrepresent facts to them, 
and in general to place their interests ahead of his own." 40 S. E. C. , at 
916, n. 31. This statement makes clear that enrichment of the insider him-
self is simply one of the results the duty attempts to prevent. 
10 Of course, an insider is not liable in a Rule 10b-5 administrative action 
unless he has the requisite scienter. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U. S. 680, 691 
(1980). He must know or intend that his conduct violate his duty. Secrist 
obviously knew and intended that Dirks would cause trading on the inside 
information and that Equity Funding shareholders would be harmed. The 
scienter requirement addresses the intent necessary to support liability; it 
does not address the motives behind the intent. 
11 The Court seems concerned that this case bears on insiders' contacts 
w:ith analysts for valid corporate reasons. A nte, at 10- 11. It also fears 
that insiders may not be able to determine whether the information trans-
mitted is material or nonpublic. !d., at 14--15. When the disclosure is to 
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This conclusion is borne out by the Court's decision in 
Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U. 8. 267 (1951). There, the Court 
faced an analogous situation: a reorganization trustee en-
gaged two employee-promoters of subsidiaries of the compa-
nies being reorganized to provide services that the trustee 
considered to be essential to the successful operation of the 
trust. In order to secure their services, the trustee ex-
pressly agreed with the employees that they could continue 
to trade in the securities of the subsidiaries. The employees 
then turned their inside position into substantial profits at 
the expense both of the trust and of other holders of the com-
panies' securities. 
The Court acknowledged that the trustee neither intended 
to nor did in actual fact benefit from this arrangement; his 
motives were completely selfless and devoted to the compa-
nies. 341 U. 8., at 275. The Court, nevertheless, found the 
. trustee liable to the estate for the activities of the employees 
he authorized. 12 The Court described the trustee's defalca-
an investment banker or some other adviser, however, there is normally no 
breach because the insider does not have scienter: he does not intend that 
the inside information be used for trading purposes to the disadvantage of 
shareholders. Moreover, if the insider in good faith does not believe that 
the information is material or nonpublic, he also lacks the necessary 
scienter. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 197 (1976). In 
fact, the scienter requirement functions in part to protect good faith errors 
of this type. !d., at 211, n. 31. 
Should the adviser receiving the information use it to trade, it may 
breach a separate contractual or other duty to the corporation not to mis-
use the information. Absent such an arrangement, however, the adviser 
is not barred by Rule 10b-5 from trading on that information if it believes 
that the insider has not breached any duty to his shareholders. See Wal-
ton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F. 2d 796, 798--799 (CA2 1980). 
The situation here, of course, is radically different. Ante, at 11, n. 17 
(Dirks received information requiring no analysis "as to its market rele-
vance"). Secrist divulged the information for the precise purpose of caus-
ing Dirks' clients to trade on it. I fail to understand how imposing liability 
on Dirks will affect legitimate insider-analyst contacts. 
"The duty involved in Mosser was the duty to the corporation in trust 
82-276---DISSENT 
DIRKS v. SEC 9 
tion as "a willful and deliberate setting up of an interest in 
employees adverse to that of the trust." I d., at 272. The 
breach did not depend on the trustee's personal gain, and his 
motives in violating his duty were irrelevant; like Secrist, the 
trustee intended that others would abuse the inside informa-
tion for their personal gain. Cf. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 
204 Mich. 459, 50&-509, 170 N. W. 668, 684-685 (1919) 
(Henry Ford's philanthropic motives did not permit him to 
set Ford Motor Company dividend policies to benefit public 
at expense of shareholders). 
As Mosser demonstrates, the breach consists in taking ac-
tion disadvantageous to the person to whom one owes a duty. 
In this case, Secrist owed a duty to purchasers of Equity 
Funding shares. The Court's addition of the bad purpose el-
ement to a breach of fiduciary duty claim is flatly inconsistent 
with the principle of Mosser. I do not join this limitation of 
the scope of an insider's fiduciary duty to shareholders. 13 
not to misappropriate its assets. This duty, of course, differs from the 
duty to shareholders involved in this case. Seen. 7, supra. Trustees are 
also subject to a higher standard of care than scienter. 3 A. Scott on 
Trusts § 201, p. 1650 (1967). In addition, strict trustees are bound not to 
trade in securities at all. See Langevoort, 70 Calif. L. Rev., at 2, n. 5. 
These differences, however, are irrelevant to the principle of Mosser that 
the motive of personal gain is not essential to a trustee's liability. In 
Mosser, as here, personal gain accrued to the tippees. See 341 U. S., at 
273. 
13 Although I disagree in principle with the Court's requirement of an 
improper motive, I also note that the requirement adds to the adminis-
trative and judicial burden in Rule 10b-5 cases. Assuming the validity of 
the requirement, the SEC's approach-a violation occurs when the insider 
knows that the tippee will trade with the information, Brief for SEC 31-
can be seen as a presumption that the insider gains from the tipping. The 
Court now requires a case-by-case determination, thus prohibiting such a 
presumption. 
The Court acknowledges the burdens and difficulties of this approach, 
but asserts that a principle is needed to guide market participants. Ante, 
at 16. I fail to see how the Court's rule has any practical advantage over 
the SEC's presumption. The Court's approach is particularly difficult to 
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III 
The improper purpose requirement not only has no basis in 
law, but it rests implicitly on a policy that I cannot accept. 
The Court justifies Secrist's and Dirks' action because the 
general benefit derived from the violation of Secrist's duty to 
shareholders outweighed the harm caused to those share-
holders, see Heller, Chiarella, SEC Rule 14e-3 and Dirks: 
"Fairness" versus Economic Theory, 37 Bus. Lawyer 517, 
550 (1982); Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, 
Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 
1981 S. Ct. Rev. 309, 338--in other words, because the end 
justified the means. Under this view, the benefit conferred 
on society by Secrist's and Dirks' activities may be paid for 
with the losses caused to shareholders trading with Dirks' cli-
ents.14 
administer when the insider is not directly enriched monetarily by the 
trading he induces. For example, the Court does not explain why the ben-
efit Secrist obtained-the good feeling of exposing a fraud and his en-
hanced reputation-is any different from the benefit to an insider who 
gives the information as a gift to a friend or relative. Under the Court's 
somewhat cynical view, gifts involve personal gain. See ibid. Secrist 
surely gave Dirks a gift of the commissions Dirks made on the deal in order 
to induce him to disseminate the information. The distinction between 
pure altruism and self-interest has puzzled philosophers for centuries; 
there is no reason to believe that courts and administrative law judges will 
have an easier time with it. 
"This position seems little different from the theory that insider trading 
should be permitted because it brings relevant information to the market. 
See H. Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market 59-76, 111-146 
(1966); Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 Vand. L. Rev. 
547, 565--576 (1970). The Court also seems to embrace a variant of that 
extreme theory, which postulates that insider trading causes no harm at all 
to those who purchase from the insider. Ante, at 18, n. 27. Both the the-
ory and its variant sit at the opposite end of the theoretical spectrum from 
the much maligned equality-of-information theory, and never have been 
adopted by Congress or ratified by this Court. See Langevoort, 70 Calif. 
L. Rev., at 1 and n. 1. The theory rejects the existence of any enforceable 
principle of fairness between market participants. 
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Although Secrist's general motive to expose the Equity 
Funding fraud was laudable, the means he chose were not. 
Moreover, even assuming that Dirks played a substantial role 
in exposing the fraud, 15 he and his clients should not profit 
from the information they obtained from Secrist. Misprision 
of a felony long has been against public policy. Branzburg v. 
Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 69tH>97 (1972); see 18 U. S. C. § 4. A 
person cannot condition his transmission of information of a 
crime on a financial award. As a citizen, Dirks had at least 
an ethical obligation to report the information to the proper 
authorities. See ante, at 13, n. 20. The Court's holding is 
deficient in policy terms not because it fails to create a legal 
norm out of that ethical norm, see ibid., but because it actu-
ally rewards Dirks for his aiding and abetting. 
Dirks and Secrist were under a duty to disclose the in-
formation or to refrain from trading on it. 16 I agree that dis-
closure in this case would have been difficult. Ante, at 13, 
n. 20. I also recognize that the SEC seemingly has been less 
than helpful in its view of the riature of disclosure necessary \ 
to satisfy the disclose-or-refrain duty. The Commission tells 
persons with inside information that they cannot trade on 
that information unless they disclose; it refuses, however, to 
15 The Court uncritically accepts Dirks' own view of his role in uncover-
ing the Equity Funding fraud. See ante, at 11, n. 17. It ignores the fact 
that Secrist gave the same information at the same time to state insurance 
regulators, who proceeded to expose massive fraud in a major Equity 
Funding subsidiary. The fraud surfaced before Dirks ever spoke to the 
SEC. 
16 Secrist did pass on his information to regulatory authorities. His 
good but misguided motive may be the reason the SEC did not join him in 
the administrative proceedings against Dirks and his clients. The fact 
that the SEC, in an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, did not charge 
Secrist under Rule lOb-5 says nothing about the applicable law. Cf. ante, 
at 18, n. 25 (suggesting otherwise). Nor does the fact that the SEC took 
an unsupportable legal position in proceedings below indicate that neither 
Secrist nor Dirks is liable under any theory. Cf. ibid. (same). 
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tell them how to disclose. 17 See In re Faberge, Inc., 45 
S. E. C. 249, 256 (1973) (disclosure requires public release 
through public media designed to reach investing public gen-
erally). This seems to be a less than sensible policy, which it 
is incumbent on the Commission to correct. The Court, 
however, has no authority to remedy the problem by opening 
a hole in the congressionally mandated prohibition on insider 
trading, thus rewarding such trading. 
IV 
In my view, Secrist violated his duty to Equity Funding 
shareholders by transmitting material nonpublic information 
to Dirks with the intention that Dirks would cause his clients 
to trade on that information. Dirks, therefore, was under a 
duty to make the information publicly available or to refrain 
from actions that he knew would lead to trading. Because 
Dirks caused his clients to trade, he violated § lO(b) and Rule 
lOb--5. Any other result is a disservice to this country's at-
tempt to provide fair and efficient capital markets. I 
dissent. 
11 At oral argument, the SEC's view was that Dirks' obligation to dis-
close would not be satisfied by reporting the information to the SEC. Tr. 
of Oral Arg. 27, quoted ante, at 13, n. 20. This position is in apparent 
conflict with the statement in its brief that speaks favorably of a safe har-
bor rule under which an investor satisfies his obligation to disclose by re-
porting the information to the Commission and then waiting a set period 
before trading. Brief for SEC 43-44. The SEC, however, has neither 
proposed nor adopted a rule to this effect, and thus persons such as Dirks 
have no real option other than to refrain from trading. 
.:iu}tuutt Qfourl qf tlr~ ~nittb .ihdts 
.ulfi:u.gton. ~. QJ. 2.0,?~~ 
C H AMBERS OF 
.JU S TI CE HARRY A . BLAC KMUN June 28, 1983 
Re: No. 82-276 - Dirks v. SEC 
Dear Lewis: 
In response to the changes made in your third draft, I 
shall make the following changes in the dissent: 
read: 
1. The opening paragraph of footnote 6 will be made to 
" 6The Court cites only a footnote in an SEC deci-
sion and Professor Brudney to support its rule. Ante, 
at 15-16. The footnote, however, merely identifies 
one result the securities laws are intended to pre-
vent. It does not define the nature of the duty it-
self. See n. 9, infra. Professor Brudney's quoted 
statement ••• " 
2. I shall add the following to my footnote 14, immediately 
following "(1970}" on the fifth line: 
"The Court also seems to embrace a variant of 
that extreme theory, which postulates that insider 
trading causes no harm at all to those who purchase 
from the insider. Ante, at 18, n. 27. Both the the-
ory and its variant sit at the opposite end of the 
theoretical spectrum from the much maligned equality-
of-information theory, and have never been adopted by 
Congress or ratified by this Court. See Langevoort, 
70 Calif. L. Rev ...• " 
Apart from these changes, I am content. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
.:§u;rrtmt (!fond of tJrt 'J!inittb .:§Wu 
'lillasfrington. ~. "f. 2.0,?-'t~ 
June 28, 1983 
Re: No. 82-276-Dirks v. Securities and Exchange 
Commission 
Dear Harry: 





cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.i'upr~nu <lJMttt ~f Ur~ ~ub' ~mt~g 
Jlu.lfittghtn. ~. <!}. 2'll.?~' 
June 28, 1983 
Re: 82-276 - Dirks v. Securities & Exchange 
Commission 
Dear Lewis: 
The last paragraph in your footnote 27 which 
begins on page 19 and runs over onto page 20 troubles 
me somewhat. I think there may be a causal connection 
between insider trading an~du siders' losses in some 
situations. I wonder, theref e, if you really need 
that last paragraph and woul consider either omitting 
it, or perhaps just omittin the reference to the Sixth 
Circuit case. 
It seems to me that you have effectively answered 
Harry in the earlier portions of that footnote. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Powell 
lfp/ss 06/30/83 82-276 Dirks v.' SEC 
This is an appeal from the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia. 
Petitioner Dirks was an officer of a broker-
dealer. ~e specialized in insurance securities. Ronald 
Secrist,ja former officer of Equity Funding of America } had 
sought unsuccessfully to bring to the attention of the pub-
lic~fraudulent practices of Equity's top management. The 
fraud primarily concerned insurance reserves. 
Hoping that Dirks,j a specialist in insurance secu-
rities, / could assist in disclosing the fraud, Secrist gave 
I 
his information to Dirks. In turn, Dirks conducted his own 
investigation. He urged the Wall Street Journal to publish 
k.. 
a story. aQdJlt the same tim~isclosed the information to 
five investment advisers~who liquidated substantial holdings 
of Equity Funding stock. 
When the authorities finally were persuaded to 
move,jthe market value of Equity Funding stock had plummet-
ed. The company was placed in bankruptcy. 
In a subsequent proceeding by the SEc,/Dirks was . 
found to have violated Rule lOb-sjby disclosing the allega~ 
~ens of fraud to persons who traded. Dirks was ce~ured 
for his conduct. 
2. 
The Court of Appeals dismissed Dirks' petition for 
review. 
Since its decision in In re Cady, Roberts & Co. in 
196l;fthe Commission - and courts - have sought to prevent 
corporate ins~~:;s;4rom breaching their duty to stockholders 
by trading on material/non-public information. Nor could 
insiders/- referred to as "tipp=.::_s"f avoid liability by 
conveying the information to som-; favored "tippee" ./!"As for-
mer Commissioner Smith write ,jthe "focus" under Rule lOb-5 
is on "policing insiders . . . rather than on policing in-
formation per se /~nd its possession". 
I 
A tippee's liability therefore is derivative:~he 
stands in the shoes of the tipper. In our recent decision 
in Chiarella/we held that "a duty to disclose does not arise/ 
I 7 
in the absence of a fiduciary relationship". 
In this case, the SEC made no finding that Secrist 
breached any duty/when he disclosed a massive fraud. It 
held, nevertheless, that Dirks - the tipp~e - violated lOb-5 
when he passed on the information to people who traded. 
It is conceded that Dirks, on his own, had no re-
lationship with Equity stockholders. Whether a particular 
3. 
disclosure by the inside~ a breach of duty~epends 
marily on his purpose, i.e., whether the insider- the 
pri-
tip-
per - personally will benefit, directly or indirectly. 
Secrist gained nothing from his efforts to bring the fraud 
to public attention. As there was no insider breach of 
duty;'Dirks was under no derivative duty. 
Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals. 
Justice Blackmun has filed a dissenting opinion, 
in which Justices Brennan and Marshall have concurred. 
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111 fr,11 11\\CA.JiiiV-, v~ r 
-:1. 
..~~ ..... --c: J:-I.LuvJ.aea on the slip 
opinion in the above-mentioned case, we wish to inform you 
of a possible typographical or other formal error in that 
Opinion. The second paragraph of note 15, page 10, of the 
Opinion of the Court, states, in part: 
Apparently recognizing the weak-
of its argument in light of Chia-
the SEC attempts to distinguish 
ness 
rella, 
that case factually as involving not 
"inside" information, but rather 
"market" information, i.e., "informa-
tion generated within the company 
relating to its assets 




However, the phrase quoted from the Brief for Respondent 
fact as a definition of "market" information, was in 
JOHN W. ZUCKE:R 
of 
infor-
presented in the Brief of Respondent as a definition 
"inside" information. Since the concept of "inside" 
mation differs significantly from the concept of 11 market" 
or nou.tsiden information, the Court may wish to amend the 
slip opinion to indicate that the quoted phrase defines 
Mr. Henry c. Lind 
July 6, 1983 
Page Two 
"inside", rather than "market" information. Indeed, the 
Court may wish to d~fine "market" information in the foot-
note by referring to other sources, some of which are cited 
elsewhere in the opinion, e.g., Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, 
and Informational Advantages-Dnder the Federal Securities 
Laws, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 322, 329 (1979); Fleischer, Mundheim 
& Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to 
Disclose Market Information, 121 u. Pa. L. Rev. 798, 799 
(1973); Barry, The Economics of Outside Information and Rule 
10 (b) ( 5) , 12 9 U. P a. L. Rev. 13 0 7 , 13 0 9-10 and n. ll ( 19 81) . 
Sincerely, 
*~Y:·M~ 
Arthur F. Mathews 
rd 
Andrew B. Weissman 
January 3 , 1984 
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MEMORANDUM '1.'0 "'llF. CONJ"ERENf'E: 
One of the- 1awver:s in this cage haR writtPn Henry 
Lind a letter pnintino out a minor inaccuracy jn n . JS, pp . 
9 and 10. 
In the first sentence of the second paraqraph in 
that note, I will chanqe th~ l~n~uage of the Rl . e.• rlause 
(p . JO) to read "i.nformation oriqinatinq outsiile the compa.ny 
1.1\no u~uaJly ahout the supply ani' demand for the company's 
securl.ties". 
~bsent dissent, I will advi~e flPnrv Lind th~t it 
is eporopr.iate to m~k~ t~is change tn the offirial rP.port~ . 
L.'P.P. , Jr . 
BS 
be: Mr. Henry Lind 
lfp/ss 05/14/83 Rider A, p. 2 6 ( D i r k s) 
DIRKS26 SALLY-POW 
The SEC, of course, has an obligated to enforce 
its rules against insider trading. For the reasons stated 
above, we think it has gone beyond any "evidence of 
congressional intent" in imposing its disclose-or-abstain 
rule in the absence of a fiduciary duty not to disclose. 
We think the SEC view that a duty to disclose arises from 
the mere possession of nonpublic market information could 
have a seriously inhibiting influence on the role of 
market analysts that the Commission itself recognizes is 
essential. It is commonplace for analysts to "ferret out 
and analyze information", see SEC Docket, at 1406, and 
this customarily is done by meeting with and questioning 
corporate officers and others who may viewed as insiders. 
2. 
Information so obtained may be the basis for judgments as 
to the market worth of a corporation's securities. The 
analyst's judgment in this respect may be made available 
in market letters or otherwise to clients of his firm. In 
the very nature of the information and indeed of the stock 
markets themselves, such information cannot be made 
simultaneously to all of the corporation's stockholders or 
the public generally. 
The line between what the corporate insider may 
disclose to the analyst, and what in turn the analyst 
properly may deduce or disclose, will not always be an 
easy one to draw. Yet, the SEC's rule, adopted in this 
case, has no limiting principle. The mere possession of 
inside information without regard to a breach of fiduciary 
duty to the coproration's stockholders, affords no 
' . ' 
3. 
guidance either to corporate executives or market 
analysts • 
.. 
lfp/ss 05/14/83 Rider A, p. 26 (Dirks) (" 1-o k 
~~ 
DIRKS26 SALLY-POW ~ '-<!.t .. t--0f. ~ 
~IV) 
The SEC, of course, has an obligation to 
enforce its rules against insider trading. We also 
appreciate the inherent difficulties even in identifying 
possible violations in view of the millions of 
transactions on the securities exchanges. We think, 
however, that the Commission has gone beyond any "evidence 
of congressional intent," see Chiarella at p. , in 
imposing its disclose-or-abstain rule ::~ ~=:~e of a 
f ic1.1ciary daly l'iet to a i sc~ ose J Imposing a duty to 
~ #u~ . disclose merely because of possession of nonpublic 
uk~ ~ 
~r, . material market information could have a seriously 
~\~/,\~~~ QJf\- 0~~ 
~cJ.. U 1 OJNl, ~b~ng influence on the role of market analysts that 
~ .. ·.·. 0-~~  7J 
~~ ~the SEC itself recognizes is essential. It is commonplace 
.do oU:: ~. o\-\l wlak 'll t'\<:G4~ ,_, ~ ~ 
-\k ~~ . """~ 
wJt- ~· 
2. 
for analysts to "ferret out and analyze information", see 
SEC Docket, at 1406, and this customarily is done by 
meeting with and questioning corporate officers and others 
t< 
who may viewed as insiders. Information so obtained may 
" 
be the basis for judgments as to the market worth of a 
corporation's securities. The analyst's judgment in this 
t,A/ 
respect ~e made available in market letters or 
1\ 
otherwise to clients of his firm. In the very nature of 
the information and indeed of the markets themselves, such 
information cannot be made simultaneously to all of the 
corporation's stockholders or the public generally. 
The line between what the corporate insider may 
disclose to the analyst, and what in turn the analyst 
~.Q. 
properly may deduce or disclose, will not-- as we~~ 
said -- always be an easy one to draw. Yet, the SEC's 
3. 
rule, adopted in this case, has no limiting principle. A 
rule imposing liability from the mere possession and use 
o;Anside information without regard to ~each of 
fiduciary duty to the coproration's stockholders, affords 
no guidance either to corporate executives or market 
analysts. 
Jim: Something along these lines might be 




This will be a rough "shot" at revising some of 
the language in our critical Subpart III-B (p. 19). 
B 
As we have shown, a tippee's liability is 
derivative from a breach of duty by the insider tipper of 
which the tippee has notice. Thus, in order to make out a 
tipping case against an individual, it is first necessary 
to establish that the insider disclosed confidential 
information in violation of his fiduciary duty to 
shareholders. It is then necessary to show that the tipee 
had notice of such a violation. These can present 
difficult factual issues. At the outset, it must be 
determined whether the information was both confidential 
and material, questions that arise in every tipping case. 
When these are answered affirmatively, the question 
remains whether the disclosure itself constituted a 
violation of duty. It is clear under our Rule lOb-5 cases 
that liability is imposed only when one acts with scienter 
(cite cases) • There would be no breach of duty where 
corporate executive inadvertently or even negligently 
disclosed the information relied upon. The critical 
2. 
quest ion, therefore, is whether there was an intent or 
purpose to disclose material nonpublic information to one 
who could trade on the information to the detriment of 
shareholders. Ascertaining intention may be difficult, 
but this is a familiar question often confronted by 
courts. There are facts and circumstances that often 
justify inferences of wrongful purpose. For example, 
there may be a relationship exists the insiderand the 
recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or 
an intention to benefit the recipient. Also, such an 
inference may arise where the disclosure was made at the 
initiative of the insider rather than by the recipient 
tipee. 
Where a breach of fiduciary duty by the insider 
is established, liability may be imposed on the tipee only 
when he has notice of such a breach. See supra, at 
Again, this is a question of fact that must be resolved in 
light of all relevant circumstances. A securities 
analyst, making a study of a particular corporation that 
includes interviews with its officers, acquires 
information that may form the basis of a market letter to 
clients. This is a typical situation, and customarily 
involves participants who understand their 
3. 
responsibilities and adhere to them. But there are cases, 
of course, where the facts -- and inferences reasonable 
drawn from them -- demonstrate the requisite scienter on 
the part of both the tipper and the tipee. This is not 
such a case. 
(Jim: If we adopt the foregoing approach, you 
will have to write it out more carefully, and with 
appropriate documentation. I would avoid, however, 
unnecessary elaboration. This subpart III-B would be 
followed by your Part IV with limited changes. For 
example, the first sentence in IV would be omitted.) 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
lfp/ss 05/14/83 Rider A, p. 1 (Dirks) 
DIRKSl SALLY-POW 
Petitioner recived material nonpublic 
information from "insiders" of a corporation with which he 
had no connection. He disclosed this information to 
investors and analysts who were prompted to use the 
information in trading in the shares of the corporation. 
The question is whether petitioner violated the antifraud 
provisions of the federal securities laws by this 
disclosure. 
lfp/ss 05/14/83 Rider A, p. 14 (Dirks) 
DIRKS14 SALLY-POW 
Mere possession of inside information did not 
impose an obligation to disclose or abstain in Chiarella. 
Similarly, merely receiving information from a corporate 
insider is not enough to impose such an obligation. The 
recipient of insider information (a "tipee") cannot be "a 
participant after the fact", see Chairella, at n. 12, or a 
"constructive trustee", see n. 17, supra, unless the 
provider of the information (the "insider") has breached 
his duty to the corporation's shareholders. Moreover, the 
tipee must have had "notice of the violation of duty". 
Loss, 3, L. Loss,(?) Securities Regulations 1451 (1961). 
2. 
Note to Jim and myself: If the above summary is correct, 
the next question analytically on the facts of this case 
is whether the insiders breached their duty. The answer 
on the facts is easy. Not even the SEC claims a breach by 
Secrest. Therefore this case could be decided quite 
narrowly on its facts. It still would be an important 
case, as the basic principle would be established. We 
would like, in addition, to make clear that the typical 
situation in which this question may arise is where 
analysts - in the normal course of their work - obtain and 
use confidential information. Determining whether the 
tipper has breached a duty and whether the tipee had 
notice, present two difficult questions. The standard we 
propose with respect to the tipper is his purpose or 
motive - essentially a subjective standard. It will be 
3. 
even more difficult to show whether or not the tipee had 
notice of an improper motive. These are the questions 
that make this case so difficult. 
--
f 
lfp/ss 05/14/83 Rider A, p. 14 (Dirks) 
DIRKS14 SALLY-POW 
Mere possession of inside information did not 
impose an obligation to disclose or abstain in Chiarella. 
Similarly, merely receiving information from a corporate 
/ 
insider is not enough to impose such an obligation. The 
recipient of insider information (a "tipee") cannot be "a 
participant after the fact", see Chairella, at n. 12, or a 
"constructive trustee", see n. 17, supra, unless the 
provider of the information (the "insider") has breached 
his duty to the corporation's shareholders. Moreover, the 
tipee must have had "notice of the violation of duty". 
Loss, 3, L. Loss,(?) Securities Regulations 1451 (1961). 
lfp/ss 05/16/83 Rider A, n. 28, p. 25 (Dirks) 
DIRKS24 SALLY-POW 
Consider a revision of n. 28 as follows: 
We agree with the view expressed in Investor's 
Management Co. by Commissioner Smith. He observed that in 
this type of case it is "important to focus on 
policing insiders and what they do • • • rather than on 
policing information per se and its possession, which I 
think is impracticable." See n. 19, p. 16. The root of 
the problem lies with the conduct of insiders, and we 
think emphasis should continue to be upon such conduct as 
it clearly was Cady Roberts. 
Similarly, following the Texas Gulf Sulphur 
decision, Commissioner (and later Chairman) Budge spoke of 
the limitation - now abandoned by the SEC - that should 
apply in insider trading cases under Rule lOb-5: 
Turning to the realm of possible defendants 
in the present and potential civil actions, the 
Commission certainly does not contemplate suing 
every person who may come accross inside 
information. In the Texas Gulf action neither 
tippees nor persons in the vast rank and file of 
employees have been named as defendants. In my 
view, the Commission in future cases normally 
should not join rank and file employees of 
persons outside the company such as an analyst 
or reporter who learn of insider information. 
Speech of Hamer Budge to the New York Regional 
Group of the American Society of Corporate 
Secretaries, Inc. (Nov. 18, 1965) (emphasis 
added), reprinted in Budge, The Texas Gulf 
Sulphur Case--What It is and What It Isn't, 






RIDER B (P J<:!J) 
The dissenting opinion talks at length about shareholder 
"losses," "injury," and "damages" without identifying the e~..t har~ 
that the shareholders suffered. See post, at 4, 7, 8, 1~ Some I 
/ 
insight into the dissent's concern can be seen in its assertion that 
I 
"[t]he effect of Dirks' selective dissemination;?' Secrist's l-0 
\ 
information was that Dirks' clients were able to shift the losses 
that were inevitable due to the Equity Funding fraud from themselver 
to uninformed market participants." Id., at 4. As a descriptive \ 
matter, the dissent is correct, but the legal significance of that 
conclusion is difficult to understand. As the dissent notes, the / 
special obligation on insider~ &f fectivel~ is a duty not to trade a~ 
all on material ryonpublic information. Id., at 12-13. And once it 
is concede that there is no duty to disclose absent trading, it is! 
h~~scape the conclusion inJ Frid:ich ;. Bradford, 542 F.2d 30;, .... ~z ~.t', 
318 {CA6 1976}, cert. denied, 429 u.s. 1053 (1977} ,A that there is no 
causal connection between inside trading and outsiders' losses: 
"Investors must be prepared to accept the risk of trading in an open 
market wi~ut complete or always accurate informatio;an·~ tt~~ 
here can be n~ argument that Secrist and Dirks created w 
.____... ----- _.... 
"victims" by disclosing the information to perso~ -who traded. If 
~~..... 
1
h d f . . d ~ t~-any..Ln t ey prevente the fraud rom cont1nu1ng an 1\ 9-r:~~Wlii!!IC• r 
i e many more i vpstors. ~QQe, it is diE~ieul~e a~sta~ 
~ W6 • lj ~ ~ f t /-JJf. ;I. ( 1 
J\ how Secrist and Dirks silenc on tne existence of the Equity 
Funding fraud would have served "this country's attempt to provide 
fair and efficient capital markets." Post, at 14. 
( 
~px_L-~M:V~~~ 
 #- .. ~":-~ ~~1-t!o' :Alasa•~
(~) . ~~~1...-t-~ &9~~ 
~~~'5 
RIDER C 
JUSTICE BLACKMON's dissenting opinion agrees with us th t the 
SEC's legal position in the proceeding~ ,below is "unsupportable~ 11 . . ~ .t .-, 1 · ; ·~~SIC~~ 
but adopts t.Ds i:Me~ new theoryAei' •ehe ~ase. But by presumptively 
m _ ..that~ iutended t~facilitate trading 
~fjducia~y duty, the dissenting opinion effectively would 
~
achieve the same result as the SEC's old theory, i. e., Apossession 
of inside information while trading would be a Rule lOb-S violation. 
~~~ ~1 disclosures of inside information areA b~aches of fiduciary 
'\ ~ . 
duty )~earl~~s-ngt ~rec~, seep. 14, supra, but even if~ i were, 
the Court has rejected the view that all breaches of corporate 
fiduciary duties are violations of the federal securities laws, see 
of an insider's duty to the corporation's shareholders. 
RIDER E 
The dissenting opinion makes some policy arguments to support 
its view that that our decision "actually rewards Dirks for his 
aiding and abetting," post, at 12, and that there is a legal duty 
"not to condition .•• transmission of information of a crime on a 
~t 
financial award," id. It .i--e a
1 
novel view for a society premised 
~~ ~~~~ 
on 
individual freedo~, however, that Government's failure to punish an 
activity is the same as rewarding the participants. And William 
Blundell, who was nominated for a Pulitzer Prize for his coverage of 
the Equity Funding scandal, see 681 F.2d, at 832 (Wright, J.), as 
well as many other reporters, might be surprised to learn that 




The dissenting opinion is concerned that the requirement that 
the insider must personally gain before he breaches his Cady, 
Roberts duty will add a significant administrative and judicial 
burden in Rule lOb-S cases. See post, at 10-11, n. 13. Although we 
preclude the SEC's use of a presumption that the insider necessarily 
violates his fiduciary duty when the insider knows that the tippee 
will trade with the information, we certainly do not discourage the 
SEC from all uses of presumptions to facilitate its prosecution of 
inside-trading cases. The voluntary disclosure of material 
nonpublic information might be, for example, presumptively a breach 
where the informant clearly had a motive for favoring the recipient, 
e. g., familial or personal relationships. Such presumptions would, 
of course, be rebuttable. 
RIDER A ( '{) 4-) 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN's dissenting opinion minimizes the role Dirks 
played in making public the Equity Funding fraud. See post, at 3 
and 12, n. 15. 
~
....e& rewrite the 
l'lJ 
efforts. See, 
The dissent staft&s~actically-aloR~ ~ ~s ef£ort~ 
.L.fe~~ ,4:-J ·~ 
history of Dirks 'I\ ~tr~o~ investigative 
e. g., pp. 115 (testimony of Stanley Goldblum, ~ 
quity Funding's Chairman and principal architect of 
Dirks "personal credit" for uncovering the fraud)~ 
S.E.C., at 1412 ("It is clear that Dirks played an important role in 
' bringing [Equity Funding's] massive fraud to light, and it is also 
true that he reported the fraud allegation to [Equity Funding's] 
auditors and sought to have the information published in the Wall 
Street Journal.") ~ 681 F. 2d, at 829 (Wright; J.) ("Largely thanks to 
Dirks one of the most infamous frauds in recent memory was uncovered 
and exposed, while the record shows that the SEC repeatedly missed 
opportunities to investigate Equity Funding."). 
lfp/ss 05/16/83 Rider A, p. (Dirks) 
DIRKSB SALLY-POW 
Add the substance of the following note at some 
appropriate place in Part V: 
On its facts, this case is the unusual one. 
Dirks is a~ analyst in a broker-dealer firm, and he did 
interview management in the course of his investigation. 
He uncovered startling information that required no 
analysis or exercise of judgment as to its market 
relevance. The principle at issue here, extends far 
beyond these facts. As we note above, the SEC's rule -
applicable without regard to any breach of duty by an 
insider that creates a derivative duty - could have wide 
ramifications. 
. ~ 
lfp/ss 05/16/83 Rider A, fn 20, p. 18 (Dirks) 
DIRKS18 SALLY-POW 
Suggested revision of n. 20: 
The SEC's decision in this case is at odds with 
that of Walton v. Morgan, Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796 (CA2 
1980). The defendant investment banking firm, representing 
one of its own corporate clients, investigated another 
corporation that was a possible target of a takeover bid by 
its client. In the course of negotiations the investment 
banking firm was given, on a confidential basis, unpublished 
material information. Subsequently, after the proposed 
takeover was abandoned, the firm was charged with relying on 
the information when it traded in the target corporation's 
stock. Apparently it was conceded that the firm knew the 
information was confidential, but it had been received in 
arm's length negotiations. In the absence of any fiduciary 
relationship, the Court of Appeals found no basis for 
t'. 
2. 
imposing a tippee liability on the investment firm. See 
id., at 799. 
May 23, 1983 
82-276 Dirks v. SEC 
Rider A, page 15 
As this case illustrates, all disclosures of 
confidential corporate information are not inconsistent 
with the duty insiders owe to 
-tkrc:. '•s A 
usual 
lA· i•~~«'• CIVI.:t, laM-:Y;.ie€) is 
lg..u~v 
r.eoeive eorper~t€? 
dnfermation from iftsiee:t&a~ 
be clear either to the 
See n. !~supra. It may not 
' corporate insider or to the 
recipient analyst - whether the information will be viewed 
as material nonpubli~formation. There may be s~ations ~ 
where both the insider and the analyst recipient have 
acted in good faith, and yet release of the information 
affected the market. Whether disclosure is a breach of 
duty therefore depends in large part on the purpose or 
good faith of the insider who made the disclosure. Absent 
an improper purpose, there has been no breach of duty to 
stockholders e.g., a corporate official mistakenly 
thinks the information already has been disclosed or that 
it is not material enough to affect the market. And 4-ft:;,...--
T-
~ absen~ ~ a breach by the insider, there is no 
derivative breach. 
lfp/ss 05/23/83 Rider B, p. 15, fn. 20 (Dirks) 
DIRK15B SALLY-POW 
We do not suggest that knowingly trading on 
inside information is "socially desirable or even that it 
is devoid of moral considerations". Dooley, at 55. Nor 
~ 
do we ~e~ an absence of ~ responsibility to disclose 
promptly indications of illegal actions by a corporation 
to the proper authorities - typically the SEC and Exchange 
authorities in cases involving securities. Depending on 
~ 
the circumstances, even where permitted by law one's 
~ ~ 
trading on material nonpublic information is behavior that 
may fall below ethical standards of conduct adopted by 
13u.r 
professional organizations of the securities business. ~ ~n 
/J.-1£~ 
an~area of the law such as securities regulation, where 
2. 
legal principles of general application must be applied, 
there may be 
... 
lfp/ss 05/23/83 Rider A, p. 16 (Dirks) 
DIRKS16 SALLY-POW 
Determining the purpose of any one disclosure, a 
8J 
question of fact, will not always be easy. ~ is 
A 
essential, we think, to have a guiding principle: as 
stated by Commissioner Smith, there must be a breach of 
the insider's fiduciary duty. The rule adopted by the SEC 
in this case would have no limiting principle. 22 
May 23, 1983 
82-276 Dirks v. SEC 
Rider A, page 15 
As this case illustrates, all disclosures of 
confidential corporate information are not inconsistent 
with the duty insiders owe to shareholders. The more 
usual context in which the question of insider duty may 
arise is when security analysts receive corporate 
information from insiders. See n. 16 supra. It may not 
be clear - either to the corporate insider or to the 
recipient analyst - whether the information will be viewed 
A;t-
as material nonpublicj nformation. There may be si~ations ~ 
where both the insider and the analyst recipient have 
acted in good faith, and yet release of the information 
affected the market. Whether disclosure is a breach of 
duty therefore depends in large part on the purpose or 
good faith of the insider who made the disclosure. Absent 
an improper purpose, there has been no breach of duty to 
stockholders e.g., a corporate official mistakenly 
thinks the information already has been disclosed or that 
it is not material enough to affect the market. And ~ 
~ abseny 9-f a breach by the insider, there is no 
derivative breach. 
lfp/ss 05/23/83 Rider A, p. 16 (Dirks) 
DIRKS16 SALLY-POW 
Determining the purpose of any one disclosure, a 
question of fact, will not always be easy. It is 
essential, we think, to have a guiding principle: as 
stated by Commissioner Smith, there must be a breach of 
the insider's fiduciary duty. The rule adopted by the SEC 
in this case would have no limiting principle. 22 
lfp/ss 05/23/83 Rider B, p. 15, fn. 20 {Dirks) 
DIRK15B SALLY-POW 
We do not suggest that knowingly trading on 
inside information is "socially desirable or even that it 
is devoid of moral considerations". Dooley, at 55. Nor 
do we suggest an absence of all responsibility to disclose 
promptly indications of illegal actions by a corporation 
to the proper authorities - typically the SEC and Exchange 
authorities in cases involving securities. Depending on 
the circumstances, even where permitted by law one's 
trading on material nonpublic information is behavior that 
may fall below ethical standards of conduct adopted by 
professional organizations of the securities business. In 
an area of the law such as securities regulation, where 
2. 
legal principles of general application must be applied, 
there may be 
lfp/ss 06/25/83 Rider A, p. (Dirks) 
DIRKSB SALLY-POW 
Consider adding a note along the following lines: 
In applying Rule lOb-5, the dissent would draw a 
distinction impossible as a guide to conduct or to 
administer by courts and the SEC. It concedes that an 
insider is not liable under the Rule "unless he has the 
requisite scienter". Seen. 10, post. The dissent then 
proposes a new definition of scienter: "[T]he scienter 
requirement addresses the intent necessary to support 
liability; it does not address the motives behin~the 
intent." Id. Therefore, ~Secrist "knew and intended 
~ 
that Dirks would cause trading", l he possessed the 
requisite scienter regardless of what his motives may have 
been. This distinction ignores both the language of lOb-5 
1'· 
2. 
and the meaning of "scienter". See Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 u.s. 185, 197-199 (1976) (the language 
"manipulative", "device", and "contrivance" connote 
"intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or 
defraud investors •... ") Even the unique facts of 
this case illustrate the distinction that the dissent 
overlooks. Dirks certainly intended to convey relevant 
information that mangement was unlawfully concealing, and 
- so far as the record goes - he quite honestly believed 
that persuading Dirks to investigate was the best way to 
disclose the fraud. The dissent acknowledges that any 
other means of "disclosures would have been difficult", 
post, at 13, and yet would charge Secrist with a breach of 
fiduciary duty even though there was no motive to deceive 
or defraud investors". We recognize the inherent 
3. 
difficult of detemining either the intent or motive of an 
actor in a particular situation. Each connotes the need 
for a subjective inquiry. Courts, however, necessarily 
look to objective evidence to ascertain the statutory 
requirement of intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud. 
The standard adopted by the Court today in cases of this 
kind is whether the insider receives a direct or indirect 
personal benefit from the disclosure. Imperfect as this 
may be it is a standard. The dissent's distinction 




Scienter--"a mental state embracing intent to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud," Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 u.s. 185, 
193, n. 12 (1976)--is an independent element of a Rule lOb-S 
violation. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980). Contrary to 
the dissent's suggestion, see post, at p. 7, n. 10, motivation is 
not irrelevant to the issue of scienter. It is not enough that an 
insider's conduct results in harm to investors; rather, a violation 
may be found only where there is "intentional or willful conduct 
designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or 
artificially affecting the price of securities." Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, supra, at 199. The issue in this case, however, is not 
~
whether Secrist or Dirks acted with scienter, but rather there was 
1\ 
any deceptive or fraudulent conduct at all, i.e., whether Secrist's 
disclosure constituted a breach of his fiduciary duty and thereby 
caused injury to shareholders. Seen. 27, infra. Only if there was 
such a breach did Dirks, a tippee, acquire a fiduciary duty to 
disclose or abstain. 
77.-.c-~ RIDER E 
1\ ~bJ.ot~!H!Iii tha e 1 'i~~U~9Rill f3a4:A 1 ~JQ _.il:AR9t ii~li'Q~~hat 
"Secrist violated his duty to Equity Funding shareholders by 
transmitting material nonpublic information to Dirks with the 
intention that Dirks would cause his clients to trade on that 
information." Post, at 12. By ~reach of fiduciary duty 
whenever inside information is intentionally disclosed to securities 
traders, the disse~t~n1 ~inion effectively would achieve the same 
t H& [ - "-
result as the SEC's theory below, i. e., mere possession of inside 
... f*" ~ ~~ IACt~....,J.. ........._ 
information while tradinJ uaM-1 a Rule lOb-S violation. The /,./" 
issent agrees that an insider does not violate Rule lOb-S ~ss he 
intend[s] that the inside information be used for 
of shareholders." - Post, at 8, n. 11. --Bu~ 
~~~~~~A 1ntentional disclosures to those 
~  ,lc . . ;B ~c..ll..a ,_...a._.,.........~~~~ 
ho will trade w~lr be to the disadvantage 6f shareholders. ~ ~1 
~ .~ ~ . 
~,.,..., t:7'JI(.J &haaA ., · ••a·t Me,.4ft4J ...... ~~ 
o:A aRd diS.C..~1.1r~J\ inside information ~ not~
of an ~Chiarella, 445 u.s., 
.,fr ;x!.. .fl. I 0 .(,. .S-
of ~;:~l!al GeeYFities 
1~, there must be fraud. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 
U.S. 185, 199 {1976} {statutory words "manipulative," "device," and 
"contrivance ••• connot[e] intentional or willful conduct designed 
to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially 
affecting the price of securities"} {emphasis added}. 
}~ There is no evidence that Secrist's disclosure was intended to 
or did in fact "deceive or defraud" anyone. Secrist certainly 
intended to convey relevant information that management was 
unlawfully concealing, and -- so far as the record shows -- he 
believed that persuk~s~i~ :::::::/::::~ 
the fraud. l Under any objective standard, Secrist received disclose 
no direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure. 
t.c:~~ch-t-The dissenting opinion tallts &t ie1'1:~+!'R1) ; shareholder 
"losses," "injury," and "damages," but as the court noted in 
Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 318 (CA6 1976), cert. denied, 
429 U.S. 1053 (1977), there is no clear causal connection between 
inside trading and outsiders' losses: "Investors must be prepared to 
accept the risk of trading in an open market without complete or 
always accurate information." In one sense, as market values 
fluctuate and investors act on inevitably incomplete or incorrect 
information, there always are winners and losers; those who have 
"lost" have not been defrauded. ~nside trading for personal gain is 
fraudulent other is a violation of the 
federal securities investors would prefer to 
--~--
stock where directors and officers do not secretly compensate 
themselves and "indulg [e themselves] to the point of dishonesty" b ~ 
trading on information not available to shareholders Dooley, ---Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 va. L. Rev. 1, 39-
41, 70 (1980),., t.ft us=~aely_~~ ~~ 
• 1~ SHPra. Thus, there is little legal significance to the 
dissent's argument that Secrist and Dirks created new "victims" by 
disclosing the information to persons who traded. In fact, they 
prevented the fraud from continuing and victimizing many more 
doubt whether Secrist and Dirks' silence 
the Equity Funding fraud would have served 
3. 
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FIRST DRAFT: Dirks v. SEC, No. 82-276 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether an individual 
~ 
... 
who is not an officer or director of J a corporation but 
nonetheless receives 
\ 
information material nonpublic 
concerning ongoing criminal conduct within the corporation 
from an officer or director violates the antifraud 
provisions of the federal securities laws by transmitting 1 
that information to persons who use the information to buy 
or sell the corporation's stock. 
I 
In March 1973, petitioner was an officer at a New 
York broker-dealer firm, providing investment analysis on 1 
insurance company securities to institutional investors. 
On March 6, petitioner received information from Ronald 
Secrist, a former officer of Equity Funding of America, a 
diversified company primarily engaged in selling life 
insurance and mutual funds, to the effect that the assets 2 
of that company were vastly overstated as the result of 
2. 
fraudulent internal corporate practices. Seer ist stated 
that regulatory agencies had failed to act on similar 
charges made by Equity Funding employees, and urged 
petitioner to verify the fraud and publicly disclose it. 
Petitioner decided to investigate personally the 
~ fl!tuv" 
allegations ~ £ly~ to Los Angeles, where Equity Funding 
.I ~ A 
~ ..u}-~~~ 
had its headquarters, ~ interview employees of the 
A 
di 
company. Despite denials of wrongdoing by ~ 
senior management, petitioner obtained 
substantial corroboration of the charges of fraud from 
current and former company employees. Neither petitioner 
nor his firm owned or traded any Equity Funding stock, but 
throughout his investigation, petitioner candidly 
2 
3 
discussed with a number of investors and analysts the 3 
progress of his investigation and the information he had 
obtained. Not surprisingly, some of the persons who spoke 
with petitioner and learned of the alleged fraud sold 
their holdings of Equity Funding securities. Five 
investment advisers who communicated with petitioner 4 
liquidated securities worth more than $16 million. 
During the entire week that petitioner was in Los 
3. 
Angeles, he was in touch regularly with William Blundell, 
the Wall Street Journal's Los Angeles bureau chief. 
Petitioner urged Blundell to write a story for the Journal 4 
fr.-~ 
on the allegations o~-fra~a a-t -Bq1:1i Ly fi'uwHAg. Blundell, 
'\ . 
however, was afraid that publishing such damaging rumors 
supported only by hearsay from former employees might be 
libelous and declined to write the story, discounting the 
allegations because he did not believe that such a huge 5 
fraud could go undetected. 
During the two-week period in which petitioner 
pursued his investigation and spread word of Seer ist' s 
charges, the price of Equity Funding stock fell 
precipitously from $26 per share to less than $15. This 5 
led the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) to halt trading on 
March 27. Shortly thereafter state insurance authorities 
impounded Equity Funding's records and uncovered evidence 
of the fraud. Only then did the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) file a complaint against Equity Funding1 6 
1As early as 1971, the SEC had received allegations 
of fraudulent accounting practices at Equity Funding. 
Moreover, on March 9, 1973, an official of the California 
Insurance Department informed the SEC's regional office in 
Los Angeles of Secrist's charges of fraud. Petitioner 
Footnote continued on next page. 
and only then, on April 2, did the Journal publish a front 
page story based largely on information assembled by 
petitioner. Equity Funding immediately went into 
. h. 2 
~~a.f~e:v~~~~ 
rece1vors 1p. a,''AJ' ~~.a.--~j/tL s ~ The SEC+~~= ~t~t 
~ 
.Petitioner '\aided and abetted violations of §17 (a) of the 
Securities Act of 1933, lS u.s.c. §77q(a) (1976) , 3 §10 (b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, lS u.s.c. 
§78j(b) , 4 and Commission Rule lOb-S, 17 C.P.R. §240.10b-S 
himself voluntarily presented his information at the SEC's 
regional office beginning on March 27. 
2A federal grand jury in Los Angeles subsequently 
returned a lOS-count indictment against 22 persons, 
including many of Equity Funding's officers and directors. 
Those proceedings were concluded by entry of guilty pleas 
or convictions after trial of all defendants for one or 
more of the counts against them. 
3section 17(a) provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the 
offer or sale of any securities by the use of 
any means or instruments of transportation or 
communication in interstate commerce or by the 
use of the mails, directly or indirectly--
"(1) to employ any device, scheme, or 
artifice to defraud, or 
" ( 2) to obtain money or property by means 
of any untrue statement of a rna ter ial fact or 
any omission to state a material fact necessary 
in order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they were 
made, not misleading, or 
"(3} to engage in any transaction, 
practice, or course of business which operates 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the 
purchaser." 
4section lO(b) provides: 
Footnote continued on next page. 
6 
~~- h).,e..,~~~ 5. 
(Jz=~r~ /Jl:-~ 'P-dv -~~ 
4~9~~~~ 
~~  
~tA-L.. ~·.L.-U_A.-o£- .. ...«i#~ ?) 
-~-~;e.--~11.. ~~~ 
(1982) , 5 when he repeated the allegations of fraud to 7 
--~J'".4"7 ~q~L . 
members of the investment community~ho later sold their tr~ 
Equity Funding stock. The Commission concluded: "Where 
'tippees'--regardless of their motivation or occupation--
come in to possess ion of rna ter ial information that they 
know is confidential and know or should know came from a 7 
corporate insider,' they must either publicly disclose 
that information or refrain from trading." 21 S.E.C. 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, 
directly or indirectly, by the use of any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of 
the mails, or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange--.... 
"(b) To use or employ, in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security registered 
on a national securities exchange or any 
security not so registered, any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention 
of such rules and regulations as the Commission 
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest or for the protection of 
investors." 
5Rule lOb-S provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, 
directly or indirectly, by the use of any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of 
the mails or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange, 
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or 
artifice to defraud, 
"(b) To make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements 
made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading, or 
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or 
course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security." 
6. 
Docket 1401, 1407 ( 1981) (footnote omitted) (quoting 
Chiarella v. United States, 445 u.s. 222, 230 n. 12 
(1980)). Recognizing, however, that petitioner played "an 8 
important role in bringing [Equity Funding] 's massive 
fraud to light," 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1412-1413, the 
Commission only censured petitioner for his conduct. 6 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
entered a judgment without accompanying opinion, denying, 8 
"for the reasons stated by the Commission in its opinion," 
petitioner's petition for review of the censure order. 
Judge Tamm dissented from the judgment. Subsequently, 
Judge Wright, a member of the panel, issued an opinion. 
Judge Robb concurred in the result, and Judge Tamm 9 
dissented; neither filed a separate opinion. Judge Wright 
believed that "the obligations of corporate fiduciaries 
pass to all those to whom they disclose their information 
before it has been disseminated to the public at large." 
6section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 
u.s.c. §78..Q.(b) (4) (E), provides that the Commission may 
impose certain sanctions, including a censure, on any 
person associated with a registered broker-dealer who has 
"willfully aided [or] abetted" any violation of the 
federal securities laws. See 15 u.s.c. §78ff(a) 
{providing criminal penalties). 
7. 
681 F.2d 824, 839 (1982). Alternatively, Judge Wright 9 
concluded that, as an employee of a broker-dealer, 
petitioner "had [violated] obligations to the SEC and to 
the public completely independent of any obligations he 
acquired" from sources at Equity Funding. Id., at 840. 
We granted a writ of certiorari, ___ u.s. ___ (1982), 10 
56C~}k 
because of the importance to the securities industry of 
A 
the question presented by this case. We now reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
II 
The majority rule in this country is that, while 10 
corporate officers and 
~~t!l.-1~~ 
directors owe thei r corporation ~ 
fiduciary duties to preserve its assets and to maintain 
its secrets, that duty does not apply to the stockholder 
in the sale and purchase of stock. See, e. g., Treadway 
Companies, Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 375-377 (CA2 11 
1980); 3A Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Laws of Private 
Corporations §1168.1 (1975 & 1982 Supp.). A minority of 
jurisdictions, however, have recognized an independent 
fiduciary duty running from the corporate officers and 
directors to individual shareholders with whom they trade 11 
41 
8. 
in the corporation's stock. See, e. g., Oliver v. Oliver, 
118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903); Stewart v. Harris, 69 
Kan. 498, 77 P. 277 (1904); 3A Fletcher, supra, §1168.2. 
These courts hold that, while he is not forbidden to deal 
with a shareholder, an officer or director's relationship 12 
of trust requires him to "inform such stockholder of the 
true condition of the affairs of the corporation" before 
trading with him. Stewart, 69 Kan., at 508, 77 P., at 
281. Cf. Strong v. Repide, 213 u.s. 419, 431-435 (1909) 
(duty to disclose because of special circumstances). 
clnsistent with this latter 
'/L.~/ 
"agency" uty owed by 
i~{iders directly to their company's shareholders, the SEC 
n the seminal case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 
S.E.C. 907 (196l), f recognized that a breach of the 
12 
) 
insiders' agency duties to shareholders also could be a 13 
violation of Rule lOb-5. 7 The Commission acknowledged 
7There are good reasons to view the breach of this I 
articular common-law duty as a violation of the fe~ral / 
securities laws. The breach of an insider's ~ustee 
duties to the corporation are peculiarly _wi~hin the 
corporation's ability to police, foL incompetence or 
negligence in management, while not beneficial to any 
particular corporation's stoCk, do not undermine the 
integrity of the securities market as a whole. 
Corporations may have little incentive, on the other hand, 
to sanction violations of an insider's agency duties to 
shareholders, and the breaches of this duty are 
Footnote continued on next page. 
9. 
that the special obligation to disclose8 or abstain from 
trading traditionally has been required of officers, 
directors, and controlling stockholders, id., at 911, but 
did not so limit the breadth of the duty required by the 13 
federal securities laws. 
Analytically, the obligation, rests on two 
principal elements; first, the existence of a 
relationship giving access, directly or 
indirectly, to information intended to be 
available only for a corporate purpose and not 
for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, 
the inherent unfairness involved where a party 
takes advantage of such information knowing it 
is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing. 
particularly difficult for outsiders to detectn 
Consequently, investors that prefer to own stock where the 
directors and officers do not secretly compensate 
themselves and "indulg ~ themselves] to the point of 
dishonesty" by trading on information not available to 
market participants generally may have difficulty 
distinguishing between corporations that tolerate such 
practices and those that do not. See Dooley, Enforcement 
of Insider Trading Rest~ictions, 66 Va. L. Rev. 1, 39-41, 
70 (1980). These dishonest acts induce investors to enter 
into or remain in a relationship that they would prefer to 
avoid, and the resulting loss of welfare inevitably 
undermines market confidence. See In re Faberge, Inc., 45 
S.E.C. ):4~ 254 (1973). Thus, insider trading satisfies 
the legal requirements of §lOb because it presupposes both 
i~stor injury and deception. See Dooley, supra, at 41 
e agree with the Cady, Roberts Commission that "[a] 
significant purpose of the Exchange Act was to eliminate 
the idea that use of inside information for personal 
advantage was a normal emolument of corporate off ice." 
See 40 S.E.C., at 912 n. 15. See Foremost-McKesson, Inc. 
v. Provident Securites Co., 423 u.s. 232, 255 (1976); §16 
of the Securities Act of 1934, 15 u.s.c. §78p; H.R. Rep. 
No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934); s. Rep. No. 792, 
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 9 (1934). 
8The SEC's disclosure duty is not just to the 
immediate purchasers or sellers: "Proper and adequate 
disclosure of significant corporate developments can only 
be effected by public release through the appropriate 
public media, designed to achieve a broad dissemination to 
the investing public generally and without favoring any 








Id., at 912 (footnote omitted). See Chiarella, 445 u.s., 
at 241 (BURGER, C.J., dissenting~ In re Van Alstyne, ,Noel 
& Co., 43 S .E.C. 1080, 1085 (1969) (noting "the inherent 
unfairness involved where one, with access by virtue of a 
special relationship to the issuer to material 
information ••• intended to be available only for a 
corporate purpose and not for his personal benefit, takes 
advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable toj 
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933, 936 (1968). Thus 
the Commission has expanded the class of individuals wh 
fall under the federal disclose-or-abstain obligation, an 
premised the disclosure requirement simply on " ( i) the 
existence of a relationship affording access to inside 
information intended to be available only for a corporate 
purpose, and ( ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate 
insider to take advantage of that information by trading 
without disclosure." Chiarella, 445 u.s., at 227. 9 J --· -- - --: ~-- -- --- -----
9The Cady, Roberts conditions for imposing a duty 
to disclose or abstain from trading are not arbitrary 
limitations on the use of inside information, but are 
consistent with the common-law rules and grounded in the 
policies underlying the federal securities laws. As a 






In Chiarella, we quoted with approval the Cady, 16 
Roberts statement of the basis for the disclose-or-abstain 
rule and adopted the Commission's twin elements for 
finding a violation of Rule 10b-5's10 insider-trading 
restrictions--a fiduciary relationship and the 
exploitation of confidential information acquired as a 17 
result of that relationship. See 445 u.s., at 227. The 
~ -JtlSki~ this Court unanimously agreed that there is no 
general duty11 to make disclosure before trading with 
material nonpublic information, 12 and recognized that "a 
general proposition, there is no duty to disclose 
information to the public at large before engaging in a 
commercial transaction or before imparting the information 
to other persons. See Chiarella, 445 u.s., at 228: id., 
at 239-240 (BURGER, C.J., dissenting). Moreover, itTs 
evident that stock ownership and securities trading by 
insiders are not nec~ariry detrimental to the 
corporation, to shareholders, or to society. Thus, the 
Cadx, Roberts elements are simply an acknowledgement that 
it 1s only some uses of inside information, and then only 
under certain circumstances, that will create liability. 
lOAlthough §10 (b) and §17 (a) both extend to a wide 
variety of fraudulent practices, there are certain 
differences in their coverage. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 u.s. 
680, 687-702 (1980). In determining whetherthere is a 
duty to disclose nonpublic information before trading or 
tipping, however, identical principles apply. 
11The Court of Appeals in Chiarella had affirmed 
petitioner's conviction by holding that "'[a]nyone--
corporate insider or not--who regularly receives-material 
nonpublic information may not use that information to 
trade in securities without incurring an affirmative duty 
to disclose.'" 445 u.s., at 231 (emphasis in original). 
12 See 445 U.S., at 233: id., at 237 (STEVENS, J., 
concurring): id., at 238-239 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in 
the result); id., at 239-240 (BURGER, C.J., dissenting) 
Footnote continued on next page. 
12. 
duty to disclose under §lO(b) does not arise from the mere 17 
possession of nonpublic market information." Id., at 235. 
Instead, such a duty arises either from the existence of a 
fiduciary relationship or some act of misappropriation or 
. 13 convers1on. 
Chiarella turned on the absence of a fiduciary 
relationship, 
d-4-
~ this was 
"' 
the r- element of an 
insider-trading violation that was missing from the case 
18 
PL::z_. f- 1/V WzS4.-. 
against petitioner there. -B-Y-t ~e also recognized " ''4-t to .. 
' 
» ~ (1--1><' the ~act of trading which essentially con st i tu tes / the 
violation of Rule lOb-5, for it is this which brings( the 
illicit benefit to the insider, and it is this con uct 
which impairs the integrity of the market and which is he 
target of the rule." Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 
("As a general rule, neither party to an arm's-length 
business transaction has an obligation to disclose 
information to the other unless the parties stand in some 
confidential or fiduciary relation."): id., at 252, n. 2 
(BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) (recognizing that there is no 
obligation to disclose material nonpublic information 
obtained through the exercise of "diligence or acumen" and 
"honest means," as opposed to "stealth"). 
13see 445 u.s., at 227-235: id., at 238-239 
(BRENNAN, J., concurring in the resul t)--;--id. , at 2 39-243 
(BURGER, C.J., dissenting) (duty of disclosure arises from 
mere possession only where information is illegally 
obtained): id., at 245-247 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) 
(mere possession creates duty where information not 
legally available to others in the investment community). 
18 
13. 
318 (CA6 1976), cert. denied, 429 u.s. 1055 (1977). See 
445 u.s., at 227; id., at 228-229 ("This relationship 19 
[between insiders and shareholders] gives rise to a duty /1 
to disc lose because of the 'necessity of preventing a 
corporate insider from ••• tak[ing] unfair advantage of the 
uninformed minority stockholders.'") (quoting Speed v. 
Transamer ica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (Del. 1951)); 19 
id., at 249 (BLACKMON, J., dissenting) ("Both the SEC and 
the courts have stressed the insider's misuse of secret 
knowledge as the gravamen of illegal conduct."). As the 
Commission noted in Cady, Roberts, unjust enrichment, the 
insider's exploitation of information "not for the 20 
I 
personal benefit of anyone," is also an element of a 
violation of the duty to disclose or abstain. Thus, an 
insider, because of the fiduciary status he has to the 
shareholders of his corporation, will be liable where he 
exploits material nonpublic information for personal gain 20 
and fails to disclose that information before doing so. 
Unlike insiders 
relationship with the 
who 
III 
..tyPje&liY have a 
;, ~~ 
fiduciary 
corporation) '\ shareholders, the 
~?'LO ~ $' 
typical tippee.A doQs Ret--heW'! a .f.;iduoi«~y relationship w4-t.1:h 
f\ ~ ~ 
21 
~~~~ 
In }~e ab•enGQ ef such / 
"duty" to refrain from trading on inside information. 
What is clear is the prophylactic need for a ban on 
. 
~
~t ieast some tippee trading. Because corporate1Ao£fi~ers 21 
) are forbidden by their ~ationship 
from using undisclosed corporate information to their 
personal advantage, they may not give such information to 
outsiders for the same improper purpose. "[T] hat which 
sure, under certain circumstances, such as 
where cor orate information is revealed legitimately to an 
underwri er, accountant, or attorney working for the 
company, ~ outsiders may, as a result of such relationship, 
become fiduciaries of the company. The basis for imposing 
fiduciary duties is not simply that such persons acquired 
nonpublic corporate information, but that they have 
~~ entered into ~~onfidential relationship in the conduct of 
·~ ,-- the business ·o'I: the enterprise and are given access to 
information solely for corporate purposes. See SEC v. 
Monarch Fund, 608 F.2d 938, 942 {CA2 1979); In re 
Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 645 {1971); In re 
Van Alystne, Noel & Co., 43 S.E.C. 1080, 1084-1085 {1969); 
In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 
S.E.C. 933, 937 {1968); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 
111~ S.E.C., at 912. When such'\~ breaches his fiduciary ~~-- relationship, he may be treated more properly as a tipper 
than a tippee. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 237 {CA2 1974) 
{investment banker learned rna ter ial information through 
. . _ _,}. _ his work on a proposed public offering for the company) • 
~ For t~ duties to be imposed, however, "there must be 
some expectation of trust and confidence with respect to 
the information imparted, and the person receiving the 
information must assent at least implicitly to the 
expectation." Langevoort, Insider Trading and the 
Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 
Calif. L. Rev. 1, 30 {1982). 
15. 
the trustee has no right to do he has no right to 22 
authorize •••• " Mosser v. Darrow, 341 u.s. 267, 272 
s~, ~ 
(1951}. :J?tH-t.her, the transactions of -a-i-1 who knowingly 
participate with the ~~~~*"~;{ such a breach are "as 
forbidden" as transactions "on behalf of the trustee 
himself." Id. See Jackson v. Smith, 254 u.s. 586, 589 22 
(1921}; Jackson v. Ludeling, 88 u.s. 616, 631-632 (1874}. 
As the Court explained in Mosser, a contrary rule "would 
open up opportunities for devious dealings in the name of 
the others that the trustee could not conduct in his own." 
15 341 u.s., at 271. 
Hence, as we noted in Chiarella, "[t]he tippee's 
obligation has been viewed as arising from his role as a 
participant after the fact in the insider's breach of a 
fiduciary duty." 16 445 u.s., at 230 n. 12. As the SEC 
15"Ei ther the transactions so traded could be 
concluded by a relative or an acquaintance of the insider, 
or implied understandings could arise under which 
reciprocal tips between insiders in different corporations 
could be given." SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulpher Co., 446 F.2d 
1301, 1308 (CA2}, cert. denied, 404 u.s. 1005 (1971}. 
16For this proposition, the Court cited 
Subcommittees of American Bar Association Section of 
Corporation, Banking, and Business Law, Comment Letter on 
Material, Non-Public Information (Oct. 15, 1973} reprinted 
in BNA, Securities Regulation & Law Report No. 233, at Dl, 
D2 (Jan. 2, 1974}, which states: 
Footnote continued on next page. 
23 
16. 
concedes, the tippee's duty is purely "derivative" of his 23 
informant's duty. Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. See Chiarella, 
445 U.s., at 246 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting); Investors 
Management, 44 S.E.C., at 651 (Smith, Commissioner, 
concurring in the result) (" [T] ippee responsibility must 
be related back to insider responsibility by a necessary 24 
finding that the tippee knew the information was given to 
him in breach of a duty by a person having a special 
relationship to the issuer not to disclose the 
information."). It therefore is clear that, although 
tippees may assume an insider's ~GJj dut1f' to 24 
shareholders, this is not because they receive ins idee:..--
d-
information, r rather ~e they receive i:he--1 
~ improperly. As THE CHIEF JUSTICE stated in 
Chiarella, a disclosure obligation should exist "when an 
informational advantage is obtained, not by superior 25 
experience, foresight, or industry, but by some unlawful 
[I]t appears that the Commission's view is based 
upon the premise that the tippee who does trade 
upon such information is a participant after the 
fact in the tipping corporate official's breach 
of fiduciary duty, and, under common law 
principles, the tippee may be held responsible 
for the consequences of that breach in 
appropriate cases. 
17. 
means." 445 U.S., at 240 (BURGER, C.J., dissenting} 
(emphasis added} • 17 
When tipping properly is viewed as a means of 
indirectly violating the disclose-or-abstain rule, it is6 25 
~t the elements of a rule lOb-5 violation in a 
tipping case should be the same as in an insider trading 
case. Thus, just as possession of inside information did 
not impose an obligation to disclose or abstain in 
Chiarella, s~ "tippee" of corporate insiders is 
C"( 
not enough to inherit such a duty. In other words, the 
simple release of information may violate trustee duties 
to the company, but it violates no obligations running 
17Professor Loss has traced tippee liability to the 
concept in the law of restitution that "' [w]here a 
fiduciary in violation of his duty to the beneficiary 
communicates confidential information to a third person, 
the third person, if he had notice of the violation of 
duty, holds upon a constructive trust for the beneficiary 
any profit which he makes through the use of such 
information.'" 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1451 
(1961} (quoting Restatement of Restitution §201(2} 
(1937}}. Other authorities ~ I1kewise Aexpressed the 
view that tippee liability ex1s s only where there has 
been a breach of trust by an insider. See, e. g., Ross v. 
Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (SDNY 1973}: Brudney, 
Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under 
the Federal Securities Laws, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 322, 348 
(1979}: Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry 
Into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 
121 u. Pa. L. Rev. 798, 818 n. 76 (1973} ("The extension 
of rule lOb-5 restrictions to tippees of corporate 
insiders can best be justified on the theory that they are 







directly to shareholders. ~ 
A 2€ 
The Commission's position, as stated in its opinion, 
is that "tippees such as [petitioner] who receive non-
public material information from insiders become 'subject 
to the same duty as [the] insider,'" 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 
1410 n. 42 {quoting Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 2i 
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 237 {CA2 1974) 
{quoting Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp., at 410)), and that 
"a tippee breaches the fiduciary duty which he assumes 
from the insider when the tippee knowingly transmits the 
information to someone who will probably trade on the 2i 
basis thereof," 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1410 n. 42. The 
outsider, by simply possessing nonpublic information while 
trading with a shareholder, is thus a participant in the 
insider's breach of duty to the shareholder and violates 
evu-
his inherited obligation to the shareholder when he is on 2~ 
notice that the insider himself is disabled from using the 
information without disclosure. 
, . 1 ,, IV~ J ~ .f· 
~~ ~· Courts are not free to "disregard [an] agency's view" 
~ 
5 ~~- of one of its statutes and to construe the statute based 
~ 
vv~ 
11 ~ 6f-' ")f.. I K D'W ~f-~ ' 
19. 
on their "own view of what would best serve the purpose 28 
and policy" of the statute. See Federal Election 
Commission v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 
454 u.s. 27, 36 (1981). The SEC's theory here, 18 however, 
~ vi4..-cv-
differs little from tfie ....SEe'~ theory that we rejected as 
inconsistent with congressional intent in Chiarella. In 
~ 
essence, the Commission's position is that ~ duty to 
disclose or 
~ 
abstain ~assed automatically 
t\ 
w-k.t ... -1. 
t6 petitioner . 
' /lh"Yk.t .y~-/-t.f 
18The SEC itself / _bas" recognized that tippee 
liability properly is imposed only in circumstances where 
the "tippee" knows, or has reason to know, that the 
insider has improperly disclosed , inside corporate 
information. In Investors Management Co., the Commission 
stated that in finding tippee liability one element is 
that the tippee knew or had reason to know "that the 
information was non-public and had been obtained 
improperly by selective revelation or otherwise." Id., at 
641 (emphasis added). Commissioner Smith, concurring in 
Investors Management, expressly read this test to mean 
that before a tippee can be held liable it must be shown 
that he received information in breach of an insider's 
duty not to disclose it. Id., at 649 (warning against 
interpretations that would "penalize or thwart the quest 
for new knowledge by analysts and researchers"). Indeed, 
before this case, the Commission apparently never held 
that tippee liability may be imposed where there has been 
no breach of fiduciary duty by the insider. 
What the Commission has said is that a recipient of 
the information need not have "actual knowledge that the 
information was disclosed in a breach of fiduciary duty 
not to reveal it." Faberge, Inc., 45 S.E.C., at 256 
(emphasis added). See Investors Management Co., 44 
s ,.E.C., at 643. , These statements s:::r:mp;fy indicate thatl\ a 
br~ach of duty by the insider is required, but that 
constructive knowledge of the breach will suffice. , Th 1 
impo~ee r1a 1 1 y unae:r sue cfrcumst:ances is 
thus nothing more than an applic 'on f the well-accepted 
common-law principle one who acquires nonpublic 
information throug participation in a breach of duty may 
become a "constructive trustee" with fiduciary duties with 
r~spect to that information. See 5 A. Scott, Scott o 
~~ sts §506, at 3569-3570 (1967). 
") 
29 
), ;U t.~ <- t-A-< d. L ~ I.J :J ;/ "?~ ~ " (L'.,~ 1 _.; I 
with 1 the inside information ~ana ~e m~r~ act of disclosure 
. , /. L/jl • L / / ~ 
of nonpublic information by corporate insiders, regardless 
.L 
of how proper and legal, conferred on petitioner duties of 29 1 
~ ~ y f )t " ~ ' f 
drsclosure. Ln-hQld~ng, howev~~, that the mere possession 
'\ 
. .s . 
of nonpublic material information do~s noe g1ve~ r1se to a 
.duty to disclose,. s..e-e-4-4.5--U-..S., at 235, 
0 fi:nd 
c.. 
a general duty between all participants in 
market transactions to forgo actions based on 
material, nonpublic information. Formulation of 
such a broad duty, which departs radically from 
the established doctrine that arises from a 
specific relationship between two 
parties ••• should not be undertaken absent some 
explicit evidence of congressional intent. 
Id., at 233. 
We thef."e f. re r again must reject the SEe's 
imposition of the abstain-or-disclose obligation on anyone 
w-b> 
'~!hat knowingly possesses material nonpublic information 






rule could have consequences ..f.a.r beyond any that we have 31 1 
assurance Congress intended. ~ mposing the abstain-or-
disclosure obligation on all who knowingly come into 
possession 
1/t.A.tr~.-t /.. -i 
Cti>mmission 
of material nonpublic information, the 
,< -IP( 
the normal and beneficial market-
facilitating 
maintaining an orderly securities market. To require 
market participants to cease trading in a particular 
security any time they knowingly possess nonpublic 
information could,j ~{fl~~r~ for that 
security .. eo a ha~t. We have no reason to assume that 
Congress intended such a 
~~ 
Eh:amat1c result. Although we 
scrutinize the trading activities of insiders and their 
confederates, 
~ 
we have had no reason to consider the 
1 
advantages that market their normal 
32 
objectives of the 331 
federal securities laws. 19 
But not only could the Commission 1 s tippee-trading 
~ 
l9As this Court recognized in 445 u.s., 
at 233, Congress has expressly exempted ~ market 
professionals from the general statutory prohibition set 
forth in §ll(a}(l} of the Act, 15 u.s.c. §78k(a}(l}, 
against members of a national securities exchange trading 
for their own account. We s~ecifically observed, 445 
u.s., at 233 n. 16, that "[t]he exception is based upon 
Congress 1 recognition that [market professionals] 
contribute to a fair and orderly marketplace at the same 
time they exploit the informational advantage that comes 
from their possession of [nonpublic information]." As the 
Commission i tse,lf has recognized, "market professionals 
have been permitted to enjoy these market information and 
competitive advantages because they have obligations to 
the markets for the securities that they trade and have 
made significant contributions to the continuity, 
liquidity and depth of the markets for these securities." 
SEC, Report of the Special Study of the Options Markets, 
House Comm. on Int. and For. Commerce, Comm. Print No. 
IFC3, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-4 (1978}. 
22. 
rules impair market orderliness, they also could penalize 
analytical excellence and, indeed, would place in jeopardy 
those analysts who have sufficient insight to observe 3~ 
values not generally perceived or to recognize the 
existence of unsoundness or even fraud in securities 
before the common crowd. 20 As the entire federal 
securities law structure manifests, public policy favors 
the unfettered dissemination of information, and this is 34 
especially true where the information concerns criminal 
fraud within the corporation. Yet the resources available 
to government law enforcement agencies to investigate all 
20The SEC here also recognized the positive side to 
information-gathering by securities analysts: "The value 
to the entire market of these efforts cannot be gainsaid~ 
market efficiency in pricing is significantly enhanced by 
such initiatives to ferret out and anlyze information, and 
thus the analyst's work redounds to the benefit of the 
investors." 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1406. Accordingly, the 
Commission acknowledges the need to accommodate the two 
goals of market efficiency and fairness, and would permit 
analysts to "utilize non-public, inside information which 
in itself is immaterial in order to fill in 'interstices 
in analysis.'" 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1409 (quoting 
Investors Management, 44 S.E.C., at 646). An analyst is 
free to "weav [e) together a series of publicly available 
facts and nonmaterial inside disclosures to form a 
'mosaic' which is only material after the bits and pieces 
are assembled into one picture." 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 
1409. But the Commission's rule is inherently imprecise, 
and imprecision prevents parties from ordering their 
actions in accord with legal requirements. Tippees are in 
a poor position to distinguish information that is 
"interstices in analysis" and that which is material in 
itself. Tippees would necessarily act at their peril in 
exploiting such information, and this risk almost 
certainly would chill the socially desirable activities of 
securities analysts. 
23. 
rumors are limited, and private parties with a financial 
incentive to pursue evidence of wrongdoing provide a 34 
valuable supplement, see, e. g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 
377 u.s. 426, 432 (1964), even if their investigation is 
not motivated by altruism. Investigative efforts can be 
costly, and if an investigation does not hold out the 
possibility of financial or at least reputational benefit 35 
which may translate into financial benefit at some later 
point, no analyst will be likely to devote substantial 
resources and expose himself to personal danger 21 to 
investigate rumors of corporate fraud. 22 
21It is doubtful that many corporate conspiracies 
can be uncovered without obtaining information from an 
inside source. Evidence of an ongoing criminal conspiracy 
involving those who control the company will not likely 
become public through the Commission's periodic disclosure 
requirements. 
22This empirical assumption in no way suggests that 
knowingly trading on inside information by securities 
analysts is "socially desirable or even that it is devoid 
of moral considerations." Dooley, supra, at 55. Nor does 
it suggest that it is unreasonable to expect that all 
citizens, including securities analysts, have a social 
obligation to disclose promptly indications of illegal 
actions by a corporation to the proper authorities--
typically the SEC in cases involving securities. See 
Lorie, Public Policy for American Capital Markets 11 
(1974). On the contrary, ~ trading on inside 
information clearly is behavior that falls below the 
standard of conduct to which many aspire. See Code of 
Ethics and Standards of Professional Conduct of the 
Financial Analysts Federation (as amended May 9, 1982). 
That conclusion does not, however, further analysis very 
far. There are "si~nificant distinctions between actual 
obligations and eth1cal ideals." s. Rep. No. 75, 94th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 237-238 (1975). Recognizing that insider 




a tipping case against 
an insider J un(:ler the fede~fra-tiQ p~onii, -i t ... is 
f~ to prove that the insider exploited 
confidential information in violation of his fiduciary 
duties to ;r shareholders. Liability for disclosing 36 
l.. 
material nonpublic information thus depends on the purpose 
/J I 
of the disclosure. An i~formant will be liable if (i) he 
discloses material, nonpublic information to 7one who 
trades on the information and (ii) the purpose of the 
disclosure 
~~~ 
to ~ s benef1t in 
. "" 
return ~:rom t.he 36 was 
f'k.< 
r~ or to make a gift of ..{ information to the 
~ ..tA.L~ ~ ,J.f!} 9~ 6-'~~ ~ 
recipient /\.13¥ giving hitm "Mt..._.arva~ over other traders. ~~ 
Similarly, a lOb-5 claim against an alleged tippee must be 
based on 
)'2a.'-~ari4. 
the theory that he knowingly23 a~~isteu the 
t\ 
trading imposes costs on society that should not be 
tolerated, Congress legislated against such actions, but 
it presumably attempted to reduce those costs as 
efficiently as possible in such a sensitive and important 
area as securities trading. We believe that the 
deterrence of the SEC's insider-trading rules, while 
certainly discouraging insider trading, would impose its 
own, perhaps greater costs on the securities industry, 
without any assurance of corresponding benefit. In the 
absence of more explicit congressional direction, we are 
not inclined to assume that Congress through its 
securities laws meant to upset the established role of 
securities dealers and analysts in the American securities 
Footnote continued on next page. 
Footnote(s) 23 will appear on following pages. 
25. 
insider in exploiting the confidential information: in 37 
essence that he was an aider and abetter. A recipient of 
such a tip would be liable if he used the information in 
connection with securities trading, knowing the purpose of 
the disclosure. 24 See Chazen, 'Dirks' Presents Unique 
industry as the SEC's rules would do. 
23rt is clear that a tipper or tippee does not 
violate Rule lOb-5 unless he acts with scienter. The 
scienter requirement protects a defendant who was unaware 
,. that he was receiving or passing on inside information. 
But this requirement is of little benefit to the tippers 
or tippees who, such as petitioner, knowingly tips or 
trades on inside information. 
24 
"All these elements can be found in classic 
tipping situations, such as an arrangement under 
which a securities firm gives its customers 
confidential information it learns from 
investment banking clients in exchange for 
brokerage bus ineS's. The tip violates the 
securities firm's duty to keep the information 
in confidence~ it is also a means by which the 
securities firm exploits the information for its 
own benefit. Similarly, the customer who 
directs brokerage to the securities firm in 
exchange for confidential information aids and 
abets the violation, in that the customer's 
willingness to pay for the information with 
'soft dollars' makes it possible for the 
securities firm to take advantage of the 
information without trading itself. 
The twin elements--breach of fiduciary duty 
and exploitation of information--are also 
present, though not quite so obviously, when an 
insider makes a gift of confidential information 
to a relative or friend, with the expectation 
that the recipient will trade on the 
information. The tip and trade are the 
functional equivalent of trading by the insider 
followed by a gift of the profits to the 
recipient. Again, the requirements for aiding 
and abetting liability are satisfied as the 
insider could not utilize this means of 
benefitting the recipient unless the recipient 
were prepared to play his part by trading on the 
information." 
Footnote continued on next page. 
Social Issues, Legal Times 14, 18 (March 14, 37 . 
liability 
not exist when the informati is transmitted 
a proper purpose but i. e., for 
trading, it would be a rare situation when 
could not fabricate some ostensibly legitimate 
justification for transmitting the information. 
other areas of the law, courts are permitted to infer 38 1 
purpose from the surrounding circumstances. Two factors 
in particular would tend to show that the informant acted 
with an improper purpose. First, it is reasonable to 
infer improper purpose when there is a relationship 
between the informant and the recipient that suggests that 391 
the informant expected a quid pro quo from the recipient, 
such as when the recipient is a customer, or that the 
informant wished to benefit the recipient, such as when 
See Chazen, 'Dirks' Presents Unique Corporate, Social 
Issues, Legal Times 14, 18 (March 14, 1983). 
27. 
they are relatives or friends. Second, a disclosure was 
made at the initiative of the informant rather than in 39 
response to questioning by the recipient may 
~"1£.~ 
ruse . a 
~hat the insider seeks to exploit information 
available to him. On the other hand, a strong 
nonfinancial motive for providing the information would be 
evidence that the disclosure was not made with a forbidden 40 
purpose. See id. 
~review of 
~fl 
the ~s for insider-trading and 
tipping restrictions underscores the weakness of the~ 
case against petitioner. 25 First, the Equity Funding 
employees did not violate their ~y to the 
1\ 
company's shareholders by providing information to 
t 't' 26 pe 1 1oner. Petitioner's informants received no 
25Petitioner contends that he was not a "tippee" 
because the information he received constituted unverified 
allegations of fraud that were v.i~nrau!l-i by 
management and were not "material facts" under the 
securities laws that required disclosure before trading. 
He also argues that the information he received was not 
truly "inside" information, i. e., intended for a 
confidential corporate purpose, but was merely evidence of 
a crime. For purposes of deciding this case, however, We---~ 
----_, assume the correctness of the SEC's findings at 
petitioner was a tippee of material, inside information. 
26In this Court, the SEC contends that an insider 
violates a fiduciary duty to the corporation's 
Footnote continued on next page. 
40 
28. 
monetary benefit for revealing Equity Funding's secrets, 
nor did they have an apparent desire to make a gift of 41 
valuable information to petitioner. Second, it is 
undisputed that petitioner himself was a stranger to 
Equity Funding, with no preexisting fiduciary duty to 
those who sold or bought Equity Funding stock. 27 He took 
no action, directly or indirectly, that induced the 41 
shareholders by transmitting nonpublic corporate 
information to an outsider when he has reason to believe 
that the outsider will take advantage of the shareholders. 
"Thus, regardless of any ultimate motive to bring to 
public attention the derelictions at Equity Funding, 
Secrist breached his duty to Equity Funding shareholders." 
Brief for Respondent 31. The Commission, however, did not 
charge Secrist with any wrongdoing, and we do not 
understand the SEC to have relied on Secrist's breach of 
any "duty" in finding that petitioner breached his duty to 
Equity Funding's shareholders. See J.A. 250 (decision of 
administrative law judge} ("One who knows himself to be a 
beneficiary of non-public, selectively disclosed inside 
information must fully disclose or refrain from 
trading."}; . 21 S.E.C., at 1410, n. 42 ("Presumably, 
[petitioner's] informants were entitled to disclose the 
[Equity Funding] fraud in order to bring it to light and 
its perpetrators to justice."}; Brief of Respondent in the 
Court of Appeals, at 50 ("The Commission and the courts 
have repeatedly held that possession of inside information 
makes one an insider, regardless of whether possession of 
the information is obtained lawfully or through a breach 
of fiduciary duty to the issuer."}; id., at 51 ("[T]he 
knowing possession of inside information by any person 
imposes a duty to abstain or disclose."}; id., at 55; 681 
F. 2d 8 24, 8 38 (Wright, J.} (assuming Seer ist breached no 
duty because of "SEC's failure to dispute the issue"}. 
The merits of such a duty are therefore not before the 
Court. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 u.s. 194, 196-197 
( 19 4 7} • 
27Judge Wright held that petitioner acquired a 
fiduciary duty by virtue of his position as an employee of 
a broker-dealer. The Commission, however, did not 
consider Judge Wright's alternate theory in its decision, 
nor did it present that theory to the Court of Appeals or 
to this Court. 
7 
29. 
stockholders or officers of Equity Funding to repose trust 
or confidence in him. 28 And clearly petitioner did not 
misappropriate or illegally obtain information about 
Equity Funding. Petitioner acquired the information from 
sources who were legally free to give it to him. 29 Under 4: 
such circumstances, petitioner did not acquire any duty to 
~~~ 
the corporation's shareholders and thus ..ft.a.e A no duty -to 
when he passed on the information to other 
investors. 
Indeed, rather than violating a duty to Equity 4: 
Funding or its shareholders, or to the market in general, 
~~~a-uP~~ 
petitioner's aetiV±tie: brought to light a massive fraud 
28There was no expectation by petitioner's sources 
that he would keep their information in confidence, nor 
could there legitimately have been any such expectation. 
He was not given information · s · · he 
~-of- """t:lre= -bus~:i::-t.y--Fuooi-A~ but, rather:, to 
expose a ma••iue fraud at the company. As a result, to 
find liability in this case, the Commission again was 
reduced to finding a general duty applicable to anyone 
possessing what is found to be material nonpublic 
information, even though this Court made clear in 
Chiarella that no such duty exists. 
29Even under the broadest formulation of the 
abstain-or-disclose doctrine articulated in Chiarella, 
petitioner would be immune from liability. Here, other 
analysts were free to contact Equity Funding's present and 
former employees, and petitioner obtained the information 
in question through a combination of good fortune and 
diligent investigative technique. In a free enterprise 
economy, "advantages obtained by honest means" are 
entitled to "reap their full reward." 445 u.s., at 252 n. 
2 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting}. 
30. 
at Equity Funding and informed the market of the true 
state of affairs at the company. 30 Until the Equity 
Funding fraud was exposed, the information in the trading 43 
market was grossly inaccurate. But for petitioner's 
efforts, the fraud might well have gone undetected longer. 
On the Commission and the federal courts has fallen 
the responsibility to develop specific trading rules that 43 
are consistent with the purposes underlying the federal 
securities laws. Although we must construct rules that 
preclude tippee trading which circumvents the prohibitions 
of our insider-trading restrictions, those rules must not 
--4~. 1 t, " t;- " 
30Although the Commission's disclose-or-abstain 
obligation is phrased in the conjunctive, in an exchange 
market with millions of impersonal transactions every 
hour, disclosure by individual shareholders is not very 
practical. Thus the special obligation on insiders is a 
duty not to trade at all on material nonpublic 
information. This fact is made obvious by the facts of 
this case. It is hard to imagine how, given his position 
as an outsider and the SEC's failure to investigate the 
----------~~r~aud allegations, petitioner could have gone about 
. _,p3bl1 · ing them other than the way he did--by talking to 
/._ .. ~~..,__,~ne press and . to anyone else who would listen to him • 
.Jf77 VK-"- Once it is conceded, as the Commission does, h t 
J ~ there is no independent duty to disclose, it is hard o 
t1 l f.(J escape the conclusion in Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F. d 
~ ~ 307,318 (CA6 1976), cert. den1ed, 429 u.s. 1053 (197 ), 
 that there is no causal connection between insider tr ing 
"",_.~ .. fl..~ and outsiders' losses: "Investors must be prepa d to 
~- accept the risk of trading in an open market ithout 
~) complete or always accurate information." 'D 
1 







sweep so broadly that they chill legitimate, socially 4~ 
useful market activity. Corporations must conduct certain 
business in private, while the securities market, to serve 
the important public interest in raising and allocating 
vast sums of capital in the most efficient and orderly 
manner possible, needs as much material information as 4~ 
possible about the public companies that it serves. 
Insiders have much discretion in delaying the disclosure 
of rna ter ial information, and securities analysts play a 
beneficial role in assaulting the corporate citadel for 
inside information. Rule lOb-5 should not be used, absent 4~ 
clear congressional intent to that effect, to upset the 
beneficial balance that the securities market has enjoyed 
by the check the competing interests have on each other. 
While the federal securities laws are appropriate bars to 
the exploitation of information by corporate insiders, 31 4~ 
31we find ourselves in agreement with many of 
Commissioner Srni th' s sta ternents in Investors Management 
Co.: 
"It is important in this type of case to focus 
on policing insiders and what they do, which I 
think appropriate, rather than on policing 
information per se and its possession, which I 
think impracticable. I believe the emphasis in 
the law should continue to be upon the conduct 
of corporate insiders and their privies, as it 
Footnote continued on next page. 
32. 
they should not be used to protect corporations from 
securities analysts performing their normal information-
gathering roles. 
We conclude that petitioner, in the circumstances of 46 
this case, had no duty to abstain from ( trading on the 
inside information that he obtained. The judgment of the 
Court of Appeals therefore is 
Reversed. 
has been since Strong v. Rep ide, 213 U.s. 419 
(1909} and as it was in Cady Roberts, Texas Gulf 
and Merrill Lynch, rather than upon a concept--
too vague for me to apply with any consistency--
of relative informational advantages in the 
marketplace." 
44 S.E.C., at 648 (concurring in the judgment}. 
46 
job 05/10/83 
SECOND DRAFT: Dirks v. SEC, No. 82-276 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether an individual 
who has no connection with a corporation but receives 5 
material nonpublic information concerning ongoing criminal 
conduct within the corporation from an officer or director 
violates the antifraud provisions of the federal 
securities laws by transmitting that information to 
persons who use the information to buy or sell the 10 
corporation's stock. 
I 
In 1973, petitioner was an offieer at a New York 
broker-dealer firm, providing investment analysis on 
insurance company securities to institutional investors. 1 15 
On March 6, petitioner received information from Ronald 
Secrist, a former officer of Equity Funding of America 
1The facts stated here are taken from more detailed 
statements set forth by the Administrative Law Judge, 
J.A., at 176-180, 225-247; the opinion of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 
1402-1406 ( 1981) ; and the opinion of Judge Wright in the 
Court of Appeals, 681 F.2d 824, 829-833 (CADC 1982). 
2. 
(Equity Funding), a diversified corporation primarily 
engaged in selling life insurance and mutual funds, to the 
effect that the assets of that corporation were vastly 20 
overstated as the result of fraudulent internal corporate 
practices. Secrist stated that regulatory agencies had 
failed to act on similar charges made by Equity Funding 
employees, and urged petitioner to verify the fraud and 
publicly disclose it. 25 
Petitioner decided to investigate personally the 
allegations. He flew to Los Angeles, where Equity Funding 
had its headquarters, and interviewed several officers and 
employees of the corporation. Despite denials of 
wrongdoing by its senior management, petitioner obtained 30 
substantial corroboration of the charges of fraud from 
current and former corporation employees. Neither 
petitioner nor his firm owned or traded any Equity Funding 
stock, but throughout his investigation, petitioner 
candidly discussed with a number of investors and analysts 35 
the progress of his investigation and the information he 
had obtained. Not surprisingly, some of the persons who 
spoke with petitioner and learned of the alleged fraud 
3. 
sold their holdings of Equity Funding securities. Five 
investment advisers who communicated with petitioner 40 
liquidated securities worth more than $16 million. 2 
During the entire week that petitioner was in Los 
Angeles, he was in touch regularly with William Blundell, 
the Wall Street Journal's Los Angeles bureau chief. 
Petitioner urged Blundell to write a story for the Journal 45 
on the fraud allegations. Blundell, however, was afraid 
that publishing such damaging rumors supported only by 
~~ 
hearsay from~ former employees might be libelous and 
declined to write the story, discounting the allegations 
I 
because he did not believe that such a~~ 50 
undetected. 
During the two-week period in which petitioner 
pur sued his investigation and spread word of Seer i st' s 
charges, the price of Equity Funding stock fell 
precipitously from $26 per share to less than $15. ~his 55 
2Petitioner received from his firm a salary plus a 
commission for securities transact ions above a certain 
amount which his clients directed through his firm. Some 
of the firms to which petitioner gave information on the 
Equity Funding fraud directed or promised to direct 
commission business to petitioner's firm. See 681 F.2d, 
at 829, 831~ 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1402, 1404. 
4. 
led the New York Stock Exchange to halt trading on March 
27. Shortly thereafter state insurance authorities 
impounded Equity Funding's records and uncovered evidence 
of the fraud. Only then did the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) file a complaint against Equity Funding 3 60 
and only then, on April 2, did the Journal publish a front 
page story based largely on information assembled by 
petitioner. Equity Funding immediately went into 
. h' 4 rece1vors 1p. 
The SEC investigated petr's role in the disclosure of 65 
the fraud, and after a hearing by an administrative law 
judge, found that petitioner aided and abetted violations 
of §17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 u.s.c. §77q(a) 
(1976) , 5 §lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
3As early as 1971, the SEC had received allegations 
of fraudulent accounting practices at Equity Funding. 
Moreover, on March 9, 1973, an official of the California 
Insurance Department informed the SEC's regional office in 
Los Angeles of Secrist's charges of fraud. Petitioner 
himself voluntarily presented his information at the SEC's 
regional office beginning on March 27. 
4A federal grand jury in Los Angeles subsequently 
returned a lOS-count indictment against 22 persons, 
including many of Equity Funding's officers and directors. 
Those proceedings were concluded by entry of guilty pleas 
or convictions after trial of all defendants for one or 
more of the counts against them. See Brief for Petitioner 
15: J.A. 149-153. 
Footnote(s) 5 will appear on following pages. 
5. 
U.S.C. §78j (b) , 6 and SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 70 
(1982) , 7 when he repeated the allegations of fraud to 
5section 17(a) provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the 
of fer or sale of any securities by the use of 
any means or instruments of transportation or 
communication in interstate commerce or by the 
use of the mails, directly or indirectly--
"(1) to employ any device, scheme, or 
artifice to defraud, or 
"(2) to obtain money or property by means 
of any untrue statement of a material fact or 
any omission to state a material fact necessary 
in order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they were 
made, not misleading, or 
"(3) to engage in any transaction, 
practice, or course of business which operates 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the 
purchaser." 
6section lO(b) provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, 
directly or indirectly, by the use of any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of 
the mails, or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange--
"(b) To use or employ, in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security registered 
on a national securities exchange or any 
security not so registered, any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention 
of such rules and regulations as the SEC may 
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest or for the protection of 
investors." 
7Rule lOb-S provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, 
directly or indirectly, by the use of any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of 
the mails or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange, 
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or 
artifice to defraud, 
"(b) To make any untrue statement of a 
rna ter ial fact or to omit to state a rna ter ial 
fact necessary in order to make the statements 
made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading, or 
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or 
Footnote continued on next page. 
6. 
members of the investment community--including clients of 
his firm--who later sold their Equity Funding stock. ~he 
SEC concluded: "Where 1 tippees 1 --regardless of their 
motivation or occupation--come into possession of material 75 
1 
••• information that they know is confidential and know or 
should know came from a corporate insider, 1 they must 
either publicly disclose that information or refrain from 
trading." 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1407 (1981) (footnote 
omitted) (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 u.s. 80 
222, 230 n. 12 (1980)). Recognizing, however, that 
petitioner played "an important role in bringing [Equity 
Funding] 1 S massive fraud to light," 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 
1412-1413, the SEC only censured petitioner for his 
conduct. 8 





business which operates or would 
a fraud or deceit upon any person, in 
with the purchase or sale of any 
8section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 
u.s.c. §78o(b) (4) (E), provides that the SEC may impose 
certain sanctions, including a censure, on any person 
associated with a registered broker-dealer who has 
"willfully aided [or] abetted" any violation of the 
federal securities laws. See 15 u.s.c. §78ff(a) 
(providing criminal penalties). 
85 
7. 
entered judgment without accompanying opinion, denying, 
"for the reasons stated by the SEC in its opinion," 
petitioner's petition for review of the censure order. 
Judge Tamm dissented from the judgment. Judge Wright, a 9C 
member of the panel, subsequently issued an opinion. 
Judge Robb concurred in the result, and Judge Tamm 
dissented; neither filed a separate opinion. Judge Wright 
believed that "the obligations of corporate fiduciaries 
pass to all those to whom they disclose their information 95 
before it has been disseminated to the public at large." 
681 F.2d 824, 839 (1982). Alternatively, Judge Wright 
concluded that, as an employee of a broker-dealer, 
petitioner "had [violated] obligations to the SEC and to 
the public completely independent of any obligations he 100 
acquired" from sources at Equity Funding. Id., at 840. 
We granted a writ of certiorari, u.s. (1982), 
because of the importance to the SEC and the securities 
industry of the question presented by this case. We now 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 105 
II 
In the seminal case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 
8. 
S.E.C. 907 (1961), the SEC recognized that a breach of the 
insiders• 9 agency duties to shareholders10 also could be a 
violation of Rule 10b-s. 11 The SEC did not limit, 
however, its special obligation to di sclose12 or abstain 
to officers, directors, and controlling shareholders, id., 
at 911, 
1(~ t-f~ 
~A found t to exist whenever two factors were 
9we use the word "insiders" to include directors, 
officers, controlling shareholders, and those ~
employees and agents of the corporation who have r~/ 
access to the corporation's confidential information. - See R 
Feldman v. Simkins Industries, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 839, 844 
( ND Ca 1 i f . 19 8 0) , a f f ' d , 6 7 9 F . 2d 12 9 9 ( CA 9 19 8 2) : n . 15 , 
infra. 
10An insider's duty to the corporation's 
shareholders not to trade on inside information is to be 
distinguished from the common-law duty that insiders also 
have to the corporation itself not to mismanage corporate 
assets, of which confidential information is one. See 3A 
Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Laws of Private Corporations 
§§1168.1, 1168.2 (1975 & 1982 Supp.). We believe that a 
breach of the duty to shareholders satisfies the legal 
requirements of ~ 10 (b) because it presupposes both 
investor injury and deception, Santa Fe Industries, Inc. 
v. Green, 430 u.s. 462, 471-474 (1977): Dooley, 
Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 Va. L. 
Rev. 1, 41 (1980), and agree with the Cady, Roberts 
Commission that "[a] significant purpose of the Exchange 
Act was to eliminate the idea that use of inside 
information for personal advantage was a normal emolument 
of corporate office." See 40 S.E.C., at 912 n. 15. 
11of the three provisions on which the SEC rested 
its decision, Rule lOb-S is generally the most inclusive, 
and we will refer to it when we note the statutory basis 
for the SEC's inside trading rules. 
(1\S ~~~ ~~~~ 12The SE~~disclosure duty~s RO~ just =ee the 
immediate purchasers or sellers: "Proper and adequate 
disclosure of significant corporate developments can only 
be effected by public release through the appropriate 
public media, designed to achieve a broad dissemination to 
the investing public generally and without favoring any 




Analytically, the obligation rests on two 
principal elements; first, the existence of a 
relationship giving access, directly or 
indirectly, to information intended to be 
available only for a corporate purpose and not 
for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, 
the inherent unfairness involved where a party 
takes advantage of such information knowing it 
is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing. 
Id., at 912 (footnote omitted) • 13 
9 . 
In Chiarella, we quoted with approval the Cady, 
Roberts statement of the basis for the disclose-or-abstain 




violation of Rule lOb-S's inside-trading restrictions--a 130 
fiduciary relationship and the exploitation of 
confidential information acquired as a result of that 
relationship. See 445 u.s., at 227. The Court 
unanimously agreed that there is no general duty to make 
13The Cady, Roberts conditions for imposing a duty 
to disclose or abstain from trading are not arbitrary 
limitations on the use of inside information, but are 
consistent with the common-law rules and grounded in the 
policies underlying the federal securities laws. As a 
general proposition, there is no duty to disclose 
information to the public at large before engaging in a 
commercial transaction or before imparting the information 
to other persons. See Chiarella, 445 u.s., at 228; id., 
at 239-240 (BURGER, C.J., dissenting). Moreover, itTs 
evident that stock ownership and securities trading by 
insiders are not detrimental to the corporation, to 
shareholders, or to society. Thus, the Cady, Roberts 
elements are simply an acknowledgement that it is only 
some uses of inside information, and then only under 
certain circumstances, that will create liability. 
10. 
disclosure before trading with material nonpublic 135 
information, 14 and recognized that "a duty to disclose 
under §lO(b) does not arise from the mere possession of 
nonpublic market information." Id., at 235. Such a duty 
arises rather from the existence of a fiduciary 
relationship. See 445 u.s., at 227-235. 140 
The case against the petitioner in Chiarella failed 





that there also can be no liability for an inside trade 
where there is no trading. Thus, an insider will be 
liable where he exploits material nonpublic information 145 
for personal gain and fails to disclose that information 
before doing so. 
III 
Unlike insiders who have independent fiduciary duties 
to both the corporation and its shareholders, the typical 150 
tippee has no such relationships. 15 In view of the 
14 See 445 U.S., at 233~ id., at 237 (STEVENS, J., 
concurring)~ id., at 238-239 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in 
the result)~ id., at 239-240, 252, n. 2 (BURGER, C.J., 
dissenting)~ ia:-;- at 252, n. 2 (BLACKMUN, ,J., dissenting). 
15To be sure, under ceta~~stances, such as 
where corporate information is revealed legitimately to an 
underwriter, accountant, or aktorn~y working for the 
Footnote continued on next page. 
( 
11. 
absence of similar relationships, it has been unclear how 
a-
~" tippee acquires the duty to refrain from trading on 
inside information. 
What is clear is the prophylactic need for a ban on 155 
some tippee trading. 
~ 
Be~e insiders are forbidden by 
A 
their fiduciary relationship from using undisclosed 
corporate information to their personal advantage, they 
may not give such information to outsiders for the same 
improper purpose. See 18 u.s.c. §78t(b). "['l']hat which 160 
the trustee has no right to do he has no right to 
authorize •.•• " Mosser v. Darrow, 341 u.s. 267, 272 
corporation, these outsiders may ) as.. a £@8eU ef sueR ,-----
r~tJoAeQip, become fiduciaries of the corporation and of 
its shareholders. The basis for imposing fiduciary duties 
is not simply that such persons acquired nonpublic 
corporate information, but that they have entered into a 
special confidential relationship in the conduct of the 
business of the enterprise and are given access to 
information solely for corporate purposes. See SEC v. 
Monarch Fund, 608 F.2d 938, 942 (CA2 1979): In re 
Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 645 (1971): In re 
Van Alystne, Noel & Co., 43 S.E.C. 1080, 1084-1085 (1969): 
In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 
S.E.C. 933, 937 (1968): In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 
S.E.C., at 912. When such a person breaches his fiduciary 
relationship, he may be treated more properly as a tipper 
~----,t;:;hc:-a=-n=---- · See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner Sm1 Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 237 (CA2 1974) 
(investment banker l.earR-Qd mater-ial- -in$ormatioA t'Arou~b 
h..i-s w~!!'k on proposed public of fer ing for the 
corporation). For such duties to be imposed, however, 
"there must be some expectation of trust and confidence 
with respect to the information imparted, and the person 
receiving the information must assent at least implicitly 
to the expectation." Langevoort, Insider Trading and the 
Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 
Calif. L. Rev. 1, 30 (1982). 
12. 
(1951). Similarly, the transactions of those who 
knowingly participate with the fiduciary in such a breach 
are "as forbidden" as transact ions "on behalf of the 165 
trustee himself." Id. See Jackson v. Smith, 254 u.s. 
586, 589 (1921): Jackson v. Ludeling, 88 U.S. 616, 631-632 
(1874). As the Court explained in Mosser, a contrary rule 
"would open up opportunities for devious dealings in the 
name of the others that the trustee could not conduct in 170 
his own." 341 u.s., at 271. See SEC v. Texas Gulf 
Sulpher Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (CA2), cert. denied, 404 
u.s. 1005 (1971). 
Hence, as we noted in Chiarella, "[t]he tippee's 
obligation has been viewed as arising from his role as a 
participant after the fact in the insider's breach of a -
f id ucia ry duty." 16 445 u.s., at 230 n. 12. As the SEC 
16For this proposition, the Court cited 
Subcommittees of American Bar Association Section of 
Corporation, Banking, and Business Law, Comment Letter on 
Material, Non-Public Information (Oct. 15, 1973) reprinted 
in BNA, Securities Regulation & Law Report No. 233, at Dl, 
D2 (Jan. 2, 197 4) , which states: 
[I]t appears that the Commission's view is based 
upon the premise that the tippee who does trade 
upon such information is a participant after the 
fact in the tipping corporate official's breach 
of fiduciary duty, and, under common law 
principles, the tippee may be held responsible 
for the consequences of that breach in 
Footnote continued on next page. 
13. 
concedes, the tippee's duty is purely "derivative" of his 
informant's duty. Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. See Chiarella, 
445 u.s., at 246 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). It therefore 180 
is clear that, although tippees may assume an insider's 
duty to the corporation's shareholders, this is not 
because they receive inside information, rather they 
receive it improperly. As THE CHIEF JUSTICE stated in 
Chiarella, a disclosure obligation should exist "when an 185 
informational advantage is obtained, not by superior 
experience, foresight, or industry, but by some unlawful 
means." 445 U.S., at 240 (BURGER, C.J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added) • 17 
appropriate cases. 
id., at D-1 ("As to 'tipper' and 
liability, itwas clear that a corporate official who is 
not allowed to benefit directly from the use of material 
undisclosed information ought not to be able to benefit 
indirectly by passing on the information to relatives, 
friends or others for the 
17Professor Loss has linked tippee liability to the 
concept in the law of restitution that "' (w]here a 
fiduciary in violation of his duty to the beneficiary 
communicates confidential information to a third person, 
the third person, if he had notice of the violation of 
duty, holds upon a constructive trust for the beneficiary 
any profit which he makes through the use of such 
information. '" 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1451 
(1961) (quoting Restatement of Restitution §201(2) 
(1937)). Other authorities ~ likewise) expressed the 
view that tippee liability ex1sts only where there has 
been a breach of trust by an insider. See, e. g., Ross v. 
Licht, 26 3 F. Supp. 39 5, 410 (SDNY 1967) : Brudney, 
Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under 
Footnote continued on next page. 
I 
When tipping is viewed as a means of 
indirectly violating the rule, the 
elements of a rule lOb-5 violation tipping case 
should be the same as in an inside-trading 
~ 4' t:X4 ... ! ~ 4ifJ[; 
{ ~jl.l'!5"r a~ossession~f inside information did no impose an 
obligation to disclose or abstain in Chiarella~ a 
~ 
tippee a£ C-GTpor~ is not: errotHJh t:n inlrM it ...such 
A 
a~. A tippee will not be liable for aiding and 
abetting an insider's exploitation of rna ter ial nonpublic 
information unless the insider breaches his dut~ to the 
shareholder sl' 'tv using 
confidential information for personal gai~ 
corporation's his access 
A 
The SEC's position, as stated in its opinion, is that 
"tippees such as [petitioner] who receive non-public 
the Federal Securities Laws, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 322, 348 
(1979); Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry 
Into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 
121 u. Pa. L. Rev. 798, 818 n. 76 (1973) ("The extension 
of rule lOb-5 restrictions to tippees of corporate 
insiders can best be justified on the theory that they are 
participating in the insider's breach of his fiduciary 
duty."). Cf. Restatement (Second) of Agency ~312, comment 
c (1958) ("A person who, with notice that an agent is 
thereby violating his duty to his principal, receives 
confidential information from the agent, may be 





material information from insiders become 'subject to the 
same duty as [the] insider,'" 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1410 n. 
42 (quoting Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 237 (CA2 1974) (quoting Ross v. 
Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (SDNY 1967)), and that "a 
tippee breaches the fiduciary duty which he assumes from 
the insider when the tippee knowingly transmits the 
information to someone who will probably trade on the 
basis thereof," 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1410 
outsider who uses the nonpublic 
with a shareholder is a in the 
breach of his 
inherited obl iga t · n to the shareholder when he is on 
is himself disabled from using the 
without disclosure." 1 
- ! -
Respondent 3~.J~.., ru4 ~ ~) 





of one of its statutes and to cons based 
on their "own view at would best serve the purpose 
the statute. See Federal Election 
v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 225 
16. 
~~UU--~~ 
454 u.s. 27, 36 (198l).~he SEC's) th€e<y fle•<~~r 
differs little from its view that we rejected as 
inconsistent with congressional intent 
J!/ 
in Chiarella. In 
short, 
possesses nonpubl ic rna ter ial 
disclose before trading. In Chiarella, 'fle specifically 
refused to find 
a general duty between all participants in 
market transactions to forgo actions based on 
material, nonpublic information. Formulation of 
such a broad duty, which departs radically from 
the established doctrine that arises from a 
specific relationship between two 
parties •.• should not be undertaken absent some 
explicit evidence of congressional intent. 
Id., at 233. 
We again reject the imposition of the abstain-or-
~~~a--~ 
disclose obligation ~ne whp knowingly possesses 
material nonpublic information and trades. 1 9 As we noted 
18The SEC itself formerly recognized that tippee 
liability properly is imposed only in circumstances where 
the "tippee" knows, or has reason to know, that the 
insider has improperly disclosed inside corporate 
information. In Investors Management Co., the SEC stated 
that in finding tippee liability one element is that the 
tippee knew or had reason to know "that the information 
was non-public and had been obtained improperly by 
selective revelation or otherwise." 44 S.E.C., at 641 
(emphasis added). Commissioner Smith expressly read this 
test to mean that before a tippee can be held liable it 
must be shown that he received information in breach of an 
insider's duty not to disclose it. Id., at 649 
Footnote continued on next page. 






in Chiarella, adopting the SEC's rule could have 
consequences well beyond any that we have assurance 
Congress intended. 
20 ~ r;;: SEC ~~1(~alue 
to the entire market of [analysts'] efforts cannot be 250 
gainsaid: market efficiency in pricing is significantly 
(concurring in the result) (see n. 25, supra). 
EC appare s that e obligation 
~ s to impose on all those who knowingly possess 
-ilv-'f' , Y material nonpublic information has no legal limit and that 
r ~ liability is limited only by its . . 
. ~ .~ reasonable under the urns As Commissioner Budge 
y~- u . ate shortly after the SEC filed the Texas Gulf Sulpher 
~. n action: "The Commission certainly does not contemplate 
· .1~ q j,{ suing every person who may come across inside 
~~A~~ inform[at]ion.... Obviously, persons such as the taxi 
~ ry·. driver, the barber, or the caddy who by chance overhear a 
.( ~- ~ bit of corporate news should not be named as defendants in 
~ }0'~?- civil actions brought by the Commission." Budge, The 
t.,. ~/""" ~ 1/ Texas Gulf Sulpher Case--What It Is and What It Isn't, 
vt' ·,J " Corp. Secretary No. 127, at 6 (1965) (quoted in 6 L. Loss, )? supra, at 3564). We find ourselves in agreement with 
yL Commissioner Smith in Investors Management Co. when he 
• • said: "It is important in this type of case to focus on 
policing insiders and what they do, which I think 
appropriate, rather than on policing information per se 
and its possess ion, which I think impracticable." 44 
S.E.C., at 648 (concurring in the judgment). 
20To require market participants to cease trading in 
a particular security any time they knowingly possess 
nonpublic information could affect adversely the market 
for that security. Although we scrutinize the trading 
activities of insiders and their confederates, we have had 
no reason to consider that the advantages that market 
professionals may gain in their normal roles are 
incompatible with the provisions or objectives of the 
federal securities laws. As this Court recognized in 
Chiarella, 445 U.S., at 233, Congress has expressly 
exempted many market professionals from the general 
statutory prohibition set forth in §ll(a) (1) of the Act, 
15 U.S .C. ~78k (a) (1), against members of a national 
securities exchange trading for their own account. We 
specifically observed, 445 U.S., at 233 n. 16, that "[t]he 
exception is based upon Congress' recognition that [market 
professionals] contribute to a fair and orderly 
marketplace at the same time they exploit the 
informational advantage that comes from their possession 
of [nonpublic information]." 
18. 
enhanced by [their] initiatives to ferret out and analyze 
information, and thus the analyst's work redounds to the 
benefit of all investors." S E C D k t at 1406. 21 • • • oc e , Yet 
the SEC's tippee-trading rules could be used to penalize 25S 
analytical excellence and place in jeopardy those analysts 
~dt9~~~~ 
A who have the insight to recogniz~value and unsoundness 
before they are reflected in the market. Moreover, the 
resources available to government law enforcement agencies 
to investigate all rumors are limited, and private parties 260 
with a financial incentive to pursue evidence of 
wrongdoing provide a valuable supplement, see, e. g., J.I. 
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 u.s. 426, 432 (1964), even if their 
investigation is not motivated by altruism. Investigative 
efforts can be costly, and if an investigation does not 265 
hold out the possibility of financial or at least 
u...a..:r 
reputational benefit w-R-:i,.e.h may translate into financial 
~ 21The SEC ~ that "[a] nalysts remain free to 
obtain from corporate ~management corporate information 
that is not itself material for purposes of filling in the 
~ 'interstices in analysis' ..•• " Brief for Respondent 42 
ting Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C., at 646). 
But~ ~ rule is inherently imprecise, and 
imprecision prevents parties from ordering their actions 
in accord with legal requirements. Unless the line 
between permissible and impermissible disclosures and uses 
is bright, neither corporate insiders nor analysts can be 
sure when the line is crossed. 
t\ 
/ \ 19. 
benefit at some later point, 
devote sab!ltantial resources to investigate rumors of 
corporate fraud. 22 
B 
As we have shown, a tippee's liability is derivative 
~of~4Pi(: 
from the tipper's liabiliey. See p. _, supra. Thus, in 
order to make out a tipping case against an individual, it 
is first necessary 
~~ A-•c..clu4> ~·~·~b~ 
to pt:ove that the insider exploited 
1\ 
confidential information in violation of his fiduciary 
dut~ to shareholders. supra. Whether 
~ 
disclosure of material nonpublic information is A a breach 
~,h.;~ 
~ therefore depends 1\ on the purpose of the 
22This empirical assumption in no way suggests that 
knowingly trading on inside information by secu · ies 
analysts is "socially desirable or even that it devoid 
of moral considerations." Dooley, supra, at 55 Nor does 
it suggest that it is unreasonable to ex ct that all 
citizens, including securities analysts, ave a social 
obligation to disclose promptly indic ions of illegal 
actions by a corporation to the oper authorities--
typically the SEC in cases ing securities. See 
Lorie, Public Policy for Arne can Capital Markets 11 
(1974). There are, howeve , "significant distinctions 
between actual legal ob · ations and ethical ideals." 
SEC, Report of the ecial Study of the Securities 
Markets, H.R. Doc. N. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 
237-238 (1963). ognizing that inside trading imposes 
costs on societ that should not be tolerated, Congress 
legislated a 1nst such actions, but it presumably 
attempted t reduce those costs as efficiently as possible 
in such sensitive and important area as securities 
tradi We believe that the deterrence of the SEC's 
ins' e-trading rules would impose its own, perhaps greater 





disclosure. 23 The tipper will be liable if (i) he 280 
discloses material nonpublic information to one who trades 
on the information and (ii) the purpose of the disclosure 
was to receive some benefit in return or to make a gift of 
the information to the recipient to enable him to gain a 
market advantage over otner traders. See p. _, supra. 285 
Similarly, a lOb-5 claim against an alleged tippee must be 
based on the theory that he knowingly 24 participated with 
the insider in exploiting the confidential information. 25 
~ 23The SEC's decision in this case is sharply at odds 
' "' with the decision in Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 
~~ F. 2d 796 (CA2 1980). There, the Court of Appeals held 
g~~~ that an investment banking firm did not acquire or breach 
~ any fiduciary duty to a corporation that was not a client 
l~ .~~~·~ when it traded in the corporation's stock on the basis of 
rv ~-  confidential earnings reports it acquired from the 
. corporation while investigating it for a client. See id., 
. ~ · , at 798-799. The in~:eMme.R.e. l;;Janl(i-R.g firm had received---u1e 
.A~ 'nformation legitimately, and while the firm knew that the 
r~~~ information was confidential corporate data that came from 
~ J. ", . L> • inside the corporation, and had been expected to keep it 
~ so, the corporation had secured no agreement that the firm 
~ ·~· ... ~ould do so. In the absence of any confidentiality 
~r~~ agreement, or other fiduciary relationship, the court 
fP,~~ held, the investment bankers did not acquire any duty with 
~ ~ respect to this information simply by receiving it 
~~ legitimately. See id:, at 799. 
r· .~ ~ 24 It is clear that a tipper or tippee does not 
~~~.~ ~ violate Rule lOb-5 unless he acts with scienter. See 
V~-I.M Aaron v. SEC 446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980). The scienter 
~~-~~ t requ1rement protects a defendant who was unaware that he 
' .~ was receiving or passing on inside information. See State 
..,VV Teachers Retirement Board v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, ).pJ 54-855 (CA2 1981). But this requirement is of li ttleJ 
benefit to the tippers or tippees who, such as petitioner, 
~ knowingly tip or trade on inside information. 
-~ . Manag!!:~t C~~~rnission&r 
/ ~ Footnote continued on next page. tJ.P' ~ 
J . ·"'~ r·l#t' .lA rf- ~·;, ~ -: . ..x./ 
~:t--vr.· ~a-· ~~~ ~~ 
~~~:;;~ 
Smith stated in Investors 
21. 
A recipient of such a tip would be liable if he used the 
information in connection with securities trading, knowing 290 
th f th d . 1 26 e purpose o e 1sc osure. 
"[T] ippee responsibility must be related back to 
insider responsibility by a necessary finding 
that the tippee knew the information was given 
to him in breach of a duty by a person having a 
special relationship to the issuer not to 
disclose the information, and that the 
information must be shown not only to have been 
material and non-public, but also to have 
substantially contributed to the trading which 
occurred." 
44 S.E.C., at 651 (concurring in the result). 
F.2d, at 839, n. 16 (Wright, J.). 
26 
See 681 
"All these elements can be found in classic 
tipping situations, such as an arrangement under 
which a securities firm gives its customers 
confidential information it learns from 
investment banking clients in exchange for 
brokerage business. The tip violates the 
securities firm's duty to keep the information 
in confidence: it is also a means by which the 
securities firm exploits the information for its 
own benefit. Similarly, the customer who 
directs brokerage to the securities firm in 
exchange for confidential information aids and 
abets the violation, in that the customer's 
willingness to pay for the information with 
'soft dollars' makes it possible for the 
securities firm to take advantage of the 
information without trading itself. 
The twin elements--breach of fiduciary duty 
and ex loitation of informat'on are alee 
present , when an 
insider makes a gift of confidential information 
to a relative or friend, with the expectation 
that the recipient will trade on the 
information. The tip and trade are the 
functional equivalent of trading by the insider 
followed by a gift of the profits to the 
recipient. Again, the requirements for aiding 
and abetting liability are satisfied as the 
insider could not utilize this means of 
benefitting the recipient unless the recipient 
were prepared to play his part by trading on the 
information." 
\ 
'Dirks' Presents Unique Corporate, 
Time s 14 , 18 (March 14 , 19 8 3 ) . 
Social l 
22. 
The SEC argues that, if inside-trading liability also 
does not exist when the information is transmitted for a 295 
proper purpose but used wrongfully, i.e., for trading, it 
would be a rare situation when the parties could not 
fabricate some ostensibly legitimate business 
justification for transmitting the information. We think 
the SEC is unduly concerned. As in other areas of the 300 
law, courts are permitted to infer purpose from the 
surrounding circumstances. Two factors in particular 
would tend to show that the informant acted with an 
improper purpose. First, 
~-4. 
i t -!:-5- reasonable to infer 
.1\ 
improper purpose when there is a relationship between the 305 
informant and the recipient that 
...4-;C ~ ~~ rl-
a.--
suggests that t&Q 
A 
informan~tQd a quid pro quo from the recipientl ~e~ 
as JollhQR ~ip.ie.ot_Ls_a. custo~r I 9!' --t.ha..t ...thQ.. iR£ormanL 
cnc-~~~~ 
<.d~ to benefit t.luil _.scj.pienJ;, SJJ.c.b ....QS -wbQR- thQy a!'e~ 
~ relativej or friendf. ~ Second, that a disclosure was made 
at the initiative of the informant rather than in response 
1\ 
.... -
to questioning by the recipient.A~ an inference 
310 
23. 
~ ~ (~ /lt~J~f-
J\ that ~he insider ~ to exploit informat~~T~Jaa+i~l~a~b~l~e~ to 
~- On the other hand, a ~ nonfinancial motive for 
providing the information would be evidence that the 315 
disclosure was not made with a forbidden purpose. ~ 
IV 
Our review of the rationales for inside-trading an~ tr.,_ 
~~~_;_@ 
tipping rules highlights the absence of any ca•Q agai-Rst 320 
f\ 
~ ~e Equity Funding employees did not 
violate their fiduciary duty to the corporation's 
h h ld b . d . . f t . t . t . 2 8 s are o ers y prov1 1ng 1n orma 1on to pe 1 1oner. 
27Petitioner contends that he was not a "tippee" 
because the information he received constituted unverified 
allegations of fraud that were denied by management and 
were not "rna ter ial facts" under the securities laws that 
required disclosure before trading. He also argues that 
the information he received was not truly "inside" 
information, i. e., intended for a confidential corporate 
purpose, but was merely evidence of a crime. For purposes 
of deciding this case, however, we must assume the 
correctness of the SEC's findings, accepted by the Court 
of Appeals, that petitioner was a tippee of material 
inside information. _., ~~i!J-4) ~· ... 
28r~ !he SEC AcontenQ.s_.t;hat ~n insi~ . 
iolateA a fiduciary duty to the corporation's 
shareholders by transmitting nonpublic corporate 
information to an outsider when he has reason to believe 
that the outsider will take arl~~ge o~ the shareholders. 
"Thus, regardless of any ultimate motive to bring to 
public attention th derelictions at Equity Funding, 
Secrist breached his Buty to Equity Funding shareholders." 
Brief for Responde 31. The SEC, however, did not charge 
Secrist with any rongdoing, and we do not understand the 
SEC to have re ed on Seer ist' s breach of any "duty" in 
finding that etitioner breached his duty to Equity 
Funding's sh reholders. See J .A. 250 (decision of 
Footnote continued on next page. 
24. 
Petitioner's informants received no monetary benefit for 
revealing Equity Funding's secrets, nor did they have an 32 
~ 
apparent desire to make a gift of valuable information to 
petitioner. ~ ~t is undisputed that petitioner 
himself was a stranger to Equity Funding, with no 
preexisting fiduciary duty 
Equity Funding stock. 29 He took no action, directly or 33( 
indirectly, that induced the shareholders or officers of 
merits of such a duty are therefore not before 
See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196-197 
29Judge Wright held that petitioner acqui~ed a 
fiduciary duty by virtue of his position as an employee of 
a broker-dealer. The SEC, however, did not consider Judge 
Wright's alternate theory in its decision, nor did it 
present that theory to the Court of Appeals or to this 
Court. 
25. 
Equity Funding to repose trust or confidence in him, and 
there was no expectation by petitioner's sources that he 
iii fi gt,tP c:, 
would keep their information in confidence. And clearly 
petitioner did not misappropriate or illegally obtain 33~ 
information about Equity Funding. Petitioner acquired the 
information from sources who were legally free to give it 
'h.-~ ~ 
to him. ~r- •u.ch circumstances, petitioner <i4d no-e 
u,..d4.~ ~ ~ ,rUJ... ~~~~~J-
acqujre. aElX dJf.y to the- c~rporation's shareholders~ and z<.S5l-
thus he~ duty when he passed on the information 
1\ 
340 
to other investors. 
\ 
l.4c-~ t:d 4,..-(.. 
Indeed, rather than violating a duty to Equity 
1 
Funding's shareholders, petitioner's careful investigation 
brought to light a massive fraud at Equity Funding and 
informed the market of the true state of affairs at the 345 
corporation. Until the Equity Funding fraud was exposed, 
the information in the trading market wa,s grossly 
inaccurate. But for petitioner's efforts, the fraud might 
well have gone undetected longer. 30 
-----y<:::::.__-~_0 ~ /.2.-4.. rl ~ / ~k..L- ~ 
petit~~ir's di"s~\~~'ls*~~< ~r•di~~~ y 
"""-- shal'~~~ -ere-a~ new victims of the co.~a:ot-i:~  
d fraud. A~:Eece-~i~ --etrse- -ft\alte <>b~ the 
/ ~ disclose-or-abstain obligation is more a duty not 
~ Footnote continued on next page. 
26. 
v 
Although the SEC must ~ r~s t<Aat ..prQclude 
1 ' 
t i p~ee tr ad i nq ;l. ~ ~p;;;:;; t §~ ci.•e,..,eR~ ~lle 
&.-;fA.--& .... ~ r ~ 
pr-O.b.ihlt i.Q.ns o£ ~ } inside-trading ~~trict:ions, .... - ~ ) 
~ k~ ~ 
A rules must not --\ sw~ so broadly that they "'\ ghil~ 
legitimate, socially useful market activity. Insiders 
have discretion in delaying the disclosure of 
material information, and securities analysts play a 
~fi';t/;_ role in relevant 
information. Rule lOb-5 should not be used to shield 
35 
35 ! 
corporations from securities analysts performing their 36( 
normal information-gathering roles. 
We conclude that petitioner, in the circumstances of 
to trade at all on material nonpub ic informa 
is a duty to disclose. It is hard to imagin ~ &ew, given 
his position as an outsider and the SEC's failure to 
investigate the fraud allegations, petitione could have 
gone about publicizing them other t an the wa he did--by 
talking to the press, to customers of his firm (to whom he 
owed some duty), and indeed, to anyone els who would Gcm.-
listen to him. - M7 as~ ..,PEC~
~ there is no 1ndependent duty to disclose ~ee Elkind ~ 
v. Liggitt & ~ 635 F.2d 156, 169, and n. 26 
(CA2 1980) 1 - -t e- ""e Scape =tlTe ~lusiQ.ll 1n 
Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 318 (CA6 1976), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 1052 (1977), ~ there is no causal 
connect ion between ins ide trading and outsiders' losses: 
"Investors must be prepared to accept the risk of trading 








this case, had no duty to abstain from facilitating 
trading by others on the inside information that he 365 




FOURTH DRAFT: Dirks v. SEC, No. 82-276 -
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Petitioner received material nonpublic information 
from "insiders" of a corporation with which he had no 
connection. He disclosed this information to investors 
who relied on it in trading in the shares of the 
corporation. The question is whether petitioner violated 
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws by 
this disclosure. lC 
I 
In 1973, petitioner was an officer of a New York 
broker-dealer firm, providing investment analysis on 
insurance company securities to institutional investors. 1 I 
On March 6, petitioner received information from Ronald E 
Secrist, a former officer of Equity Funding of America. 
Secrist alleged that the assets of Equity Funding, a 
1The facts stated here are taken from more detailed 
statements set forth by the administrative law judge, App. 
176-180, 225-247~ the op1n1on of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1402-1406 
(1981) ~ and the opinion of Judge Wright in the Court of 
Appeals, 220 U.S. App. D.C. 309, 314-318, 681 F.2d 824, 
829-833 (1982). 
2. 
diversified corporation primarily engaged in selling life 
insurance and mutual funds, were vastly overstated as the 
result of fraudulent internal corporate practices. 2( 
Seer ist also stated that various regulatory agencies had 
failed to act on similar charges made by Equity Funding 
employees, and urged petitioner to verify the fraud and 
disclose it publicly. 
Petitioner decided to investigate the allegations. 2~ 
He visited Equity Funding's headquarters in Los Angeles 
and interviewed several officers and employees of the 
corporation. Its senior management denied any wrongdoing, 
but current and former corporation employees corroborated 
the charges of fraud. Neither petitioner nor his firm 3( 
owned or traded any Equity Funding stock, but throughout 
his investigation petitioner candidly discussed with a 
number of investors and analysts the information he had 
obtained. Some of these persons sold their holdings of 
Equity Funding securities, including five investment 35 
advisers who liquidated securities worth more than $16 
million. 2 
Footnote(s) 2 will appear on following pages. 
3. 
During the entire week that petitioner was in Los 
Angeles, he was in touch regularly with William Blundell, 
the Wall Street Journal's Los Angeles bureau chief. 40 
Petitioner urged Blundell to write a story on the fraud 
allegations. Blundell discounted the allegations because 
he did not believe that such a massive fraud could go 
undetected. He declined to write the story, fearing that 
publishing such damaging rumors supported only by hearsay 45 
from current and former employees might be libelous. 
During the two-week period in which petitioner 
pursued his investigation and spread word of Secrist's 
charges, the price of Equity Funding stock fell 
precipitously from $26 per share to less than $15 per 50 
share. This led the New York Stock Exchange to halt 
trading on March 27. Shortly thereafter California 
2Peti tioner received from his firm a salary plus a 
commission for securities transactions above a certain 
amount that his clients directed through his firm. See 21 
S.E.C. Docket, at 1402, n. 3. But "[i]t is not clear how 
many of those with whom [petitioner] spoke promised to 
direct some brokerage business through [petitioner's firm] 
to compensate [petitioner], or how many actually did so." 
220 u.s. App. D.C., at 316, 681 F.2d, at 831. The Boston 
Company Institutional Investors, Inc., promised petitioner 
about $25,000 in commissions, but it is unclear whether 
Boston actually generated any brokerage business for 
petitioner's firm. See App. 199, 204-205; 21 S.E.C. 
Docket, at 1404, n. 10; 220 u.s. App. D.C., at 316, n. 5, 
681 F.2d, at 831, n. 5. 
4. 
insurance authorities impounded Equity Funding's records 
and uncovered evidence of the fraud. Only then did the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) file a complaint 5! 
against Equity Funding 3 and only then, on April 2, did the 
Wall Street Journal publish a front-page story based 
largely on information assembled by petitioner. Equity 
Funding immediately went into receivorship. 4 
The SEC investigated petitioner's role in the 6( 
disclosure of the fraud. After a hearing by an 
administrative law judge, the SEC found that petitioner 
had aided and abetted violations of §17(a) of the 
Securities Act of 1933, 15 u.s.c. §77q(a) , 5 §lO(b) of the 
3As early as 1971, the SEC had received allegations 
of fraudulent accounting practices at Equity Funding. 
Moreover, on March 9, 1973, an official of the California 
Insurance Department informed the SEC's regional office in 
Los Angeles of Seer ist' s charges of fraud. Petitioner 
himself voluntarily presented his information at the SEC's 
regional office beginning on March 27. 
4A federal grand jury in Los Angeles subsequently 
returned a 105-count indictment against 22 persons, 
including many of Equity Funding's officers and directors. 
All defendants were found guilty of one or more counts, 
either by a plea of guilty or a conviction after trial. 
See Brief for Petitioner 15; App. 149-153. 
5section 17(a) provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the 
offer or sale of any securities by the use of 
any means or instruments of transportation or 
communication in interstate commerce or by the 
use of the mails, directly or indirectly--
"(1) to employ any device, scheme, or 
Footnote continued on next page. 
5. 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 u.s.c. §78j (b) , 6 and 65 
SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1982) , 7 when he 
repeated the allegations of fraud to members of the 
artifice to defraud, or 
"(2) to obtain money or property by means 
of any untrue statement of a material fact or 
any omission to state a material fact necessary 
in order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they were 
made, not misleading, or 
"(3) to engage in any transaction, 
practice, or course of business which operates 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the 
purchaser." 
6section lO(b) provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, 
directly or indirectly, by the use of any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of 
the mails, or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange--
"(b) To use or employ, in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security registered 
on a national securities exchange or any 
security not so registered, any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention 
of such rules and regulations as the Commission 
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest or for the protection of 
investors." 
7Rule lOb-5 provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, 
directly or indirectly, by the use of any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of 
the mails or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange, 
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or 
artifice to defraud, 
"(b) To make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements 
made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading, or 
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or 
course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security." 
6. 
investment community--including clients of his f irrn--who 
later sold their Equity Funding stock. The SEC concluded: 
"Where 'tippees '--regardless of their motivation or 
occupation--come into possession of material 'information 
that they know is confidential and know or should know 
carne from a corporate insider,' they must either publicly 
disclose that information or refrain from trading." 21 
S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1407 (1981) (footnote omitted) 
(quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 u.s. 222, 230 n., 
12 (1980)). Recognizing, however, that petitioner "played 
an important role in bringing [Equity Funding's] massive 
fraud to light," 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1412, the SEC only 
censured hirn. 8 
Petitioner sought review in the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit. Without opinion, the 
court entered judgment against petitioner "for the reasons 
stated by the Commission in its opinion." App. to Pet. 
8section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 
U.S.C. §78o(b) (4) (E), provides that the SEC may impose 
certain sanctions, including censure, on any person 
associated with a registered broker-dealer who has 
"willfully aided [or] abetted" any violation of the 
federal securities laws. See 15 U.S.C. §78ff(a) 





for Cert. C-2. Judge Wright, a member of the panel, 8~ 
subsequently issued an opinion. Judge Robb concurred in 
the result, and Judge Tamm dissented~ neither filed a 
separate opinion. Judge Wright believed that "the 
obligations of corporate fiduciaries pass to all those to 
whom they disclose their information before it has been 9C 
disseminated to the public at large." 220 u.s. App. D.C. 
309, 324, 681 F. 2d 824, 839 (1982) • Alternatively, Judge 
Wright concluded that, as an employee of a broker-dealer, 
petitioner had violated "obligations to the SEC and to the 
public completely independent of any obligations he 95 
acquired" from sources at Equity Funding. Id., at 325, 
681 F.2d, at 840. 
We granted a writ of certiorari, u.s. (1982), 
because of the importance to the SEC and to the securities 
industry of the question presented by this case. We now lOC 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
II 
In the seminal case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 
S.E.C. 907 (1961), the SEC recognized that "[a]n 
affirmative duty to disclose material information has been 105 
8. 
traditionally imposed on corporate 'insiders,' 
particularly officers, directors, or controlling 
stockholders," id., at 911, and that a breach of that duty 
to shareholders9 also could be a violation of Rule lOb-
5. 10 The SEC did not, however, limit this obligation to 11( 
? 
9. 
disclose11 or abstain to these insiders. See id., at 911. 
Rather, the duty was found to exist whenever two factors 
were present: 
Analytically, the obligation rests on two 
principal elements; first, the existence of a 
relationship giving access, directly or 
indirectly, to information intended to be 
available only for a corporate purpose and not 
for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, 
the inherent unfairness involved where a party 
takes advantage of such information knowing it 
is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing. 
Id., at 912 (footnote omitted). 
In Chiarella, we quoted with approval the Cady, 
Roberts statement of the basis for the disclose-or-abstain 
rule and adopted the SEC's twin elements for finding a 




" ( i) the existence of a relationship affording access to 13 
inside information intended to be available only for a 
corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a 
corporate insider to take advantage of that information by 
11The SEC views the disclosure duty as extending 
beyond the immediate purchasers or sellers: "Proper and 
adequate disclosure of significant corporate developments 
can only be effected by a public release through the 
appropriate public media, designed to achieve a broad 
dissemination to the investing public generally and 
without favoring any special person or group." Faberge, 
Inc., 45 S.E.C., at 256. 
10. 
trading without disclosure." 445 u.s., at 227. The Court 
agreed that there is no general duty to make disclosure 13~ 
before trading with material nonpublic information, 12 and 
held that "a duty to disclose under §lO{b) does not arise 
from the mere possession of nonpublic market information." 
Id., at 235. Such a duty arises rather from the existence 
of a fiduciary relationship. See id., at 227-235. 
~;;:~ 
The fraud in an inside-trading case is not, of 
course, the mere possession of inside information or 
simply the person's relationship with the shareholders "by 
virtue of [his] position." Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C., at 
911. Rather, is the "inherent unfairness involved 
where one [with access by virtue of a special relationship 
to the issuer to material information intended to be 
available only for a corporate purpose and not for 
personal gain] takes advantage of such information knowing 
140 
145 
it is unavailable to the investing public." In re Merrill 150 
12 See 445 U.S., at 233; id., at 237 {STEVENS, J., 
concurring) ; id., at 238-239 {BRENNAN, J., concurring in 
the judgment); id., at 239-240 {BURGER, C.J., dissenting). 
Cf. id., at 252, n. 2 {BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) 
{recognizing that there is no obligation to disclose 
material nonpublic information obtained through the 
exercise of "diligence or acumen" and "honest means," as 
opposed to "stealth"). 
11. 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933, 936 
I 
L.A.-
(1968). It is therefore clear that there g.au breach 
of the Cady, Roberts duty that insiders have to 
shareholders unless the insider exploits the information 
available to him for his personal benefit. Thus, an 15 
insider will be liable under Rule lOb-5 for inside trading 
only where he exploits material nonpublic information for 
personal gain and fails to disclose that information 
before doing so. 
III 
.. ~ ~~~- ~ r2.d'4(~ 
We made clear in Chiarella ~ there can be no duty 
~ ~ 
to disclose where the person who has traded on inside 
infomation "was not [the corporation's] agent, he was not 
a fiduciary, [or] he was not a person in whom the sellers 
[of the securities] had placed their trust and 16 
confidence." 445 u.s., at 232. Not to require such a 
fiduciary relationship, we recognized, would "depar[t] 
radically from the established doctrine that duty arises 
from a specific relationship between two parties" and 
would amount to "recognizing a general duty between all 171 
participants in market transactions to forgo actions based 
12. 
on material, nonpublic information." Id., at 232, 233. 
This requirement of a specific relationship between the 
shareholders and the individual trading on inside 
information, however, has created analytical difficulties 17~ 
for the SEC in policing tippees who trade on inside 
information. Unlike insiders who have independent 
fiduciary duties to both the corporation and its 
shareholders, the typical tippee has no such 
relationships.l3 In view of this absence, it has been 
unclear how a tippee acquires the duty to refrain from 
trading on inside information. 
13under certain circumstances, such as where 
corporate information is revealed legitimately to an 
underwriter, accountant, or lawyer working for the 
corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the 
shareholders. The basis for recognizing such fiduciary 
duties is not simply that such persons acquired nonpublic 
corporate information, but also that they have entered 
into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of 
the business of the enterprise and are given access to 
information solely for corporate purposes. See SEC v. 
Monarch Fund, 608 F. 2d 938, 942 (CA2 1979} ~ In re 
Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 645 (1971}~ In re 
Van Alystne, Noel & Co., 43 S.E.C. 1080, 1084-1085 (1969} ~ 
In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 
S.E.C. 933, 937 (1968} ~ Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C., at 912. 
When such a person breaches his fiduciary relationship, he 
may be treated more properly as a tipper than a tippee. 
See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc., 495 F. 2d 228, 23 7 (CA2 197 4} (investment banker had 
access to material information when working on a proposed 
public offering for the corporation}. For such duties to 
be imposed, however, the corporation must expect the 
outsider to keep the disclosed nonpublic information 
confidential, and the person receiving the information 





The SEC's position, as stated in its opinion, is 
"In tipping potential traders, [petitioner] 
breached a duty which he had assumed as a result 
of knowingly receiving confidential information 
from [Equity Funding] insiders. Tippees such as 
[petitioner] who receive non-public material 
information from insiders become 'subject to the 
same duty as [the] insiders. ' Shapiro v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 
[495 F.2d 228, 237 (CA2 1974) (quoting Ross v. 
Licht, 263 F. Supp. 39 5, 410 (SDNY 1967) ) ] . 
Such a tippee breaches the fiduciary duty which 
he assumes from the insider when the tippee 
knowingly transmits the information to someone 
who will probably trade on the basis thereof ••.• 
Presumably, [petitioner's] informants were 
entitled to disclose the [Equity Funding] fraud 
in order to bring it to light and its 
perpetrators to justice. However, [petitioner]-
-standing in their shoes--committed a breach of 
the fiduciary duty which he had assumed in 
dealing with them, when he passed the 
information on to traders. 
21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1410, n. 42. 
W.Q..-tbink thrt fhe SEC's position in this case differs 
little from its view that we rejected as inconsistent with 
congressional intent in Chiarella. 
~f~, 
In C!l;i ereJ ,J a, the 
(\ 







conviction there by holding that "' [~_] nyone--corporate 21~ 
insider or not--who regularly receives material nonpublic 
information may not use that information to trade in 
securities without incurring an affirmative duty to 
disclose.'" United States v. Chiarella, 588 F. 2d 1358, 
1365 {CA2 1978) {emphasis in original). Here, the SEC 
maintains that anyone who knowingly receives nonpublic 
material information has a fiduciary duty to disclose 
before trading. The SEC fails to explain, however, why or 
how the possession of nonpublic information imposed on 
petitioner a fiduciary duty with Equity Funding's 
shareholders when Chiarella's possession did not. 14 
The SEC must consider the difference between this 
case and Chiarella 
. 
~ 
somehow pesseee&a the disclosed information with more 
accompanying duties than the information that Chiarella 
came by 
as we 
without the direct involvement of an inside~ut 
~n Chiarella, mere possession of 
nonpublic information 
duty; only a specific 
~~ 
does no~ng the ...;;C....;.a.;._d_,y""','--....;.R.;..;;o_b_;e;_r.;._t.;._s_ 
1\ 
relationship does that. ~n effect, 
14Apparently recognizing the weakness of its 
argument in light of Chiarella, the SEC attempts to 
distinguish that case factually as involving not "inside" 
information, but rather "market" information, i. e., 
"information generated within the company relating to its 
assets or earnings." Brief for Respondent 23. This Court 
drew no such distinction in Chiarella and, as THE CHIEF 
JUSTICE noted, "[i]t is clear that §lO{b) and Rule lOb-5 
by their terms and by their history make no such 
distinction." 445 u.s., at 241, n.l {dissenting opinion). 
See ALI Fed. Sec. Code §1603, Comment {2) {j) {Proposed 




then, the SEC's theory of tippee liability seems rooted 235 
more in the di~e~t:::. that the antifraud provisions 
A 
require equal access 
~ 
to material nonpublic 
1\ 
information 
than in the principle set forth in Cady, Roberts and 
Chiarella that only some persons, under some 
circumstances, will be barred from trading while in 240 





Wright correctly read our opinion in Chiarella, however, 
as repudiating any notion that traders must enjoy equal 
information before trading: "[T]he 'information' theory is 
rejected. Because the disclose-or-refrain duty is 245 
extraordinary, it attaches only when a party has legal 
obligations other than a mere duty to comply with the 
general antifraud proscriptions in the federal securities 
~ 15rn Chiarella, we noted that formulation of an ~ 
equal information rule "should not be undertaken absent 
some explicit evidence of congressional intent." 445 
U.S., at 233. Rather than adopting such a radical view of 
securities trading, Congress has expressly exempted many 
market professionals from the general statutory 
prohibition set forth in §ll(a) (1) of the Securities 
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §78k(a) (1), against members of a 
national securities exchange trading for their own 
account. See id., at 233, n. 16. We observed in 
Chiarella th"'at "[t] he exception is based upon Congress' 
recognition that [market professionals] contribute to a 
fair and orderly marketplace at the same time they exploit 
the informational advantage that comes from their 
possession of [nonpublic information]." Ibid. 
16. 
laws." 220 u.s. App. D.C., at 322, 681 F.2d, at 837. See 
Chiarella, 445 U.S., at 235, n. 20 (BLACKMON, J., 25 
dissenting}. 
We therefore reject the view that a duty to disclose 
or abstain exists solely because a person knowingly 
receives material nonpublic information and trades. 
Imposing such a duty could have an inhibiting influence on 25 
the role of market analysts that the SEC itself recognizes 
is essentia1. 16 It is commonplace for analysts to "ferret 
out and analyze information," 21 S.E.C., at 1406, and this 
often is done by meeting with and questioning corporate 
officers and others who may be viewed as insiders. Such 26 
meetings customarily involve participants who understand 
16The SEC expressly recognized that "[t] he value to 
the entire market of [analysts'] efforts cannot be 
gainsaid; market efficiency in pricing is significantly 
enhanced by [their] initiatives to ferret out and analyze 
information, and thus the analyst's work redounds to the 
benefit of all investors." 21 S.E.C., at 1406. The SEC 
asserts that "[a]nalysts remain free to obtain from 
corporate management corporate information that is not 
itself material for purposes of filling in the 
'interstices in analysis' " Brief for Respondent 42 
(quoting Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C., at 646}. 
But its rule is inherently imprecise, and imprec1s1on 
prevents parties from ordering their actions in accord 
with legal requirements. Unless the parties know where 
the line is between permissible and impermissible 
disclosures and uses, neither corporate insiders nor 
analysts can be sure when the line is crossed. Cf. Adler 
v. Klawans, 267 F. 2d 840, 845 (CA2 1959} (Burger, J., 
sitt1ng by designation}. 
17. 
their responsibilities and adhere to them. And 
information that the analysts obtain normally may be the 
basis for judgments as to the market worth of a 
corporation's securities. The analyst's judgment in this 265 
respect is made available in market letters or otherwise 
to clients of the firm. A different judgment may be made 
by a different analyst: ~fferent views make a market. 17 
In the very nature of this type of information, and indeed 
of the markets themselves, such information cannot be made 27C 
simultaneously available to all of the corporation's 
stockholders or the public generally. 
In effect, the SEC's view would mean that the duty to 
disclose accompanies the inside information, resting on 
all those who possess nonpublic material information. 27: 
That is the general duty ~ we rejected in Chiarella • 
. ~ 
We reaff1rm that "[a] duty [to disclose] arises from the 
t\ 
17on its facts, this case is the unusual one. 
Petitioner is an analyst in a broker-dealer firm, and he 
did interview management in the course of his 
investigation. He uncovered, however, startling 
information that required no analysis or exercise of 
judgment as to its market relevance. Nonetheless, the 
principle at issue here extends beyond these facts. The 
SEC's rule--applicable without regard to any breach by an 
insider--could have wide ramifications on reporting by 
analysts of :mere---Jftti.R9tme investment~~~
18. 
relationship between parties ••• and not merely from one's 
ability to acquire information because of his position in 
the market." 445 u.s., at 232-233, n. 14. 281 
B 
It is clear under Cady, Roberts that, not only are 
insiders forbidden by their fiduciary relationship from 
using undisclosed corporate information to their personal 
advantage, but they may not give such information to an 28~ 
outsider for the same improper purpose of exploiting the 
information for their personal gain. See 15 u.s.c. 
§78t (b). Similarly, the transactions of those who 
knowingly participate and profit with the fiduciary in 
such a breach are "as forbidden" as transactions "on 29( 
behalf of the trustee himself." Mosser v. Darrow, 341 
u.s. 267, 272 (1951). See Jackson v. Smith, 254 u.s. 586, 
589 (1921): Jackson v. Ludeling, 88 U.S. 616, 631-632 
(1874). As the Court explained in Mosser, a contrary rule 
"would open up opportunities for devious dealings in the 29~ 
name of the others that the trustee could not conduct in 
his own." 341 U.S., at 271. See SEC v. Texas Gulf 
Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (CA2), cert. denied, 404 
19. 
u.s. 1005 (1971). 
Hence, as we noted in Chiarella, "[t]he tippee's 30 
obligation has been viewed as arising from his role as a 
participant after the fact in the insider's breach of a 
fiduciary duty." 445 U.S., at 230, n. 12. Tippees may 
assume an insider's duty to the corporation's shareholders 
not because they receive inside information, but rather 30 
because they receive it improperly. 18 And clearly not all 
disclosures are improper simply because people trade as a 
result. The SEC's rules are meant to promote many such 
disclosures. Rather, for Rule lOb-5 purposes, the 
disclosure is improper where it would violate the 311 
insider's duties under Cady, Roberts. Thus, a tippee 
assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a 
corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information 
18The SEC itself has recognized that tippee 
liability properly is imposed only in circumstances where 
the tippee knows, or has reason to know, that the insider 
has disclosed improperly inside corporate information. In 
Investors Mana~ement Co., the SEC stated that one element 
of tippee liab1lity is that the tippee knew or had reason 
to know "that [the information] was non-public and had 
been obtained improperly by selective revelation or 
otherwise." 44 S.E.C., at 641 (emphasis added). 
Commissioner Smith read this test to mean that a tippee 
can be held liable only if he received information in 
breach of an insider's duty not to disclose it. Id., at 
650 (concurring in the result). See n. 19, supra.---
20. 
only when the insider breaches his fiduciary duty to the 
shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee 31 1 
and the tippee knows of that breach •19 As Commissioner 
Smith perceptively observed in Investors Management Co.: 
"It is important in this typ~ of case to focus 
on policing insiders and what they do, which I 
think appropriate, rather than on policing 
information per se and its possession, which I 
think impracticable. I believe the emphasis in 
the law should continue to be upon the conduct 
of corporate insiders and their privies, as it 
has been since Strong v. Rep ide, 213 U.S. 419 
(1909) and as it was in Cady Roberts, Texas Gulf 
and Merrill Lynch, rather than upon a concept--
too vague for me to apply with any consistency--
of relative informational advantages in the 
marketplace." 
44 S.E.C., at 648 (concurring in 
the re~ur :t ~~. 
~~ 
19Professor Loss has linked ippee liability to the 
concept in the law of restit tion that "' [w]here a 
fiduciary in violation of his uty to the beneficiary 
communicates confidential inform -ion to a third person, 
the third person, if he had noti e of the violation of 
duty, holds upon a constructive tr st for the beneficiary 
any profit which he makes thro gh the use of such 
information.'" 3 L. Loss, Securiti s Regulation 1451 (2d 
ed. 1961) (quoting Restatement of Restitution §201(2) 
(1937)). Other authorities likewis have expressed the 
view that tippee liability exists o ly where there has 
been a breach of trust by an insider See, e. g., Ross v. 




Impact of Rule lOb-5, §167, at 7-4 (1975) (" [T] he better~ 
view is that a tipper must know or have reason to know the , 
information is nonpublic and was improperly obtained."); He., 
Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry Into the ~ 
Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 u. Pa. 
L. Rev. 798, 818, n. 76 (1973) ("The extension of rule 
lOb-5 restrictions to tippees of corporate insiders can 
best be justified on the theory that they are 
participating in the insider's breach of his fiduciary 
duty."). Cf. Restatement (Second) of Agency §312, comment 
c (1958) ("A person who, with notice that an agent is } 1 -J..A.. 
thereby violating his duty to his principal, receives ~ 
confidential information from the agent, may be [deemed] 
.•• a constructive trustee."). 
21. 
c 
Tipping thus properly is viewed as a means of 33 
indirectly violating the Cady, Roberts disclose-or-abstain 
rule. Accordingly, the elements of a Rule lOb-5 violation 
in a tipping case should be the same as in an inside-
trading case. Mere possession of inside information does 
not impose an obligation to disclose or abstain. See 34 
Chiarella, supra. Similarly, mere receipt of information 
from a corporate insider is not enough to impose such an 
obligation. The recipient or tippee of inside information 
thus cannot be "a participant after the fact," Chiarella, 
445 U.S., at 230, n. 12, unless the insider or provider of 34 
the information has breached his duty to the corporation's 
shareholders, i. e., he has a specific relationship to the 
shareholders of the corporation and he exploits 
confidential information received as a result of that 
relationship for his personal benefit. 20 
20The legal conclusion that all trading on nonpublic 
inside information by securities analysts does not violate 
the antifraud provisions of the securities laws in no way 
suggests that knowingly trading on inside information~ 
~ securities analystSl is "socially desirable or even that it 
· is devoid of moral considerations." Dooley, at 55. Nor 
~-~ does it suggest that it is unreasonable to expect that all 
 . ~ citizens, including securities analysts, have an 
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Because all disclosures of confidential corporate 
information are not inconsistent with the duty insiders 
owe to shareholders, all disclosures will not qualify as 
exploitation. Whether disclosure of material nonpublic 
information is a breach of duty therefore depends in large 35! 
part on the purpose of the disclosure. 21 As Commissioner 
Smith stated in Investors Management Co.: 
"[T]ippee responsibility must be related back to 
insider responsibility by a necessary finding 
that the tippee knew the information was given 36( 
to him in breach of a duty by a person having a 
special relationship to the issuer not to 
disclose the information, and that the 
information must be shown not only to have been 
4:14- ~ 
obligation to disclose promptly in ications of i legal 
actions by a corporation to the roper author'ties--
typically the SEC and exchange a thorities in cases 
involving securities. On the contrary, tradi g on 
---=--~,ial nonpublic information is b havior that fal~ 
below standard of conduct ,_ · · e. ~/~ 
conclusion does not, however, further analysis very far. 
There are "significant distinctions between actual legal 
obligations and ethical ideals." SEC, Report of the 
Special Study of Securities Markets, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 
88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 237-238 (1963). 
21An example of a case turning on the court's 
determination that the disclosure did not impose any 
fiduciary duties on the recipient of the inside 
information is Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 
796 (CA2 1980) • There, the defendant investment banking 
firm, representing one of its own corporate clients, 
investigated another corporation that was a possible 
target of a takeover bid by its client. In the course of 
negotiations the investment banking firm was given, on a 
confidential basis, unpublished material information. 
Subsequently, after the proposed takeover was abandoned, 
the firm was charged with relying on the information when 
it traded in the target corporation's stock. For purposes 
of the decision, it was assumed that the firm knew the 
information was confidential, but that it had been 
received in arm's-length negotiations. See id., at 798. 
In the absence of any fiduciary relationship, the Court of 
Appeals found no basis for imposing tippee liability on 
the investment firm. See id., at 799. 
material and non-public, but also to have 
substantially contributed to the trading which 
occurred." 
44 S.E.C., at 651 (concurring in the result). 
23. 
There are facts and circumstances that often may 
justify an inference that the insider has breached his 
fiduciary duty. For example, there may be a relationship 
that exists between the insider and the recipient that 
36 
37 
suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention 37 
to benefit the particular recipient. The elements of 
fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic information 
certainly exist when an insider makes a gift of 
confidential information to a trading relative or friend. 
~ 
The tip and trade resemble trading by the insider followed 38 
/\ 
by a gift of the profits to the recipient. 
Determining the purpose of any one disclosure may not 
always be easy. And the rules and presumptions that will 
govern disclosures under the various situations that will 
arise may not be easy for the SEC and the courts to draw. 38 
But some clear lines for the securities industry must be 
drawn and the liability for trading may not follow inside 
information throughout the entire securities market. In 
24. 
contrast, the rule set forth by the SEC in this case would 
have no limiting principle. 22 
IV 
Under the inside-trading and tipping rules set forth 
above, we find that there was no actionable violation by 
petitioner. 23 It is undisputed that petitioner himself 
22without legal limitations, market participants are 
forced to rely on the reasonableness of the SEC's 
litigation strategy, but that can be hazardous, as the 
facts of this case make plain. Following the SEC's filing 
of the Texas Gulf Sulphur action, Commissioner (and later 
Chairman) Budge spoke of the various implications of 
applying Rule lOb-5 in inside trading cases: 
Turning to the realm of possible defendants 
in the present and potential civil actions, the 
Commission certainly does not contemplate suing 
every person who may have come across inside 
information. In the Texas Gulf action neither 
tippees nor persons in the vast rank and file of 
employees have been named as defendants. In my 
view, the Commission in future cases normally 
should not join rank and file employees or 
persons outside the company such as an analyst 
or reporter who learns of inside information. 
Speech of Hamer Budge to the New York Regional Group of 
the American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc. (Nov. 
18, 1965) (emphasis added) , reprinted in Budge, The Texas 
Gulf Sulphur Case--What It Is and What It Isn't, Corp. 
Secretary No. 127, at 6 (Dec. 17, 1965). 
23Petitioner contends that he was not a "tippee" 
because the information he received constituted unverified 
allegations of fraud that were denied by management and 
were not "material facts" under the securities laws that 
required disclosure before trading. He also argues that 
the information he received was not truly "inside" 
information, i. e., intended for a confidential corporate 
purpose, but was merely evidence of a crime. The 
Solicitor General agrees. See Brief for United States as 
Amicus Curiae 22. For purposes of deciding this case, 
however, we assume the correctness of the SEC's findings, 
accepted by the Court of Appeals, that petitioner was a 
tippee of material inside information. 
39 
25. 
was a stranger to Equity Funding, with no pre-existing 39 
fiduciary duty to its shareholders. 24 He took no action, 
directly or indirectly, that induced the shareholders or 
officers of Equity Funding to repose trust or confidence 
in him. There was no expectation by petitioner's sources 
that he would keep their information in confidence. Nor 40 
~d petitione~ misappropriate 
information about Equity Funding. 
A 
or illegally obtain 
Unless the insiders 
breached their Cady, Roberts duty to shareholders in 
~h, . . . .. h 
 t e nonpubl1c 1nformat1on to pet1t1oner, e 
1\ 
L--+ 
breached no duty when he passed 1\ on tQ.e.. -inT i on to 
investors as well as to the Wall Street Journal. 
t-<~~~~ 
In this case, ;\:i,.:er is clear that the Equity Funding 
employees did not violate their Cady, Roberts duty to the 
corporation's shareholders by providing information to 
petitioner. 25 The tippers received no monetary or 
24Judge Wright found that petitioner acquired a 
fiduciary duty by virtue of his position as an employee of 
a broker-dealer. See 220 u.s. App. D.C., at 325-327, 681 
F.2d, at 840-842. The SEC, however, did not consider 
Judge Wright's alternate theory in its decision, nor did 
it present that theory to the Court of Appeals. The SEC 
also has not argued Judge Wright's theory in this Court. 
See Brief for Respondent 21, n. 27. The merits of such a 
duty are therefore not before the Court. See SEC v. 
Chenery Corp., 332 u.s. 194, 196-197 (1947}. 
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Secrist breached his d ty to Equity Funding sharehold'llJ3."i5 
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Q ~ Funding's shareholders. See App. 250 (decision of 
"' ( .A. administrative law judge) ("One who knows himself to be a 
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Rule lOb-5 must preclude tippee-trading that · 
circumvents prohibitions of the 42 
restrictions, those rules must not sweep so broa ly that 
socially useful marke activity. 
Corporations must certain busine s in private, 
while the securities arket, to serve e important public 
interest in raising allocating ast sums of capital in 42 
· ~ 
t~t efficient and o derly manner poS::S::ih:le, needs as 
A. ) 
much material possible about the public 
corporations that it Insiders have much 
discretion in of material 
information, and securities play a beneficial 431 
role in pro ing the corporate structure for inside 
informatio • Rule lOb-S should not e used, absent clear 
intent to that to upset the 
bene icial balance that the securities has enjoyed 
b the check the competing interests on each other. 
While the federal securities laws are app priate bars to I " 
the exploitation of information by corpo insiders, 
they should not be used to protect from 
securities analysts performing their normal · nformation-
this 
28. 
We conclude that petitioner, in the circumstances of 
case, had 
~~ 
no duty to abstain from~ faoilitatiog 
~ 
tr-esiAg by -Mh~s en the inside information that ..fie-
44 













From: Justice Powell 
Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SlWREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-276 
RAYMOND L. DIRKS, PETITIONER v. SECURITIES 
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
[May -, 1983] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Petitioner received material nonpublic information from 
"insiders" of a corporation with which he had no connection. 
He disclosed this information to investors who relied on it in 
trading in the shares of the corporation. The question is 
whether petitioner violated the antifraud provisions of the 
federal securities laws by this disclosure. 
I 
In 1973, petitioner was an officer of a New York broker-
dealer firm, providing investment analysis on insurance com-
pany securities to institutional investors. 1 On March 6, peti-
tioner received information from Ronald Secrist, a former 
officer of Equity Funding of America. Secrist alleged that 
the assets of Equity Funding, a diversified corporation pri-
marily engaged in selling life insurance and mutual funds, 
were vastly overstated as the result of fraudulent internal 
corporate practices. Secrist also stated that various regula-
'The facts stated here are taken from more detailed statements set forth 
by the administrative law judge, App. 176-180, 225--247; the opinion of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1402-1406 
(1981); and the opinion of Judge Wright in the Court of Appeals, 220 U. S. 
App. D.C. 309, 314-318, 681 F. 2d 824, 829-833 (1982). 
82-276-0PINION 
2 DIRKS v. SEC 
tory agencies had failed to act on similar charges made by 
Equity Funding employees. He urged petitioner to verify 
the fraud and disclose it publicly. 
Petitioner decided to investigate the allegations. He vis-
ited Equity Funding's headquarters in Los Angeles and in-
terviewed several officers and employees of the corporation. 
Its senior management denied any wrongdoing, but current 
and former corporation employees corroborated the charges 
of fraud. Neither petitioner nor his firm owned or traded 
any Equity Funding stock, but throughout his investigation 
petitioner candidly discussed with a number of investors and 
analysts the information he had obtained. Some of these 
persons sold their holdings of Equity Funding securities, in-
cluding five investment advisers who liquidated securities 
worth more than $16 million. 2 
During the entire week that petitioner was in Los Angeles, 
he was in touch regularly with William Blundell, the Wall 
Street Journal's Los Angeles bureau chief. Petitioner urged 
Blundell to write a story on the fraud allegations. Blundell 
discounted the allegations b~cause he did not believe that 
such a massive fraud could go undetected. He declined to 
write the story, fearing that publishing such damaging ru-
mors supported only by hearsay from current and former em-
ployees might be libelous. · 
During the two-week period in which petitioner pursued 
his investigation and spread word of Secrist's charges, the 
2 Petitioner received from his firm a salary plus a commission for securi-
ties transactions above a certain amount that his clients directed through 
his firm. See 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1402, n. 3. But "[i]t is not clear how 
many of those with whom [petitioner] spoke promised to direct some bro-
kerage business through [petitioner's firm] to compensate [petitioner], or 
how many actually did so." 220 U. S. App. D.C., at 316, 681 F. 2d, at 831. 
The Boston Company Institutional Investors, Inc., promised petitioner 
about $25,000 in commissions, but it is unclear whether Boston actually 
generated any brokerage business for petitioner's firm. See App. 199, 
204-205; 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1404, n. 10; 220 U. S. App. D.C., at 316, 
n. 5, 681 F. 2d, at 831, n. 5. 
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price of Equity Funding stock fell precipitously from $26 per 
share to less than $15 per share. This led the New York 
Stock Exchange to halt trading on March 27. Shortly there-
after California insurance authorities impounded Equity 
Funding's records and uncovered evidence of the fraud. 
Only then did the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) file a complaint against Equity Funding 3 and only 
then, on April 2, did the Wall Street Journal publish a front-
page story based largely on information assembled by peti-
tioner. Equity Funding immediately went into 
receivership. 4 
The SEC investigated petitioner's role in the disclosure of 
the fraud. After a hearing by an administrative law judge, 
the SEC found that petitioner had aided and abetted viola-
tions of § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 77q(a), 5 § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
3 As early as 1971, the SEC had received allegations of fraudulent ac-
counting practices at Equity Funding. Moreover, on March 9, 1973, an 
official of the California Insurance Department informed the SEC's re-
gional office in Los Angeles of Secrist's charges of fraud. Petitioner him-
self voluntarily presented his information at the SEC's regional office be-
ginning on March 27. 
• A federal grand jury in Los Angeles subsequently returned a 105-
count indictment against 22 persons, including many of Equity Funding's 
officers and directors. All defendants were found guilty of one or more 
counts, either by a plea of guilty or a conviction after trial. See Brief for 
Petitioner 15; App. 149-153. 
• Section 17(a) provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities 
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication 
in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
"(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or 
"(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a 
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which 
they were made, not misleading, or 
"(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser." 
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U.S. C. §78j(b), 6 and SEC Rule 10l:r-5, 17 CFR §240.10l:r-5 
(1982), 7 when he repeated the allegations of fraud to mem-
bers of the investment community-including clients of his 
firm-who later sold their Equity Funding stock. The SEC 
concluded: "Where 'tippees'-regardless of their motivation 
or occupation-come into possession of material 'information 
that they know is confidential and know or should know came 
from a corporate insider,' they must either publicly disclose 
that information or refrain from trading." 21 S.E.C. Docket 
1401, 1407 (1981) (footnote omitted) (quoting Chiarella v. 
United States, 445 U. S. 222, 230 n., 12 (1980)). Recogniz-
ing, however, that petitioner "played an important role in 
bringing [Equity Funding's] massive fraud to light," 21 
S.E.C. Docket, at 1412, the SEC only censured him. 8 
"Section 10(b) provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of 
any facility of any national securities exchange-
"(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
curity registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so 
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors." 
7 Rule 10b-5 provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of 
any facility of any national securities exchange, 
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
"(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state 
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security." 
8 Section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78o(b)(4)(E), 
provides that the SEC may impose certain sanctions, including censure, on 
any person associated with a registered broker-dealer who has "willfully 
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Petitioner sought review in the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit. Without opinion, the court en-
tered judgment against petitioner "for the reasons stated by 
the Commission in its opinion." App. to Pet. for Cert. C-2. 
Judge Wright, a member of the panel, subsequently issued 
an opinion. Judge Robb concurred in the result, and Judge 
Tamm dissented; neither filed a separate opinion. Judge 
Wright believed that "the obligations of corporate fiduciaries 
pass to all those to whom they disclose their information be-
fore it has been disseminated to the public at large." 220 
U. S. App. D.C. 309, 324, 681 F. 2d 824, 839 (1982). Alter-
natively, Judge Wright concluded that, as an employee of a 
broker-dealer, petitioner had violated "obligations to the 
SEC and to the public completely independent of any obliga-
tions he acquired" from sources at Equity Funding. Id., at 
325, 681 F. 2d, at 840. 
We granted a writ of certiorari, U. S. (1982), because of 
the importance to the SEC and to the securities industry of 
the question presented by this case. We now reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
II 
In the seminal case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 
S.E.C. 907 (1961), the SEC recognized that "[a]n affirmative 
duty to disclose material information has been traditionally 
imposed on corporate 'insiders,' particularly officers, direc-
tors, or controlling stockholders," id., at 911, and that a 
breach of that duty to shareholders 9 also could be a violation 
aided [or] abetted" any violation of the federal securities laws. See 15 
U. S. C. § 78ff(a) (providing criminal penalties). 
9 An insider's duty to the corporation's shareholders not to trade on in-
side information differs from the common-law duty that insiders also have 
to the corporation itself not to mismanage corporate assets, of which con-
fidential information is one. See 3 Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Laws of Pri-
vate Corporations §§ 848, 900 (1975 ed. and Supp. 1982); 3A Fletcher, 
supra, §§ 1168.1, 1168.2. There are good reasons to view the breach of 
the duty to shareholders as also a violation of the federal securities laws. 
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of Rule 10b-5. 10 The SEC did not, however, limit this ob-
ligation to disclose 11 or abstain to these insiders. See id., at 
911. Rather, the duty was found to exist whenever two fac-
tors were present: 
Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal ele-
ments; first, the existence of a relationship giving access, 
directly or indirectly, to information intended to be avail-
able only for a corporate purpose and not for the per-
sonal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfair-
ness involved where a party takes advantage of such 
information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom 
he is dealing. Id., at 912 (footnote omitted). 
In Chiarella, we quoted with approval the Cady, Roberts 
statement of the basis for the disclose-or-abstain rule and 
adopted the SEC's twin elements for finding a violation of 
Rule 10b-5's inside-trading restrictions: "(i) the existence of a 
relationship affording access to inside information intended to 
be available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfair-
ness of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that 
information by trading without disclosure." 445 U. S., at 
227. The Court agreed that there is no general duty to make 
Inside trading violates Rule 10b-5.because it presupposes both investor in-
jury and deception. See Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restric-
tions, 66 Va. L. Rev. 1, 41 (1980). We agree with the Cady, Roberts Com-
mission that "[a] significant purpose of the Exchange Act was to eliminate 
the idea that use of inside information for personal advantage was a normal 
emolument of corporate office." See 40 S.E.C., at 912, n. 15. 
'
0 Rule 10b-5 is generally the most inclusive of the three provisions on 
which the SEC rested its decision in this case, and we will refer to it when 
we note the statutory basis for the SEC's inside-trading rules. 
11 The SEC views the disclosure duty as extending beyond the immedi-
ate purchasers or sellers: "Proper and adequate disclosure of significant 
corporate developments can only be effected by a public release through 
the appropriate public media, designed to achieve a broad dissemination to 
the investing public generally and without favoring any special person or 
group." In re Faberge, Inc., 45 S.E.C. 249, 256 (1973). 
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disclosure before trading with material nonpublic informa-
tion, 12 and held that "a duty to disclose under§ lO(b) does not 
arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market informa-
tion." I d., at 235. Such a duty arises rather from the exist-
ence of a fiduciary relationship. See id., at 227-235. 
The fraud in an inside-trading case is the "inherent unfair-
ness involved where one [with access by virtue of a special 
relationship to the issuer to material information intended to 
be available only for a corporate purpose and not for personal 
gain] takes advantage of such information knowing it is un-
available to the investing public." In re Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933, 936 (1968). It 
is therefore clear that there is no breach of the Cady, Roberts 
duty that insiders have to shareholders unless the insider ex-
ploits the information available to him for his personal bene-
fit. Thus, an insider will be liable under Rule lOb--5 for in-
side trading only where he exploits material nonpublic 
information for personal gain and fails to disclose that in-
formation before doing so. 
III 
We were explicit in Chiarella in saying that there can be 
no duty to disclose where the person who has traded on inside 
information "was not [the corporation's] agent, he was not a 
fiduciary, [or] he was not a person in whom the sellers [of the 
securities] had placed their trust and confidence." 445 
U. S., at 232. Not to require such a fiduciary relationship, 
we recognized, would "depar[t] radically from the established 
doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship between 
two parties" and would amount to "recognizing a general 
12 See 445 U. S., at 233; id., at 237 (STEVENS, J., concurring); id., at 
238-239 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment); id., at 239-240 (BUR-
GER, C. J., dissenting). Cf. id., at 252, n. 2 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) 
(recognizing that there is no obligation to disclose material nonpublic in-
formation obtained through the exercise of "diligence or acumen" and "hon-
est means," as opposed to "stealth"). 
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duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo 
actions based on material, nonpublic information." Id., at 
232, 233. This requirement of a specific relationship be-
tween the shareholders and the individual trading on inside 
information, however, has created analytical difficulties for 
the SEC in policing tippees who trade on inside information. 
Unlike insiders who have independent fiduciary duties to 
both the corporation and its shareholders, the typical tippee 
has no such relationships. 13 In view of this absence, it has 
been unclear how a tippee acquires the duty to refrain from 
trading on inside information. 
A 
The SEC's position, as stated in its opinion, is that: 
"In tipping potential traders, [petitioner] breached a 
duty which he had assumed as a result of knowingly re-
ceiving confidential information from [Equity Funding] 
13 Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is 
revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, or lawyer working for 
the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the sharehold-
ers. The basis for recognizing such fiduciary duties is not simply that such 
persons acquired nonpublic corporate information, but also that they have 
entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the busi-
ness of the enterprise and are given access to information solely for corpo-
rate purposes. See SEC v. Monarch Fund, 608 F. 2d 938, 942 (CA2 
1979); In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 645 (1971); In re 
VanAlystne, Noel & Co., 43 S.E.C. 1080, 1084-1085 (1969); In re Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933, 937 (1968); Cady, 
Roberts, 40 S.E.C., at 912. When such a person breaches his fiduciary 
relationship, he may be treated more properly as a tipper than a tippee. 
See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F. 2d 
228, 237 (CA2 1974) (investment banker had access to material information 
when working on a proposed public offering for the corporation). For such 
duties to be imposed, however, the corporation must expect the outsider to 
keep the disclosed nonpublic information confidential, and the person re-
ceiving the information must agree at least implicitly to such an arrange-
ment. 
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insiders. Tippees such as [petitioner] who receive non-
public material information from insiders become 'sub-
ject to the same duty as [the] insiders.' Shapiro v. Mer-
rill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [495 F. 2d 228, 
237 (CA2 1974) (quoting Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 
410 (SDNY 1967))]. Such a tippee breaches the fidu-
ciary duty which he assumes from the insider when the 
tippee knowingly transmits the information to someone 
who will probably trade on the basis thereof. . . . Pre-
sumably, [petitioner's] informants were entitled to dis-
close the [Equity Funding] fraud in order to bring it to 
light and its perpetrators to justice. However, [peti-
tioner ]-standing in their shoes-committed a breach of 
the fiduciary duty which he had assumed in dealing with 
them, when he passed the information on to traders. 21 
S.E.C. Docket, at 1410, n. 42. 
The SEC's position in this case differs little from its view 
that we rejected as inconsistent with congressional intent in 
Chiarella. In that case, the Court of Appeals agreed with 
the SEC and affirmed the conviction there by holding that 
"'[a]nyone-corporate insider or not-who regularly re-
ceives material nonpublic information may not use that in-
formation to trade in securities without incurring an affirma-
tive duty to disclose."' United States v. Chiarella, 588 
F. 2d 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978) (emphasis in original). Here, 
the SEC maintains that anyone who knowingly receives non-
public material information has a fiduciary duty to disclose 
before trading. Apparently, the SEC believes this case dif-
fers from Chiarella in that here the petitioner's receipt of in-
side information from an insider brought the duties of an in-
sider, while Chiarella received the information without the 
direct involvement of an insider and thus inherited no Cady, 
Roberts duty. The SEC still fails to explain, however, why 
or how the possession of nonpublic information imposed on 
petitioner a fiduciary duty with Equity Funding's sharehold-
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ers when Chiarella's possession did not. 14 As we emphasized 
in Chiarella, mere possession of non public information does 
not give rise to the Cady, Roberts duty; only a specific rela-
tionship does that. 
In effect, then, the SEC's theory of tippee liability seems 
rooted more in the rejected idea that the antifraud provisions 
require equal access to all material nonpublic information 
than in the principle set forth in Cady, Roberts and Chiarella 
that only some persons, under some circumstances, will be 
barred from trading while in possession of such information. 15 
Judge Wright correctly read our opinion in Chiarella, how-
ever, as repudiating any notion that traders must enjoy equal 
information before trading: "[T]he 'information' theory is re-
jected. Because the disclose-or-refrain duty is extraordi-
nary, it attaches only when a party has legal obligations other 
than a mere duty to comply with the general antifraud pro-
scriptions in the federal securities laws." 220 U. S. App. 
14 Apparently recognizing the weakness of its argument in light of Chia-
rella, the SEC attempts to distinguish that case factually as involving not 
"inside" information, but rather "market" information, i. e., "information 
generated within the company relating to its assets or earnings." Brief 
for Respondent 23. This Court drew no such distinction in Chiarella and, 
as THE CHIEF JUSTICE noted, "[i]t is clear that § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 by 
their terms and by their history make no such distinction." 445 U. S., at 
241, n. 1 (dissenting opinion). See ALI Fed. Sec. Code§ 1603, Comment 
(2)(j) (Proposed Official Draft 1978). 
'
6 In Chiarella, we noted that formulation of an absolute equal informa-
tion rule "should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of con-
gressional intent." 445 U. S. , at 233. Rather than adopting such a radi-
cal view of securities trading, Congress has expressly exempted many 
market professionals from the general statutory prohibition set forth in 
§ ll(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78k(a)(1), against 
members of a national securities exchange trading for their own account. 
See id., at 233, n. 16. We observed in Chiarella that "[t]he exception is 
based upon Congress' recognition that [market professionals] contribute to 
a fair and orderly marketplace at the same time they exploit the informa-
tional advantage that comes from their possession of [nonpublic informa-
tion]." Ibid. 
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D.C., at 322, 681 F. 2d, at 837. See Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 
235, n. 20 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). 
We therefore reject the view that a duty to disclose or ab-
stain exists solely because a person knowingly receives mate-
rial nonpublic information and trades. Imposing such a duty 
could have an inhibiting influence on the role of market ana-
lysts that the SEC itself recognizes is essential. 16 It is com-
monplace for analysts to "ferret out and analyze informa-
tion," 21 S.E.C., at 1406, and this often is done by meeting 
with and questioning corporate officers and others who may 
be viewed as insiders. Such meetings customarily involve 
participants who understand their responsibilities and adhere 
to them. And information that the analysts obtain normally 
may be the basis for judgments as to the market worth of a 
corporation's securities. The analyst's judgment in this re-
spect is made available in market letters or otherwise to cli-
ents of the firm. A different judgment may be made by a 
different analyst: different views make a market. 17 In the 
16 The SEC expressly recognized that "[t]he value to the entire market of 
[analysts') efforts cannot be gainsaid; market efficiency in pricing is signifi-
cantly enhanced by [their] initiatives to ferret out and analyze information, 
and thus the analyst's work redounds to the benefit of all investors." 21 
S.E.C., at 1406. The SEC asserts that "[a]nalysts remain free to obtain 
from corporate management corporate information that is not itself mate-
rial for purposes of filling in the 'interstices in analysis'. . . . " Brief for 
Respondent 42 (quoting Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C., at 646). 
But its rule is inherently imprecise, and imprecision prevents parties from 
ordering their actions in accord with legal requirements. Unless the par-
ties know where the line is between permissible and impermissible disclo-
sures and uses, neither corporate insiders nor analysts can be sure when 
the line is crossed. Cf. Adler v. Klawans, 267 F. 2d 840, 845 (CA2 1959) 
(Burger, J., sitting by designation). 
17 On its facts, this case is the unusual one. Petitioner is an analyst in a 
broker-dealer firm, and he did interview management in the course of his 
investigation. He uncovered, however, startling information that re-
quired no analysis or exercise of judgment as to its market relevance. 
Nonetheless, the principle at issue here extends beyond these facts. The 
SEC's rule-applicable without regard to any breach by an insider-could 
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very nature of this type of information, and indeed of the 
markets themselves, such information cannot be made simul-
taneously available to all of the corporation's stockholders or 
the public generally. 
In effect, the SEC's view would mean that the duty to dis-
close accompanies the inside information, resting on all those 
who possess nonpublic material information. That is the 
general duty we rejected in Chiarella. We reaffirm today 
that "[a] duty [to disclose] arises from the relationship be-
tween parties . . . and not merely from one's ability to ac-
quire information because of his position in the market." 445 
U. S., at 232-233, n. 14. 
B 
Although there are problems with the SEC's theory of 
tippee liability, the prophylactic need for a ban on some 
tippee trading is clear. And it is also clear that the tippee's 
duty to disclose or abstain is derivative from that of the insid-
er's duty. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. Cf. Chiarella, 445 
U. S., at 246, n. 1 (BLACKMUN J., dissenting). Under Cady, 
Roberts, not only are insiders forbidden by their fiduciary 
relationship from using undisclosed corporate information to 
their personal advantage, but they may not give such in-
formation to an outsider for the same improper purpose of ex-
ploiting the information for their personal gain. See 15 
U. S. C. § 78t(b) (making it unlawful to do indirectly any act 
made unlawful by the federal securities acts "by means of any 
other person"). Similarly, the transactions of those who 
knowingly participate and profit with the fiduciary in such a 
breach are "as forbidden" as transactions "on behalf of the 
trustee himself." Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U. S. 267, 272 
(1951). See Jackson v. Smith, 254 U. S. 586, 589 (1921); 
Jackson v. Ludeling, 88 U. S. 616, 631-632 (1874). As the 
have wide ramifications on reporting by analysts of investment views and 
news. 
82-276-0PINION 
DIRKS v. SEC 13 
Court explained in Mosser, a contrary rule "would open up 
opportunities for devious dealings in the name of the others 
that the trustee could not conduct in his own." 341 U. S., at 
271. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F. 2d 1301, 
1308 (CA2), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 1005 (1971). 
Hence, as we noted in Chiarella, "[t]he tippee's obligation 
has been viewed as arising from his role as a participant after 
the fact in the insider's breach of a fiduciary duty." 445 
U. S., at 230, n. 12. Tippees may assume an insider's duty 
to the shareholders not because they receive inside informa-
tion, but rather because they receive it improperly. 18 And 
clearly not all disclosures are improper simply because people 
trade as a result. The SEC's rules are meant to promote 
many such disclosures. Rather, for Rule 10b-5 purposes, 
the disclosure is improper where it would violate the insider's 
duties under Cady, Roberts. Thus, a tippee assumes a fidu-
ciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on 
material nonpublic information only when the insider 
breaches his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing 
the information to the tippee and the tippee knows of that 
breach. 19 As Commissioner Smith perceptively observed in 
Investors Management Co.: 
18 The SEC itself has recognized that tippee liability properly is imposed 
only in circumstances where the tippee knows, or has reason to know, that 
the insider has disclosed improperly inside corporate information. In In-
vestors Management Co., the SEC stated that one element of tippee liabil-
ity is that the tippee knew or had reason to know "that [the information] 
was non-public and had been obtained improperly by selective revelation 
or otherwise." 44 S.E.C., at 641 (emphasis added). Commissioner Smith 
read this test to mean that a tippee can be held liable only if he received 
information in breach of an insider's duty not to disclose it. Id., at 650 
(concurring in the result). See n. 19, supra. 
19 Professor Loss has linked tippee liability to the concept in the law of 
restitution that " '[ w ]here a fiduciary in violation of his duty to the benefi-
ciary communicates confidential information to a third person, the third 
person, if he had notice of the violation of duty, holds upon a constructive 
trust for the beneficiary any profit which he makes through the use of such 
14 
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"It is important in this type of case to focus on policing 
insiders and what they do, which I think appropriate, 
rather than on policing information per se and its posses-
sion, which I think impracticable. I believe the empha-
sis in the law should continue to be upon the conduct of 
corporate insiders and their privies, as it has been since 
Strong v. Repide, 213 U. S. 419 (1909) and as it was in 
Cady Roberts, Texas Gulf and Merrill Lynch, rather 
than upon a concept-too vague for me to apply with any 
consistency-of relative informational advantages in the 
marketplace." 44 S.E.C., at 648 (concurring in the 
result). 
c 
Tipping thus properly is viewed as a means of indirectly vi-
olating the Cady, Roberts disclose-or-abstain rule. Accord-
ingly, the elements of a Rule 10b-5 violation in a tipping case 
should be the same as in an inside-trading case. Mere pos-
session of inside information does not impose an obligation to 
disclose or abstain. See Chiarella, supra. Similarly, mere 
receipt of information from a corporate insider is not enough 
to impose such an obligation. The recipient or tippee of in-
information.'" 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1451 (2d ed. 1961) (quot-
ing Restatement of Restitution § 201(2) (1937)). Other authorities like-
wise have expressed the view that tippee liability exists only where there 
has been a breach of trust by an insider of which the tippee had knowledge. 
See, e. g., Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (SDNY 1967); A. Jacobs, 
The Impact of Rule 10~, § 167, at 7-4 (1975) ("[T]he better view is that a 
tipper must know or have reason to know the information is nonpublic and 
was improperly obtained.''); Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial In-
quiry Into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 798, 818, n. 76 (1973) ("The extension of rule 10~ restrictions to 
tippees of corporate insiders can best be justified on the theory that they 
are participating in the insider's breach of his fiduciary duty."). Cf. Re-
statement (Second) of Agency § 312, comment c (1958) ("A person who, 
with notice that an agent is thereby violating his duty to his principal, re-
ceives confidential information from the agent, may be [deemed] ... a con-
structive trustee."). 
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side information thus cannot be "a participant after the fact," 
Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 230, n. 12, unless the insider or pro-
vider of the information has breached his duty to the corpora-
tion's shareholders, i. e., he has a specific relationship to the 
shareholders of the corporation and he exploits confidential 
information received as a result of that relationship for his 
personal benefit. 2Q 
Because all disclosures of confidential corporate informa-
tion are not inconsistent with the duty insiders owe to share-
holders, all disclosures will not qualify as exploitation. 
Whether disclosure of material nonpublic information is a 
breach of duty therefore depends in large part on the purpose 
of the disclosure. 21 As Commissioner Smith stated in I nves-
tors Management Co.: 
20 The legal conclusion that all trading on non public inside infonnation by 
securities analysts does not violate the antifraud provisions of the securi-
ties laws in no way suggests that knowingly trading on inside infonnation 
is "socially desirable or even that it is devoid of moral considerations." 
Dooley, at 55. Nor does it suggest that it is unreasonable to expect that 
all citizens, including securities analysts, have an obligation to disclose 
promptly indications of illegal actions by a corporation to the proper au-
thorities-typically the SEC and exchange authorities in cases involving 
securities. On the contrary, trading on material nonpublic infonnation is 
behavior that may fall below highly ethical standards of conduct. This 
conclusion does not, however, further legal analysis very far. There are 
"significant distinctions between actual legal obligations and ethical 
ideals." SEC, Report of the Special Study of Securities Markets, H. R. 
Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 237-238 (1963). 
21 An example of a case turning on the court's detennination that the dis-
closure did not impose any fiduciary duties on the recipient of the inside 
infonnation is Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F. 2d 796 (CA2 1980). 
There, the defendant investment banking finn, representing one of its own 
corporate clients, investigated another corporation that was a possible tar-
get of a takeover bid by its client. In the course of negotiations the invest-
ment banking finn was given, on a confidential basis, unpublished material 
infonnation. Subsequently, after the proposed takeover was abandoned, 
the finn was charged with relying on the infonnation when it traded in the 
target corporation's stock. For purposes of the decision, it was assumed 
16 
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"[T]ippee responsibility must be related back to insider 
responsibility by a necessary finding that the tippee 
knew the information was given to him in breach of a 
duty by a person having a special relationship to the is-
suer not to disclose the information, and that the in-
formation must be shown not only to have been material 
and non-public, but also to have substantially contrib-
uted to the trading which occurred." 44 S.E.C., at 651 
(concurring in the result). 
There are facts and circumstances that often may justify an 
inference that the insider has breached his fiduciary duty. 
For example, there may be a relationship that exists between 
the insider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo 
from the latter, or an intention to benefit the particular re-
cipient. The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of 
nonpublic information certainly exist when an insider makes 
a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or 
friend. The tip and trade resemble trading by the insider 
himself followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient. 
· Determining the purpose of any one disclosure may not al-
ways be easy. And the rules and presumptions that will 
govern disclosures under the various situations that will arise 
may not be easy for the SEC and the courts to draw. But 
some clear lines for the securities industry must be drawn 
and the liability for trading may not follow inside information 
throughout the entire securities market. In contrast, the 
rule set forth by the SEC in this case would have no limiting 
principle. 22 
that the firm knew the information was confidential, but that it had been 
received in arm's-length negotiations. See id., at 798. In the absence of 
any fiduciary relationship, the Court of Appeals found no basis for impos-
ing tippee liability on the investment firm. See id., at 799. 
22 Without legal limitations, market participants are forced to rely on the 
reasonableness of the SEC's litigation strategy, but that can be hazardous, 
as the facts of this case make plain. Following the SEC's filing of the 
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IV 
Under the inside-trading and tipping rules set forth above, 
we find that there was no actionable violation by petitioner. 23 
It is undisputed that petitioner himself was a stranger to Eq-
uity Funding, with no pre-existing fiduciary duty to its 
shareholders. 24 He took no action, directly or indirectly, 
Texas Gulf Sulphur action, Commissioner (and later Chairman) Budge 
spoke of the various implications of applying Rule lOb-5 in inside trading 
cases: 
Turning to the realm of possible defendants in the present and potential 
civil actions, the Commission certainly does not contemplate suing every 
person who may have come across inside information. In the Texas Gulf 
action neither tippees nor persons in the vast rank and file of employees 
have been named as defendants. In my view, the Commission in future 
cases normally should not join rank and file employees or persons outside 
the company such as an analyst or reporter who learns of inside 
information. 
Speech of Hamer Budge to the New York Regional Group of the American 
Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc. (Nov. 18, 1965) (emphasis added), 
reprinted in Budge, The Texas Gulf Sulphur Case-What It Is and What It 
Isn't, Corp. Secretary No. 127, at 6 (Dec. 17, 1965). 
23 Petitioner contends that he was not a "tippee" because the information 
he received constituted unverified allegations of fraud that were denied by 
management and were not "material facts" under the securities laws that 
required disclosure before trading. He also argues that the information 
he received was not truly "inside" information, i. e., intended for a con-
fidential corporate purpose, but was merely evidence of a crime. The So-
licitor General agrees. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22. 
For purposes of deciding this case, however, we assume the correctness of 
the SEC's findings, accepted by the Court of Appeals, that petitioner was a 
tippee of material inside information. 
24 Judge Wright found that petitioner acquired a fiduciary duty by virtue 
of his position as an employee of a broker-dealer. See 220 U. S. App. 
D.C., at 32fh327, 681 F. 2d, at 840-842. The SEC, however, did not con-
sider Judge Wright's alternate theory in its decision, nor did it present that 
theory to the Court of Appeals. The SEC also has not argued Judge 
Wright's theory in this Court. See Brief for Respondent 21, n. 27. The 
merits of such a duty are therefore not before the Court. See SEC v. 
Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 196-197 (1947). 
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that induced the shareholders or officers of Equity Funding 
to repose trust or confidence in him. There was no expecta-
tion by petitioner's sources that he would keep their informa-
tion in confidence. Nor did petitioner misappropriate or ille-
gally obtain the information about Equity Funding. Unless 
the insiders breached their Cady, Roberts duty to sharehold-
ers in disclosing the nonpublic information to petitioner, he 
breached no duty when he passed it on to investors as well as 
to the Wall Street Journal. 
In this case, we think it also is clear that the Equity Fund-
ing employees did not violate their Cady, Roberts duty to the 
corporation's shareholders by providing information to peti-
tioner.25 The tippers received no monetary or personal bene-
fit for revealing Equity Funding's secrets, nor did they have 
an apparent purpose or desire to make a gift of valuable in-
formation to petitioner. As the facts of this case clearly indi-
25 In this Court, the SEC appears to contend that an insider invariably 
violates a fiduciary duty to the corporation's shareholders by transmitting 
nonpublic corporate information to an outsider when he has reason to be-
lieve that the outsider may use it to the disadvantage of the shareholders. 
"Thus, regardless of any ultimate motive to bring to public attention the 
derelictions at Equity Funding, Secrist breached his duty to Equity Fund-
ing shareholders." Brief for Respondent 31. This perceived "duty" dif-
fers markedly from the one that the SEC identified in Cady, Roberts and 
that has been the basis for federal tippee-trading rules to date. In fact, 
the SEC did not charge Secrist with any wrongdoing, and we do not under-
stand the SEC to have relied on any theory of a breach of duty by Secrist in 
finding that petitioner breached his duty to Equity Funding's sharehold-
ers. See App. 250 (decision of administrative law judge) ("One who knows 
himself to be a beneficiary of non-public, selectively disclosed inside in-
formation must fully disclose or refrain from trading."); 21 S. E. C., at 1410, 
n. 42 ("Presumably, [petitioner's] informants were entitled to disclose the 
[Equity Funding] fraud in order to bring it to light and its perpetrators to 
justice."); Brief on behalf of the SEC in the Court of Appeals, at 47-50; id., 
at 51 ("[K]nowing possession of inside information by any person imposes a 
duty to abstain or disclose."); id., at 52-54; id., at 55 ("[T]his obligation 
arises not from the manner in which such information is acquired. . .. "); 
220 U. S. App. D.C., at 322-323, 681 F. 2d, at 838 (Wright, J.). 
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cate, the tippees were motivated solely by a desire to expose 
the fraud. See supra, at --. In the absence of a breach of 
duty to shareholders by the insiders, there was no derivative 
breach by petitioner. Seen. 19, supra. As we said in Chia-
rella, petitioner therefore could not have been "a participant 
after the fact in [an] insider's breach of a fiduciary duty." 
445 U. S., at 230, n. 12. 
v 
We conclude that petitioner, in the circumstances of this 
case, had no duty to abstain from use of the inside informa-
tion that he obtained. The judgment of the Court of Appeals 
therefore is 
Reversed. 
MAY 2 2 1983 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Petitioner received material nonpublic information from 
"insiders" of a corporation with which he had no connection. 
He disclosed this information to investors who relied on it in 
trading in the shares of the corporation. The question is 
whether petitioner violated the antifraud provisions of the 
federal securities laws by this disclosure. 
I 
In 1973, petitioner was an officer of a New York broker-
ealer m · · g investment analysis Gfilrlsurance com-
pany securities to institutional investors. 1 On March 6, peti-
tioner received information from Ronald Secrist, a former 
officer of Equity Funding of America. Secrist alleged that 
the assets of Equity Funding, a diversified corporation pri-
marily engaged in selling life insurance and mutual funds, 
were vastly overstated as the result of fraudulent internal 
corporate practices. Secrist also stated that various regula-
1 The facts stated here are taken from more detailed statements set forth 
by the administrative law judge, App. 176-180, 225-247; the opinion of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1402-1406 
(1981); and the opinion of Judge Wright in the Court of Appeals, 220 U. S. 












2 DIRKS v. SEC 
tory agencies had failed to act on similar charges made by 
Equity Funding employees. He urged petitioner to verify 
the fraud and disclose it publicly. 
Petitioner decided to investigate the allegations. He vis-
ited Equity Funding's headquarters in Los Angeles and in-
terviewed several officers and employees of the corporation. 
Its senior management denied any wrongdoing, but current 
and former corporation employees corroborated the charges 
of fraud. Neither petitioner nor his firm owned or traded 
any Equity Funding stock, but throughout his investigation 
petitioner candidly discussed with a number of investors and 
analysts the information he had obtained. Some of these 
persons sold their holdings of Equity Funding securities, in-
cluding five investment advisers who liquidated securities 
worth more than $16 million. 2 
During the entire week that petitioner was in Los Angeles, 
he was in touch regularly with William Blundell, the Wall 
Street Journal's Los Angeles bureau chief. Petitioner urged 
Blundell to write a story on the fraud allegations. Blundell 
discounted the allegations because he did not believe that 
such a massive fraud could go undetected. He declined to 
write the story, fearing that publishing such damaging ru-
mors supported only by hearsay from current and former em-
ployees might be libelous. 
During the two-week period in which petitioner pursued 
his investigation and spread word of Secrist's charges, the 
2 Petitioner received from his firm a salary plus a commission for securi-
ties transactions above a certain amount that his clients directed through 
his firm. See 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1402, n. 3. But "[i]t is not clear how 
many of those with whom [petitioner] spoke promised to direct some bro-
kerage business through [petitioner's firm] to compensate [petitioner], or 
how many actually did so." 220 U. S. App. D.C., at 316, 681 F. 2d, at 831. 
The Boston Company Institutional Investors, Inc. , promised petitioner 
about $25,000 in commissions, but it is unclear whether Boston actually 
generated any brokerage business for petitioner's firm. See App. 199, 
204-205; 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1404, n. 10; 220 U.S. App. D.C. , at 316, 
n. 5, 681 F. 2d, at 831, n. 5. 
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price of Equity Funding stock fell precipitously from $26 per 
share to less than $15 per share. This led the New York 
Stock Exchange to halt trading on March 27. Shortly there-
after California insurance authorities impounded Equity 
Funding's records and uncovered evidence of the fraud. 
Only then did the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) file a complaint against Equity Funding 3 and only 
then, on April2, did the Wall Street Journal publish a front-
page story based largely on information assembled by peti-
tioner. Equity Funding immediately went into 
receivership. 4 
The SEC investigated petitioner's role in the disclosure of 
the fraud. After a hearing by an administrative law judge, 
the SEC found that petitioner had aided and abetted viola-
tions of § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 77q(a), 5 § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
8 As early as 1971, the SEC had received allegations of fraudulent ac-
counting practices at Equity Funding. Moreover, on March 9, 1973, an 
official of the California Insurance Department informed the SEC's re-
gional office in Los Angeles of Secrist's charges of fraud. Petitioner him-
self voluntarily presented his information at the SEC's regional office be-
ginning on March 27. 
'A federal grand jury in Los Angeles subsequently returned a 105-
count indictment against 22 persons, including many of Equity Funding's 
officers and directors. All defendants were found guilty of one or more 
counts, either by a plea of guilty or a conviction after trial. See Brief for 
Petitioner 15; App. 149-153. 
5 Section 17(a) provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities 
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication 
in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
"( I) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or 
"(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a 
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which 
they were made, not misleading, or 
"(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser." 
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U.S. C. §78j(b), 6 and SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR §240.10b-5 
(1982), 7 when he repeated the allegations of fraud to mem-
bers of the investment community-including clients of his 
firm-who later sold their Equity Funding stock. The SEC 
concluded: "Where 'tippees'-regardless of their motivation 
or occupation-come into possession of material 'information 
that they know is confidential and know or should know came 
from a corporate insider,' they must either publicly disclose 
that information or refrain from trading." 21 S.E.C. Docket 
1401, 1407 (1981) (footnote omitted) (quoting Chiarella v. 
United States, 445 U.S. 222,230 n., 12 (1980)). Recogniz-
ing, however, that petitioner "played an important role in 
bringing [Equity Funding's] massive fraud to light," 21 
S.E.C. Docket, at 1412, the SEC only censured him.8 
6 Section 10(b) provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of 
any facility of any national securities exchange-
"(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
curity registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so 
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as 
neces!?ary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors." 
7 Rule 101:>-5 provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of 
any facility of any national securities exchange, 
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
"(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state 
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security." 
8 Section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78o(b)(4)(E), 
provides that the SEC may impose certain sanctions, including censure, on 
any person associated with a registered broker-dealer who has "willfully 
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Petitioner sought review in the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit. Without opinion, the court en-
tered judgment against petitioner "for the reasons stated by 
the Commission in its opinion." App. to Pet. for Cert. C-2. 
Judge Wright, a member of the panel, subsequently issued 
an opinion. Judge Robb concurred in the result, and Judge 
Tamm dissented; neither filed a separate opinion. Judge 
Wright believed that "the obligations of corporate fiduciaries 
pass to all those to whom they disclose their information be-
fore it has been disseminated to the public at large." 220 
U. S. App. D.C. 309, 324, 681 F. 2d 824, 839 (1982). Alter-
natively, Judge Wright concluded that, as an employee of a 
broker-dealer, petitioner had violated "obligations to the 
SEC and to the public completely independent of any obliga-
tions he acquired" from sources at Equity Funding. I d., at 
325, 681 F. 2d, at 840. 
We granted a writ of certiorari, U. S. (1982), because of 
the importance to the SEC and to the securities industry of 
the question presented by this case. We now reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
II 
In the seminal case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 
S.E.C. 907 (1961), the SEC recognized that "[a]n affirmative 
duty to disclose material information has been traditionally 
imposed on corporate 'insiders,' particularly officers, direc-
tors, or controlling stockholders," id., at 911, and that a 
breach of that duty to shareholders 9 also could be a violation 
aided [or] abetted" any violation of the federal securities laws. See 15 
U. S. C. § 78ff(a) (providing criminal penalties). 
9 An insider's duty to the corporation's shareholders not to trade on in-
side information differs from the common-law duty that insiders also have 
to the corporation itself not to mismanage corporate assets, of which con-
fidential information is one. See 3 Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Laws of Pri-
vate Corporations §§ 848, 900 (1975 ed. and Supp. 1982); 3A Fletcher, 
supra, §§ 1168.1, 1168.2. There are good reasons to view the breach of 
the duty to shareholders as also a violation of the federal securities laws. 
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of Rule 10b--5. 10 The SEC did not, however, limit this ob-
ligation to disclose 11 or abstain to these insiders. See id., at 
911. Rather, the duty was found to exist whenever two fac-
tors were present: 
Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal ele-
ments; first, the existence of a relationship giving access, 
directly or indirectly, to information intended to be avail-
able only for a corporate purpose and not for the per-
sonal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfair-
ness involved where a party takes advantage of such 
information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom 
he is dealing. ld., at 912 (footnote omitted). 
In Chiarella, we quoted with approval the Cady, Roberts 
statement of the basis for the disclose-or-abstain rule and 
adopted the SEC's twin elements for finding a violation of 
Rule 10b--5's inside-trading restrictions: "(i) the existence of a 
relationship affording access to inside information intended to 
be available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfair-
ness of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that 
information by trading without disclosure." 445 U. S., at 
227. The Court agree~hat there is no general duty to make 
1 
~ 
Inside trading violates Rule 10b-5 because it presupposes both investor in-
jury and deception. See Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restric-
tions, 66 Va. L. Rev. 1, 41 (1980). We agree with the Cady, Roberts Com-
mission that "[a] significant purpose of the Exchange Act was to eliminate 
the idea that use of inside information for personal advantage was a normal 
emolument of corporate office." See 40 S.E.C., at 912, n. 15. 
•• Rule 10b-5 is generally the most inclusive of the three provisions on 
which the SEC rested its decision in this case, and we will refer to it when 
we note the statutory basis for the SEC's inside-trading rules. 
11 The SEC views the disclosure duty as extending beyond the immedi-
ate purchasers or sellers: "Proper and adequate disclosure of significant 
corporate developments can only be effected by a public release through 
the appropriate public media, designed to achieve a broad dissemination to 
the investing public generally and without favoring any special person or 
group." In re Faberge, Inc., 45 S.E.C. 249, 256 (1973). 
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A ?.isclosure before trading with material nonpublic informa-
tion, 12 and held that "a duty to disclose under§ lO(b) does not 
arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market informa-
tion." I d., at 235. Such a duty arises rather from the exist-
ence of a fiduciary relationship. See id., at 227-235. 
The fraud in an inside-trading case is the "inherent unfair-
ness involved where one [with access by virtue of a special 
relationship to the issuer to material information intended to 
be available only for a corporate purpose and not for personal 
gain] takes advantage of such information knowing it is un-
available to the investing public." In re Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933, 936 (1968). It 
is therefore clear that there is no breach of the Cady, Roberts 
duty that insiders have to shareholders unless the insider ex-
ploits the information available to him for his personal bene-
fit. Thus, an insider will be liable under Rule lOb-5 for in-
side trading only where he ) s*f3l9its. material non public 
information for personal gain and fails to disclose that in-
formation before doing so. 
III 
We were explicit in Chiarella in saying that there can be 
no duty to disclose where the person who has traded on inside 
information "was not [the corporation's] agent, he was not a 
fiduciary, [or] he was not a person in whom the sellers [of the 
securities] had placed their trust and confidence." 445 
U. S., at 232. Not to require such a fiduciary relationship, 
we recognized, would "depar[t] radically from the established 
doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship between 
two parties" and would amount to "recognizing a general 
12 See 445 U.S., at 233; id., at 237 (STEVENS, J ., concurring); id., at 
238--239 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment); id., at 239-240 (BUR-
GER, C. J ., dissenting). Cf. id. , at 252, n. 2 (BLACKMUN, J ., dissenting) 
(recognizing that there is no obligation to disclose material nonpublic in-
formation obtained through the exercise of "diligence or acumen" and "hon-







8 DIRKS v. SEC 
duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo 
actions based on material, nonpublic information." I d., at 
232, 233. This requirement of a specific relationship be-
tween the shareholders and the individual trading on inside 
information ,...Sew e~ has created analytical difficulties for 
the SEC in policing tippees who trade on inside information. 
Unlike insiders who have independent fiduciary duties to 
both the corporation and its shareholders, the typical tippee 
has no such relationships. 13 In view of this absence, it has 
been unclear how a tippee acquires the duty to refrain from 
trading on inside information. 
The SEC's position, as stat~d in its opinimf is that: ~ ;;:::;__ ~ 1 
"In tipping pot:btial traders, [petitioner] breached a - -
duty which he had assumed as a result of knowingly re-
ceiving confidential information from [Equity Funding] 
13 Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is 
revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, or lawyer working for 
the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the sharehold-
ers. The basis for recognizing such fiduciary duties is not simply that such 
persons acquired nonpublic corporate information, but also that they have 
entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the busi-
ness of the enterprise and are given access to information solely for corpo-
rate purposes. See SEC v. Monarch Fund, 608 F. 2d 938, 942 (CA2 
1979); In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 645 (1971); In re 
Van Alystne, Noel & Co., 43 S.E.C. 1080, 1084-1085 (1969); In re Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933, 937 (1968); Cady, 
Roberts , 40 S.E.C., at 912. When such a person breaches his fiduciary 
relationship, he may be treated more properly as a tipper than a tippee. 
See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc ., 495 F. 2d 
228, 237 (CA2 1974) (investment banker had access to material information 
when working on a proposed public offering for the corporation). For such 
duties to be imposed, however, the corporation must expect the outsider to 
keep the disclosed nonpublic information confidential, and the person re-
ceiving the information must agree at least implicitly to such an arrange-
ment. 
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insiders. Tippees such as [petitioner] who receive non-
public material information from insiders become 'sub-
ject to the same duty as [the] insiders.' Shapiro v. Mer-
rill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner& Smith, Inc., [495 F. 2d 228, 
237 (CA2 1974) (quoting Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 
410 (SDNY 1967))]. Such a tippee breaches the fidu-
ciary duty which he assumes from the insider when the 
tippee knowingly transmits the information to someone 
who will probably trade on the basis thereof. . . . Pre-
sumably, [petitioner's] informants were entitled to dis-
close the [Equity Funding] fraud in order to bring it to 
light and its perpetrators to justice. However, [peti-
tioner ]-standing in their shoes-committed a breach of 
the fiduciary duty which he had assumed in dealing with 
them, when he passed the information on to traders. 21 
S.E.C. Docket, at 1410, n. 42. 
The SEC's position in this case differs little from its view 
that we rejected as inconsistent with congressional intent in 
Chiarella. In that case, the Court of Appeals agreed with 
the SEC and affirmed the conviction there by holding that 
"'[a]nyone-corporate insider or not-who regularly re-
ceives material nonpublic information may not use that in-
formation to trade in securities without incurring an affirma-
tive duty to disclose."' United States v. Chiarella, 588 
F. 2d 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978) (emphasis in original). Here, 
the SEC maintains that anyone who knowingly receives non-
public material information has a fiduciary duty to disclose 
before trading. Apparently, the SEC believes this case dif-
fers from Chiarella in that here the petitioner's receipt of in-
side information from an insider brought the duties of an in-
sider, while Chiarella received the information without the 
direct involvement of an insider and thus inherited no Cady, 
Roberts duty. The SEC still fails to explain, however, why 
or how the possession of nonpublic information imposed on 
petitioner a fiduciary duty with Equity Funding's sharehold-
1-\ 
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ers when Chiarella's possession did not. 14 As we emphasized 
in Chiarella, mere possession of nonpublic information does 
not give rise to the Cady, Roberts duty; only a specific rela-
tionship does that. 
In effect, then, the SEC's theory of tippee liability seems 
rooted ~ in the rejected idea that the antifraud provisions 
require e ual access to all material nonpublic information/@ , 
,tha&ffi the principle set forth m a y, o e sand Chiare ~ vvd-
that only some persons, under some circumstances, will be  
barred from trading while in possession of such information. 15 
Judge Wright correctly read our opinion in Chiarella, how-
ever, as repudiating any notion that traders must enjoy equal ~ 
information before trading: "[T]he 'information' theory is re-
jected. Because the disclose-or-refrain duty is extraordi-
nary, it attaches only when a party has legal obligations other 
than a mere duty to comply with the general antifraud pro-
scriptions in the federal securities laws." 220 U. S. App. 
14 Apparently recognizing the weakness of its argument in light of Chia-
rella, the SEC attempts to distinguish that case factually as involving not 
"inside" information, but rather "market" information, i. e., "information 
generated within the company relating to its assets or earnings." Brief 
for Respondent 23. This Court drew no such distinction in Chiarella and, 
as THE CHIEF JUSTICE noted, "[i]t is clear that § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by 
their terms and by their history make no such distinction." 445 U. S., at 
241, n. 1 (dissenting opinion). See ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1603, Comment 
(2)(j) (Proposed Official Draft 1978). 
15 In Chiarella, we noted that formulation of an absolute equal informa-
tion rule "should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of con-
gressional intent." 445 U. S., at 233. Rather than adopting such a radi-
cal view of securities trading, Congress has expressly exempted many 
market professionals from the general statutory prohibition set forth in 
§ ll(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78k(a)(1), against 
members of a national securities exchange trading for their own account. 
See id., at 233, n. 16. We observed in Chiarella that "[t]he exception is 
based upon Congress' recognition that [market professionals] contribute to 
a fair and orderly marketplace at the same time they exploit the informa-
tional advantage that comes from their possession of [nonpublic informa-
tion]." Ibid. 
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D.C., at 322, 681 F. 2d, at 837. See Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 
235,n. 20(BLACKMUN~,J~.~'~d~is~s~e~n~tiEng)h·~~~~~----~-,~~;---:-~~:-
WQ thereforQ reject e view that a duty to disclose or ab- w~ ~~ 
stain exists solely because a person knowingly receives mate- 1-o 
rial nonpublic information and trades. Imposing such a duty 
could have an inhibiting influence on the role of market ana- ~f-
lysts that the SEC itself recognizes is essential. 16 It is com-
monplace for analysts to "ferret out and analyze informa-
tion," 21 S.E.C., at 1406, and this often is done by meeting 
with and questioning corporate officers and others who may 
be viewed as insiders. Such meetings customarily involve 
participants who understand their responsibilities and adhere 
to them. And information that the analysts obtain normally 
may be the basis for judgments as to the market worth of a 
corporation's securities. The analyst's judgment in this re-
spect is made available in market letters or otherwise to cli-
ents of the firm. A different jud ent rna be made by a 
different analyst: difierm~t v1ews make a mar et. 17 e 
16 The SEC expressly recognized that "[t]he value to the entire market of 
[analysts'] efforts cannot be gainsaid; market efficiency in pricing is signifi-
cantly enhanced by [their] initiatives to ferret out and analyze information, 
and thus the analyst's work redounds to the benefit of all investors." 21 
S.E.C., at 1406. The SEC asserts that "[a)nalysts remain free to obtain 
from corporate management corporate information that is not itself mate-
rial for purposes of filling in the 'interstices in analysis' .... " Brief for 
Respondent 42 (quoting Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C., at 646). 
But its rule is inherently imprecise, and imprecision prevents parties from 
ordering their actions in accord with legal requirements. Unless the ar-
ties w ere the line is between perm1ssible an lmperm!SSl e disclo-
sures an uses, neither corporate insiders nor analysts can be sure when 
the line is crossed. Cf. Adler v. Klawans, 267 F. 2d 840, 845 (CA2 1959) 
(Burger, J., sitting by designation). 
17 On its facts, this case is the unusual one. Petitioner is an analyst in a 
broker-dealer firm, and he did interview management in the course of his 
investigation. He uncovered, however, startling information that re-
quired no analysis or exercise of judgment as to its market relevance. 
Nonetheless, the principle at issue here extends beyond these facts. The 
SEC's rule-applicable without regard to any breach by an insider-could 
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very nature of this type of information, and indeed of the 
markets themselves, such information cannot be made simul-
taneously available to all of the corporation's stockholders or 
the public generally. 
In effect, the SEC's view would mean that the duty to dis-
close accompanies the inside information, resting on all those 
who possess nonpublic material information. That is the 
general duty we rejected in Chiarella. We reaffirm today 
that "[a] duty [to disclose] arises from the relationship be-
tween parties ... and not merely from one's ability to ac-
quire information because of his position in the market." 445 
U. S., at 232-233, n. 14. 
B 
Although there are problems with the SEC's theory of 
tippee liability, the prophylactic need for a ban on some 
tippee trading is clear. And it is also clear that the tippee's 
duty to disclose or abstain is derivative from that of the insid-
er's duty. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. Cf. Chiarella, 445 
U. S., at 246, n. 1 (BLACKMUN J., dissenting). Under Cady, 
Roberts, not only are insiders forbidden by their fiduciary 
relationship from using undisclosed corporate information to 
their personal advantage, but they may not give such in-
formation to an outsider for the same improper purpose of ex-
ploiting the information for their personal gain. See 15 
U. S. C. § 78t(b) (making it unlawful to do indirectly any act 
made unlawful by the federal securities acts "by means of any 
other person"). Similarly, the transactions of those who 
knowingly participate and profit with the fiduciary in such a 
breach are "as forbidden" as transactions "on behalf of the 
trustee himself." Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U. S. 267, 272 
(1951). See Jackson v. Smith, 254 U. S. 586, 589 (1921); 
Jackson v. Ludeling, 88 U. S. 616, 631-632 (1874). As the 
have wide ramifications on reporting by analysts of investment views and 
news. 
82-27~0PINION 
DIRKS v. SEC 13 
Court explained in Mosser, a contrary rule "would open up 
opportunities for devious dealings in the name of the others 
that the trustee could not conduct in his own." 341 U. S., at 
271. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F. 2d 1301, 
1308 (CA2), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 1005 (1971). 
Hence, as we noted in Chiarella, "[t]he tippee's obligation 
has been viewed as arising from his role as a participant after 
the fact in the insider's breach of a fiduciary duty." 445 
U. S., at 230, n. 12. Tippees may assume an insider's duty 
to the shareholders not because they receive inside informa-
tion, but rather because they receive it improperly. 18 And 
clearly not all disclosures are improper simply because people 
trade as a result. The SEC's rules are -meaHt o promote 
many such disclosures. Rather, for Rule lOb- purposes, 
the disclosure is improper where it would violate the insider's 
duties under Cady, Roberts. Thus, a tippee assumes a fidu-
ciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on 
material nonpublic information only when the insider 
breaches his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing 
the information to the tippee and the tippee knows of that 
breach. 19 As Commissioner Smith perceptively observed in 
Investors Management Co.: 
18 The SEC itself has recognized that tippee liability properly is imposed 
only in circumstances where the tippee knows, or has reason to know, that 
the insider has disclosed improperly inside corporate information. In In-
vestors Management Co., the SEC stated that one element of tippee liabil-
ity is that the tippee knew or had reason to know "that [the information] 
was non-public and had been obtained improperly by selective revelation 
or otherwise." 44 S.E.C., at 641 (emphasis added). Commissioner Smith 
read this test to mean that a tippee can be held liable only if he received 
information in breach of an insider's duty not to disclose it. I d., at 650 
(concurring in the result). Seen. 19, supra. 
19 Professor Loss has linked tippee liability to the concept in the law of 
restitution that" '[w]here a fiduciary in violation of his duty to the benefi-
ciary communicates confidential information to a third person, the third 
person, if he had notice of the violation of duty, holds upon a constructive 
trust for the beneficiary any profit which he makes through the use of such 
14 
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"It is important in this type of case to focus on policing 
insiders and what they do, which I think appropriate, 
rather than on policing information per se and its posses-
sion, which I think impracticable. I believe the empha-
sis in the law should continue to be upon the conduct of 
corporate insiders and their privies, as it has been since 
Strong v. Repide, 213 U. S. 419 (1909) and as it was in 
Cady Roberts, Texas Gulf and Merrill Lynch, rather 
than upon a concept-too vague for me to apply with any 
consistency-of relative informational advantages in the 
marketplace." 44 S.E.C., at 648 (concurring in the 
result). 
c 
Tipping thus properly is viewed as a means of indirectly vi-
olating the Cady, Roberts disclose-or-abstain rule. Accord-
ingly, the elements of a Rule 10b-5 violation in a tipping case 
should be the same as in an inside-trading case. Mere pos-
session of inside information does not impose an obligation to 
disclose or abstain. See Chiarella, supra. Similarly, mere 
receipt of information from a.corporate insider is not enough 
to impose such an obligation. The recipient or tippee of in-
information.'" 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1451 (2d ed. 1961) (quot-
ing Restatement of Restitution § 201(2) (1937)). Other authorities like-
wise have expressed the view that tippee liability exists only where there 
has been a breach of trust by an insider of which the tippee had knowledge. 
See, e. g., Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (SDNY 1967); A. Jacobs, 
The Impact of Rule 10b-5, § 167, at 7~ (1975) ("[T]he better view is that a 
tipper must know or have reason to know the information is nonpublic and 
was improperly obtained."); Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial In-
quiry Into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 798, 818, n. 76 (1973) ("The extension of rule 10b-5 restrictions to 
tippees of corporate insiders can best be justified on the theory that they 
are participating in the insider's breach of his fiduciary duty."). Cf. Re-
statement (Second) of Agency § 312, comment c (195~ ("A person who, 
with notice that an agent is thereby violating his duty to his principal, re-
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side information thus cannot be "a participant after the fact," 
Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 230, n. 12, unless the insider or pro-
vider of the information has breached his duty to the corpora-
tion's shareholders, i. e., he has a specific relationship to the 
shareholders of the corporation and he exploits confidential 
information received as a result of that relationship for his 
personal benefit. 
20 <f-7!)~ 
'K'I~rHQ-P--'~1.-disclosureS"of confidential corpurnt'Erin orma /fT 
ion are not inconsistent with the duty insiders owe to share-
alders, all disclosures will not qualify as exploitation. 
ether disclosure of material nonpublic information is a 
breach of duty therefo~r:e_o~.eperu:l8-i·~~~~t-.Q;~~p.ult:p(lSe' 
of th · cl As Commissioner Smith stated in Inves-
tors Management Co.: 
one , 
significant distinctions between actual legal obligations and ethical 
ideals." SEC, Report of the Special Study of Securities Markets, H. R. 
Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 237-238 (1963). 
21 An example of a case turning on the court's determination that the dis-
closure did not impose any fiduciary duties on the recipient of the inside 
information is Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co ., 623 F. 2d 796 (CA2 1980). 
There, the defendant investment banking firm, representing one of its own 
corporate clients, investigated another corporation that was a possible tar-
get of a takeover bid by its client. In the course of negotiations the invest-
ment banking firm was given, on a confidential basis, unpublished material 
information. Subsequently, after the proposed takeover was abandoned, 
the firm was charged with relying on the information when it traded in the 
target corporation's stock. For purposes of the decision, it was assumed 
16 
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"[T]ippee responsibility must be related back to insider 
responsibility by a necessary finding that the tippee 
knew the information was given to him in breach of a 
duty by a person having a special relationship to the is-
suer not to disclose the information, and that the in-
formation must be shown not only to have been material 
and non-public, but also to have substantially contrib-
uted to the trading which occurred." 44 S.E.C., at 651 
(concurring in the result). 
There are facts and circumstances that often may justify an 
inference that the insider has breached his fiduciary duty. 
For example, there may be a relationship that exists between 
the insider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo 
from the latter, or an intention to benefit the particular re-
cipient. The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of 
nonpublic information certainly exist when an insider makes 
a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or 
friend. The tip and trade resemble trading by the insider 
hi elf followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient. cl)' 
Determining the purpose of any one disclosure may 
ways be easy. AR£i.-th:e-Jml1ss-~Eh:»-e8i:H~~~iinrt-wtltlr-,.,-
that the firm knew the information was confidential, but that it had been 
received in arm's-length negotiations. See id., at 798. In the absence of 
any fiduciary relationship, the Court of Appeals found no basis for impos-
ing tippee liability on the investment firm. See id., at 799. 
22 Without legal limitations, market participants are forced to rely on the 
reasonableness of the SEC's litigation strategy, but that can be hazardous, 
as the facts of this case make plain. Following the SEC's filing of the 
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IV 
Under the inside-trading and tipping rules set forth above, 
we find that there was no actionable violation by petitioner. 23 
It is undisputed that petitioner himself was a stranger to Eq-
uity Funding, with no pre-existing fiduciary duty to its 
shareholders. 24 He took no action, directly or indirectly, 
Texas Gulf Sulphur action, Commissioner (and later Chairman) Budge 
spoke of the various implications of applying Rule lOb-5 in inside trading 
cases: 
Turning to the realm of possible defendants in the present and potential 
civil actions, the Commission certainly does not contemplate suing every 
person who may have come across inside information. In the Texas Gulf 
action neither tippees nor persons in the vast rank and file of employees 
have been named as defendants. In my view, the Commission in future 
cases normally should not join rank and file employees or persons outside 
the company such as an analyst or reporter who learns of inside 
information. 
Speech of Hamer Budge to the New York Regional Group of the American 
Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc. (Nov. 18, 1965) (emphasis added), 
reprinted in Budge, The Texas Gulf Sulphur Case-What It Is and What It 
Isn't, Corp. Secretary No. 127, at 6 (Dec. 17, 1965). 
23 Petitioner contends that he was not a "tippee" because the information 
he received constituted unverified allegations of fraud that were denied by 
management and were not "material facts" under the securities laws that 
required disclosure before trading. He also argues that the information 
he received was not truly "inside" information, i. e., intended for a con-
fidential corporate purpose, but was merely evidence of a crime. The So-
licitor General agrees. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22. 
For purposes of deciding this case, however, we assume the correctness of 
the SEC's findings, accepted by the Court of Appeals, that petitioner was a 
tippee of material inside information. 
24 Judge Wright found that petitioner acquired a fiduciary duty by virtue 
of his position as an employee of a broker-dealer. See 220 U. S. App. 
D.C., at 325-327, 681 F. 2d, at 840-842. The SEC, however, did not con-
sider Judge Wright's alternate theory in its decision, nor did it present that 
theory to the Court of Appeals. The SEC also has not argued Judge 
Wright's theory in this Court. See Brief for Respondent 21, n. 27. The 
merits of such a duty are therefore not before the Court. See SEC v. 
Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 19&-197 (1947). 
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that induced the shareholders or officers of Equity Funding 
to repose trust or confidence in him. There was no expecta-
tion by petitioner's sources that he would keep their informa-
tion in confidence. Nor did petitioner misappropriate or ille-
gally obtain the information about Equity Funding. Unless 
the insiders breached their Cady, Roberts duty to sharehold-
ers in disclosing the nonpublic information to petitioner, he 
breached no duty when he passed it on to investors as well as 
to the Wall Street Journal. 
In this case, we think it also is clear that the Equity Fund-
ing employees did not violate their Cady, Roberts duty to the 
corporation's shareholders by providing information to peti-
tioner. 25 The tippers received no monetary or personal bene-
fit for revealing Equity Funding's secrets, nor did they have 
an apparent purpose or desire to make a gift of valuable in-
formation to petitioner. As the facts of this case clearly indi-
~In this Court, the SEC appears to contend that an insider invariably 
violates a fiduciary duty to the corporation's shareholders by transmitting 
nonpublic corporate information to an outsider when he has reason to be-
lieve that the outsider may use it to the disadvantage of the shareholders. 
"Thus, regardless of any ultimate motive to bring to public attention the 
derelictions at Equity Funding, Secrist breached his duty to Equity Fund-
ing shareholders." Brief for Respondent 31. This perceived "duty" dif-
fers markedly from the one that the SEC identified in Cady, Roberts and 
that has been the basis for federal tippee-trading rules to date. In fact, 
the SEC did not charge Secrist with any wrongdoing, and we do not under-
stand the SEC to have relied on any theory of a breach of duty by Secrist in 
finding that petitioner breached his duty to Equity Funding's sharehold-
ers. See App. 250 (decision of administrative law judge) ("One who knows 
himself to be a beneficiary of non-public, selectively disclosed inside in-
formation must fully disclose or refrain from trading."); 21 S.E.C., at 1410, 
n. 42 ("Presumably, [petitioner's] informants were entitled to disclose the 
[Equity Funding] fraud in order to bring it to light and its perpetrators to 
justice."); Brief on behalf of the SEC in the Court of Appeals, at 47-50; id., 
at 51 ("[K]nowing possession of inside information by any person imposes a 
duty to abstain or disclose."); id., at 52-54; id., at 55 ("[T]his obligation 
arises not from the manner in which such information is acquired .... "); 
220 U.S. App. D.C., at 322-323, 681 F. 2d, at 838 (Wright, J.). 
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cate, the tipp were motivated solely by a desire to expose 
the fraud. See supra, at--. In the absence of a breach of 
duty to shareholders by the insiders, there was no derivative 
breach by petitioner. Seen. 19, supra. As we said in Chia-
rella, petitioner therefore could not have been "a participant 
after the fact in [an] insider's breach of a fiduciary duty." 
445 U. S., at 230, n. 12. 
v 
We conclude that petitioner, in the circumstances of this 
case, had no duty to abstain from use of the inside informa-
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[May-, 1983] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Petitioner Raymond Dirks received material nonpublic in-
formation from "insiders" of a corporation with which he had 
no connection. He disclosed this information to investors 
who relied on it in trading in the shares of the corporation. 
The question is whether Dirks violated the antifraud provi-
sions of the federal securities laws by this disclosure. 
I 
In 1973, Dirks was an officer of a New York broker-dealer 
firm and provided investment analysis of insurance company 
securities to institutional investors. 1 On March 6, Dirks re-
ceived information from Ronald Secrist, a former officer of 
Equity Funding of America. Secrist alleged that the assets 
of Equity Funding, a diversified corporation primarily en-
gaged in selling life insurance and mutual funds, were vastly 
overstated as the result of fraudulent corporate practices. 
Secrist also stated that various regulatory agencies had failed 
'The facts stated here are taken from more detailed statements set forth 
by the administrative law judge, App. 176-180, 225-247; the opinion of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1402-1406 
(1981); and the opinion of Judge Wright in the Court of Appeals, 220 U. S. 
App. D.C. 309, 314-318, 681 F. 2d 824, 829-833 (1982). 
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to act on similar charges made by Equity Funding employ-
ees. He urged Dirks to verify the fraud and disclose it 
publicly. 
Dirks decided to investigate the allegations. He visited 
Equity Funding's headquarters in Los Angeles and inter-
viewed several officers and employees of the corporation. 
Its senior management denied any wrongdoing, but current 
and former corporation employees corroborated the charges 
of fraud. Neither Dirks nor his firm owned or traded any 
Equity Funding stock, but throughout his investigation he 
openly discussed with a number of clients openly investors 
and investors the information he had obtained. Some of 
these persons sold their holdings of Equity Funding securi-
-ties, including five investment advisers who liquidated se-
curities worth more than $16 million. 2 
During the week that Dirks was in Los Angeles, he was in 
touch regularly with William Blundell, the Wall Street Jour-
nal's Los Angeles bureau chief. Dirks urged Blundell to 
write a story on the fraud allegations. Blundell discounted 
the allegations because he did not believe that such a massive 
fraud could go undetected. He declined to write the story, 
fearing that publishing such damaging rumors supported only 
by hearsay from current and former employees might be 
libelous. 
During the two-week period in which Dirks pursued his in-
vestigation and spread word of Secrist's charges, the price of 
2 Dirks received from his firm a salary plus a commission for securities 
transactions above a certain amount that his clients directed through his 
firm. See 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1402, n. 3. But "[i]t is not clear how 
many of those with whom Dirks spoke promised to direct some brokerage 
business through [Dirks' firm] to compensate [him], or how many actually 
did so." 220 U.S. App. D.C., at316, 681 F. 2d, at831. The Boston Com-
pany Institutional Investors , Inc., promised Dirks about $25,000 in com-
missions, but it is unclear whether Boston actually generated any broker-
age business for his firm. See App. 199, 204-205; 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 
1404, n. 10; 220 U. S. App. D.C., at 316, n. 5, 681 F. 2d, at 831, n. 5. 
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Equity Funding stock fell precipitously from $26 per share to 
less than $15 per share. This led the New York Stock Ex-
change to halt trading on March 27. Shortly thereafter Cali-
fornia insurance authorities impounded Equity Funding's 
records and uncovered evidence of the fraud. Only then did 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) file a com-
plaint against Equity Funding 3 and only then, on April2, did 
the Wall Street Journal publish a front-page story based 
largely on information assembled by Dirks. Equity Fund-
ing immediately went into receivership. 4 
The SEC investigated Dirks' role in the disclosure of the 
fraud. After a hearing by an administrative law judge, the 
SEC found that Dirks had aided and abetted violations of 
§17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S. C. §77q(a),6 
§ lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. , 
8 As early as 1971, the SEC had received allegations of fraudulent ac-
counting practices at Equity Funding. Moreover, on March 9, 1973, an 
official of the California Insurance Department informed the SEC's re-
gional office in Los Angeles of Secrist's charges of fraud. Dirks himself 
voluntarily presented his information at the SEC's regional office begin-
ning on March 27. 
• A federal grand jury in Los Angeles subsequently returned a 105-
count indictment against 22 persons, including many of Equity Funding's 
officers and directors. All defendants were found guilty of one or more 
counts, either by a plea of guilty or a conviction after trial. See Brief for 
Petitioner 15; App. 14~153. 
5 Section 17(a) provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities 
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication 
in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
"(!) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or 
"(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a 
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which 
they were made, not misleading, or 
"(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser." 
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§78j(b),6 and SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR §240.10b-5 (1982), 7 
when he repeated the allegations of fraud to members of the 
investment community who later sold their Equity Funding 
stock. The SEC concluded: "Where 'tippees'-regardless of 
their motivation or occupation-come into possession of ma-
terial 'information that they know is confidential and know or 
should know came from a corporate insider,' they must either 
publicly disclose that information or refrain from trading." 
21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1407 (1981) (footnote omitted) (quot-
ing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U. S. 222, 230 n. 12 
(1980)). Recognizing, however, that Dirks "played an im-
portant role in bringing [Equity Funding's] massive fraud to 
light," 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1412, the SEC only censured 
hi 8 m. 
6 Section 10(b) provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of 
any facility of any national securities exchange-
"(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
curity registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so 
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors." 
7 Rule 10b-5 provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of 
any facility of any national securities exchange, 
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
"(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state 
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security." 
8 Section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78o(b)(4)(E), 
provides that the SEC may impose certain sanctions, including censure, on 
any person associated with a registered broker-dealer who has "willfully 
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Dirks sought review in the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit. Without opinion, the court en-
tered judgment against Dirks "for the reasons stated by the 
Commission in its opinion." App. to Pet. for Cert. C-2. 
Judge Wright, a member of the panel, subsequently issued 
an opinion. Judge Robb concurred in the result, and Judge 
Tamm dissented; neither filed a separate opinion. Judge 
Wright believed that "the obligations of corporate fiduciaries 
pass to all those to whom they disclose their information be-
fore it has been disseminated to the public at large." 220 
U. S. App. D.C. 309, 324, 681 F. 2d 824, 839 (1982). Alter-
natively, Judge Wright concluded that, as an employee of a 
broker-dealer, Dirks had violated "obligations to the SEC 
and to the public completely independent of any obligations 
he acquired" from sources at Equity Funding. I d., at 325, 
681 F. 2d, at 840. 
In view of the importance to the SEC and to the securities 
industry of the question presented by this case, we granted a 
writ of certiorari. -- U. S. -- (1982). We now reverse. 
II 
In the seminal case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 
S.E.C. 907 (1961), the SEC recognized that the common law 
in some jurisdictions imposes on "corporate 'insiders,' par-
ticularly officers, directors, or controlling stockholders" an 
"affirmative duty of disclosure . . . when dealing in securi-
ties." Id., at 911, and n. 13.9 The SEC found that, not only 
aided [or] abetted" any violation of the federal securities laws. See 15 
U. S. C. § 78ff(a) (providing criminal penalties). 
9 The duty that insiders owe to the corporation's shareholders not to 
trade on inside infonnation differs from the common-law duty that officers 
and directors also have to the corporation itself not to mismanage corpo-
rate assets, of which confidential infonnation is one. See 3 Fletcher Cy-
clopedia of the Laws of Private Corporations §§ 848, 900 (1975 ed. and 
Supp. 1982); 3A Fletcher §§ 1168.1, 1168.2. We agree with the Cady, 
Roberts Commission that "[a] significant purpose of the Exchange Act was 
to eliminate the idea that use of inside infonnation for personal advantage 
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did breach of this duty recognized at common law satisfy the 
elements for a violation of Rule 101>-5, 10 but that individuals 
other than insiders could H&'l~ the galiga~ to disclose mate- J.L ~~ 
rial nonpublic information 11 before trading or to abstain from 
trading altogether: 
Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal ele-
ments; first, the existence of a relationship giving access, 
directly or indirectly, to information intended to be avail-
able only for a corporate purpose and not for the per-
sonal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfair-
ness involved where a party takes advantage of such 
information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom 
he is dealing. Id., at 912 (footnote omitted). 
In Chiarella, we quoted with approval the Cady, Roberts 
statement of the basis for the disclose-or-abstain rule and 
adopted the SEC's twin elements for finding a violation of 
Rule 101>-5's inside-trading restrictions: "(i) the existence of a 
relationship affording access to inside information intended to 
be available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfair-
ness of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that 
information by trading without disclosure." 445 U. S., at 
227. In examining whether Chiarella had an obligation to 
disclose or abstain, the Court found that there is no general 
was a normal emolument of corporate office." See 40 S.E.C., at 912, 
n. 15. 
10 Rule 10b--5 is generally the most inclusive of the three provisions on 
which the SEC rested its decision in this case, and we will refer to it when 
we note the statutory basis for the SEC's inside-trading rules. 
11 The SEC views the disclosure duty as requiring more than disclosure 
to purchasers or sellers: "Proper and adequate disclosure of significant cor-
porate developments can only be effected by a public release through the 
appropriate public media, designed to achieve a broad dissemination to the 
investing public generally and without favoring any special person or 
group." In re Faberge, Inc., 45 S.E.C. 249, 256 (1973). As used in this 
opinion, "nonpublic information" will refer to information that has not been 
so disclosed. 
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duty to disclose before trading on material nonpublic informa-
tion, 12 and held that "a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not 
arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market informa-
tion." I d., at 235. Such a duty arises rather from the exist-
ence of a fiduciary relationship. See id., at 227-235. 
Not "all breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a se-
curities transaction," however, come within the ambit of Rule 
lOI:Hi. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462, 
472 (1977). There must also be "manipulation or deception." 
I d., at 473. The fraud in an inside-trading case is the "inher-
ent unfairness involved where one "takes advantage" of "in-
formation intended to be available only for a corporate pur-
pose and not for the personal benefit of anyone." In re Mer-
rill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933, 936 
(1968). Thus, an insider will be liable under Rule 101:Hi for 
inside trading only where he makes "secret profits" from ma-
terial nonpublic information, Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C., at 
916, n. 31, and fails to disclose that information before doing 
so. 
III 
We were explicit in Chiarella in saying that there can be 
no duty to disclose where the person who has traded on inside 
information "was not [the corporation's] agent, ... was not a 
fiduciary, [or] was not a person in whom the sellers [of the 
securities] had placed their trust and confidence." 445 
U. S., at 232. Not to require such a fiduciary relationship, 
we recognized, would "depar[t] radically from the established 
doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship between 
two parties" and would amount to "recognizing a general 
12 See 445 U. S., at 233; id., at 237 (STEVENS, J., concurring); id., at 
238-239 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment); id., at 239--240 (BUR-
GER, C. J., dissenting). Cf. id., at 252, n. 2 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) 
(recognizing that there is no obligation to disclose material nonpublic in-
formation obtained through the exercise of "diligence or acumen" and "hon-
est means," as opposed to "stealth"). 
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duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo 
actions based on material, nonpublic information." I d., at 
232, 233. This requirement of a specific relationship be-
tween the shareholders and the individual trading on inside 
information has created analytical difficulties for the SEC in 
policing tippees who trade on inside information. Unlike in-
siders who have independent fiduciary duties to both the cor-
poration and its shareholders, the typical tippee has no such 
relationship. 13 In view of this absence, it has been unclear 
how a tippee acquires the Cady, Roberts duty to refrain from 
trading on inside information. 
A 
The SEC's position, as stated in its opinion in this case, is 
that a tippee inherits the Cady, Roberts obligation to share-
holders when he receives inside information from an insider: 
"In tipping potential traders, Dirks breached a duty 
18 Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is 
revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, or lawyer working for 
the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the sharehold-
ers. The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that such 
persons acquired nonpublic corporate information, but rather that they 
have entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the 
business of the enterprise and are given access to information solely for 
corporate purposes. See SEC v. Monarch Fund, 608 F. 2d 938, 942 (CA2 
1979); In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 645 (1971); In re 
Van Alystne, Noel & Co., 43 S.E.C. 1080, 1084-1085 (1969); In re Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933, 937 (1968); Cady, 
Roberts, 40 S.E.C., at 912. When such a person breaches his fiduciary 
relationship, he may be treated more properly as a tipper than a tippee. 
See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F. 2d 
228, 237 (CA2 1974) (investment banker had access to material information 
when working on a proposed public offering for the corporation). For such 
a duty to be imposed, however, the corporation must expect the outsider to 
keep the disclosed nonpublic information confidential, and the ~ re-
ceiving tb& i~ nt1:H!~e at l~i~r:...to il.lcHL..aB-~ange-
~t. ----------~~----------~ 
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which he had assumed as a result of knowingly receiving 
confidential information from [Equity Funding] insiders. 
Tippees such as Dirks who receive non-public material 
information from insiders become 'subject to the same 
duty as [the] insiders.' Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. [495 F. 2d 228, 237 (CA2 
1974) (quoting Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 
(SDNY 1967))]. Such a tippee breaches the fiduciary 
duty which he assumes from the insider when the tippee 
knowingly transmits the information to someone who 
will probably trade on the basis thereof. . . . Presum-
ably, Dirks' informants were entitled to disclose the [Eq-
uity Funding] fraud in order to bring it to light and its 
perpetrators to justice. However, Dirks-standing in 
their shoes-committed a breach of the fiduciary duty 
which he had assumed in dealing with them, when he 
passed the information on to traders." 21 S.E.C. 
Docket, at 1410, n. 42. 
This view differs little from the view that we rejected as 
inconsistent with congressional intent in Chiarella. In that 
case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the SEC and affirmed 
Chiarella's conviction by holding that "'[a]nyone-corporate 
insider or not-who regularly receives material nonpublic in-
formation may not use that information to trade in securities 
without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose.'" United 
States v. Chiarella, 588 F. 2d 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978) (empha-
sis in original). Here, the SEC maintains that anyone who 
knowingly receives nonpublic material information has a fidu-
ciary duty to disclose before trading. 14 
14 Apparently, the SEC believes this case differs from Chiarella in that 
Dirks receipt of inside information from Secrist, an insider, carried 
Secrist's duties with it, while Chiarella received the information without 
the direct involvement of an insider and thus inherited no duty to disclose 
or abstain. The SEC fails to explain, however, why the receipt ofnonpub-
lic information from an insider automatically carries with it the fiduciary 
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We again decline to accept the view that a duty to disclose 
or abstain exists solely because a person knowingly receives 
material nonpublic information from an insider and trades. 
Imposing such a duty could have an inhibiting influence on 
the role of market analysts that the SEC itself recognizes is 
essential. 15 It is commonplace for analysts to "ferret out and 
analyze information," 21 S.E.C., at 1406/6 and this often is 
duty of the insider. As we emphasized in Chiarella, mere possession of 
nonpublic information does not give rise to a duty to disclose or abstain; 
only a specific relationship does that. And we do not believe that the mere 
receipt of information from an insider creates such a special relationship 
between the tippee and the corporation's shareholders. 
Apparently recognizing the weakness of its argument in light of Chia-
rella, the SEC attempts to distinguish that case factually as involving not 
"inside" information, but rather "market" information, i. e., "information 
generated within the company relating to its assets or earnings." Brief 
for Respondent 23. This Court drew no such distinction in Chiarella and, 
as THE CHIEF JUSTICE noted, "[i]t is clear that § 10(b) and Rule 101:H> by 
their terms and by their history make no such distinction." 445 U. S., at 
241, n. 1 (dissenting opinion). See ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1603, Comment 
(2)(j) (Proposed Official Draft 1978). 
16 The SEC expressly recognized that "[t]he value to the entire market of 
[analysts'] efforts cannot be gainsaid; market efficiency in pricing is signifi-
cantly enhanced by [their] initiatives to ferret out and analyze information, 
and thus the analyst's work redounds to the benefit of all investors." 21 
S.E.C., at 1406. The SEC asserts that "[a]nalysts remain free to obtain 
from corporate management corporate information that is not itself mate-
rial for purposes of filling in the 'interstices in analysis'. . . . " Brief for 
Respondent 42 (quoting Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C., at 646). 
But its rule is inherently imprecise, and imprecision prevents parties from 
ordering their actions in accord with legal requirements. Unless the par-
ties have some guidance as to where the line is between permissible and 
impermissible disclosures and uses, neither corporate insiders nor analysts 
can be sure when the line is crossed. Cf. Adler v. Klawans, 267 F. 2d 840, 
845 (CA2 1959) (Burger, J., sitting by designation). 
16 On its facts, this case is the unusual one. Dirks is an analyst in a bro-
ker-dealer firm, and he did interview management in the course of his in-
vestigation. He uncovered, however, startling information that required 
no analysis or exercise of judgment as to its market relevance. Nonethe-
less, the principle at issue here extends beyond these facts. The SEC's 
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done by meeting with and questioning corporate officers and 
others who may be viewed as insiders. And information 
that the analysts obtain normally may be the basis for judg-
ments as to the market worth of a corporation's securities. 
The analyst's judgment in this respect is made available in 
market letters or otherwise to clients of the firm. In the 
very nature of this type of information, and indeed of the 
markets themselves, such information cannot be made simul-
taneously available to all of the corporation's stockholders or 
the public generally. 
In effect, then, the SEC's theory of tippee liability appears 
rooted in the rejected idea that the antifraud provisions re-
quire equal information. This is a significant departure from 
_ the principle set forth in Cady, Roberts and Chiarella that 
only some persons, under some circumstances, will be barred 
from trading while in possession of ~ A!nformat10n. 17 
rule-applicable without regard to any breach by an insider-could have 
wide ramifications on reporting by analysts of investment views and news. 
Despite the unusualness, however, of Dirks' "find," the central role that 
he played in uncovering the fraud at Equity Funding, and that analysts in 
general can play in-'p~ eePpellaie Bb:uot.I.Y:ei fup- e¥ideRee e& 1JJ:F9Rgdo-
ing:, BAel.lkl be a.ppt:eoiated. Dirks' careful investigation brought to light a 
massive fraud at the corporation. And until the Equity Funding fraud 
was exposed, the information in the trading market was grossly inaccu-
rate. But for Dirks' efforts, the fraud might well have gone undetected 
longer. The SEC should be wary of using Rule 10b-5 to shield corpora-
tions from the socially beneficial scrutiny of securities analysts performing 
their normal roles. 
17 In Chiarella, we noted that formulation of an absolute equal informa-
tion rule "should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of con-
gressional intent." 445 U. S., at 233. Rather than adopting such a radi-
cal view of securities trading, Congress has expressly'\ ~emt~ted many 
market professionals from the general statutory prohibition set forth in 
§ ll(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78k(a)(1), against 
members of a national securities exchange trading for their own account. 
See id., at 233, n. 16. We observed in Chiarella that "[t]he exception is 
based upon Congress' recognition that [market professionals] contribute to 
a fair and orderly marketplace at the same time they exploit the informa-
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Judge Wright correctly read our opinion in Chiarella as re-
pudiating any notion that traders must enjoy equal informa-
tion before trading: "[T]he 'information' theory is rejected. 
Because the disclose-or-refrain duty is extraordinary, it at-
taches only when a party has legal obligations other than a 
mere duty to comply with the general antifraud proscriptions 
in the federal securities laws." 220 U. S. App. D.C., at 322, 
681 F. 2d, at 837. See Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 235, n. 20 
(BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). 
The SEC's view would mean that the duty to disclose ac-
companies the inside information, resting on all those who 
possess nonpublic material information. That is the general 
duty we rejected in Chiarella. We reaffirm today that "[a] 
duty [to disclose] arises from the relationship between par-
ties ... and not merely from one's ability to acquire informa-
tion because of his position in the market." 445 U. S., at 
232-233, n. 14. 
B 
Although there are problems with the SEC's theory of 
tippee liability, the prophylactic need for a ban on some 
tippee trading is clear. Under Cady, Roberts , not only are 
insiders forbidden by their fiduciary relationship from using 
undisclosed corporate information to their personal advan-
tage, but they may not give such information to an outsider 
for the same improper purpose of exploiting the information 
for their personal gain. See 15 U. S. C. § 78t(b) (making it 
unlawful to do indirectly any act made unlawful by the fed-
eral securities acts "by means of any other person"). Simi-
larly, the transactions of those who knowingly participate 
and profit with the fiduciary in such a breach are "as forbid-
den" as transactions "on behalf of the trustee himself." 
Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U. S. 267, 272 (1951). See Jackson 
tional advantage that comes from their possession of [nonpublic informa-
tion]. " Ibid. 
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v. Smith, 254 U. S. 586, 589 (1921); Jackson v. Ludeling, 88 
U. S. 616, 631-632 (1874). As the Court explained in 
Mosser, a contrary rule "would open up opportunities for de-
vious dealings in the name of the others that the trustee could 
not conduct in his own." 341 U. S., at 271. See SEC v. 
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F. 2d 1301, 1308 (CA2), cert. 
denied, 404 U. S. 1005 (1971). Thus, the tippee's duty to 
disclose or abstain is derivative from that of the insider's 
duty. See Tr. of Oral Ar. 38. Cf. Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 
246, n. 1 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). 
As we noted in Chiarella, "[t]he tippee's obligation has 
been viewed as arising from his role as a participant after the 
fact in the insider's breach of a fiduciary duty." 445 U. S., at 
230, n. 12. Tippees may assume an insider's duty to the 
shareholders not because they receive inside information but 
rather because t.hey-reeli¥e it tmproperly. 18 And or Rule 
101:H5 purposes, the insider's disclosure is improper where it 
would violate his duty under Cady, Roberts. Thus, a tippee 
assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation L---------
not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the 
insider breaches his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by dis-
closing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or 
should know that there has been a breach. 19 As Commis-
'
8 The SEC itself has recognized that tippee liability properly is imposed 
only in circumstances where the tippee knows, or has reason to know, that 
the insider has disclosed improperly inside corporate information. In In-
vestors Management Co., the SEC stated that one element of tippee liabil-
ity is that the tippee kne~ or had reason to know "that [the information] 
was non-public and had been obtained improperly by selective revelation 
or otherwise." 44 S.E.C., at 641 (emphasis added). Commissioner Smith 
read this test to mean that a tippee can be held liable only if he received 
information in breach of an insider's duty not to disclose it. Id., at 650 
(concurring in the result). 
19 Professor Loss has linked tippee liability to the concept in the law of 
restitution that "'[ w ]here a fiduciary in violation of his duty to the benefi-
ciary communicates confidential information to a third person, the third 
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sioner Smith perceptively observed in Investors Manage-
ment Co.: 
"It is important in this type of case to focus on policing 
insiders and what they do, which I think appropriate, 
rather than on policing information per se and its posses-
sion, which I think impracticable. I believe the empha-
sis in the law should continue to be upon the conduct of 
corporate insiders and their privies, as it has been since 
Strong v. Repide, 213 U. S. 419 (1909) and as it was in 
Cady Roberts, Texas Gulf and Merrill Lynch, rather 
than upon a concept-too vague for me to apply with any 
consistency-of relative informational advantages in the 
marketplace." 44 S.E.C., at 648 (concurring in the 
result). 
c 
Tipping thus properly is viewed as a means of indirectly vi-
olating the Cady, Roberts disclose-or-abstain rule. Accord-
ingly, the elements of a Rule lOb-5 violation in a tipping case 
should be the same as in an inside-trading case. Mere re-
ceipt of information from a corporate insider is not enough to 
trust for the beneficiary any profit which he makes through the use of such 
information.'" 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1451 (2d ed. 1961) (quot-
ing Restatement of Restitution § 201(2) (1937)). Other authorities like-
wise have expressed the view that tippee liability exists only where there 
has been a breach of trust by an insider of which the tippee had knowledge. 
See, e. g., Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (SDNY 1967); A. Jacobs, 
The Impact of Rule 10l:Hi, § 167, at 7-4 (1975) ("[T]he better view is that a 
tipper must know or have reason to know the information is nonpublic and 
was improperly obtained."); Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial In-
quiry Into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 798, 818, n. 76 (1973) ("The extension of rule 10l:Hi restrictions to 
tippees of corporate insiders can best be justified on the theory that they 
are participating in the insider's breach of his fiduciary duty."). Cf. Re-
statement (Second) of Agency § 312, comment c (1958) ("A person who, 
with notice that an agent is thereby violating his duty to his principal, re-
ceives confidential information from the agent, may be [deemed] ... a con-
structive trustee."). 
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impose an obligation to disclose or abstain. The recipient or 
tippee of inside information thus cannot be "a participant 
after the fact," Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 230, n. 12, unless the 
insider or provider of the information has breached his duty 
to the corporation's shareholders, and the tippee knows or 
should know that there has been a breach. 20 
All disclosures of c.onfidential corporate information are not 
inconsistent with the duty insiders owe to shareholders. In 
contrast to the extraordinary facts of this case, the more 
typical situation in which there will be a question whether 
disclosure violates the insider's Cady, Roberts duty is when 
insiders disclose information to analysts. See n. 16, supra. 
In some situations, both the insider and the analyst recipient 
will act in good faith, and yet release of the information may 
affect the market. For example, it may not be clear-either 
to the corporate insider or to the recipient analyst-whether 
00 We do not suggest that knowingly trading on inside infonnation is "so-
cially desirable or even that it is devoid of moral considerations." Dooley, 
at 55. Nor do we imply an absence of responsibility to disclose promptly 
indications of illegal actions by a corporation to the proper authorities-
typically the SEC and exchange authorities in cases involving securities. 
Depending on the circumstances, and even where pennitted by law, one's 
trading on material nonpublic infonnation is behavior that may fall below 
ethical standards of conduct. But in a statutory area of the law such as 
securities regulation, where legal principles of general application must be 
applied, there may be "significant distinctions between actual legal obliga-
tions and ethical ideals." SEC, Report of the Special Study of Securities 
Markets, H. R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 237-238 
(1963). 
At oral argument, the following exchange took place: 
"QUESTION: So, it would not have satisfied his obligation under the 
law to go to the SEC first? 
"[SEC's counsel]: That is correct. That an insider has to observe what 
has come to be known as the abstain or disclosure rule. Either the in-
fonnation has to be disclosed to the market if it is inside infonnation . .. or 
the insider must abstain." Tr. of Oral Arg. 27. Thus, it is clear that Rule 
lOb-5 does not impose any obligation simply to tell the SEC about the 
fraud before trading. 
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the information will be viewed as material nonpublic informa-
tion. Corporate officials may mistakenly think the informa-
tion already has been disclosed or that it is not material 
enough to affect the market. Whether disclosure is a breach 
of duty therefore depends in large part on the purpose or 
good faith of the insider who made the disclosure. Absent 
an improper purpose, there has been no breach of duty to 
stockholders. And absent a breach by the insider, there is 
no derivative breach. 21 As Commissioner Smith stated in 
Investors Management Co.: 
"[T]ippee responsibility must be related back to insider 
responsibility by a necessary finding that the tippee 
knew the information was given to him in breach of a 
duty by a person having a special relationship to the is-
suer not to disclose the information, and that the in-
formation must be shown not only to have been material 
and non-public, but also to have substantially contrib-
uted to the trading which occurred." 44 S.E.C., at 651 
(concurring in the result). 
There are facts and circumstances that often may justify an 
inference that the insider has breached his fiduciary duty. 
For example, there may be a relationship that exists between 
21 An example of a case turning on the court's detennination that the dis-
closure did not impose any fiduciary duties on the recipient of the inside 
information is Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F. 2d 796 (CA21980). 
There, the defendant investment banking firm, representing one of its own 
corporate clients, investigated another corporation that was a possible tar-
get of a takeover bid by its client. In the course of negotiations the invest-
ment banking firm was given, on a confidential basis, unpublished material 
information. Subsequently, after the proposed takeover was abandoned, 
the firm was charged with relying on the information when it traded in the 
target corporation's stock. For purposes of the decision, it was assumed 
that the firm knew the information was confidential, but that it had been 
received in arm's-length negotiations. See id., at 798. In the absence of 
any fiduciary relationship, the Court of Appeals found no basis for impos-
ing tippee liability on the investment firm. See id., at 799. 
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the insider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo 
from the latter, or an intention to benefit the particular re-
cipient. The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of 
nonpublic information certainly exist when an insider makes 
a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or 
friend. The tip and trade resemble trading by the insider 
himself followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient. 
Determining the purpose of any one disclosure, a question 
of fact, will not always be easy. But it is essential, we think, 
to have a guiding principle, and we believe that there must be 
a breach of the insider's fiduciary duty before the tippee in-
herits the duty to disclose or abstain. In contrast, the rule 
adopted by the SEC in this case would have no limiting 
principle. 22 
IV 
Under the inside-trading and tipping rules set forth above, 
we find that there was no actionable violation by Dirks. 23 It 
22 Without legal limitations, market participants are forced to rely on the 
reasonableness of the SEC's litigation strategy, but that can be hazardous, 
as the facts of this case make plain. Following the SEC's filing of the 
Texas Gulf Sulphur action, Commissioner (and later Chairman) Budge 
spoke of the various implications of applying Rule 10b--5 in inside-trading 
cases: 
"Turning to the realm of possible defendants in the present and potential 
civil actions, the Commission certainly does not contemplate suing every 
person who may have come across inside information. In the Texas Gulf 
action neither tippees nor persons in the vast rank and file of employees 
have been named as defendants. In my view, the Commission in future 
cases normally should not join rank and file employees or persons outside 
the company such as an analyst or reporter who learns of inside informa-
tion." Speech of Hamer Budge to the New York Regional Group of the 
American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc. (Nov. 18, 1965) (emphasis 
added), reprinted in Budge, The Texas Gulf Sulphur Case-What It Is and 
What It Isn't, Corp. Secretary No. 127, at 6 (Dec. 17, 1965). 
23 Dirks contends that he was not a "tippee" because the information he 
received constituted unverified allegations of fraud that were denied by 
management and were not "material facts" under the securities laws that 
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is undisputed that Dirks himself was a stranger to Equity 
Funding, with no pre-existing fiduciary duty to its share-
holders. 24 He took no action, directly or indirectly, that in-
duced the shareholders or officers of Equity Funding to re-
pose trust or confidence in him. There was no expectation 
by Dirks sources that he would keep their information in con-
fidence. Nor did Dirks misappropriate or illegally obtain the 
information about Equity Funding. Unless the insiders 
breached their Cady, Roberts duty to shareholders in disclos-
ing the nonpublic information to Dirks, he breached no duty 
when he passed it on to investors as well as to the Wall Street 
Journal. 
We also think it is clear that the Equity Funding employ-
-ees did not violate their Cady, Roberts duty to the corpora-
tion's shareholders by providing information to Dirks. 25 The 
required disclosure before trading. He also argues that the information 
he received was not truly "inside" information, i. e., intended for a con-
fidential corporate purpose, but was merely evidence of a crime. The So-
licitor General agrees. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22. 
For purposes of deciding this case, however, we assume the correctness of 
the SEC's findings, accepted by the Court of Appeals, that petitioner was a 
tippee of material inside information. 
24 Judge Wright found that Dirks acquired a fiduciary duty by virtue of 
his position as an employee of a broker-dealer. See 220 U. S. App. D.C., 
at 325--327, 681 F. 2d, at 840-842. The SEC, however, did not consider 
Judge Wright's novel theory in its decision, nor did it present that theory 
to the Court of Appeals. The SEC also has not argued Judge Wright's 
theory in this Court. See Brief for Respondent 21, n. 27. The merits of 
such a duty are therefore not before the Court. See SEC v. Chenery 
Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 1~197 (1947). 
25 In this Court, the SEC appears to contend that an insider invariably 
violates a fiduciary duty to the corporation's shareholders by transmitting 
nonpublic corporate information to an outsider when he has reason to be-
lieve that the outsider may use it to the disadvantage of the shareholders. 
"Thus, regardless of any ultimate motive to bring to public attention the 
derelictions at Equity Funding, Secrist breached his duty to Equity Fund-
ing shareholders." Brief for Respondent 31. This perceived "duty" dif-
fers markedly from the one that the SEC identified in Cady, Roberts and 
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tippers received no monetary or personal benefit for reveal-
ing Equity Funding's secrets, nor did they have an apparent 
purpose or desire to make a gift of valuable information to 
Dirks. As the facts of this case clearly indicate, the tippers 
were motivated by a desire to expose the fraud. See supra, 
at 1-2. In the absence of a breach of duty to shareholders by 
the insiders, there was no derivative breach by Dirks. See 
n. 19, supra. Dirks therefore could not have been "a partici-
pant after the fact in [an] insider's breach of a fiduciary 
duty." Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 230, n. 12. 
v 
We conclude that Dirks, in the circumstances of this case, 
had no duty to abstain from use of the inside information that 
- he obtained. The judgment of the Court of Appeals there-
fore is 
Reversed. 
that has been the basis for federal tippee-trading rules to date. In fact, 
the SEC did not charge Secrist with any wrongdoing, and we do not under-
stand the SEC to have relied on any theory of a breach of duty by Secrist in 
finding that Dirks breached his duty to Equity Funding's shareholders. 
See App. 250 (decision of administrative law judge) ("One who knows him-
self to be a beneficiary of non-public, selectively disclosed inside informa-
tion must fully disclose or refrain from trading."); 21 S.E.C., at 1410, n. 42 
("Presumably, Dirks' informants were entitled to disclose the [Equity 
Funding] fraud in order to bring it to light and its perpetrators to jus-
tice."); Brief on behalf of the SEC in the Court of Appeals, at 47--50; id., at 
51 ("[K]nowing possession of inside information by any person imposes a 
duty to abstain or disclose."); id., at 52-54; id., at 55 ("[T]his obligation 
arises not from the manner in which such information is acquired .... "); 
220 U. S. App. D.C., at 322-323, 681 F. 2d, at 838 (Wright, J.). 
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JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Petitioner Raymond Dirks received material nonpublic in-
formation from "insiders" of a corporation with which he had 
no connection. He disclosed this information to investors 
who relied on it in trading in the shares of the corporation. 
The question is whether Dirks violated the antifraud provi-
sions of the federal securities laws by this disclosure. 
I 
In 1973, Dirks was an officer of a New York broker-dealer 
firm who specialized in providing investment analysis of in-
surance company securities to institutional investors. 1 On 
March 6, Dirks received information from Ronald Secrist, a 
former officer of Equity Funding of America. Secrist al-
leged that the assets of Equity Funding, a diversified cor-
poration primarily engaged in selling life insurance and mu-
tual funds, were vastly overstated as the result of fraudulent 
corporate practices. Secrist also stated that various regula-
' The facts stated here are taken from more detailed statements set forth 
by the administrative law judge, App. 176-180, 225-247; the opinion of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1402-1406 
(1981); and the opinion of Judge Wright in the Court of Appeals, 220 U. S. 
App. D.C. 309, 314-318, 681 F. 2d 824, 829--833 (1982). 
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tory agencies had failed to act on similar charges made by 
Equity Funding employees. He urged Dirks to verify the 
fraud and disclose it publicly. 
Dirks decided to investigate the allegations. He visited 
Equity Funding's headquarters in Los Angeles and inter-
viewed several officers and employees of the corporation. 
The senior management denied any wrongdoing, but the cor-
poration employees corroborated the charges of fraud. N ei-
ther Dirks nor his firm owned or traded any Equity Funding 
stock, but throughout his investigation he openly discussed 
the information he had obtained with a number of clients in-
vestors. Some of these persons sold their holdings of Equity 
Funding securities, including five investment advisers who 
liquidated holdings of more than $16 million. 2 
While Dirks was in Los Angeles, he was in touch regularly 
with William Blundell, the Wall Street Journal's Los Angeles 
bureau chief. Dirks urged Blundell to write a story on the 
fraud allegations. Blundell did not believe that such a mas-
sive fraud could go undetected and declined to write the 
story. He feared that publishing such damaging rumors 
might be libelous. 
During the two-week period in which Dirks pursued his in-
vestigation and spread word of Secrist's charges, the price of 
Equity Funding stock fell from $26 per share to less than $15 
per share. This led the New York Stock Exchange to halt 
trading on March 27. Shortly thereafter California insur-
2 Dirks received from his firm a salary plus a commission for securities 
transactions above a certain amount that his clients directed through his 
firm. See 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1402, n. 3. But "[i]t is not clear how 
many of those with whom Dirks spoke promised to direct some brokerage 
business through [Dirks' firm] to compensate [Dirks], or how many actu-
ally did so." 220 U. S. App. D.C., at 316, 681 F. 2d, at 831. The Boston 
Company Institutional Investors, Inc., promised Dirks about $25,000 in 
commissions, but it is unclear whether Boston actually generated any bro-
kerage business for his firm. See App. 199, 204-205; 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 
1404, n. 10; 220 U. S. App. D.C., at 316, n. 5, 681 F. 2d, at 831, n. 5. 
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ance authorities impounded Equity Funding's records and 
uncovered evidence of the fraud. Only then did the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) file a complaint against 
Equity Funding 3 and only then, on April 2, did the Wall 
Street Journal publish a front-page story based largely on in-
formation assembled by Dirks. Equity Funding immedi-
ately went into receivership. 4 
The SEC began an investigation into Dirks' role in the ex-
posure of the fraud. After a hearing by an administrative 
law judge, the SEC found that Dirks had aided and abetted 
violations of § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 77q(a), 5 § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S. C. §78j(b),6 and SEC Rule lOb--5, 17 CFR §240.10b--5 
3 As early as 1971, the SEC had received allegations of fraudulent ac-
counting practices at Equity Funding. Moreover, on March 9, 1973, an 
official of the California Insurance Department informed the SEC's re-
gional office in Los Angeles of Secrist's charges of fraud. Dirks himself 
voluntarily presented his information at the SEC's regional office begin-
ning on March 27. 
• A federal grand jury in Los Angeles subsequently returned a 105-
count indictment against 22 persons, including many of Equity Funding's 
officers and directors. All defendants were found guilty of one or more 
counts, either by a plea of guilty or a conviction after trial. See Brief for 
Petitioner 15; App. 14~153. 
• Section 17(a) provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities 
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication 
in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
"(!) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or 
"(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a 
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which 
they were made, not misleading, or 
"(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser." 
6 Section lO(b) provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of 
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(1982), 7 by repeating the allegations of fraud to members of 
the investment community who later sold their Equity Fund-
ing stock. The SEC concluded: "Where 'tippees'-regard-
less of their motivation or occupation-come into possession 
of material 'information that they know is confidential and 
know or should know came from a corporate insider,' they 
must either publicly disclose that information or refrain from 
trading." 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1407 (1981) (footnote omit-
ted) (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U. S. 222, 230 
n. 12 (1980)). Recognizing, however, that Dirks "played an 
important role in bringing [Equity Funding's] massive fraud 
to light," 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1412, the SEC only censured 
him. 8 
Dirks sought review in the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit. The court entered judgment 
any facility of any national securities exchange-
. 
"(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
curity registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so 
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors." 
7 Rule lOb-5 provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of 
any facility of any national securities exchange, 
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
"(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state 
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security." 
8 Section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78o(b)(4)(E), 
provides that the SEC may impose certain sanctions, including censure, on 
any person associated with a registered broker-dealer who has "willfully 
aided [or] abetted" any violation of the federal securities laws. See 15 
U. S. C. § 78ff(a) (providing criminal penalties). 
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against Dirks "for the reasons stated by the Commission in 
its opinion." App. to Pet. for Cert. C-2. Judge Wright, a 
member of the panel, subsequently issued an opinion. Judge 
Robb concurred in the result, and Judge Tamm dissented; 
neither filed a separate opinion. Judge Wright believed that 
"the obligations of corporate fiduciaries pass to all those to 
whom they disclose their information before it has been dis-
seminated to the public at large." 220 U. S. App. D.C. 309, 
324, 681 F. 2d 824, 839 (1982). Alternatively, Judge Wright 
concluded that, as an employee of a broker-dealer, Dirks had 
violated "obligations to the SEC and to the public completely 
independent of any obligations he acquired" as a result of re-
ceiving the information. !d., at 325, 681 F. 2d, at 840. 
In view of the importance to the SEC and to the securities 
industry of the question presented by this case, we granted a 
writ of certiorari.-- U. S. -- (1982). We now reverse. 
II 
In the seminal case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 
S.E.C. 907 (1961), the SEC recognized that the common law 
in some jurisdictions imposes on "corporate 'insiders,' par-
ticularly officers, directors, or controlling stockholders" an 
"affirmative duty of disclosure . . . when dealing in securi-
ties." !d., at 911, and n. 13.9 The SEC found that, not only 
did breach of this common-law duty also establish the ele-
ments of a Rule 10b--5 violation, '0 but that individuals other 
9 The duty that insiders owe to the corporation's shareholders not to 
trade on inside information differs from the common-law duty that officers 
and directors also have to the corporation itself not to mismanage corpo-
rate assets, of which confidential information is one. See 3 Fletcher Cy-
clopedia of the Laws of Private Corporations §§ 848, 900 (1975 ed. and 
Supp. 1982); 3A Fletcher §§ 1168.1, 1168.2. In holding that breaches of 
this duty to shareholders violated the Securities Exchange Act, the Cady, 
Roberts Commission recognized, and we agree that "[a] significant purpose 
of the Exchange Act was to eliminate the idea that use of inside informa-
tion for personal advantage was a normal emolument of corporate office." 
See 40 S.E.C., at 912, n. 15. 
10 Rule lOir-5 is generally the most inclusive of the three provisions on 
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than corporate insiders could be obligated to disclose material 
nonpublic information 11 before trading or to abstain from 
trading altogether. !d., at 912. In Chiarella, we accepted 
the two elements set out initially in Cady Roberts for estab-
lishing a Rule 10b-5 violation: "(i) the existence of a relation-
ship affording access to inside information intended to be 
available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness 
of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that in-
formation by trading without disclosure." 445 U. S., at 227. 
In examining whether Chiarella had an obligation to disclose 
or abstain, the Court found that there is no general duty to 
disclose before trading on material nonpublic information, 12 
and held that "a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise 
from the mere possession of nonpublic market information." 
I d., at 235. Such a duty arises rather from the existence of a 
fiduciary relationship. See id., at 227-235. 
Not "all breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a se-
curities transaction," however, come within the ambit of Rule 
10b-5. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462, 
472 (1977). There must also be "manipulation or deception." 
!d., at 473. In an inside-trading case this fraud derives from 
which the SEC rested its decision in this case, and we will refer to it when 
we note the statutory basis for the SEC's inside-trading rules. 
11 The SEC views the disclosure duty as requiring more than disclosure 
to purchasers or sellers: "Proper and adequate disclosure of significant cor-
porate developments can only be effected by a public release through the 
appropriate public media, designed to achieve a broad dissemination to the 
investing public generally and without favoring any special person or 
group." In re Faberge, Inc., 45 S.E.C. 249, 256 (1973). As used in this 
opinion, "nonpublic information" will refer to information that has not been 
so disclosed. 
'
2 See 445 U.S., at 233; id., at 237 (STEVENS, J., concurring); id., at 
238-239 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment); id., at 239-240 (BUR-
GER, C. J., dissenting). Cf. id., at 252, n. 2 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) 
(recognizing that there is no obligation to disclose material nonpublic in-
formation obtained through the exercise of "diligence or acumen" and "hon-
est means," as opposed to "stealth"). 
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the "inherent unfairness involved where one takes advan-
tage" of "information intended to be available only for a cor-
porate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone." 
In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 
S.E.C. 933, 936 (1968). Thus, an insider will be liable under 
Rule 101H> for inside trading only where he fails to disclose 
material nonpublic information before trading on it and thus 
makes "secret profits." Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C., at 916, n. 
31. 
III 
We were explicit in Chiarella in saying that there can be 
no duty to disclose where the person who has traded on inside 
information "was not [the corporation's] agent, ... was not a 
fiduciary, [or] was not a person in whom the sellers [of the 
securities] had placed their trust and confidence." 445 
U. S., at 232. Not to require such a fiduciary relationship, 
we recognized, would "depar[t] radically from the established 
doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship between 
two parties" and would amount to "recognizing a general 
duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo 
actions based on material, nonpublic information." I d., at 
232, 233. This requirement of a specific relationship be-
tween the shareholders and the individual trading on inside 
information has created analytical difficulties for the SEC in 
policing tippees who trade on inside information. Unlike in-
siders who have independent fiduciary duties to both the cor-
poration and its shareholders, the typical tippee has no such 
relationship. 13 In view of this absence, it has been unclear 
13 Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is 
revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, or lawyer working for 
the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the sharehold-
ers. The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that such 
persons acquired nonpublic corporate information, but rather that they 
have entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the 
business of the enterprise and are given access to information solely for 
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how a tippee acquires the Cady, Roberts duty to refrain from 
trading on inside information. 
A 
The SEC's position, as stated in its opinion in this case, is 
that a tippee inherits the Cady, Roberts obligation to share-
holders whenever he receives inside information from an 
insider: 
"In tipping potential traders, Dirks breached a duty 
which he had assumed as a result of knowingly receiving 
confidential information from [Equity Funding] insiders. 
Tippees such as Dirks who receive non-public material 
information from insiders become 'subject to the same 
duty as [the] insiders.' Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. [495 F. 2d 228, 237 (CA2 
1974) (quoting Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 
(SDNY 1967))]. Such a tippee breaches the fiduciary 
duty which he assumes from the insider when the tippee 
knowingly transmits the information to someone who 
will probably trade on the basis thereof. . . . Presum-
ably, Dirks' informants were entitled to disclose the [Eq-
uity Funding] fraud in order to bring it to light and its 
perpetrators to justice. However, Dirks-standing in 
their shoes-committed a breach of the fiduciary duty 
corporate purposes. See SEC v. Monarch Fund, 608 F. 2d 938, 942 (CA2 
1979); In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 645 (1971); In re 
Van Alystne, Noel & Co., 43 S.E.C. 1080, 1084-1085 (1969); In re Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933, 937 (1968); Cady, 
Roberts, 40 S.E.C., at 912. When such a person breaches his fiduciary 
relationship, he may be treated more properly as a tipper than a tippee. 
See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F. 2d 
228, 237 (CA21974) (investment banker had access to material information 
when working on a proposed public offering for the corporation). For such 
a duty to be imposed, however, the corporation must expect the outsider to 
keep the disclosed nonpublic information confidential, and the relationship 
at least must imply such a duty. 
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which he had assumed in dealing with them, when he 
passed the information on to traders." 21 S.E.C. 
Docket, at 1410, n. 42. 
This view differs little from the view that we rejected as 
inconsistent with congressional intent in Chiarella. In that 
case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the SEC and affirmed 
Chiarella's conviction, holding that "'[a]nyone-corporate in-
sider or not-who regularly receives material nonpublic in-
formation may not use that information to trade in securities 
without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose."' United 
States v. Chiarella, 588 F. 2d 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978) (empha-
sis in original). Here, the SEC maintains that anyone who 
knowingly receives nonpublic material information from an 
insider has a fiduciary duty to disclose before trading. 14 
In effect, the SEC's theory of tippee liability in both cases 
appear rooted in the idea that the antifraud provisions re-
quire equal information. This is a significant departure from 
14 Apparently, the SEC believes this case differs from Chiarella in that 
Dirks' receipt of inside information from Secrist, an insider, carried 
Secrist's duties with it, while Chiarella received the information without 
the direct involvement of an insider and thus inherited no duty to disclose 
or abstain. The SEC fails to explain, however, why the receipt ofnonpub-
lic information from an insider automatically carries with it the fiduciary 
duty of the insider. As we emphasized in Chiarella, mere possession of 
nonpublic information does not give rise to a duty to disclose or abstain; 
only a specific relationship does that. And we do not believe that the mere 
receipt of information from an insider creates such a special relationship 
between the tippee and the corporation's shareholders. 
Apparently recognizing the weakness of its argument in light of Chia-
rella, the SEC attempts to distinguish that case factually as involving not 
"inside" information, but rather "market" information, i. e., "information 
generated within the company relating to its assets or earnings." Brief 
for Respondent 23. This Court drew no such distinction in Chiarella and, 
as THE CHIEF JUSTICE noted, "[i]t is clear that § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by 
their terms and by their history make no such distinction." 445 U. S., at 
241, n. 1 (dissenting opinion). See ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1603, Comment 
(2)(j) (Proposed Official Draft 1978). 
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the principle set forth in Chiarella that only some persons, 
under some circumstances, will be barred from trading while 
in possession of material nonpublic information. 15 Judge 
Wright correctly read our opinion in Chiarella as repudiating 
any notion that all traders must enjoy equal information be-
fore trading: "[T]he 'information' theory is rejected. Be-
cause the disclose-or-refrain duty is extraordinary, it at-
taches only when a party has legal obligations other than a 
mere duty to comply with the general antifraud proscriptions 
in the federal securities laws." 220 U. S. App. D.C., at 322, 
681 F. 2d, at 837. See Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 235, n. 20. 
We reaffirm today that "[a] duty [to disclose] arises from the 
relationship between parties ... and not merely from one's 
ability to acquire information because of his position in the 
market." 445 U. S., at 232-233, n. 14. 
Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a per-
son knowingly receives material nonpublic information from 
an insider and trades on it could have an inhibiting influence 
on the role of market analysts that the SEC itself recognizes 
is essential. 16 It is commonplace for analysts to "ferret out 
16 In Chiarella, we noted that formulation of an absolute equal informa-
tion rule "should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of con-
gressional intent." 445 U. S., at 233. Rather than adopting such a radi-
cal view of securities trading, Congress has expressly exempted many 
market professionals from the general statutory prohibition set forth in 
§ ll(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78k(a)(1), against 
members of a national securities exchange trading for their own account. 
See id., at 233, n. 16. We observed in Chiarella that "[t]he exception is 
based upon Congress' recognition that [market professionals] contribute to 
a fair and orderly marketplace at the same time they exploit the informa-
tional advantage that comes from their possession of [nonpublic informa-
tion]." Ibid. 
16 The SEC expressly recognized that "[t]he value to the entire market of 
[analysts'] efforts cannot be gainsaid; market efficiency in pricing is signifi-
cantly enhanced by [their] initiatives to ferret out and analyze information, 
and thus the analyst's work redounds to the benefit of all investors." 21 
S.E.C., at 1406. The SEC asserts that analysts remain free to obtain 
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and analyze information," 21 S.E.C., at 1406, 17 and this often 
is done by meeting with and questioning corporate officers 
and others who are insiders. And information that the ana-
lysts obtain normally may be the basis for judgments as to 
the market worth of a corporation's securities. The analyst's 
judgment in this respect is made available in market letters 
or otherwise to clients of the firm. In the very nature of this 
type of information, and indeed of the markets themselves, 
such information cannot be made simultaneously available to 
all of the corporation's stockholders or the public generally. 
B 
The conclusion that recipients of inside information do not 
invariably acquire a duty to disclose or abstain does not mean 
from management corporate information for purposes of "filling in the 'in-
terstices in analysis' .... " Brief for Respondent 42 (quoting Investors 
Management Co., 44 S.E.C., at 646). But this rule is inherently impre-
cise, and imprecision prevents parties from ordering their actions in accord 
with legal requirements. Unless the parties have some guidance as to 
where the line is between permissible and impermissible disclosures and 
uses, neither corporate insiders nor analysts can be sure when the line is 
crossed. Cf. Adler v. Klawans, 267 F. 2d 840, 845 (CA21959) (Burger, J., 
sitting by designation). 
17 On its facts, this case is the unusual one. Dirks is an analyst in a bro-
ker-dealer firm, and he did interview management in the course of his in-
vestigation. He uncovered, however, startling information that required 
no analysis or exercise of judgment as to its market relevance. N onethe-
less, the principle at issue here extends beyond these facts. The SEC's 
rule-applicable without regard to any breach by an insider-could have 
serious ramifications on reporting by analysts of investment views. 
Despite the unusualness, of Dirks' "find," the central role that he played 
in uncovering the fraud at Equity Funding, and that analysts in general 
can play in revealing information that corporations may have reason to 
withhold from the public is an important one. Dirks' careful investigation 
brought to light a massive fraud at the corporation. And until the Equity 
Funding fraud was exposed, the information in the trading market was 
grossly inaccurate. But for Dirks' efforts, the fraud might well have gone 
undetected longer. 
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that such tippee always are free to trade on the information. 
The need for a prophylactic ban on some tippee trading is 
clear. Not only must insiders be forbidden by their fiduciary 
relationship from personally using undisclosed corporate in-
formation to their advantage, but they may not give such in-
formation to an outsider for the same improper purpose of ex-
ploiting the information for their personal gain. See 15 
U. S. C. § 78t(b) (making it unlawful to do indirectly "by 
means of any other person" any act made unlawful by the fed-
eral securities laws). Similarly, the transactions of those 
who knowingly participate with the fiduciary in such a breach 
are "as forbidden" as transactions "on behalf of the trustee 
himself." Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U. S. 267, 272 (1951). See 
Jackson v. Smith, 254 U. S. 586, 589 (1921); Jackson v. 
Ludeling, 88 U. S. 616, 631-632 (1874). As the Court ex-
plained in Mosser, a contrary rule "would open up opportuni-
ties for devious dealings in the name of the others that the 
trustee could not conduct in his own." 341 U. S., at 271. 
See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 ·F. 2d 1301, 1308 
(CA2), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 1005 (1971). Thus, the 
tippee's duty to disclose or abstain is derivative from that of 
the insider's duty. See Tr. of Oral Ar. 38. Cf. Chiarella, 
445 U. S., at 246, n. 1 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). As we 
noted in Chiarella, "[t]he tippee's obligation has been viewed 
as arising from his role as a participant after the fact in the 
insider's breach of a fiduciary duty." 445 U. S., at 230, n. 
12. 
Thus, some tippees must assume an insider's duty to the 
shareholders not because they receive inside information, but 
rather because it has been made available to them improp-
erly.18 And for Rule 10b--5 purposes, the insider's disclosure 
18 The SEC itself has recognized that tippee liability properly is imposed 
only in circumstances where the tippee knows, or has reason to know, that 
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is improper only where it would violate his Cady, Roberts 
duty. Thus, a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the share-
holders of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic in-
formation only when the insider has breached his fiduciary 
duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the 
tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has 
been a breach. 19 As Commissioner Smith perceptively ob-
served in Investors Management Co.: "It is important in this 
type of case to focus on policing insiders and what they do, 
which I think appropriate, rather than on policing informa-
vestors Management Co., supra, at--, the SEC stated that one element 
of tippee liability is that the tippee knew or had reason to know "that [the 
information] was non-public and had been obtained improperly by selective 
revelation or otherwise." 44 S.E.C., at 641 (emphasis added). Commis-
sioner Smith read this test to mean that a tippee can be held liable only if 
he received information in breach of an insider's duty not to disclose it. 
Id., at 650 (concurring in the result). 
19 Professor Loss has linked tippee liability to the concept in the law of 
restitution that "'[ w ]here a fiduciary in violation of his duty to the benefi-
ciary communicates confidential information to a third person, the third 
person, if he had notice of the violation of duty, holds upon a constructive 
trust for the beneficiary any profit which he makes through the use of such 
information.'" 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1451 (2d ed. 1961) (quot-
ing Restatement of Restitution § 201(2) (1937)). Other authorities like-
wise have expressed the view that tippee liability exists only where there 
has been a breach of trust by an insider of which the tippee had knowledge. 
See, e. g., Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (SDNY 1967); A. Jacobs, 
The Impact of Rule 10l:Hi, § 167, at 7-4 (1975) ("[T]he better view is that a 
tipper must know or have reason to know the information is nonpublic and 
was improperly obtained.''); Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial In-
quiry Into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 798, 818, n. 76 (1973) ("The extension of rule 10l:Hi restrictions to 
tippees of corporate insiders can best be justified on the theory that they 
are participating in the insider's breach of his fiduciary duty."). Cf. Re-
statement (Second) of Agency § 312, comment c (1958) ("A person who, 
with notice that an agent is thereby violating his duty to his principal, re-
ceives confidential information from the agent, may be [deemed] ... a con-
structive trustee.''). 
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tion per se and its possession, which I think impracticable." 
44 S.E.C., at 648 (concurring in the result). Tipping thus 
properly is viewed as a means of indirectly violating the 
Cady, Roberts disclose-or-abstain rule. 20 
c 
In determining whether a tippee is under an obligation to 
disclose or abstain, it thus is necessary to determine whether 
the insiders "tip" constituted a breach of the insider's fidu-
ciary duty. All disclosures of confidential corporate informa-
tion are not inconsistent with the duty insiders owe to share-
holders. In contrast to the extraordinary facts of this case, 
the more typical situation in which there will be a question 
whether disclosure violates the insider's Cady, Roberts duty 
is when insiders disclose information to analysts. Seen. 16, 
supra. In some situations, both the insider and the analyst 
20 We do not suggest that knowingly trading on inside information is ever 
"socially desirable or even that it is devoid of moral considerations." 
Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 Va. L. Rev. 1, 55 
(1980). Nor do we imply an absence of responsibility to disclose promptly 
indications of illegal actions by a corporation to the proper authorities-
typically the SEC and exchange authorities in cases involving securities. 
Depending on the circumstances, and even where permitted by law, one's 
trading on material nonpublic information is behavior that may fall below 
ethical standards of conduct. But in a statutory area of the law such as 
securities regulation, where legal principles of general application must be 
applied, there may be "significant distinctions between actual legal obliga-
tions and ethical ideals." SEC, Report of the Special Study of Securities 
Markets, H. R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 237-238 
(1963). The SEC recognizes this. At oral argument, the following ex-
change took place: 
"QUESTION: So, it would not have satisfied his obligation under the 
law to go to the SEC first? 
"[SEC's counsel]: That is correct. That an insider has to observe what 
has come to be known as the abstain or disclosure rule. Either the in-
formation has to be disclosed to the market if it is inside information ... or 
the insider must abstain." Tr. of Oral Arg. 27. 
Thus, it is clear that Rule lOb-5 does not impose any obligation simply to 
tell the SEC about the fraud before trading. 
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recipient will act in good faith, and yet release of the informa-
tion may affect the market. For example, it may not be 
clear-either to the corporate insider or to the recipient ana-
lyst-whether the information will be viewed as material 
nonpublic information. Corporate officials may mistakenly 
think the information already has been disclosed or that it is 
not material enough to affect the market. Whether disclo-
sure is a breach of duty therefore depends in large part on 
the purpose or good faith of the insider who made the disclo-
sure. Absent an improper purpose, there has been no 
breach of duty to stockholders. And absent a breach by the 
insider, there is no derivative breach. 21 As Commissioner 
Smith stated in Investors Management Co.: 
"[T]ippee responsibility must be related back to insider 
responsibility by a necessary finding that the tippee 
knew the information was given to him in breach of a 
duty by a person having a special relationship to the is-
suer not to disclose the information, and that the in-
formation must be shown not only to have been material 
and non-public, but also to have substantially contrib-
uted to the trading which occurred." 44 S.E.C., at 651 
(concurring in the result). 
21 An example of a case turning on the court's determination that the dis-
closure did not impose any fiduciary duties on the recipient of the inside 
information is Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F. 2d 796 (CA2 1980). 
There, the defendant investment banking firm, representing one of its own 
corporate clients, investigated another corporation that was a possible tar-
get of a takeover bid by its client. In the course of negotiations the invest-
ment banking firm was given, on a confidential basis, unpublished material 
information. Subsequently, after the proposed takeover was abandoned, 
the firm was charged with relying on the information when it traded in the 
target corporation's stock. For purposes of the decision, it was assumed 
that the firm knew the information was confidential, but that it had been 
received in arm's-length negotiations. See id. , at 798. In the absence of 
any fiduciary relationship, the Court of Appeals found no basis for impos-
ing tippee liability on the investment firm. See id. , at 799. 
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There are facts and circumstances that often may justify an 
inference that the insider has breached his fiduciary duty. 
For example, there may be a relationship that exists between 
the insider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo 
from the latter, or an intention to benefit the particular re-
cipient. The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of 
nonpublic information certainly exist when an insider makes 
a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or 
friend. The tip and trade resemble trading by the insider 
himself followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient. 
Determining the purpose of any one disclosure, a question 
of fact, will not always be easy for courts. But it is essential, 
we think, to have a guiding principle for those whose daily 
activities must be limited and instructed by the SEC's inside-
trading rules, and we believe that there must be a breach of 
the insider's fiduciary duty before the tippee inherits the 
duty to disclose or abstain. In contrast, the rule adopted by 
the SEC in this case would have no limiting principle. 22 
IV 
22 Without legal limitations, market participants are forced to rely on the 
reasonableness of the SEC's litigation strategy, but that can be hazardous, 
as the facts of this case make plain. Following the SEC's filing of the 
Texas Gulf Sulphur action, Commissioner (and later Chairman) Budge 
spoke of the various implications of applying Rule lOI:Hi in inside-trading 
cases: 
"Turning to the realm of possible defendants in the present and potential 
civil actions, the Commission certainly does not contemplate suing every 
person who may have come across inside information. In the Texas Gulf 
action neither tippees nor persons in the vast rank and file of employees 
have been named as defendants. In my view, the Commission in future 
cases normally should not join rank and file employees or persons outside 
the company such as an analyst or reporter who learns of inside informa-
tion." Speech of Hamer Budge to the New York Regional Group of the 
American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc. (Nov. 18, 1965) (emphasis 
added), reprinted in Budge, The Texas Gulf Sulphur Case-What It Is and 
What It Isn't, Corp. Secretary No. 127, at 6 (Dec. 17, 1965). 
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Under the inside-trading and tipping rules set forth above, 
we find that there was no actionable violation by Dirks. 23 It 
is undisputed that Dirks himself was a stranger to Equity 
Funding, with no pre-existing fiduciary duty to its share-
holders. 24 He took no action, directly or indirectly, that in-
duced the shareholders or officers of Equity Funding to re-
pose trust or confidence in him. There was no expectation 
by Dirk's sources that he would keep their information in con-
fidence. Nor did Dirks misappropriate or illegally obtain the 
information about Equity Funding. Unless the insiders 
breached their Cady, Roberts duty to shareholders in disclos-
ing the nonpublic information to Dirks, he breached no duty 
when he passed it on to investors as well as to the Wall Street 
Journal. 
We also think it is clear that the Equity Funding employ-
ees did not violate their Cady, Roberts duty to the corpora-
tion's shareholders by providing information to Dirks. 25 The 
28 Dirks contends that he was not a "tippee" because the information he 
received constituted unverified allegations of fraud that were denied by 
management and were not "material facts" under the securities laws that 
required disclosure before trading. He also argues that the information 
he received was not truly "inside" information, i. e., intended for a con-
fidential corporate purpose, but was merely evidence of a crime. The So-
licitor General agrees. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22. 
For purposes of deciding this case, however, we assume the correctness of 
the SEC's findings, accepted by the Court of Appeals, that petitioner was a 
tippee of material inside information. 
24 Judge Wright found that Dirks acquired a fiduciary duty by virtue of 
his position as an employee of a broker-dealer. See 220 U. S. App. D.C., 
at 32&-327, 681 F . 2d, at 840-842. The SEC, however, did not consider 
Judge Wright's novel theory in its decision, nor did it present that theory 
to the Court of Appeals. The SEC also has not argued Judge Wright's 
theory in this Court. See Brief for Respondent 21, n. 27. The merits of 
such a duty are therefore not before the Court. See SEC v. Chenery 
Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 19&-197 (1947). 
26 In this Court, the SEC appears to contend that an insider invariably 
violates a fiduciary duty to the corporation's shareholders by transmitting 
nonpublic corporate information to an outsider when he has reason to be-
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tippers received no monetary or personal benefit for reveal-
ing Equity Funding's secrets, nor did they have an apparent 
purpose or desire to make a gift of valuable information to 
Dirks. As the facts of this case clearly indicate, the tippers 
were motivated by a desire to expose the fraud. See supra, 
at 1-2. In the absence of a breach of duty to shareholders by 
the insiders, there was no derivative breach by Dirks. See 
n. 19, supra. Dirks therefore could not have been "a partici-
pant after the fact in [an] insider's breach of a fiduciary 
duty." Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 230, n. 12. 
v 
We conclude that Dirks, in the circumstances of this case, 
had no duty to abstain from use of the inside information that 
he obtained. The judgment of the Court of Appeals there-
fore is 
Reversed. 
lieve that the outsider may use it to the disadvantage of the shareholders. 
"Thus, regardless of any ultimate motive to bring to public attention the 
derelictions at Equity Funding, Secrist breached his duty to Equity Fund-
ing shareholders." Brief for Respondent 31. This perceived "duty" dif-
fers markedly from the one that the SEC identified in Cady, Roberts and 
that has been the basis for federal tippee-trading rules to date. In fact, 
the SEC did not charge Secrist with any wrongdoing, and we do not under-
stand the SEC to have relied on any theory of a breach of duty by Secrist in 
finding that Dirks breached his duty to Equity Funding's shareholders. 
See App. 250 (decision of administrative law judge) ("One who knows him-
self to be a beneficiary of non-public, selectively disclosed inside informa-
tion must fully disclose or refrain from trading."); SEC's Reply to Notice of 
Supplemental Authority before the SEC 4 ("If Secrist was acting properly, 
Dirks inherited a duty to [Equity Funding]'s shareholders to refrain from 
improper private use of the information"); Brief on behalf of the SEC in the 
Court of Appeals, at 47-50; id., at 51 ("[K]nowing possession of inside in-
formation by any person imposes a duty to abstain or disclose."); id., at 
52-54; id., at 55 ("[T]his obligation arises not from the manner in which 
such information is acquired .. . . "); 220 U. S. App. D.C., at 322-323, 681 
F. 2d, at 838 (Wright, J.). 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Petitioner Raymond Dirks received material nonpublic in-
formation from "insiders" of a corporation with which he had 
no connection. He disclosed this information to investors 
who relied on it in trading in the shares of the corporation. 
The question is whether Dirks violated the antifraud provi-
sions of the federal securities laws by this disclosure. 
I 
In 1973, Dirks was an officer of a New York broker-dealer 
firm who specialized in providing investment analysis of in-
surance company securities to institutional investors. 1 On 
March 6, Dirks received information from Ronald Secrist, a 
former officer of Equity Funding of America. Secrist al-
leged that the assets of Equity Funding, a diversified cor-
poration primarily engaged in selling life insurance and mu-
tual funds, were vastly overstated as the result of fraudulent 
corporate practices. Secrist also stated that various regula-
'The facts stated here are taken from more detailed statements set forth 
by the administrative law judge, App. 176-180, 225-247; the opinion of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1402-1406 
(1981); and the opinion of Judge Wright in the Court of Appeals, 220 U. S. 
App. D.C. 309, 314-318, 681 F. 2d 824, 829-833 (1982). 
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tory agencies had failed to act on similar charges made by 
Equity Funding employees. He urged Dirks to verify the 
fraud and disclose it publicly. 
Dirks decided to investigate the allegations. He visited 
Equity Funding's headquarters in Los Angeles and inter-
viewed several officers and employees of the corporation. 
The senior management denied any wrongdoing, but certain 
corporation employees corroborated the charges of fraud. 
Neither Dirks nor his firm owned or traded any Equity 
Funding stock, but throughout his investigation he openly 
discussed the information he had obtained with a number of 
clients and investors. Some of these persons sold their hold-
ings of Equity Funding securities, including five investment 
advisers who liquidated holdings of more than $16 million. 2 
While Dirks was in Los Angeles, he was in touch regularly 
with William Blundell, the Wall Street Journal's Los Angeles 
bureau chief. Dirks urged Blundell to write a story on the 
fraud allegations. Blundell did not believe, however, that 
such a massive fraud could go undetected and declined to 
write the story. He feared that publishing such damaging 
rumors might be libelous. 
During the two-week period in which Dirks pursued his in-
vestigation and spread word of Secrist's charges, the price of 
Equity Funding stock fell from $26 per share to less than $15 
per share. This led the New York Stock Exchange to halt 
trading on March 27. Shortly thereafter California insur-
2 Dirks received from his firm a salary plus a commission for securities 
transactions above a certain amount that his clients directed through his 
firm. See 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1402, n. 3. But "[i]t is not clear how 
many of those with whom Dirks spoke promised to direct some brokerage 
business through [Dirks' firm] to compensate Dirks, or how many actually 
did so." 220 U. S. App. D.C., at 316, 681 F. 2d, at 831. The Boston Com-
pany Institutional Investors, Inc., promised Dirks about $25,000 in com-
missions, but it is unclear whether Boston actually generated any broker-
age business for his firm. See App. 199, 204-205; 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 
1404, n. 10; 220 U. S. App. D.C., at 316, n. 5, 681 F . 2d, at 831, n. 5. 
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ance authorities impounded Equity Funding's records and 
uncovered evidence of the fraud. Only then did the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) file a complaint against 
Equity Funding 3 and only then, on April 2, did the Wall 
Street Journal publish a front-page story based largely on in-
formation assembled by Dirks. Equity Funding immedi-
ately went into receivership. 4 
The SEC began an investigation into Dirks' role in the ex-
posure of the fraud. After a hearing by an administrative 
law judge, the SEC found that Dirks had aided and abetted 
violations of § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 77q(a),5 § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S. C. §78j(b),6 and SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 CFR §240.10b-5 
3 As early as 1971, the SEC had received allegations of fraudulent ac-
counting practices at Equity Funding. Moreover, on March 9, 1973, an 
official of the California Insurance Department informed the SEC's re-
gional office in Los Angeles of Secrist's charges of fraud. Dirks himself 
voluntarily presented his information at the SEC's regional office begin-
ning on March 27. 
• A federal grand jury in Los Angeles subsequently returned a 105-
count indictment against 22 persons, including many of Equity Funding's 
officers and directors. All defendants were found guilty of one or more 
counts, either by a plea of guilty or a conviction after trial. See Brief for 
Petitioner 15; App. 149-153. 
5 Section 17(a) provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities 
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication 
in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
"(!) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or 
"(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a 
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which 
they were made, not misleading, or 
"(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser." 
6 Section 10(b) provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of 
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(1982), 7 by repeating the allegations of fraud to members of 
the investment community who later sold their Equity Fund-
ing stock. The SEC concluded: "Where 'tippees'-regard-
less of their motivation or occupation-come into possession 
of material 'information that they know is confidential and 
know or should know came from a corporate insider,' they 
must either publicly disclose that information or refrain from 
trading." 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1407 (1981) (footnote omit-
ted) (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U. S. 222, 230 
n. 12 (1980)). Recognizing, however, that Dirks "played an 
important role in bringing [Equity Funding's] massive fraud 
to light," 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1412, the SEC only censured 
hi 8 m. 
Dirks sought review in the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit. The court entered judgment 
any facility of any national securities exchange-
"(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
curity registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so 
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors." 
7 Rule 10b--5 provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of 
any facility of any national securities exchange, 
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
"(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state 
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security." 
8 Section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78o(b)(4)(E), 
provides that the SEC may impose certain sanctions, including censure, on 
any person associated with a registered broker-dealer who has "willfully 
aided [or] abetted" any violation of the federal securities laws. See 15 
U. S. C. § 78ff(a) (providing criminal penalties). 
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against Dirks "for the reasons stated by the Commission in 
its opinion." App. to Pet. for Cert. C-2. Judge Wright, a 
member of the panel, subsequently issued an opinion. Judge 
Robb concurred in the result and Judge Tamm dissented; nei-
ther filed a separate opinion. Judge Wright believed that 
"the obligations of corporate fiduciaries pass to all those to 
whom they disclose their information before it has been dis-
seminated to the public at large." 220 U. S. App. D.C. 309, 
324, 681 F. 2d 824, 839 (1982). Alternatively, Judge Wright 
concluded that, as an employee of a broker-dealer, Dirks had 
violated "obligations to the SEC and to the public completely 
independent of any obligations he acquired" as a result of re-
ceiving the information. I d., at 325, 681 F. 2d, at 840. 
In view of the importance to the SEC and to the securities 
industry of the question presented by this case, we granted a 
writ of certiorari.-- U. S. -- (1982). We now reverse. 
II 
In the seminal case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 
S.E.C. 907 (1961), the SEC recognized that the common law 
in some jurisdictions imposes on "corporate 'insiders,' par-
ticularly officers, directors, or controlling stockholders" an 
"affirmative duty of disclosure . . . when dealing in securi-
ties." !d., at 911, and n. 13.9 The SEC found not only did 
breach of this common-law duty also establish the elements of 
a Rule 10b-5 violation, 10 but that individuals other than cor-
· 
9 The duty that insiders owe to the corporation's shareholders not to 
trade on inside information differs from the common-law duty that officers 
and directors also have to the corporation itself not to mismanage corpo-
rate assets, of which confidential information is one. See 3 Fletcher Cy-
clopedia of the Laws of Private Corporations §§ 848, 900 (1975 ed. and 
Supp. 1982); 3A Fletcher §§ 1168.1, 1168.2. In holding that breaches of 
this duty to shareholders violated the Securities Exchange Act, the Cady, 
Roberts Commission recognized, and we agree, that "[a] significant pur-
pose of the Exchange Act was to eliminate the idea that use of inside in-
formation for personal advantage was a normal emolument of corporate of-
fice." See 40 S.E.C., at 912, n. 15. 
10 Rule 10b-5 is generally the most inclusive of the three provisions on 
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porate insiders could be obligated either to disclose material 
nonpublic information 11 before trading or to abstain from 
trading altogether. !d., at 912. In Chiarella, we accepted 
the two elements set out in Cady Roberts for establishing a 
Rule 10b--5 violation: "(i) the existence of a relationship af-
fording access to inside information intended to be available 
only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allow-
ing a corporate insider to take advantage of that information 
by trading without disclosure." 445 U. S., at 227. In exam-
ining whether Chiarella had an obligation to disclose or ab-
stain, the Court found that there is no general duty to dis-
close before trading on material non public information, 12 and 
held that "a duty to disclose under§ 10(b) does not arise from 
the mere possession of nonpublic market information." I d., 
at 235. Such a duty arises rather from the existence of a fi-
duciary relationship. See id., at 227-235. 
Not "all breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a se-
curities transaction," however, come within the ambit of Rule 
10b--5. Santa Fe Industries, Inc: v. Green, 430 U. S. 462, 
472 (1977). There must also be "manipulation or deception." 
!d., at 473. In an inside-trading case this fraud derives from 
the "inherent unfairness involved where one takes advan-
tage" of "information intended to be available only for a cor-
which the SEC rested its decisio11 in this case, and we will refer to it when 
we note the statutory basis for the SEC's inside-trading rules. 
11 The SEC views the disclosure duty as requiring more than disclosure 
to purchasers or sellers: "Proper and adequate disclosure of significant cor-
porate developments can only be effected by a public release through the 
appropriate public media, designed to achieve a broad dissemination to the 
investing public generally and without favoring any special person or 
group." In re Faberge, Inc., 45 S.E.C. 249, 256 (1973). 
12 See 445 U. S., at 233; id., at 237 (STEVENS, J., concurring); id., at 
238-239 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment); id., at 239-240 (BUR-
GER, C. J., dissenting). Cf. id., at 252, n. 2 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) 
(recognizing that there is no obligation to disclose material nonpublic in-
formation obtained through the exercise of "diligence or acumen" and "hon-
est means," as opposed to "stealth"). 
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porate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone." 
In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 
S.E.C. 933, 936 (1968). Thus, an insider will be liable under 
Rule 10b-5 for inside trading only where he fails to disclose 
material nonpublic information before trading on it and thus 
makes "secret profits." Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C., at 916, 
n. 31. 
III 
We were explicit in Chiarella in saying that there can be 
no duty to disclose where the person who has traded on inside 
information "was not [the corporation's] agent, ... was not a 
fiduciary, [or] was not a person in whom the sellers [of the 
securities] had placed their trust and confidence." 445 
U. S., at 232. Not to require such a fiduciary relationship, 
we recognized, would "depar[t] radically from the established 
doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship between 
two parties" and would amount to "recognizing a general 
duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo 
actions · based on material, nonpublic information." I d., at 
232, 233. This requirement of a specific relationship be-
tween the shareholders and the individual trading on inside 
information has created analytical difficulties for the SEC in 
policing tippees who trade on inside information. Unlike in-
siders who have independent fiduciary duties to both the cor-
poration and its shareholders, the typical tippee has no such 
relationships. 13 In view of this absence, it has been unclear 
13 Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is 
revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, or lawyer working for 
the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the sharehold-
ers. The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that such 
persons acquired nonpublic corporate information, but rather that they 
have entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the 
business of the enterprise and are given access to information solely for 
corporate purposes. See SEC v. Monarch Fund, 608 F. 2d 938, 942 (CA2 
1979); In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 645 (1971); In re 
Van Alystne, Noel & Co., 43 S.E.C. 1080, 1084-1085 (1969); In re Merrill 
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how a tippee acquires the Cady, Roberts duty to refrain from 
trading on inside information. 
A 
The SEC's position, as stated in its opinion in this case, is 
that a tippee inherits the Cady, Roberts obligation to share-
holders whenever he receives inside information from an 
insider: 
"In tipping potential traders, Dirks breached a duty 
which he had assumed as a result of knowingly receiving 
confidential information from [Equity Funding] insiders. 
Tippees such as Dirks who receive non-public material 
information from insiders become 'subject to the same 
duty as [the] insiders.' Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. [495 F. 2d 228, 237 (CA2 
1974) (quoting Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 
(SDNY 1967))]. Such a tippee breaches the fiduciary 
duty which he assumes from the insider when the tippee 
knowingly transmits the information to someone who 
will probably trade on the basis thereof. . . . Presum-
ably, Dirks' informants were entitled to disclose the [Eq-
uity Funding] fraud in order to bring it to light and its 
perpetrators to justice. However, Dirks-standing in 
their shoes-committed a breach of the fiduciary duty 
which he had assumed in dealing with them, when he 
passed the information on to traders." 21 S.E.C. 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933, 937 (1968); Cady, 
Roberts, 40 S.E.C., at 912. When such a person breaches his fiduciary 
relationship, he may be treated more properly as a tipper than a tippee. 
See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F. 2d 
228, 237 (CA21974) (investment banker had access to material information 
when working on a proposed public offering for the corporation). For such 
a duty to be imposed, however, the corporation must expect the outsider to 
keep the disclosed nonpublic information confidential, and the relationship 
at least must imply such a duty. 
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Docket, at 1410, n. 42. 
This view differs little from the view that we rejected as · 
inconsistent with congressional intent in Chiarella. In that 
case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the SEC and affirmed 
Chiarella's conviction, holding that "'[a]nyone-corporate in-
sider or not-who regularly receives material nonpublic in-
formation may not use that information to trade in securities 
without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose."' United 
States v. Chiarella, 588 F. 2d 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978) (empha-
sis in original). Here, the SEC maintains that anyone who 
knowingly receives nonpublic material information from an 
insider has a fiduciary duty to disclose before trading. 14 
In effect, the SEC's theory of tippee liability in both cases 
appears rooted in the idea that the antifraud provisions re-
quire equal information among all traders. This conflicts 
with the principle set forth in Chiarella that only some per-
sons, under some circumstances, will be barred from trading 
14 Apparently, the SEC believes this case differs from Chiarella in that 
Dirks' receipt of inside information from Secrist, an ilfSider, carried 
Secrist's duties with it, while Chiarella received the information without 
the direct involvement of an insider and thus inherited no duty to disclose 
or abstain. The SEC fails to explain, however, why the receipt of nonpub-
lic information from an insider automatically carries with it the fiduciary 
duty of the insider. As we emphasized in Chiarella, mere possession of 
nonpublic information does not give rise to a duty to disclose or abstain; 
only a specific relationship does that. And we do not believe that the mere 
receipt of information from an insider creates such a special relationship 
between the tippee and the corporation's shareholders. 
Apparently recognizing the weakness of its argument in light of Chia-
rella, the SEC attempts to distinguish that case factually as involving not 
"inside" information, but rather "market" information, i. e., "information 
generated within the company relating to its assets or earnings." Brief 
for Respondent 23. This Court drew no such distinction in Chiarella and, 
as THE CHIEF JUSTICE noted, "(i)t is clear that § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by 
their terms and by their history make no such distinction." 445 U. S., at 
241, n. 1 (dissenting opinion). See ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1603, Comment 
(2)(j) (Proposed Official Draft 1978). 
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while in possession of materia~nonpublic information. 15 
Judge Wright correctly read our ppinion in Chiarella as re-
pudiating any notion that all traders must enjoy equal in-
formation before trading: "[T]he 'information' theory is re-
jected. Because the disclose-or-refrain duty is 
extraordinary, it attaches only when a party has legal obliga-
tions other than a mere duty to comply with the general anti-
fraud proscriptions in the federal securities laws." 220 U. S. " 
App. D.C., at 322, 681 F. 2d, at 837. See Chiarella, 445 
U. S., at 235, n. 20. We reaffirm today that "[a] duty [to 
disclose] arises from the relationship between parties ... 
and not merely from one's ability to acquire information be-
cause of his position in the market." 445 U. S., at 232-233, 
n. 14. 
Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a per-
son knowingly receives material nonpublic information from 
an insider and trades on it could have an inhibiting influence 
on the role of market analysts, which the SEC itself recog-
nizes is necessary to the preservation of a healthy market. 16 
• 
15 In Chiarella, we noted that formulation of an absolute equal informa-
tion rule "should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of con-
gressional intent." 445 U. S., at 233. Rather than adopting such a radi-
cal view of securities trading, Congress has expressly exempted many 
market professionals from the general statutory prohibition set forth in 
§ ll(a)(l) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78k(a)(1), against 
members of a national securities exchange trading for their own account. 
See id., at 233, n. 16. We observed in Chiarella that "[t]he exception is 
based upon Congress' recognition that [market professionals] contribute to 
a fair and orderly marketplace at the same time they exploit the informa-
tional advantage that comes from their possession of [nonpublic informa-
tion]." Ibid. 
16 The SEC expressly recognized that "[t]he value to the entire market of 
[analysts'] efforts cannot be gainsaid; market efficiency in pricing is signifi-
cantly enhanced by [their] initiatives to ferret out and analyze information, 
and thus the analyst's work redounds to the benefit of all investors." 21 
S.E.C. , at 1406. The SEC asserts that analysts remain free to obtain 
from management corporate information for purposes of "filling in the 'in-
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It is commonplace for analysts to "ferret out and analyze in-
formation," 21 S.E.C., at 1406, 17 and this often is done by 
meeting with and questioning corporate officers and others 
who are insiders. And information that the analysts obtain 
normally may be the basis for judgments as to the market 
worth of a corporation's securities. The analyst's judgment 
in this respect is made available in market letters or other-
wise to clients of the firm. It is the nature of this type of 
information, and indeed of the markets themselves, that such 
information cannot be made simultaneously available to all of 
the corporation's stockholders or the public generally. 
B 
The conclusion that recipients of inside information do not 
invariably acquire a duty to disclose or abstain does not mean 
terstices in analysis' .... " Brief for Respondent 42 (quoting Investors 
Management Co., 44 S.E.C., at 646). But this rule is inherently impre-
cise, and imprecision prevents parties from ordering their actions in accord 
with legal requirements. Unless the parties have some guidance as to 
where the line is between permissible and impermissible disclosures and 
uses, neither corporate insiders nor analysts can be sure when the line is 
crossed. Cf. Adlerv. Klawans, 267 F. 2d 840,845 (CA21959) (Burger, J., 
sitting by designation). 
17 On its facts, this case is the unusual one. Dirks is an analyst in a bro-
ker-dealer firm, and he did interview management in the course of his in-
vestigation. He uncovered, however, startling information that required 
no analysis or exercise of judgment as to its market relevance. N onethe-
less, the principle at issue here extends beyond these facts. The SEC's 
rule-applicable without regard to any breach by an insider-could have 
serious ramifications on reporting by analysts of investment views. 
Despite the unusualness of Dirks' "find," the central role that he played 
in uncovering the fraud at Equity Funding, and that analysts in general 
can play in revealing information that corporations may have reason to 
withhold from the public, is an important one. Dirks' careful investigation 
brought to light a massive fraud at the corporation. And until the Equity 
Funding fraud w~ exposed, the information in the trading market was 
grossly inaccurate. But for Dirks' efforts, the fraud might well have gone 
undetected longer. 
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that such tippees always are free to trade on the information. 
The need for a prophylactic ban on some tippee trading is 
clear. Not only are insiders forbidden by their fiduciary 
relationship from personally using undisclosed corporate in-
formation to their advantage, but they may not give such in-
formation to an outsider for the same improper purpose of ex-
ploiting the information for their personal gain. See 15 
U. S. C. § 78t(b) (making it unlawful to do indirectly "by 
means of any other person" any act made unlawful by the fed-
eral securities laws). Similarly, the transactions of those 
who knowingly participate with the fiduciary in such a breach 
are "as forbidden" as transactions "on behalf of the trustee 
himself." Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U. S. 267, 272 (1951). See 
Jackson v. Smith, 254 U. S. 586, 589 (1921); Jackson v. 
Ludeling, 88 U. S. 616, 631-632 (1874). As the Court ex-
plained in Mosser, a contrary rule "would open up opportuni-
ties for devious dealings in the name of the others that the 
trustee could not conduct in his own." 341 U. S., at 271. 
See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F. 2d 1301, 1308 
(CA2), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 1005 (1971). Thus, the 
tippee's duty to disclose or abstain is derivative from that of 
the insider's duty. See Tr. of Oral Ar. 38. Cf. Chiarella, 
445 U. S., at 246, n. 1 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). As we 
noted in Chiarella, "[t]he tippee's obligation has been viewed 
as arising from his role as a participant after the fact in the 
insider's breach of a fiduciary duty." 445 U. S., at 230, 
n. 12. 
Thus, some tippees must assume an insider's duty to the 
shareholders not because they receive inside information, but 
rather because it has been made available to them improp-
erly.18 And for Rule 10b-5 purposes, the insider's disclosure 
18 The SEC itself has recognized that tippee liability properly is imposed 
only in circumstances where the tippee knows, or has reason to know, that 
the insider has disclosed improperly inside corporate information. In In-
vestors Management Co., supra, the SEC stated that one element of 
tippee liability is that the tippee knew or had reason to know "that [the 
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is improper only where it would violate his Cady, Roberts 
duty. Thus, a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the share-
holders of a corporation not to trade on material non public in-
formation only when the insider has breached his fiduciary 
duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the 
tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has 
been a breach. 19 As Commissioner Smith perceptively ob-
served in Investors Management Co.: "It is important in this 
type of case to focus on policing insiders and what they do 
. . . rather than on policing information per se and its posses-
sion .... " 44 S.E.C., at 648 (concurring in the result). 
Tipping thus properly is viewed only as a means of indirectly 
violating the Cady, Roberts disclose-or-abstain rule. 20 
infonnation] was non-public and had been obtained improperly by selective 
revelation or otherwise." 44 S.E.C., at 641 (emphasis added). Commis-
sioner Smith read this test to mean that a tippee can be held liable only if 
he received infonnation in breach of an insider's duty not to disclose it. 
I d., at 650 (concurring in the result). 
19 Professor Loss has linked tippee liability to the concept in the law of 
restitution that " '[ w ]here a fiduciary in violation of his duty to the benefi-
ciary communicates confidential infonnation to a third person, the third 
person, if he had notice of the violation of duty, holds upon a constructive 
trust for the beneficiary any profit which he makes through the use of such 
infonnation."' 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1451 (2d ed. 1961) (quot-
ing Restatement of Restitution § 201(2) (1937)). Other authorities like-
wise have expressed the view that tippee liability exists only where there 
has been a breach of trust by an insider of which the tippee had knowledge. 
See, e. g., Ross v. Licht, 263 F . Supp. 395, 410 (SDNY 1967); A. Jacobs, 
The Impact of Rule 10b-5, § 167, at 7-4 (1975) ("[T]he better view is that a 
tipper must know or have reason to know the infonnation is nonpublic and 
was improperly obtained."); Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial In-
quiry Into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Infonnation, 121 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 798, 818, n. 76 (1973) ("The extension of rule 10b-5 restrictions to 
tippees of corporate insiders can best be justified on the theory that they 
are participating in the insider's breach of his fiduciary duty."). Cf. Re-
statement (Second) of Agency § 312, comment c (1958) ("A person who, 
with notice that an agent is thereby violating his duty to his principal, re-
ceives confidential infonnation from the agent, may be [deemed] ... a con-
structive trustee."). 
2l) We do not suggest that knowingly trading on inside infonnation is ever 
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In determining whether a tippee is under an obligation to 
disclose or abstain, it thus is necessary to determine whether 
the insider's "tip" constituted a breach of the insider's fidu-
ciary duty. All disclosures of confidential corporate informa-
tion are not inconsistent with the duty insiders owe to share-
holders. In contrast to the extraordinary facts of this case, 
the more typical situation in which there will be a question 
whether disclosure violates the insider's Cady, Roberts duty 
is when insiders disclose information to analysts. Seen. 16, 
supra. In some situations, both the insider and the analyst 
recipient will act in good faith, and yet release of the informa-
tion may affect the market. For example, it may not be 
clear-either to the corporate insider or to the recipient ana-
lyst-whether the information will be viewed as material 
"socially desirable or even that it is devoid of moral considerations." 
Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 Va. L. Rev. 1, 55 
(1980). Nor do we imply an absence of responsibility to disclose promptly 
indications of illegal actions by a corporation to the proper authorities-
typically the SEC and exchange authorities in cases involving securities. 
Depending on the circumstances, and even where permitted by law, one's 
trading on material nonpublic information is behavior that may fall below 
ethical standards of conduct. But in a statutory area of the law such as 
securities regulation, where legal principles of general application must be 
applied, there may be "significant distinctions between actual legal obliga-
tions and ethical ideals." SEC, Report of the Special Study of Securities 
Markets, H. R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 237-238 
(1963). The SEC recognizes this. At oral argument, the following ex-
change took place: 
"QUESTION: So, it would not have satisfied his obligation under the 
law to go to the SEC first? 
"[SEC's counsel]: That is correct. That an insider has to observe what 
has come to be known as the abstain or disclosure rule. Either the in-
formation has to be disclosed to the market if it is inside information ... or 
the insider must abstain." Tr. of Oral Arg. 27. 
Thus, it is clear that Rule lOb-5 does not impose any obligation simply to 
tell the SEC about the fraud before trading. 
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nonpublic information. Corporate officials may mistakenly 
think the information already has been disclosed or that it is 
not material enough to affect the market. Whether disclo-
sure is a breach of duty therefore depends in large part on 
the purpose or good faith of the insider who made the disclo-
sure. Absent an improper purpose, there has been no 
breach of duty to stockholders. And absent a breach by the 
insider, there is no derivative breach. 21 As Commissioner 
Smith stated in Investors Management Co.: 
"[T]ippee responsibility must be related back to insider 
responsibility by a necessary finding that the tippee 
knew the information was given to him in breach of a 
duty by a person having a special relationship to the is-
suer not to disclose the information, and that the in-
formation must be shown not only to have been material 
and non-public, but also to have substantially contrib-
uted to the trading which occurred." 44 S.E.C., at 651 
(concurring in the result). 
There are facts and circumstances that often may justify an 
inference that the insider has breached his fiduciary duty. 
For example, there may be a relationship between the in-
sider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the 
21 An example of a case turning on the court's determination that the dis-
closure did not impose any fiduciary duties on the recipient of the inside 
information is Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co ., 623 F. 2d 796 (CA21980). 
There, the defendant investment banking firm, representing one of its own 
corporate clients, investigated another corporation that was a possible tar-
get of a takeover bid by its client. In the course of negotiations the invest-
ment banking firm was given, on a confidential basis, unpublished material 
information. Subsequently, after the proposed takeover was abandoned, 
the firm was charged with relying on the information when it traded in the 
target corporation's stock. For purposes of the decision, it was assumed 
that the firm knew the information was confidential, but that it had been 
received in arm's-length negotiations. See id. , at 798. In the absence of 
any fiduciary relationship, the Court of Appeals found no basis for impos-
ing tippee liability on the investment firm. See id., at 799. 
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latter, or an intention to benefit the particular recipient. 
The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic 
information certainly exist when an insider makes a gift of 
confidential information to a trading relative or friend. The 
tip and trade resemble trading by the insider himself fol-
lowed by a gift of the profits to the recipient. 
Determining the purpose of any one disclosure, a question 
of fact, will not always be easy for courts. But it is essential, 
we think, to have a guiding principle for those whose daily 
activities must be limited and instructed by the SEC's inside-
trading rules, and we believe that there must be a breach of 
the insider's fiduciary duty before the tippee inherits the 
duty to disclose or abstain. In contrast, the rule adopted by 
the SEC in this case would have no limiting principle. 22 
IV 
Under the inside-trading and tipping rules set forth above, 
we find that there was no actionable violation by Dirks. 23 It 
22 Without legal limitations, market participants are forced to rely on the 
reasonableness of the SEC's litigation strategy, but that can be hazardous, 
as the facts of this case make plain. Following the SEC's filing of the 
Texas Gulf Sulphur action, Commissioner (and later Chairman) Budge 
spoke of the various implications of applying Rule 10b-5 in inside-trading 
cases: 
"Turning to the realm of possible defendants in the present and potential 
civil actions, the Commission certainly does not contemplate suing every 
person who may have come across inside information. In the Texas Gulf 
action neither tippees nor persons in the vast rank and file of employees 
have been named as defendants. In my view, the Commission in future 
cases normally should not join rank and file employees or persons outside 
the company such as an analyst or reporter who learns of inside informa-
tion." Speech of Hamer Budge to the New York Regional Group of the 
American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc. (Nov. 18, 1965) (emphasis 
added), reprinted in Budge, The Texas Gulf Sulphur Case-What It Is and 
What It Isn't, Corp. Secretary No. 127, at 6 (Dec. 17, 1965). 
23 Dirks contends that he was not a "tippee" because the information he 
received constituted unverified allegations of fraud that were denied by 
management and were not "material facts" under the securities laws that 
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is undisputed that Dirks himself was a stranger to Equity 
Funding, with no pre-existing fiduciary duty to its share-
holders.24 He took no action, directly or indirectly, that in-
duced the shareholders or officers of Equity Funding to re-
pose trust or confidence in him. There was no expectation 
by Dirk's sources that he would keep their information in con-
fidence. Nor did Dirks misappropriate or illegally obtain the 
information about Equity Funding. Unless the insiders 
breached their Cady, Roberts duty to shareholders in disclos-
ing the nonpublic information to Dirks, he breached no duty 
when he passed it on to investors as well as to the Wall Street 
Journal. 
We also think it is clear that the Equity Funding employ-
ees did not violate their Cady, Roberts duty to the corpora-
tion's shareholders by providing information to Dirks. 25 The 
required disclosure before trading. He also argues that the information 
he received was not truly "inside" information, i. e., intended for a con-
fidential corporate purpose, but was merely evidence of a crime. The So-
licitor General agrees. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22. 
For purposes of deciding this case, however, we assume the correctness of 
the SEC's findings, accepted by the Court of Appeals, that petitioner was a 
tippee of material inside information. 
24 Judge Wright found that Dirks acquired a fiduciary duty by virtue of 
his position as an employee of a broker-dealer. See 220 U. S. App. D.C., 
at 325-327, 681 F. 2d, at 840-842. The SEC, however, did not consider 
Judge Wright's novel theory in its decision, nor did it present that theory 
to the Court of Appeals. The SEC also has not argued Judge Wright's 
theory in this Court. See Brief for Respondent 21, n. 27. The merits of 
such a duty are therefore not before the Court. See SEC v. Chenery 
Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 196-197 (1947). 
26 In this Court, the SEC appears to contend that an insider invariably 
violates a fiduciary duty to the corporation's shareholders by transmitting 
nonpublic corporate information to an outsider when he has reason to be-
lieve that the outsider may use it to the disadvantage of the shareholders. 
"Thus, regardless of any ultimate motive to bring to public attention the 
derelictions at Equity Funding, Secrist breached his duty to Equity Fund-
ing shareholders." Brief for Respondent 31. This perceived "duty" dif-
fers markedly from the one that the SEC identified in Cady, Roberts and 
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tippers received no monetary or personal benefit for reveal-
ing Equity Funding's secrets, nor did they have an apparent 
purpose or desire to make a gift of valuable information to 
Dirks. As the facts of this case clearly indicate, the tippers 
were motivated by a desire to expose the fraud. See supra, 
at 1-2. In the absence of a breach of duty to shareholders by 
the insiders, there was no derivative breach by Dirks. See 
n. 19, supra. Dirks therefore could not have been "a partici-
pant after the fact in [an] insider's breach of a fiduciary 
duty." Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 230, n. 12. 
v 
We conclude that Dirks, in the circumstances of this case, 
had no duty to abstain from use of the inside information that 
he obtained. The judgment of the Court of Appeals there-
fore is 
Reversed. 
that has been the basis for federal tippee-trading rules to date. In fact, 
the SEC did not charge Secrist with any wrongdoing, and we do not under-
stand the SEC to have relied on any theory of a breach of duty by Secrist in 
finding that Dirks breached his duty to Equity Funding's shareholders. 
See App. 250 (decision of administrative law judge) ("One who knows him-
self to be a beneficiary of non-public, selectively disclosed inside informa-
tion must fully disclose or refrain from trading."); SEC's Reply to Notice of 
Supplemental Authority before the SEC 4 ("If Secrist was acting properly, 
Dirks inherited a duty to [Equity Funding]'s shareholders to refrain from 
improper private use of the information."); Brief on behalf of the SEC in 
the Court of Appeals, at 47--50; id. , at 51 ("[K]nowing possession of inside 
information by any person imposes a duty to abstain or disclose."); id., at 
52-54; id., at 55 ("[T]his obligation arises not from the manner in which 
such information is acquired .... "); 220 U. S. App. D.C. , at 322-323, 681 
F . 2d, at 838 (Wright, J.). 
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JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Petitioner Raymond Dirks received material nonpublic in-
formation from "insiders" of a corporation with which he had 
no connection. He disclosed this information to investors 
who relied on it in trading in the shares of the corporation. 
The question is whether Dirks violated the antifraud provi-
sions of the federal securities laws by this disclosure. 
I 
In 1973, Dirks was an officer of a New York broker-dealer 
firm ~ specialized in providing investment analysis of in-
surance company securities to institutional investors. 1 On 
March 6, Dirks received information from Ronald Secrist, a 
former officer of Equity Funding of America. Secrist al-
leged that the assets of Equity Funding, a diversified cor-
poration primarily engaged in selling life insurance and mu-
tual funds, were vastly overstated as the result of fraudulent 
corporate practices. Secrist also stated that various regula-
'The facts stated here are taken from more detailed statements set forth 
by the administrative law judge, App. 176-180, 22~247; the opinion of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1402-1406 
(1981); and the opinion of Judge Wright in the Court of Appeals, 220 U. S. 
App. D.C. 309, 314-318, 681 F. 2d 824, 829-833 (1982). 
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tory agencies had failed to act on similar charges made by 
Equity Funding employees. He urged Dirks to verify the 
fraud and disclose it publicly. 
Dirks decided to investigate the allegations. He visited 
Equity Funding's headquarters in Los Angeles and inter-
viewed several officers and employees of the corporation. 
The senior management denied any wrongdoing, but certain 
corporation employees corroborated the charges of fraud. 
Neither Dirks nor his firm owned or traded any Equity 
Funding stock, but throughout his investigation he openly 
discussed the information he had obtained with a number of 
clients and investors. Some of these persons sold their hold-
ings of Equity Funding securities, including five investment 
advisers who liquidated holdings of more than $16 million. 2 
While Dirks was in Los Angeles, he was in touch regularly 
with William Blundell, the Wall Street Journal's Los Angeles 
bureau chief. Dirks urged Blundell to write a story on the 
fraud allegations. Blundell did not believe, however, that 
such a massive fraud could go undetected and declined to 
write the story. He feared that publishing such damaging 
~ might be libelous. 
During the two-week period in which Dirks pursued his in-
vestigation and spread word of Secrist's charges, the price of 
Equity Funding stock fell from $26 per share to less than $15 
per share. This led the New York Stock Exchange to halt 
trading on March 27. Shortly thereafter California insur-
2 Dirks received from his firm a salary plus a commission for securities 
transactions above a certain amount that his clients directed through his 
firm. See 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1402, n. 3. But "[i]t is not clear how 
many of those with whom Dirks spoke promised to direct some brokerage 
business through [Dirks' firm] to compensate Dirks, or how many actually 
did so." 220 U. S. App. D.C., at 316, 681 F. 2d, at 831. The Boston Com-
pany Institutional Investors, Inc., promised Dirks about $25,000 in com-
missions, but it is unclear whether Boston actually generated any broker-
age business for his firm. See App. 199, 204-205; 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 
1404, n. 10; 220 U. S. App. D.C., at 316, n. 5, 681 F. 2d, at 831, n. 5. 
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ance authorities impounded Equity Funding's records and 
uncovered evidence of the fraud. Only then did the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) file a complaint against 
Equity Funding 3 and only then, on April 2, did the Wall 
Street Journal publish a front-page story based largely on in-
formation assembled by Dirks. Equity Funding immedi-
ately went into receivership. 4 
The SEC began an investigation into Dirks' role in the ex-
posure of the fraud. After a hearing by an administrative 
law judge, the SEC found that Dirks had aided and abetted 
violations of § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. 
§77q(a),5 § lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S. C. §78j(b),6 and SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR §240.10b-5 
3 As early as 1971, the SEC had received allegations of fraudulent ac-
counting practices at Equity Funding. Moreover, on March 9, 1973, an 
official of the California Insurance Department informed the SEC's re-
gional office in Los Angeles of Secrist's charges of fraud. Dirks himself 
voluntarily presented his information at the SEC's regional office begin-
ning on March 27. 
• A federal grand jury in Los Angeles subsequently returned a 105-
count indictment against 22 persons, including many of Equity Funding's 
officers and directors. All defendants were found guilty of one or more 
counts, either by a plea of guilty or a conviction after trial. See Brief for 
Petitioner 15; App. 149-153. 
5 Section 17(a) provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities 
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication 
in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails , directly or indirectly-
"( I) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or 
"(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a 
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which 
they were made, not misleading, or 
"(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser." 
6 Section lO(b) provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of 
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(1982), 7 by repeating the allegations of fraud to members of 
the investment community who later sold their Equity Fund-
ing stock. The SEC concluded: "Where 'tippees'-regard-
less of their motivation or occupation-come into possession 
of material 'information that they know is confidential and 
know or should know came from a corporate insider,' they 
must either publicly disclose that information or refrain from 
trading." 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1407 (1981) (footnote omit-
ted) (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U. S. 222, 230 
n. 12 (1980)). Recognizing, however, that Dirks "played an 
important role in bringing [Equity Funding's] massive fraud 
to light," 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1412, the SEC only censured 
hi 8 m. 
Dirks sought review in the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit. The court entered judgment 
any facility of any national securities exchange-
"(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
curity registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so 
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors." 
7 Rule 10b-5 provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of 
any facility of any national securities exchange, 
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
"(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state 
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security." 
8 Section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78o(b)(4)(E), 
provides that the SEC may impose certain sanctions, including censure, on 
any person associated with a registered broker-dealer who has "willfully 
aided [or] abetted" any violation of the federal securities laws. See 15 
U. S. C. § 78ff(a) (providing criminal penalties). 
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against Dirks "for the reasons stated by the Commission in 
its opinion." App. to Pet. for Cert. C-2. Judge Wright, a 
member of the panel, subsequently issued an opinion. Judge 
Robb concurred in the result and Judge Tamm dissented; nei-
ther filed a separate opinion. Judge Wright believed that 
"the obligations of corporate fiduciaries pass to all those to 
whom they disclose their information before it has been dis-
seminated to the public at large." 220 U. S. App. D.C. 309, 
324, 681 F. 2d 824, 839 (1982). Alternatively, Judge Wright 
concluded that, as an employee of a broker-dealer, Dirks had 
violated "obligations to the SEC and to the public completely 
independent of any obligations he acquired" as a result of re-
ceiving the information. I d., at 325, 681 F. 2d, at 840. 
In view of the importance to the SEC and to the securities 
industry of the question presented by this case, we granted a 
writ of certiorari.-- U. S. -- (1982). We now reverse. 
II 
In the seminal case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 
S.E.C. 907 (1961), the SEC recognized that the common law 
in some jurisdictions imposes on "corporate 'insiders,' par-
ticularly officers, directors, or controlling stockholders" an 
"affirmative duty of disclosure . . . when dealing in securi-
ties." Id., at 911, and n. 13.9 The SEC found not only did 
breach of this common-law duty also establish the elements of 
a Rule 10b-5 violation, 10 but that individuals other than cor-
9 The duty that insiders owe to the corporation's shareholders not to 
trade on inside information differs from the common-law duty that officers 
and directors also have to the corporation itself not to mismanage corpo-
rate assets, of which confidential information is one. See 3 Fletcher Cy-
clopedia of the Laws of Private Corporations §§ 848, 900 (1975 ed. and 
Supp. 1982); 3A Fletcher §§ 1168.1, 1168.2. In holding that breaches of 
this duty to shareholders violated the Securities Exchange Act, the Cady, 
Roberts Commission recognized, and we agree, that "[a] significant pur-
pose of the Exchange Act was to eliminate the idea that use of inside in-
formation for personal advantage was a normal emolument of corporate of-
fice." See 40 S.E.C., at 912, n. 15. 
10 Rule 10b-5 is generally the most inclusive of the three provisions on 
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porate insiders could be obligated either to disclose material 
nonpublic information 11 before trading or to abstain from 
trading altogether. !d., at 912. In Chiarella, we accepted 
the two elements set out in Cady Roberts for establishing a 
Rule 10b-5 violation: "(i) the existence of a relationship af-
fording access to inside information intended to be available 
only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allow-
ing a corporate insider to take advantage of that information 
by trading without disclosure." 445 U. S., at 227. In exam-
ining whether Chiarella had an obligation to disclose or ab-
stain, the Court found that there is no general duty to dis-
close before trading on material non public information, 12 and 
held that "a duty to disclose under§ 10(b) does not arise from 
the mere possession of nonpublic market information." I d., 
at 235. Such a duty arises rather from the existence of a fi-
duciary relationship. See id., at 227-235. 
Not "all breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a se-
curities transaction," however, come within the ambit of Rule 
10b-5. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462, 
472 (1977). There must also be "manipulation or deception." 
!d., at 473. In an inside-trading case this fraud derives from 
the "inherent unfairness involved where one takes advan-
tage" of "information intended to be available only for a cor-
which the SEC rested its decision in this case, and we will refer to it when 
we note the statutory basis for the SEC's inside-trading rules. 
11 The SEC views the disclosure duty as requiring more than disclosure 
to purchasers or sellers: "Proper and adequate disclosure of significant cor-
porate developments can only be effected by a public release through the 
appropriate public media, designed to achieve a broad dissemination to the 
investing public generally and without favoring any special person or 
group." In re Faberge, Inc., 45 S.E.C. 249, 256 (1973). 
12 See 445 U. S., at 233; id., at 237 (STEVENS, J., concurring); id., at 
238-239 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment); id., at 239-240 (BUR-
GER, C. J., dissenting). Cf. id., at 252, n. 2 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) 
(recognizing that there is no obligation to disclose material nonpublic in-
formation obtained through the exercise of "diligence or acumen" and "hon-
est means," as opposed to "stealth"). 
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porate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone." 
In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 
S.E.C. 933, 936 (1968). Thus, an insider will be liable under 
Rule 10b-5 for inside trading only where he fails to disclose 
material nonpublic information before trading on it and thus 
makes "secret profits." Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C., at 916, 
n.31. 
III 
We were explicit in Chiarella in saying that there can be 
no duty to disclose where the person who has traded on inside . 
information "was not [the corporation's] agent, ... was not a 
fiduciary, [or] was not a person in whom the sellers [of the 
securities] had placed their trust and confidence." 445 
U. S., at 232. Not to require such a fiduciary relationship, 
we recognized, would "depar[t] radically from the established 
doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship between 
two parties" and would amount to "recognizing a general 
duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo 
actions based on material, nonpublic information." I d., at 
232, 233. This requirement of a specific relationship be-
tween the shareholders and the individual trading on inside 
information has created analytical difficulties for the SE~ in 
policing tippees who trade on inside information. Unlike m-
siders who have independent fiduciary duties to both the cor-
poration and its shareholders, the typical tippee has no such 
relationships. 13 In view of this absence, it has been unclear 
13 Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is 
revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, or lawyer working for 
the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the sharehold-
ers. The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that such 
persons acquired nonpublic corporate information, but rather that they 
have entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the 
business of the enterprise and are given access to information solely for 
corporate purposes. See SEC v. Monarch Fund, 608 F. 2d 938, 942 (CA2 
1979); In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 645 (1971); In re 
Van Alystne, Noel & Co., 43 S.E.C. 1080, 1084-1085 (1969); In re Merrill 
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how a tippee acquires the Cady, Roberts duty to refrain from 
trading on inside information. 
A 
The SEC's position, as stated in its opinion in this case, is 
that a tippee inherits the Cady, Roberts obligation to share-
holders whenever he receives inside information from an 
insider: 
"In tipping potential traders, Dirks breached a duty 
which he had assumed as a result of knowingly receiving 
confidential information from [Equity Funding] insiders. 
Tippees such as Dirks who receive non-public material 
information from insiders become 'subject to the same 
duty as [the] insiders.' Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. [495 F. 2d 228, 237 (CA2 
1974) (quoting Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 
(SDNY 1967))]. Such a tippee breaches the fiduciary 
duty which he assumes from the insider when the tippee 
knowingly transmits the information to someone who 
will probably trade on the basis thereof. . . . Presum-
ably, Dirks' informants were entitled to disclose the [Eq-
uity Funding] fraud in order to bring it to light and its 
perpetrators to justice. However, Dirks-standing in 
their shoes-committed a breach of the fiduciary duty 
which he had assumed in dealing with them, when he 
passed the information on to traders." 21 S.E.C. 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933, 937 (1968); Cady, 
Roberts, 40 S.E.C., at 912. When such a person breaches his fiduciary 
relationship, he may be treated more properly as a tipper than a tippee. 
See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F . 2d 
228, 237 (CA2 1974) (investment banker had access to material information 
when working on a proposed public offering for the corporation). For such 
a duty to be imposed, however, the corporation must expect the outsider to 
keep the disclosed nonpublic information confidential, and the relationship 
at least must imply such a duty. 
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Docket, at 1410, n. 42. 
This view differs little from the view that we rejected as 
inconsistent with congressional intent in Chiarella. In that 
case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the SEC and affirmed 
Chiarella's conviction, holding that "'[a]nyone-corporate in-
sider or not-who regularly receives material nonpublic in-
formation may not use that information to trade in securities 
without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose."' United 
States v. Chiarella, 588 F. 2d 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978) (empha-
sis in original). Here, the SEC maintains that anyone who 
knowingly receives nonpublic material information from an 
insider has a fiduciary duty to disclose before trading. 14 
In effect, the SEC's theory of tippee liability in both cases 
appears rooted in the idea that the antifraud provisions re-
quire equal information among all traders. This conflicts 
with the principle set forth in Chiarella that only some per-
sons, under some circumstances, will be barred from trading 
1
' Apparently, the SEC believes this case differs from Chiarella in that 
Dirks' receipt of inside information from Secrist, an insider, carried 
Secrist's duties with it, while Chiarella received the information without 
the direct involvement of an insider and thus inherited no duty to disclose 
or abstain. The SEC fails to explain, however, why the receipt of nonpub-
lic information from an insider automatically carries with it the fiduciary 
duty of the insider. As we emphasized in Chiarella, mere possession of 
nonpublic information does not give rise to a duty to disclose or abstain; 
only a specific relationship does that. And we do not believe that the mere 
receipt of information from an insider creates such a special relationship 
between the tippee and the corporation's shareholders. 
Apparently recognizing the weakness of its argument in light of Chia-
rella, the SEC attempts to distinguish that case factually as involving not 
"inside" information, but rather "market" information, i. e., "information 
generated within the company relating to its assets or earnings." Brief 
for Respondent 23. This Court drew no such distinction in Chiarella and, 
as THE CHIEF JUSTICE noted, "[i]t is clear that § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by 
their terms and by their history make no such distinction." 445 U. S., at 
241, n. 1 (dissenting opinion). See ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1603, Comment 
(2)(j) (Proposed Official Draft 1978). 
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while in possession of material" non public info"rmation. 15 
Judge Wright correctly read our opinion in Chiarella as re-
pudiating any notion that all traders must enjoy equal in-
formation before trading: "[T]he 'information' theory is re-
jected. Because the disclose-or-refrain duty is 
extraordinary, it attaches only when a party has legal obliga-
tions other than a mere duty to comply with the general anti-
fraud proscriptions in the federal securities laws." 220 U. S. " 
App. D.C., at 322, 681 F. 2d, at 837. See Chiarella, 445 
U. S., at 235, n. 20. We reaffirm today that "[a] duty [to 
disclose] arises from the relationship between parties ... 
and not merely from one's ability to acquire information be-
cause of his position in the market." 445 U. S., at 232-233, 
n. 14. 
Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a per-
son knowingly receives material nonpublic information from 
an insider and trades on it could have an inhibiting influence 
on the role of market analysts, which the SEC itself recog-
nizes is necessary to the preservation of a healthy market. 16 
'
5 In Chiarella, we noted that formulation of an absolute equal informa-
tion rule "should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of con-
gressional intent." 445 U. S., at 233. Rather than adopting such a radi-
cal view of securities trading, Congress has expressly exempted many 
market professionals from the general statutory prohibition set forth in 
§ ll(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78k(a)(1), against 
members of a national securities exchange trading for their own account. 
See id., at 233, n. 16. We observed in Chiarella that "[t]he exception is 
based upon Congress' recognition that [market professionals] contribute to 
a fair and orderly marketplace at the same time they exploit the informa-
tional advantage that comes from their possession of [nonpublic informa-
tion]." Ibid. 
'
6 The SEC expressly recognized that "[t]he value to the entire market of 
[analysts'] efforts cannot be gainsaid; market efficiency in pricing is signifi-
cantly enhanced by [their] initiatives to ferret out and analyze information, 
and thus the analyst's work redounds to the benefit of all investors." 21 
S.E.C., at 1406. The SEC asserts that analysts remain free to obtain 
from management corporate information for purposes of "filling in the 'in-
' · 
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It is commonplace for analysts to "ferret out and analyze in-
formation," 21 S.E.C., at 1406, 17 and this often is done by 
meeting with and questioning corporate officers and others 
who are insiders. And information that the analysts obtain 
normally may be the basis for judgments as to the market 
worth of a corporation's securities. The analyst's judgment 
in this respect is made available in market letters or other-
wise to clients of the firm. It is the nature of this type of 
information, and indeed of the markets themselves, that such 
information cannot be made simultaneously available to all of 
the corporation's stockholders or the public generally. 
B 
The conclusion that recipients of inside information do not 
invariably acquire a duty to disclose or abstain does not mean 
terstices in analysis' . ... " Brief for Respondent 42 (quoting Investors 
Management Co., 44 S.E.C., at 646). But this rule is inherently impre-
cise, and imprecision prevents parties from ordering their actions in accord 
with legal requirements. Unless the parties have some guidance as to 
where the line is between permissible and impermissible disclosures and 
uses, neither corporate insiders nor analysts can be sure when the line is 
crossed. Cf. Adler v. Klawans , 267 F . 2d 840, 845 (CA21959) (Burger, J. , 
sitting by designation). 
17 On its facts, this case is the unusual one. Dirks is an analyst in a bro-
ker-dealer firm, and he did interview management in the course of his in-
vestigation. He uncovered, however, startling information that required 
no analysis or exercise of judgment as to its market relevance. N onethe-
less, the principle at issue here extends beyond these facts. The SEC's 
rule-applicable without regard to any breach by an insider-could have 
serious ramifications on reporting by analysts of investment views. 
Despite the unusualness of Dirks' "find," the central role that he played 
in uncovering the fraud at Equity Funding, and that analysts in general 
can play in revealing information that corporations may have reason to 
withhold from the public, is an important one. Dirks' careful investigation 
brought to light a massive fraud at the corporation. And until the Equity 
Funding fraud Wl!S exposed, the information in the trading market was 
grossly inaccurate. But for Dirks' efforts, the fraud might well have gone 
undetected longer. 
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that such tippees always are free to trade on the information. 
The need for a prophylactic ban on some tippee trading is 
clear. Not only are insiders forbidden by their fiduciary 
relationship from personally using undisclosed corporate in-
formation to their advantage, but they may not give such in-
formation to an outsider for the same improper purpose of ex-
ploiting the information for their personal gain. See 15 
U. S. C. § 78t(b) (making it unlawful to do indirectly "by 
means of any other person" any act made unlawful by the fed-
eral securities laws); Similarly, the transactions of those 
who knowingly participate with the fiduciary in such a breach 
are "as forbidden" as transactions "on behalf of the trustee 
himself." Mosserv. Darrow, 341 U. S. 267, 272 (1951). See 
Jackson v. Smith, 254 U. S. 586, 589 (1921); Jackson v. 
Ludeling, 88 U. S. 616, 631-632 (1874). As the Court ex-
plained in Mosser, a contrary rule "would open up opportuni-
ties for devious dealings in the name of the others that the 
trustee could not conduct in his own." 341 U. S., at 271. 
See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F. 2d 1301, 1308 
(CA2), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 1005 (1971). Thus, the 
tippee's duty to disclose or abstain is derivative from that of 
the insider's duty. See Tr. of Oral Ar. 38. Cf. Chiarella, 
445 U. S., at 246, n. 1 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). As we 
noted in Chiarella, "[t]he tippee's obligation has been viewed 
as arising from his role as a participant after the fact in the 
insider's breach of a fiduciary duty." 445 U. S., at 230, 
n. 12. · 
Thus, some tippees must assume an insider's duty to the 
shareholders not because they receive inside information, but 
rather because it has been made available to them improp-
erly.18 And for Rule 10lr-5 purposes, the insider's disclosure 
18 The SEC itself has recognized that tippee liability properly is imposed 
only in circumstances where the tippee knows, or has reason to know, that 
the insider has disclosed improperly inside corporate information. In In-
vestors Management Co., supra, the SEC stated that one element of 
tippee liability is that the tippee knew or had reason to know "that [the 
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is improper only where it would violate his Cady, Roberts 
duty. Thus, a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the share-
holders of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic in-
formation only when the insider has breached his fiduciary 
duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the 
tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has 
been a breach. 19 As Commissioner Smith perceptively ob-
served in Investors Management Co.: "It is important in this 
type of case to focus on policing insiders and what they do 
... rather than on policing information per se and its posses-
sion .... " 44 S.E.C., at 648 (concurring in the result). 
Tipping thus properly is viewed only as a means of indirectly 
violating the Cady, Roberts disclose-or-abstain rule. 20 
information] was non-public and had been obtained improperly by selective 
revelation or otherwise." 44 S.E.C., at 641 (emphasis added). Commis-
sioner Smith read this test to mean that a tippee can be held liable only if 
he received information in breach of an insider's duty not to disclose it. 
Id. , at 650 (concurring in the result). 
19 Professor Loss has linked tippee liability to the concept in the law of 
restitution that " '[ w ]here a fiduciary in violation of his duty to the benefi-
ciary communicates confidential information to a third person, the third 
person, if he had notice of the violation of duty, holds upon a constructive 
trust for the beneficiary any profit which he makes through the use of such 
information.'" 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1451 (2d ed. 1961) (quot-
ing Restatement of Restitution § 201(2) (1937)). Other authorities like-
wise have expressed the view that tippee liability exists only where there 
has been a breach of trust by an insider of which the tippee had knowledge. 
See, e. g., Ross v. Licht, 263 F . Supp. 395, 410 (SDNY 1967); A. Jacobs, 
The Impact of Rule 10b--5, § 167, at 7-4 (1975) ("[T]he better view is that a 
tipper must know or have reason to know the information is nonpublic and 
was improperly obtained."); Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial In-
quiry Into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 798, 818, n. 76 (1973) ("The extension of rule 10b--5 restrictions to 
tippees of corporate insiders can best be justified on the theory that they 
are participating in the insider's breach of his fiduciary duty.''). Cf. Re-
statement (Second) of Agency § 312, comment c (1958) ("A person who, 
with notice that an agent is thereby violating his duty to his principal, re-
ceives confidential information from the agent, may be [deemed] . .. a con-
structive trustee. "). 
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c 
In determining whether a tippee is under an obligation to 
disclose or abstain, it thus is necessary to determine whether 
the insider's "tip" constituted a breach of the insider's fidu-
ciary duty. All disclosures of confidential corporate informa-
tion are not inconsistent with the duty insiders owe to share-
holders. In contrast to the extraordinary facts of this case, 
the more typical situation in which there will be a question 
whether disclosure violates the insider's Cady, Roberts duty 
is when insiders disclose information to analysts. Seen. 16, 
supra. In some situations, both the insider and the analyst 
recipient will act in good faith, and yet release of the informa-
tion may affect the market. For example, it may not be 
clear-either to the corporate insider or to the recipient ana-
lyst-whether the information will be viewed as material 
"socially desirable or even that it is devoid of moral. considerations." 
Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 Va. L. Rev. 1, 55 
(1980). Nor do we imply an absence of responsibility to disclose promptly 
indications of illegal actions by a corporation to the proper authorities-
typically the SEC and exchange authorities in cases involving securities. 
Depending on the circumstances, and even where permitted by law, one's 
trading on material nonpublic information is behavior that may fall below 
ethical standards of conduct. But in a statutory area of the law such as 
securities regulation, where legal principles of general application must be 
applied, there may be "significant distinctions between actual legal obliga-
tions and ethical ideals." SEC, Report of the Special Study of Securities 
Markets, H. R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 237-238 
(1963). rihe SEC recognizes this. At oral argument, the following ex-
change"tbok place: 
"QUESTION: So, it would not have satisfied his obligation under the 
law to go to the SEC first? 
"[SEC's counsel]: That is correct. That an insider has to observe what 
has come to be known as the abstain or disclosure rule. Either the in-
formation has to be disclosed to the market if it is inside information .. . or 
the insider must abstain." Tr. of Oral Arg. 27. 
Thus, it is clear that Rule lOJ:r-5 does not impose any obligation simply to 
tell the SEC about the fraud before trading-J 
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nonpublic information. Corporate officials may mistakenly 
think the information already has been disclosed or that it is 
not material enough to affect the market. Whether disclo-
sure is a breach of duty therefore depends in large part on 
the purpose or good faith of the insider who made the disclo-
sure. Absent an improper purpose, there has been no 
breach of duty to stockholders. And absent a breach by the 
insider, there is no derivative breach. 21 As Commissioner 
Smith stated in Investors Management Co.: 
"[T]ippee responsibility must be related back to insider 
responsibility by a necessary finding that the tippee 
knew the information was given to him in breach of a 
duty by a person having a special relationship to the is-
suer not to disclose the information, and that the in-
formation must be shown not only to have been material 
and non-public, but also to have substantially contrib-
uted to the trading which occurred." 44 S.E.C., at 651 
(concurring in the result). 
There are facts and circumstances that often may justify an 
inference that the insider has breached his fiduciary duty. 
For example, there may be a relationship between the in-
sider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the 
21 An example of a case turning on the court's determination that the dis-
closure did not impose any fiduciary duties on the recipient of the inside 
information is Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F. 2d 796 (CA21980). 
There, the defendant investment banking firm, representing one of its own 
corporate clients, investigated another corporation that was a possible tar-
get of a takeover bid by its client. In the course of negotiations the invest-
ment banking firm was given, on a confidential basis, unpublished material 
information. Subsequently, after the proposed takeover was abandoned, 
the firm was charged with relying on the information when it traded in the 
target corporation's stock. For purposes of the decision, it was assumed 
that the firm knew the information was confidential, but that it had been 
received in arm's-length negotiations. See id., at 798. In the absence of 
any fiduciary relationship, the Court of Appeals found no basis for impos-
ing tippee liability on the investment firm. See id., at 799. 
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latter, or an intention to benefit the particular recipient. 
The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic 
information certainly exist when an insider makes a gift of 
confidential information to a trading relative or friend. The 
tip and trade resemble trading by the insider himself fol-
lowed by a gift of the profits to the recipient. 
Determining the purpose of any one disclosure, a question 
of fact, will not always be easy for courts. But it is essential, 
we think, to have a guiding principle for those whose daily 
activities must be limited and instructed by the SEC's inside-
trading rules, and we believe that there must be a breach of 
the insider's fiduciary duty before the tippee inherits the 
duty to disclose or abstain. In contrast, the rule adopted by 
the SEC in this case would have no limiting principle. 22 
IV 
Under the inside-trading and tipping rules set forth above, 
we find that there was no actionable violation by Dirks. 23 It 
22 Without legal limitations, market participants are forced to rely on the 
reasonableness of the SEC's litigation strategy, but that can be hazardous, 
as the facts of this case make plain. Following the SEC's filing of the 
Texas Gulf Sulphur action, Commissioner (and later Chairman) Budge 
spoke of the various implications of applying Rule lOb-5 in inside-trading 
cases: 
"Turning to the realm of possible defendants in the present and potential 
civil actions, the Commission certainly does not contemplate suing every 
person who may have come across inside information. In the Texas Gulf 
action neither tippees nor persons in the vast rank and file of employees 
have been named as defendants. In my view, the Commission in future 
cases normally should not join rank and file employees or persons outside 
the company such as an analyst or reporter who learns of inside informa-
tion." Speech of Hamer Budge to the New York Regional Group of the 
American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc. (Nov. 18, 1965) (emphasis 
added), reprinted in Budge, The Texas Gulf Sulphur Case-What It Is and 
What It Isn't, Corp. Secretary No. 127, at 6 (Dec. 17, 1965). 
23 Dirks contends that he was not a "tippee" because the information he 
received constituted unverified allegations of fraud that were denied by 
management and were not "material facts" under the securities laws that 
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is undisputed that Dirks himself was a stranger to Equity 
Funding, with no pre-existing fiduciary duty to its share-
holders.24 He took no action, directly or indirectly, that in-
duced the shareholders or officers of Equity Funding to re-
pose trust or confidence in him. There was no expectation 
by Dirk's sources that he would keep their information in con-
fidence. Nor did Dirks misappropriate or illegally obtain the 
information about Equity Funding. Unless the insiders 
breached their Cady, Roberts duty to shareholders in disclos-
ing the nonpublic information to Dirks, he breached no duty 
when he passed it on to investors as well as to the Wall Street 
Journal. 
We also think it is clear that the Equity Funding employ-
ees did not violate their Cady, Roberts duty to the corpora-
tion's shareholders by providing information to Dirks. 25 The 
required disclosure before trading. He also argues that the information 
he received was not truly "inside" information, i. e., intended for a con-
fidential corporate purpose, but was merely evidence of a crime. The So-" 
licitor General agrees. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22. 
For purposes of deciding this case, however, we assume the correctness of 
the SEC's findings, accepted by the Court of Appeals, that petitioner was a 
tippee of material inside information. 
24 Judge Wright found that Dirks acquired a fiduciary duty by virtue of 
his position as an employee of a broker-dealer. See 220 U. S. App. D.C., 
at 32&-327, 681 F. 2d, at 840-842. The SEC, however, did not consider 
Judge Wright's novel theory in its decision, nor did it present that theory 
to the Court of Appeals. The SEC also has not argued Judge Wright's 
theory in this Court. See Brief for Respondent 21, n. 27. The merits of 
such a duty are therefore not before the Court. See SEC v. Chenery 
Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 196-197 (1947). 
""In this Court, the SEC appears to contend that an insider invariably 
violates a fiduciary duty to the corporation's shareholders by transmitting 
nonpublic corporate information to an outsider when he has reason to be-
lieve that the outsider may use it to the disadvantage of the shareholders. 
"Thus, regardless of any ultimate motive to bring to public attention the 
derelictions at Equity Funding, Secrist breached his duty to Equity Fund-
ing shareholders." Brief for Respondent 31. This perceived "duty" dif-
fers markedly from the one that the SEC identified in Cady, Roberts and 
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tippers received no monetary or personal benefit for reveal-
ing Equity Funding's secrets, nor did they have an apparent 
purpose or desire to make a gift of valuable information to 
Dirks. As the facts of this case clearly indicate, the tippers 
were motivated by a desire to expose the fraud. See supra, 
at 1-2. In the absence of a breach of duty to shareholders by 
the insiders, there was no derivative breach by Dirks. See 
n. 19, supra. Dirks therefore could not have been "a partici-
pant after the fact in [an] insider's breach of a fiduciary 
duty." Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 230, n. 12. 
v 
We conclude that Dirks, in the circumstances of this case, 
had no duty to abstain from use of the inside information that 
he obtained. The judgment of the Court of Appeals there-
fore is 
Reversed. 
that has been the basis for federal tippee-trading rules to date. In fact, 
the SEC did not charge Secrist with any wrongdoing, and we do not under-
stand the SEC to have relied on any theory of a breach of duty by Secrist in 
finding that Dirks breached his duty to Equity Funding's shareholders. 
See App. 250 (decision of administrative law judge) ("One who knows him-
self to be a beneficiary of non-public, selectively disclosed inside informa-
tion must fully disclose or refrain from trading."); SEC's Reply to Notice of 
Supplemental Authority before the SEC 4 ("If Secrist was acting properly, 
Dirks inherited a duty to [Equity Funding]'s shareholders to refrain from 
improper private use of the information."); Brief on behalf of the SEC in 
the Court of Appeals, at 47-50; id., at 51 ("[K]nowing possession of inside 
information by any person imposes a duty to abstain or disclose."); id., at 
52-54; id., at 55 ("[T]his obligation arises not from the manner in which 
such information is acquired . . .. "); 220 U. S. App. D.C., at 322-323, 681 
F. 2d, at 838 (Wright, J.). 
\. 
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IV 
Under the inside-trading and tipping rules set forth above, 
we find that there was no actionable violation by Dirks. 23 It 
is undisputed that Dirks himself was a stranger to Equity 
Funding, with no pre-existing fiduciary duty to its share-
holders. 24 He took no action, directly or indirectly, that in-
reasonableness of the SEC's litigation strategy, but that can be hazardous, 
as the facts of this case make plain. Following the SEC's filing of the 
Texas Gulf Sulphur action, Commissioner (and later Chairman) Budge 
spoke of the various implications of applying Rule 10b-5 in inside-trading 
cases: 
"Turning to the realm of possible defendants in the present and potential 
civil actions, the Commission certainly does not contemplate suing every 
person who may have come across inside information. In the Texas Gulf 
action neither tippees nor persons in the vast rank and file of employees 
have been named as defendants. In my view, the Commission in future 
cases normally should not join rank and file employees or persons outside 
the company such as an analyst or reporter who learns of inside informa-
tion." Speech of Hamer Budge to the New York Regional Group of the 
American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc. (Nov. 18, 1965) (emphasis 
added), reprinted in Budge, The Texas Gulf Sulphur Case-Wbat It Is and 
Wbat It Isn't, Corp. Secretary No. 127, at 6 (Dec. 17, 1965). 
Zl Dirks contends that he was not a "tippee" because the information he 
received constituted unverified allegations of fraud that were denied by 
management and were not "material facts" under the securities laws that 
required disclosure before trading. He also argues that the information 
he received was not truly "inside" information, i. e., intended for a con-
fidential corporate purpose, but was merely evidence of a crime. The So-
licitor General agrees. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22. 
We need not decide, however, whether the information constituted "mate-
rial facts," or whether information concerning corporate crime is properly 
characterized as "inside information." For purposes of deciding this case, 
we assume the correctness of the SEC's findings, accepted by the Court of 
Appeals, that petitioner was a tippee of material inside information. 
24 Judge Wright found that Dirks acquired a fiduciary duty by virtue of 
his position as an employee of a broker-dealer. See 220 U. S. App. D. C., 
at 325-327, 681 F. 2d, at 840-842. The SEC, however, did not consider 
Judge Wright's novel theory in its decision, nor did it present that theory 
to the Court of Appeals. The SEC also has not argued Judge Wright's 
theory in this Court. See Brief for Respondent 21, n. 27. The merits of 
such a duty are therefore not before the Court. See SEC v. Chenery 
.. 
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APPEALS FOR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
[June-, 1983] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Petitioner Raymond Dirks received material nonpublic in-
formation from "insiders" of a corporation with which he had 
no connection. He disclosed this information to investors 
who relied on it in trading in the shares of the corporation. 
The question is whether Dirks violated the antifraud provi-
sions of the federal securities laws by this disclosure. 
I 
In 1973, Dirks was an officer of a New York broker-dealer 
firm who specialized in providing investment analysis of in-
surance company securities to institutional investors. 1 On 
March 6, Dirks received information from Ronald Secrist, a 
former officer of Equity Funding of America. Secrist al-
leged that the assets of Equity Funding, a diversified cor-
poration primarily engaged in selling life insurance and mu-
tual funds, were vastly overstated as the result of fraudulent 
corporate practices. Secrist also stated that various regula-
'The facts stated here are taken from more detailed statements set forth 
by the administrative law judge, App. 176-180, 225-247; the opinion of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 21 S. E. C. Docket 1401, 1402-1406 
(1981); and the opinion of Judge Wright in the Court of Appeals, 220 U. S. 
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tory agencies had failed to act on similar charges made by 
Equity'""F'un<rlng employees. He urged Dirks to verify the 
fraud and disclose it publicly. ---Dirks decided to investigate the allegations. He visited 
Equity Funding's headquarters in Los Angeles and inter-
viewed several officers and employees of the corporation. 
The senior management denied any wrongdoing, but certain 
corporation employees corroborated the charges of fraud. 
Neither Dirks nor his firm owned or traded any Equity 
Funding stock, but throughout his investigation he openly 
discussed the information he had obtained with a number of 
clients and investors. Some of these persons sold their hold-
ings of Equity Funding securities, including five investment 
advisers who liquidated holdings of more than $16 million. 2 
While Dirks was in Los Angeles, he was in touch refQ!larly ""2 
with William Blundell, the Wall StreetJ ournal's Los Angeles ) 
bureau cTiier Dirks urged Blundell to write a story on the 
fraud allegations. Blundell did not believe, however, that 
such a massive fraud could go undetected and declined to 
write the story. He feared that publishing such damaging 
hearsay might be libelous. 
During the two-week period in which Dirks pursued his in-
vestigation and spread word of Secrist's charges, the price of 
Equity Funding stock fell from $26 per share to less than $15 
per share. This led the New York Stock Exchange to halt 
trading on March 27. Shortly thereafter California insur-
'Dirks received from his firm a salary plus a commission for securities 
transactions above a certain amount that his clients directed through his 
firm. See 21 S. E. C. Docket, at 1402, n. 3. But "[i]t is not clear how 
many of those with whom Dirks spoke promised to direct some brokerage 
business through [Dirks' firm] to compensate Dirks, or how many actually 
did so." 220 U. S. App. D. C., at 316, 681 F. 2d, at 831. The Boston ' 
Company Institutional Investors, Inc., promised Dirks about $25,000 in 
commissions, but it is unclear whether Boston actually generated any bro-
kerage business for his firm. See App. 199, 204-205; 21 S. E. C. Docket, 
at 1404, n. 10; 220 U. S. App. D. C., at 316, n. 5, 681 F. 2d, at 831, n. 5. 
'· 
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ance authorities impounded Equity Funding's records and 
uncovered evidence of the fraud . Only then did the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) file a complaint against 
Equity Funding 3 and only then, on April 2, did the Wall 
Street Journal publish a front-page story based largely on in-
formation assembled by Dirks. Equity Funding immedi-
ately went into receivership. 4 
The SEC began an investigation into Dirks' role in the ex-
posure of the fraud. After a hearing by an administrative 
law judge, the SEC found that Dirks had aided and abetted 
violations of§ 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 77q(a), 5 § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U. S. C. §78j(b), 6 and SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR §240.10b-5 
3 As early as 1971, the SEC had received allegations of fraudulent ac-
counting practices at Equity Funding. Moreover, on March 9, 1973, an 
official of the California Insurance Department informed the SEC's re-
gional office in Los Angeles of Secrist's charges of fraud. Dirks himself 
. voluntarily presented his information at the SEC's regional office begin-
ning on March 27. 
'A federal grand jury in Los Angeles subsequently returned a 105-
count indictment against 22 persons, including many of Equity Funding's 
officers and directors. All defendants were found guilty of one or more 
counts, either by a plea of guilty or a conviction after trial. See Brief for 
Petitioner 15; App. 149-153. 
• Sehion 17(a) provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities 
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication 
in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
"(!) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or 
"(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a 
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which 
they were made, not misleading, or 
"(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser." 
• Section 10(b) provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
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(1982), 7 by repeating the allegations of fraud to members of 
the investment community who later sold their Equity Fund-
ing stock. The SEC concluded: "Where 'tippees'-regard-
less of their motivation or occupation-come into possession 
o( matenal 'information that ffiey- know is confidential and 
know or should know came from a corporate insider,' they 
must either publicly disclose that information or refrain from 
trading." 21 S. E. C. Docket 1401, 1407 (1981) (footnote 
omitted) (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U. S. 222, 
230 n. 12 (1980)). Recognizing, however, that Dirks "played 
an important role in bringing [Equity Funding's] massive 
fraud to light," 21 S. E. C. Docket, at 1412, the SEC only 
censured him. 8 
Dirks sought review in the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit. The court entered judgment 
any facility of any national securities exchange-
"(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
curity registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so 
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors." 
7 Rule 10b-5 provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of 
any facility of any national securities exchange, 
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
"(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state 
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not rrlisleading, or 
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security." 
8 Section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78o(b)(4)(E), 
provides that the SEC may impose certain sanctions, including censure, on 
any person associated with a registered broker-dealer who has "willfully 
aided [or] abetted" any violation of the federal securities laws. See 15 
U. S. C. § 78ff(a) (providing criminal penalties). 
··'!.:. 
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against Dirks "for the reasons stated by the Commission in 
its opinion." App. to Pet. for Cert. C-2. Judge Wright, a 
member of the panel, subsequently issued an opinion. Judge 
Robb concurred in the result and Judge Tamm dissented; nei-
ther filed a separate opinion. Judge Wright believed that 
"the obligations of corporate fiduciaries pass to all those to 
whom they disclose their information before it has been dis-
seminated to the public at large." 220 U. S. App. D. C. 309, 
324, 681 F. 2d 824, 839 (1982). Alternatively, Judge Wright 
concluded that, as an employee of a broker-dealer, Dirks had 
violated "obligations to the SEC and to the public completely 
independent of any obligations he acquired" as a result of re-
ceiving the information. !d., at 325, 681 F. 2d, at 840. 
In view of the importance to the SEC and to the securities 
industry of the question presented by this case, we granted a 
writ of certiorari. --U. S. -- (1982). We now reverse. 
II 
In the seminal case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 
S. E. C. 907 (1961), the SEC recogllizea Ulat fl1eCommon law 
in some jurisdictions imposes on "corporate 'insiders,' par-
ticularly officers, directors, or controlling stockholders" an 
"affirmative duty of disclosure .. . when dealing in securi-
ties." !d., at 911, and n. 13. 9 The SEC found that not only 
did breach of this common-law duty also establish the ele-
ments of a Rule 10b-5 violation, 10 but that individuals other 
• The duty that insiders owe to the corporation's shareholders not to 
trade on inside information differs from the common-law duty that officers 
and directors also have to the corporation itself not to mismanage corpo-
rate assets, of which confidential information is one. See 3 Fletcher 
Cyclopedia of the Laws of Private Corporations §§ 848, 900 (1975 ed. and 
Supp. 1982); 3A Fletcher §§ 1168.1, 1168.2. In holding that breaches of 
this duty to shareholders violated the Securities Exchange Act, the Cady, 
Roberts Commission recognized, and we agree, that "[a] significant pur-
poseortl1eEXchange Act was to eliminate the idea that use of inside in-
formation for personal advantage was a normal emolument of corporate of-
fice." See 40 S. E. C., at 912, n. 15. 
10 Rule 10b-5 is generally the most inclusive of the three provisions on 
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than corporate insiders could be obligated either to disclose 
material nonpublic information 11 before trading or to abstain 
from trading altogether. !d., at 912. In Chiarella, we ac-
cepted the two elements set out in Cady Roberts for estab-
lishing a Rule 10b-5 violation: "(i) the existence of a relation-
ship affording access to inside information intended to be 
available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness 
of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that in-
formation by trading without disclosure." 445 U. S., at 227. 
In examining whether Chiarella had an obligation to disclose 
or abstain, the Court foundthat there is no general duty to 
disclose before trading on material nonpublic iriformation, 12 
and held that "a auty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise 
from the mere possession of nonpublic market iriforma"t10n." 
I d., ~y arises rather from the existence of a 
fiduciary relationship. See id., at 227-235. 
Not "all breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a se-
curities transaction," however, come within the ambit of Rule 
10b-5. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462, 
472 (1977). There must also be "manipulation or deception." 
!d., at 473. In an inside-trading case this fraud derives from 
the "inherent unfairness involved where one takes advan-
tage" of "information intended to be available only for a cor-
which the SEC rested its decision in this case, and we will refer to it when 
we note the statutory basis for the SEC's inside-trading rules. 
11 The SEC views the disclosure duty as requiring more than disclosure 
to purchasers or sellers: "Proper and adequate disclosure of significant cor-
porate developments can only be effected by a public release through the 
appropriate public media, designed to achieve a broad dissemination to the 
investing public generally and without favoring any special person or 
group." In re Faberge, Inc., 45 S. E. C. 249, 256 (1973). 
12 See 445 U. S., at 233; id., at 237 (STEVENS, J., concurring); id., at 
238-239 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment); id., at 239-240 (BUR-
GER, C. J., dissenting). Cf. id., at 252, n. 2 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) 
(recognizing that there is no obligation to disclose material nonpublic in-
formation obtained through the exercise of "diligence or acumen" and "hon-
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porate purpose and not for the ~ersonal benefit of an,y~ne." 
In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, enner-&-smith, Inc., 43 
S. E. C. 933, 936 (1968). Thus, an insider will be liable 
under Rule 10b-5 for inside trading only where he fails to dis-
close material nonpublic information before trading on it and 
thus makes "secret profits." Cady, Roberts, 40 S. E. C., at 
916, n. 31. 
III 
We were explicit in Chiarella in saying that there can be 
no duty to disclose where the person who has traded on inside 
information "was not [the corporation's] agent, ... was not 
a fiduciary, [or] was not a person in whom the sellers [of 
the securities] had placed their trust and confidence." 445 
U. S., at 232. Not to require such a fiduciary relationship, 
we recognized, would "depar[t] radically from the established 
doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship between 
two parties" and would amount to "recognizing a general 
duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo 
actions based on material, nonpublic information." Id., at 
232, 233. This requirement of a specific relationship be-
tween the shareholders and the individual trading on inside 
information has created analytical difficulties for the SEC 
and courts in policing tippees who trade on inside informa- I 
tion. Unlike insiders who have independent fiduciary duties 
to both the corporation and its shareholders, the typical 
tippee has no such relationships. 13 In view of this absence, it 
'
3 Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is 
revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant I 
working for the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the 
shareholders. The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply 
that such persons acquired nonpublic corporate information, but rather 
that they have entered into a special confidential relationship in the con-
duct of the business of the enterprise and are given access to information 
solely for corporate purposes. See SEC v. Monarch Fund, 608 F. 2d 938, 
942 (CA2 1979); In re Investors Management Co., 44 S. E. C. 633, 645 
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has been unclear how a tippee acquires the Cady, Roberts 
duty to refrain from trading on inside information. 
A 
The SEC's position, as stated in its opinion in this case, is 
that a tippee "inherits" the Cady, Roberts obligation to 
shareholders whenever he receives inside information from 
an insider: 
"In tipping potential traders, Dirks breached a duty 
which he had assumed as a result'Ofknowingly receiving 
confidential information from [Equity Funding] insiders. 
Tippees such as Dirks who receive non-public material 
information from insiders become 'subject to the same 
duty as [the] insiders.' Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. [495 F. 2d 228, 237 (CA2 
1974) (quoting Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 
(SDNY 1967))]. Such a tippee breaches the fiduciary 
duty which he assumes from the insider when the tippee 
knowingly transmits the information to someone who 
will probably trade on the basis thereof. . . . Presum-
ably, Dirks' informants were entitled to disclqse the 
[Equity FUirali1gJ fraud m order to bring it to light alli:I 
its perpetrators to justice. However, Dirks-standing 
in their shoes-committed a breach of the fiduciary duty 
which he had assumed in dealing with them, when he 
passed the information on to traders." 21 S. E. C. 
In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S. E. C. 933, 937 
(1968); Cady, Roberts, 40 S. E. C., at 912. When such a person breaches 
his fiduciary relationship, he may be treated more properly as a tipper than 
a tippee. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 
495 F. 2d 228, 237 (CA2 1974) (investment banker had access to material 
information when working on a proposed public offering for the corpora-
tion). For such a duty to be imposed, however, the corporation must ex-
pect the outsider to keep the disclosed nonpublic information confidential, 
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Docket, at 1410, n. 42. 
This view differs little from the view that we rejected as 
inconsistent with congressional intent in Chiarella. In that 
case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the SEC and affirmed 
Chiarella's convktion, holding that "'[a]nyone--corporate in-
sider or not-who regularly receives material nonpublic in-
formation may not use that information to trade in securities 
without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose."' United 
States v. Chiarella, 588 F. 2d 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978) (empha-
sis in original). Here, the SEC maintains that anyone who 
knowingly receives nonpublic material information from an 
insider has a fiduciary duty to disclose before trading. 14 
In effect, the SEC's theory of tippee liability in both cases 
appears rooted in the idea that the antifraud provisions re-
quire equal information among all traders. This conflicts 
with the principle set forth in Chiarella that only some per-
sons, under some circumstances, will be barred from trading 
"Apparently, the SEC believes this case differs from Chiarella in that 
Dirks' receipt of inside information from Secrist, an insider, carried 
Secrist's duties with it, while Chiarella received the information without 
the direct involvement of an insider and thus inherited no duty to disclose 
or abstain. The SEC fails to explain, however, why the receipt ofnonpub-
lic information from an insider automatically carries with it the fiduciary 
duty of the insider. As we emphasized in Chiarella, mere possession of 
nonpublic information does not give rise to a duty to disclose or abstain; 
only a specific relationship does that. And we do not believe that the mere 
receipt of information from an insider creates such a special relationship 
between the tippee and the corporation's shareholders. 
Apparently recognizing the weakness of its argument in light of Chia-
rella, the SEC attempts to distinguish that case factually as involving not 
"inside" information, but rather "market" information, i. e., "information 
generated within the company relating to its assets or earnings." Brief 
for Respondent 23. This Court drew no such distinction in Chiarella and, 
as THE CHIEF JUSTICE noted, "[i)t is clear that § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 by 
their terms and by their history make no such distinction." 445 U. S., at 
241, n. 1 (dissenting opinion). See ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1603, Comment 
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while in possession of material non public information. 16 
Ju~ Wright corr~ctly read our opinion in Chia~lla as re-
pudiating any notion that all traders must enJOY 'equal in-
formation before trading: "[T]he 'information' theory is re-
jected. Because the disclose-or-refrain duty is extraordi-
nary, it attaches only when a party has legal obligations other 
than a mere duty to comply with the general antifraud pro-
scriptions in the federal securities laws." 220 U. S. App. D. 
235, n. 20. We reaffirm today that "[a] duty [to disclose] ~ ~ 
C., at 322, 681 F. 2d, at 837. See Chiarella, 445 U. S., at ~ 
arises from the relationship between parties . . . and not ---
merely from one's ability to acquire information because of 
his position in the market." 445 U. S., at 232-233, n. 14. 
Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a per-
son knowingly receives material nonpublic information from 
an insider and trades on it could have an inhibiting influence 
on the role of market analysts, which the SEC itself recog-
nizes is necessary to the preservation of a healthy market. 16 
15 In Chiarella, we noted that formulation of an absolute equal informa-
tion rule "should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of con-
gressional intent." 445 U . S., at 233. Rather than adopting such a radi-
cal view of securities trading, Congress has expressly exempted many 
market professionals from the general statutory prohibition set forth in 
§ ll(a)(l) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78k(a)(l), against 
members of a national securities exchange trading for their own account. 
See id., at 233, n. 16. We observed in Chiarella that "[t]he exception is 
based upon Congress' recognition that [market professionals] contribute to 
a fair and orderly marketplace at the same time they exploit the informa-
tional advantage that comes from their possession of [nonpublic informa-
tion]." Ibid. 
'
6 The SEC expressly recognized that "[t]he value to the entire market of 
[analysts'] efforts cannot be gainsaid; market efficiency in pricing is signifi-
cantly enhanced by [their] initiatives to ferret out and analyze information, 
and thus the analyst's work redounds to the benefit of all investors." 21 
S. E. C., at 1406. The SEC asserts that analysts remain free to obtain 
from management corporate information for purposes of "filling in the 'in-
terstices in analysis' . . .. " Brief for Respondent 42 (quoting Investors 
Management Co., 44 S. E. C., at 646). But this rule is inherently impre-
.. 
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It is commonplace for analysts to "ferret out and analyze in-
formation," 21 S. E. C., at 1406/7 and this often is done by 
meeting with and questioning corporate officers and others 
who are insiders. And information that the analysts obtain 
normally may be the basis for judgments as to the market 
worth of a corporation's securities. The analyst's judgment 
in this respect is made available in market letters or other-
wise to clients of the firm. It is the nature of this type of 
information, and indeed of the markets themselves, that such 
information cam'l.ot be made simultaneously available to all of 
the corporation's stockholders or the public generally. 
B 
The conclusion that recipients of inside information do not 
invariably acquire a duty to disclose or abstain does not mean 
that such tippees always are free to trade on the information. 
The need for a ban on some tippee trading is clear. Not only 
cise, and imprecision prevents parties from ordering their actions in accord 
with legal requirements. Unless the parties have some guidance as to 
where the line is betweer< permissible and impermissible disclosures and 
uses, neither corporate insiders nor analysts can be sure when the line is 
crossed. Cf. Adler v. Klawans, 267 F. 2d 840, 845 (CA2 1959) (Burger, J., 
sitting by designation). 
17 On its facts, this case is the unusual one. Dirks is an analyst in a bro-
ker-dealer firm, and he did interview management in the course of his in-
vestigation. He uncovered, however, startling information that required ' -, 
no analysis or exercise of judgment as to its market relevance. Nonethe- ..... 
less, the principle at issue here extends beyond these facts. The SEC's 
rule-applicable without regard to any breach by an insider--<:ould have 
serious ramifications on reporting by analysts of investment views. 
Despite the unusualness of Dirks' "find," the central role that he played 
in uncovering the fraud at Equity Funding, and that analysts in general 
can play in revealing information that corporations may have reason to 
withhold from the public, is an important one. Dirks' careful investigation 
brought to light a massive fraud at the corporation. And until the Equity 
Funding fraud was exposed, the information in the trading market was 
grossly inaccurate. ~ Dirks' efforts '\~e fraud might well have gone 
undetected longer. L_ IT""' 
1..-f:t- ~ 5E~ ) 
82--276-0PINION 
12 DIRKS v. SEC 
are insiders forbidden by their fiduciary relationship from 
personally using undisclosed corporate information to their 
advantage, but they may not give such information to an out-
sider for the same improper purpose of exploiting the in-
formation for their personal gain. See 15 U. S. C. § 78t(b) 
(making it unlawful to do indirectly "by means of any other 
person" any act made unlawful by the federal securities 
laws). Similarly, the transactions of those who knowingly 
participate with the fiduciary in such a breach are "as forbid-
den" as transactions "on behalf of the trustee himself." 
Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U. S. 267, 272 (1951). See Jackson 
v. Smith, 254 U. S. 586, 589 (1921); Jackson v. Ludeling, 88 
U. S. 616, 631-632 (1874). As the Court explained in 
Mosser, a contrary rule "would open up opportunities for de-
vious dealings in the name of the others that the trustee could 
not conduct in his own." 341 U. S., at 271. See SEC v. 
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F. 2d 1301, 1308 (CA2), cert. 
denied, 404 U. S. 1005 (1971). Thus, the tippee's duty to 
disclose or abstain is derivative from that of the insider's 
duty. See Tr. of Oral Ar. 38. Cf. Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 
246, n. 1 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). As we noted in 
Chiarella, "[t]he tippee's obligation has been viewed as aris-
ing from his role as a participant after the fact in the insider's 
breach of a fiduciary duty." 445 U. S., at 230, n. 12. 
Thus, some tippees must assume an insider's duty to the 
shareholders not because they receive inside information, but 
rather because it has been made available to them improp-
erly .18 And for Rule 10b-5 purposes, the insider's disclosure 
'
8 The SEC itself has recognized that tippee liability properly is imposed 
only in circumstances where the tippee knows, or has reason to know, that 
the insider has disclosed improperly inside corporate information. In In-
vestors Management Co., supra, the SEC stated that one element of 
tippee liability is that the tippee knew or had reason to know "that [the 
information] was non-public and had been obtained improperly by selective 
revelation or otherwise." 44 S. E . C., at 641 (emphasis added). Commis-
sioner Smith read this test to mean that a tippee can be held liable only if 
82-276---0PINION 
DIRKS v. SEC 13 
is improper only where it would violate his Cady, Roberts 
duty. Thus, a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the share-
holders of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic in-
formation only when the insider has breached his fiduciary 
duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the 
tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has 
been a breach. 19 As Commissioner Smith perceptively ob-
served in Investors Management Co.: "It is important in this 
type of case tQ focus on J20licing insider_s and what they do 
... rather than on policing information per se and its posses-
sion .. . . " 44 S. E. C., at 648 (concurring in the result). 
Tipping thus properly is viewed only as a means of indirectly 
violating the Cady, Roberts disclose-or-abstain rule. 20 
he received information in breach of an insider's duty not to disclose it. 
I d., at 650 (concurring in the result). · 
19 Professor Loss has linked tippee liability to the concept in the law of 
restitution that "'[ w ]here a fiduciary in violation of his duty to the benefi-
ciary communicates confidential information to a third person, the third 
person, if he had notice of the violation of duty, holds upon a constructive 
trust for the beneficiary any profit which he makes through the use of such 
information."' 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1451 (2d ed. 1961) (quot-
ing Restatement of Restitution § 201(2) (1937)). Other authorities like-
wise have expressed the view that tippee liability exists only where there 
has been a breach of trust by an insider of which the tippee had knowledge. 
See, e. g., Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (SDNY 1967); A. Jacobs, 
The Impact of Rule 10b-5, § 167, at 7-4 (1975) ("[T]he better view is that a 
tipper must know or have reason to know the information is nonpublic and 
was improperly obtained."); Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial In-
quiry Into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 798, 818, n. 76 (1973) ("The extension of rule 10b-5 restrictions to 
tippees of corporate insiders can best be justified on the theory that they 
are participating in the insider's breach of his fiduciary duty."). Cf. Re-
statement (Second) of Agency § 312, comment c (1958) ("A person who, 
with notice that an agent is thereby violating his duty to his principal, re-
ceives confidential information from the agent, may be [deemed] ... a con-
structive trustee."). 
20 We do not suggest that knowingly trading on inside information is ever 
"socially desirable or even that it is devoid of moral considerations." 
" ·~ 
82-276-0PINION 
14 DIRKS v. SEC 
c 
In determining whether a tippee is under an obligation to 
disclose or abstain, it thus is necessary to determine whether 
the insider's "tip" constituted a breach of the insider's fidu-
ciary duty. All disclosures of confidential corporate informa-
tion are not inconsistent with the duty insiders owe to share-
holders. In contrast to the extraordinary facts of this case, 
the more typical situation in which there will be a question 
whether disclosure violates the insider's Cady, Roberts duty 
is when insiders disclose information to analysts . See n. 16, 
supra. In some situations, the insider will act consistently 
with his fiduciary duty to shareholders, and yet release of the 
information may affect the market. For example, it may not 
be clear-either to the corporate insider or to the recipient 
analyst-whether the information will be viewed as material 
nonpublic information. Corporate officials may mistakenly 
Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 Va. L. Rev. 1, 55 
(1980). Nor do we imply an absence of responsibility to disclose promptly 
indications of illegal actions by a corporation to the proper authorities-
typically the SEC and exchange authorities in cases involving securities. 
Depending on the circumstances, and even where permitted by law, one's 
trading on material nonpublic information is behavior that may fall below 
ethical standards of conduct. But in a statutory area of the law such as 
securities regulation, where legal principles of general application must be 
applied, there may be "significant distinctions between actual legal obliga-
tions and ethical ideals." SEC, Report of the Special Study of Securities 
Markets, H. R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 237-238 
(1963). The SEC recognizes this. At oral argument, the following ex-
change took place: 
"QUESTION: So, it would not have satisfied his obligation under the 
law to go to the SEC first? 
"[SEC's counsel]: That is correct. That an insider has to observe what 
has come to be !mown as the abstain or disclosure rule. Either the in-
formation has to be disclosed to the market if it is inside information ... or 
the insider must abstain." Tr. of Oral Arg. 27. 
Thus, it is clear that Rule lOb-5 does not impose any obligation simply to 
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not material enough to a ct the market. Whether disclo-
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p~ purpose, there has een no reach of duty to stoc 
holders. And absent a breach by the insider, there is no ~e:::e-
derivative breach. 21 As Commissioner Smith stated in In-
vestors Management Co.: 
"[T]ippee responsibility must be related back to insider 
responsibility by a necessary finding that the tippee 
knew the information was given to him in breach of a 
duty by a person having a special relationship to the is-
suer not to disclose the information, and that the in-
formation must be shown not only to have been material 
and non-public, but also to have substantially contrib-
uted to the trading which occurred." 44 S. E. C., at 651 
(concurring in the result). 
The SEC argues that, if inside-trading liability does not 
exist when the information is transmitted for a proper pur-
pose but is used for trading, it would be a rare situation when 
the parties could not fabricate some ostensibly legitimate 
21 An example of a case turning on the court's determination that the dis-
closure did not impose any fiduciary duties on the recipient of the inside 
information is Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F. 2d 796 (CA21980). 
There, the defendant investment banking firm, representing one of its own 
corporate clients, investigated another corporation that was a possible tar-
get of a takeover bid by its client. In the course of negotiations the invest-
ment banking firm was given, on a confidential basis, unpublished material 
information. Subsequently, after the proposed takeover was abandoned, 
the firm was charged with relying on the information when it traded in the 
target corporation's stock. For purposes of the decision, it was assumed 
that the firm knew the information was confidential, but that it had been 
received in arm's-length negotiations. See id., at 798. In the absence of 
any fiduciary relationship, the Court of Appeals found no basis for impos-
ing tippee liability on the investment firm. See id., at 799. 
/ 
16 
business justification for ransmitting t We 
think the SEC is unduly co cerned. In 
the insider's 12urpo1W in aking a pa icular disclosure is 
fraudulent, the SEC and the courts ar not re uired to read 
the arties' in s. Scienter re evan m eter-
mming whether the tipper ha violate his Ca y, Roberts 
,....""----::Jr.::u-;,.. , but to determine whethe the disclosure itself "de-
ceive[s], manipulate[s], or\ defrau [s]" shareholders, Aaron 
v. SEC, 446 U. S. 680, 68() (1980 oACourts -shmild ocus on 
/ whether the-insidm;yFe.<t~v~~ a di ect or indirec personal 
benefit from the disclosure, s~ch a ~ pecuniary gain or 
a reputational benefit that will' translate into future earnings. 
Cf. Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Ad-
vantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 Harv. L. 
Rev. 324, 348 (1979) ("The theory ... is that the insider, by 
giving the information out selectively, is in effect selling the 
information to its recipient for cash, reciprocal information, 
or other things of value for himself .... "). There are ac s 
and circumstances that often ~ justify such an inference. 
For example, there may be a relationship between the in-
sider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the 
latter, or an intention to benefit the particular recipient. 
The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic 
information also exist when an insider makes a gift of con-
fidential information to a trading relative or friend. The tip 
and trade resemble trading by the insider himself followed by 
a gift of the profits to the recipient. 
Determining whether an insider personally benefits from a 
particular disclosure, a question of fact, will not always be 
'· 
easy for courts. But it is essential, we think, to have a guid-
ing principle for those whose daily activities must be limited 
and instructed by the SEC's inside-trading rules, and we be-
lieve that there must be a breach of the insider's fiduciarj ( 
duty before the tippee inherits the duty to disclose or ab- \ 
stain. In contrast, the rule adopted by the SEC in this case ------.... 
would have no limiting principle. 22 
22 Without legal limitations, market participants are forced to rely on the 
( 
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duced the shareholders or officers of Equity Funding to re-
pose trust or confidence in him. There was no expectation 
by Dirk's sources that he would keep their information in con-
fidence. Nor did Dirks misappropriate or illegally obtain the 
information about Equity Funding. Unless the insiders 
breached their Cady, Roberts duty to shareholders in disclos-
ing the nonpublic information to Dirks, he breached no duty 
when he passed it on to investors as well as to the Wall Street 
Journal. &_ , 
We..al.se-tJH.n t Js clear that thE?tEquity Funding employ-
ees did-Iwt violatw~heir Cady, Roberts duty to the corpora-
tion's shareholders by providing information to Dirks. 25 The 
tippers received no monetary or personal benefit for reveal-
ing Equity Funding's secrets, nor did.the-~pparent 
Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 196-197 (1947). 
u In this Court, the SEC appears to contend that an insider invariably 
violates a fiduciary duty to the corporation's shareholders by transmitting 
nonpublic corporate information to an outsider when he has reason to be-
lieve that the outsider may use it to the disadvantage of the shareholders. 
"Thus, regardless of any ultimate motive to bring to public attention the 
derelictions at Equity Funding, Secrist breached his duty to Equity Fund-
ing shareholders." Brief for Respondent 31. This perceived "duty" dif-
fers markedly from the one that the SEC identified in Cady, Roberts and 
that has been the basis for federal tippee-trading rules to date. In fact, 
the SEC did not charge Secrist with any wrongdoing, and we do not under-
stand the SEC to have relied on any theory of a breach of duty by Secrist in 
finding that Dirks breached his duty to Equity Funding's shareholders. 
See App. 250 (decision of administrative law judge) ("One who knows him-
self to be a beneficiary of non-public, selectively disclosed inside informa-
tion must fully disclose or refrain from trading."); SEC's Reply to Notice of 
Supplemental Authority before the SEC 4 ("If Secrist was acting properly, 
Dirks inherited a duty to [Equity Funding)'s shareholders to refrain from 
improper private use of the information."); Brief on behalf of the SEC in 
the Court of Appeals, at 47-50; id., at 51 ("[K]nowing possession of inside 
information by any person imposes a duty to abstain or disclose."); id., at 
52-54; id., at 55 ("[T]his obligation arises not from the manner in which 
such information is acquired .... "); 220 U. S. App. D. C., at 322-323, 681 
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purpose ~e to make a gift of valuable information to 
Dirks. As the facts of this case clearly indicate, the tippers 
were motivated by a desire to expose the fraud . See supra, 
at 1-2. In the absence of a breach of duty to shareholders by 
the insiders, there was no derivative breach by Dirks. See 
n. 19, supra. Dirks therefore could not have been "a partici-
pant after the fact in [an] insider's breach of a fiduciary 
duty." Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 230, n. 12. 
v 
We conclude that Dirks, in the circumstances of this case, 
had no duty to abstain from use of the inside information that 
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JUSTICE PoWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Petitioner Raymond Dirks received material nonpublic in-
formation from "insiders" of a corporation with which he had 
no connection. He disclosed this information to investors 
who relied on it in trading in the shares of the corporation. 
The question is whether Dirks violated the antifraud provi-
sions of the federal securities laws by this disclosure. 
I 
In 1973, Dirks was an officer of a New York broker-dealer 
firm who specialized in providing investment analysis of in-
surance company securities to institutional investors. 1 On 
March 6, Dirks received information from Ronald Secrist, a 
former officer of Equity Funding of America. Secrist al-
leged that the assets of Equity Funding, a diversified cor-
poration primarily engaged in selling life insurance and mu-
tual funds, were vastly overstated as the result of fraudulent 
corporate practices. Secrist also stated that various regula-
'The facts stated here are taken from more detailed statements set forth 
by the administrative law judge, App. 176-180, 225-247; the opinion of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 21 S. E. C. Docket 1401. 1402-1406 
(1981); and the opinion of Judge Wright in the Comt of Appeals, 220 U. S. 
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tory agencies had failed to act on similar charges made by 
Equity Funding employees. He urged Dirks to verify the 
fraud and disclose it publicly. 
Dirks decided to investigate the allegations. He visited 
Equity Funding's headquarters in Los Angeles and inter-
viewed several officers and employees of the corporation. 
The senior management denied any wrongdoing, but certain 
corporation employees corroborated the charges of fraud. 
Neither Dirks nor his firm owned or traded any Equity 
Funding stock, but throughout his investigation he openly 
discussed the information he had obtained with a number of 
clients and im·estors. Some of these persons sold their hold-
ings of Equity Funding securities, including five investment 
advisers who liquidated holdings of more than $16 million.~ 
While Dirks was in Los Angeles, he was.in touch regularly 
with William Blundell, the Wall Stteet Jow'1zal's Los Angeles 
bureau chief. Dirks urged Blundell to write a story on the 
fraud allegations. Blundell did not believe, however, that 
such a massive fraud could go undetected and declined to 
write the story. He feared that publishing such damaging 
hearsay might be libelous. 
During the two-week period in which Dirks pursued his in-
vestigation and spread word of Secrist's charges, the price of 
Equity Funding stock fell from $26 per share to less than $15 
per share. This led the New York Stock Exchange to halt 
trading on March 27. Shortly thereafter California insur-
' Dirks received from his firm a salary plus a commission for securities 
transactions above a certain amount that his clients directed through his 
firm. See 21 S. E. C. Docket. at 1-JO:Z. n. 3. But ''[i]t is not clear ho\\' 
many of those with whom Dirks ;;poke promised to direct some brokerage 
business through [Dirks' firm I to compensate Dirks. or how many actually 
did so." 220 U. S. App. D. C .. at 316. 681 F. :Zd, at 831. The Boston 
Company Institutional Investors. Inc .. promised Dirks about $25,000 in 
commissions. but it is unclear \\'hether Boston actually generated any bro-
kerage business for his firm. ·see App. 199, 20+-205; 21 S. E. C. Docket, 
at 1-10-1. n. 10; 220 U. S. App. D. C .. at 316, n. 5. 681 F. 2d. at 831, n. 5. 
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ance authorities impounded Equity Funding's records and 
uncovered evidence of the fraud. Only then did the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) file a complaint against 
Equity Funding :• and only then, on April 2, did the Wall 
Street Journal publish a front-page story based largely on in-
formation assembled by Dirks. Equity Funding immedi-
ately went into receivership.' 
The SEC began an investigation into Dirks' role in the ex-
posure of the fraud. After a hearing by an administrative 
law judge, the SEC found that Dirks had aided and abetted 
violations of§ 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 77q(a), ' § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U. S. C. § 78j(b)," and SEC Rule 10lr5, 17 CFR § 240.10lr5 
'As early as 1971, the SEC had received allegations of fraudulent ac-
counting practices at Equity Funding. Moreover, on March 9, 1973, an 
official of the California Insurance Department informed the SEC's re-
gional office in Los Angeles of Secrist's charges of fraud. Dirks himself 
voluntarily presented his information at the SEC's regional office begin-
ning on March 27. 
• A federal grand jury in Los Angeles subsequently returned a 105-
count indictment against 22 persons. including many of Equity Funding's 
officers and directors. All defendants were found guilty of one or more 
counts, either by a plea of guilty or a conviction after trial. See Brief for 
Petitioner 15; App. 149-153. 
• Section 17(a) provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities 
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication 
in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
"( I) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or 
''(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a 
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which 
they were made, not misleading, or 
"(3) to engage in any transaction, practice. or course of business \\"hich 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the pu1·chaser." 
.; Section lO(b) provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person. directly or indirectly. by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of 
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(1982), 7 by repeating the allegations of fraud to members of 
the investment community who later sold their Equity Fund-
ing stock. The SEC concluded: "Where 'tippees'-regard-
less of their motivation or occupation-come into possession 
of material 'information that they know is confidential and 
know or should know came from a corporate insider,' they 
must either publicly disclose that information or refrain from 
trading." 21 S. E. C. Docket 1401, 1407 (1981) (footnote 
omitted) (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U. S. 222, 
230 n. 12 (1980)). Recognizing, however, that Dirks "played 
an important role in bringing [Equity Funding's) massive 
fraud to light," 21 S. E. C. Docket, at 1-H2,' the SEC only I 
censured him. 9 
any facility of any national securities exchange- . 
"(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
curity registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so 
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors." 
'Rule lOb-5 provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person. directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of 
any facility of any national securities exchange, 
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
"(b) To make any 'untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state 
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of busines!" which operates 
or would operate as a fraud ot· deceit upon any person, in connection \\ith 
the purchase or sale of any security." 
' Jt:STICE BLACKm: ;-.;';; dissenting opinion minimizes the role Dirks 
played in making public the Equity Funding fraud. See poiil, at 3 and 11. 
n. 15. The dissent would re\\Tite the history of Dirks' extensive investiga-
tive efforts. See. e. ,q .. 21 S. E. C., at 1412 ("It is clear that Dirks played 
an important role in bringing [Equity Funding's) massive fraud to light, 
and it is also true that he reported the fraud allegation to [Equity 
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Dirks sought review in the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit. The court entered judgment 
against Dirks "for the reasons stated by the Commission in 
its opinion." App. to Pet. for Cert. C-2. Judge Wright, a 
member of the panel, subsequently issued an opinion. Judge 
Robb concurred in the result and Judge Tamm dissented; nei-
ther filed a separate opinion. Judge Wright believed that 
"the obligations of corporate fiduciaries pass to all those to 
whom they disclose their information before it has been dis-
seminated to the public at large." 220 U. S. App. D. C. 309, 
324, 681 F. 2d 824, 839 (1982). Alternatively, Judge Wright 
concluded that, as an employee of a broker-dealer, Dirks had 
violated "obligations to the SEC and to the public completely 
independent of any obligations he acquired" as a result of re-
ceiving the information. /d., at 325, 681 F. 2d, at 840. 
In view of the importance to the SEC and to the securities 
industry of the question presented by this case, we granted a 
writ of certiorari. -- U. S. -- (1982). We now reverse. 
II 
In the seminal case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 
S. E. C. 907 (1961), the SEC recognized that the common law 
in some jurisdictions imposes on "corporate 'insiders,' par-
ticularly officers, directors, or controlling stockholders" an 
"affirmative duty of disclosure ... when dealing in securi-
ties." /d., at 911, and n. 13. 10 The SEC found that not only 
Funding's] auditors ·and sought to have the information published in the 
Wall Street Journal."); 681 F. 2d, at 829 (Wright, J.) ("Largely thanks to 
Dirks one of the most infamous frauds in recent memory was uncovered 
and exposed, while the record shows that the SEC repeatedly missed 
opportunities to investigate Equity Funding."). 
• Section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78o(b)(4)(E), 
provides that the SEC may impose certain sanctions. including censure, on 
any person associated with a registered broker-dealer ,,·ho has '\\illfully 
aided [or) abetted" any violation of the federal securities laws. See 15 
U. S. C. § 78ff(a) (providing criminal penalties). 
"' The duty that insiders owe to the corporation's shareholders not to 
82-276-0PI:-.JIO:-.J 
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did breach of this common-law duty also establish the ele-
ments of a Rule lOb-5 violation, 11 but that individuals other 
than corporate insiders could be obligated either to disclose 
material nonpublic information 12 before trading or to abstain 
from trading altogether. !d., at 912. In Chia1·ella, we ac-
cepted the two elements set out in Cady Roberts for estab-
lishing a Rule lOb-5 violation: "(i) the existence of a relation-
ship affording access to inside information intended to be 
available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness 
of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that in-
formation by trading ·without disclosure." 445 U. S., at 227. 
In examining whether Chiarella had an obligation to disclose 
or abstain, the Court found that there is no general duty to 
disclose before trading on material non public information, Ia 
trade on inside information differs from the common-law duty that officers 
and directors also have to the corporation itself not to mismanage corpo-
rate assets. of which confidential information is one. See 3 Fletcher 
Cyclopedia of the Laws of Pri\'ate Corporations ~* 8-18, 900 (1975 ed. and 
Supp. 1982); 3A Fletcher §~ 1168.1, 1168.2. In holding that breaches of 
this duty to shareholders violated the Securities Exchange Act, the Cady, 
Robel'ts Commission recognized, and we agree. that "[a] significant pur-
pose of the Exchange Act was to eliminate the idea that use of inside in-
formation for personal advantage was a normal emolument of corporate of-
fice." See 40 S. E. C., at 912, n. 15. 
"Rule lOb-5 is generally the most inclusive of the three pro\'isions on 
which the SEC rested its decision in this case, and we will refer to it when 
we note the statutory basis for the SEC's inside-trading rules. 
"The SEC views the disclosure duty as requiring more than disclosure 
to purchasers or sellers: "Proper and adequate disclosure of significant cor-
porate developments can only be effected by a public release through the 
appropriate public media. designed to achieve a broad dissemination to the 
investing public generally and without favoring any special person or 
group." In re Faberge, file., -15 S. E. C. 249, 256 (1973). 
"' See 445 U. S., at 233: hi .. at 237 (STEVENS, J., concurring); id., at 
238-239 (BRENNAN. J .. concurring in the judgment); id . , at 239-2-10 (BeR-
GER, C. J., dissenting). Cf. id .. at 252. n. 2 (BLACKMCN, J., dissenting) 
(recognizing that there is no obligation to disclose material nonpublic in-
formation obtained through the exercise of "diligence or acumen" and "bon-
82-276--0PIN ION 
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and held that "a duty to disclose under § lO(b) does not arise 
from the mere possession of non public market information." 
I d., at 235. Such a duty arises rather from the existence of a 
fiduciary relationship. See id., at 227-235. 
Not "all breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a se-
curities transaction," however, come \\rithin the ambit of Rule 
10b-5. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462, 
472 (1977). There must also be "manipulation or deception." 
I d., at 473. In an inside-trading case this fraud derives from 
the "inherent unfairness involved where one takes advan-
tage" of "information intended to be available only for a cor-
porate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone." 
In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 
S. E. C. 933, 936 (1968). Thus, an insider will be liable 
under Rule 10b-5 for inside trading only where he fails to dis-
close material nonpublic information before trading on it and 
thus makes "secret profits." Cady, Roberts, 40 S. E. C., at 
916, n. 31. 
III 
We were explicit in Chiarella in saying that there can be 
no duty to disclose where the person \Vho has traded on inside 
information "was not [the corporation's] agent, ... was not 
a fiduciary, [or] was not a person in whom the sellers [of 
the securities] had placed their trust and confidence." 445 
U. S., at 232. Not to require such a fiduciary relationship, 
we recognized, Would "depar[t] radically from the established 
doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship between 
two parties" and would amount to "recognizing a general 
duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo 
actions based on material, non public information." I d., at 
232, 233. This requirement of a specific relationship be-
tween the shareholders and the individual trading on inside 
information has created analytical difficulties for the SEC 
est means," as opposed to ":'tealth"). 
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and courts in policing tippees who trade on inside informa-
tion. Unlike insiders who have independent fiduciary duties 
to both the corporation and its shareholders, the typical 
tippee has no such relationships. 11 In view of this absence, it 
has been unclear how a tippee acquires the Cady, Roberts 
duty to refrain from trading on inside information. 
A 
The SEC's position, as stated in its opinion in this case. is 
that a tippee "inherits" the Cady. Roberts obligation to 
shareholders whenever he receives inside information from 
an insider: 
"In tipping potential traders, Dirks breached a duty 
which he had assumed as a result of kno'Ningly receiving 
confidential information from [Equity Funding] insiders. 
Tippees such as Dirks who receive non-public material 
information from insiders become 'subject to the same 
duty as [the] insiders.' Shapiro v. J1e1Till Lynch, 
"Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is 
revealed legitimately to an underwriter. accountant, lawyer, or consultant 
working for the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the 
shareholders. The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply 
that such persons acquired nonpublic corporate information, but rather 
that they have entered into a special confidential relationship in the con-
duct of the business of the enterprise and are giYen access to information 
solely for corporate ·purposes. See SEC v. Jlonarch F11nd. 608 F. 2d 938. 
942 (CA2 1979); In 1·e Investors Management Co., 44 S. E. C. 633, 645 
(1971); In1·e Van Alystne, Noel & Co., 43 S. E. C. 1080, 1084-1085 (1969): 
In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith. Inc .. 43 S. E. C. 933, 937 
(1968): Cady, Robe11s. 40 S. E. C .. at 912. When such a person breaches 
his fiduciary relationship, he may be treated more properly as a tipper than 
a tippee. See Shapim v. Jie1·ril/ Lunch. Pierce, Fennel' & Smith. Inc., 
495 F. 2d 228, 237 (CA2 1974) (inYestment banker had access to material 
information when working on a proposed public offering for the corpora-
tion). For such a dut~· to be imposed. howeYer. the corporation must ex-
pect the outsider to keep the disclosed nonpublic information confidential, 
and the relationship at least must imp!~· such a duty. 
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Pierce, Fenne1· & Smith, Inc. [495 F. 2d 228, 237 (CA2 
1974) (quoting Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 
(SDNY 1967))]. Such a tippee breaches the fiduciary 
duty which he assumes from the insider when the tippee 
knowingly transmits the information to someone who 
will probably trade on the basis thereof. . . . Presum-
ably, Dirks' informants were entitled to disclose the 
[Equity Funding] fraud in order to bring it to light and 
its perpetrators to justice. However, Dirks-standing 
in their shoes-committed a breach of the fiduciary duty 
which he had assumed in dealing \Vith them, when he 
passed the information on to traders." 21 S. E. C. 
Docket, at 1410, n. 42. 
This view differs little from the view that we rejected as 
inconsistent with congressional intent in Chiarella. In that 
case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the SEC and affirmed 
Chiarella's conviction, holding that "'[a]nyone-corporate in-
sider or not-who regularly receives material nonpublic in-
formation may not use that information to trade in securities 
without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose."' United 
States v. Chiarella, 588 F. 2d 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978) (empha-
sis in original). Here, the SEC maintains that anyone who 
kno'Wingly receives nonpublic material information from an 
insider has a fiduciary duty to disclose before trading., ;; 
,., Apparently, the 'SEC believes this case differs from Chiarella in that 
Dirks' receipt of inside information from Secrist, an insider, caniecl 
Secrist's duties with it, while Chiarella received the information ,,·ithout 
the direct involvement of an insider and thus inherited no duty to disclose 
or abstain. The SEC fails to explain, however, why the receipt of non pub-
lic information from an insider automatically carries with it the fiduciary 
duty of the insider. As we emphasized in Chiarella, mere possession of 
nonpublic information does not give rise to a duty to disclose or abstain; 
only a specific relationship does that. And we do not believe that the mere 
receipt of information from an insider creates such a special relationship 
between the tippee and the corporation's shareholders. 
Apparently recognizing the weakness of its argument in light of Chia-
82-276-0PINION 
10 DIRKS u. SEC 
In effect, the SEC's theory of tippee liability in both cases 
appears rooted in the idea that the antifraud provisions re-
quire equal information among all traders. This conflicts 
with the principle set forth in Chiarella that only some per-
sons, under some circumstances, will be barred from trading 
while in possession of material non public information.,,; f 
Judge Wright correctly read our opinion in Chiarella as re-
pudiating any notion that all traders must enjoy equal in-
formation before trading: "[T]he 'information' theory is re-
jected. Because the disclose-or-refrain duty is extraordi-
nary, it attaches only when a party has legal obligations other 
than a mere duty to comply with the general antifraud pro-
scriptions in the federal securities laws." 220 U. S. App. D. 
C., at 322, 681 F. 2d, at 837. See Chiarella, -145 U. S., at 
235, n. 20. We reaffirm today that ''[a] duty [to disclose] 
arises from the relationship between parties ... and not 
merely from one's ability to acquire information because of 
his position in the market." -145 U. S., at 232-233, n. 14. 
rella. the SEC attempts to distinguish that case factually as involving not 
"inside" information. but rather "market" information, i. e., "information 
generated within the company relating to its assets or earnings." Brief 
for Respondent 23. This Court drew no such distinction in Chiarella and, 
as THE CHIEF JUSTICE noted, "(i]t is clear that ~ 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 by 
their terms and by their history make no such distinction." 4-15 U. S., at 
2-11. n. 1 (dissenting opinion). See ALI Fed. Sec. Code * 1603, Comment 
(2)(j) (Proposed Official Draft 1978). 
"In Chiarella. we noted that formulation of an absolute equal informa-
tion rule ''should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of con-
gressional intent.'' -1-15 U. S .. at 233. Rather than adopting such a radi-
cal view of securities trading, Congress has expressly exempted many 
market professionals from the general statutory prohibition set forth in 
§ ll(a}(1) of the Securities Exchange Act. 15 U. S. C. § 78k(a}(l}, against 
members of a national securities exchange trading for their own account. 
See id., at 233, n. 16. We obsen·ed in Chiarella that "[t]he exception is 
based upon Congress' recognition that [market professionals] contribute to 
a fair and orderly marketplace at the same time they exploit the informa-
tional advantage that comes from their posse:;sion of [nonpublic informa-
tion]." Ibid. 
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Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because i.,... 
son knowingly receives material nonpublic information from 
an insider and trades on it could have an inhibiting influence 
on the role of market analysts, which the SEC itself recog-
nizes is necessary to the preservation of a healthy market. 17 
It is commonplace for analysts to "ferret out and analyze in-
formation," 21 S. E. C., at 1406, 1" and this often is done by 
meeting with and questioning corporate officers and others 
who are insiders. And information that the analysts obtain 
normally may be the basis for judgments as to the market 
"The SEC expressly recognized that "[t]he value to the entire market of 
[analysts') efforts cannot be gainsaid; market efficiency in pricing is signifi-
cantly enhanced by [their) initiatives to ferret out and analyze infonnation, 
and thus the analyst's work redounds to the benefit of all investors." 21 
S. E. C., at 1406. The SEC asserts that analysts remain free to obtain 
from management corporate information for purposes of "filling in the 'in-
terstices in analysis' .... " Brief for Respondent 42 (quoting Investors 
Management Co., 44 S. E. C., at 646). But this rule is inherently impre-
cise, and imprecision prevents parties from ordering their actions in accord 
with legal requirements. Unless the parties have some guidance as to 
where the line is between permissible and impennissible disclosures and 
uses, neither corporate insiders nor analysts can be sure when the line is 
crossed. Cf. Adler v. Klawans, 267 F. 2d 840, 845 (CA2 1959) (Burger, J., 
sitting by designation). 
'' On its facts, this case is the unusual one. Dirks is an analyst in a bro-
ker-dealer firm, and he did interview management in the course of his in-
vestigation. He uncovered, however, startling information that required 
no analysis or exercise of judgment as to its market relevance. Nonethe-
less, the principle at issue here extends beyond these facts. The SEC's 
rule-applicable without regard to any breach by an insider~ould have 
serious ramifications on reporting by analysts of investment views. 
Despite the unusualness of Dirks' ''find," the central role that he played 
in uncovering the fraud at Equity Funding, and that analysts in general 
can play in revealing information that corporations may have reason to 
withhold from the public, is an important one. Dirks' careful investigation 
brought to light a massive fraud at the corporation. And until the Equity 
Funding fraud was exposed, the information in the trading market was 
grossly inaccurate. But for Dirks' eff01ts, the fraud might well have gone 
undetected longer. See n. 8, snpra. 
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worth of a corporation's securities. The analyst's judgment 
in this respect is made available in market letters or other-
wise to clients of the firm. It is the nature of this type of 
information, and indeed of the markets themselves, that such 
information cannot be made simultaneously available to all of 
the corporation's stockholders or the public generally. 
B 
The conclusion that recipients of inside information do not 
invariably acquire a duty to disclose or abstain does not mean 
that such tippees always are free to trade on the information. 
The need for a ban on some tippee trading is clear. Not only 
are insiders forbidden by their fiduciary relationship from 
personally using undisclosed corporate information to their 
advantage, but they may not give such information to an out-
sider for the same improper purpose of exploiting the in-
formation for their personal gain. See 15 U. S. C. § 78t(b) 
(making it unlawful to do indirectly "by means of any other 
person" any act made unlawful by the federal securities 
laws). Similarly, the transactions of those who knowingly 
participate with the fiduciary in such a breach are "as forbid-
den" as transactions "on behalf of the trustee himself." 
Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U. S. 267, 272 (1951). See Jackson 
v. Smith, 254 U. S. 586, 589 (1921); Jacksou v. Ludeling, 88 
U. S. 616, 631-632 (1874). As the Court explained in 
Mosser, a contrary rule "would open up opportunities for de-
vious dealings in ·the name of the others that the trustee could 
not conduct in his own." 341 U. S., at 271. See SEC v. 
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F. 2d 1301, 1308 (CA2), cert. 
denied, 404 U. S. 1005 (1971). Thus, the tippee's duty to 
disclose or abstain is derivative from that of the insider's 
duty. See Tr. of Oral Ar. 38. Cf. Chiarella, -!45 U. S., at 
246, n. 1 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). As we noted in 
Chia1·ella, "[t]he tippee's obligation has been viewed as aris-
ing from his role as a participant after the fact in the insider's 
breach of a fiduciary duty." 445 U. S., at 230, n. 12. 
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Thus, some tippees must assume an insider's duty to the 
shareholders not because they receive inside information, but 
rather because it has been made available to them improp-
erly.19 And for Rule lOt-5 purposes, the insider's disclosure 
is improper only where it would violate his Cady, Roberts 
duty. Thus, a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the share-
holders of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic in-
formation only when the insider has breached his fiduciary 
duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the 
tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has 
been a breach. 20 As Commissioner Smith perceptively ob-
•• The SEC itself has recognized that tippee liability properly is imposed 
only in circumstances where the tippee knows, or has reason to know, that 
the insider has disclosed improperly inside corporate information. In In-
vestors Management Co., supra, the SEC stated that one element of 
tippee liability is that the tippee knew or had reason to know "that [the 
information) was non-public and had been obtained improperly by selective 
revelation or otherwise." 44 S. E. C., at 641 (emphasis added). Commis-
sioner Smith read this test to mean that a tippee can be held liable only if 
he received information in breach of an insider's duty not to disclose it. 
!d., at 650 (concurring in the result). 
c'll Professor Loss has linked tippee liability to the concept in the law of 
restitution that "'( w ]here a fiduciary in violation of his duty to the benefi-
ciary communicates confidential information to a third person, the third 
person, if he had notice of the violation of duty, holds upon a constructive 
trust for the beneficiary any profit which he makes through the use of such 
information.'" 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1451 (2d ed. 1961) (quot-
ing Restatement of Restitution § 201(2) (1937)). Other authorities like-
wise have expressed the view that tippee liability exists only where there 
has been a breach of trust by an insider of which the tippee had knowledge. 
See, e. g., Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (SDNY 1967); A. Jacobs, 
The Impact of Rule 10b-5, § 167, at 7-1 (1975) (''(T)he better view is that a 
tipper must know or have reason to know the information is nonpublic and 
was improperly obtained."); Fleischer. Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial In-
quiry Into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 798, 818. n. 76 ( 1973) ("The extension of rule lOb-5 restrictions to 
tippees of corporate insiders can best be justified on the theory that they 
are participating in the insider's breach of his fiduciary duty."). Cf. Re-
statement (Second) of Agency § 312, comment c (1958) ("A person who. 
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served in Investors Management Co.: "[T]ippee responsibil-
ity must be related back to insider responsibility by a neces-
sary finding that the tippee knew the information was given 
to him in breach of a duty by a person having a special rela-
tionship to the issuer not to disclose the information . . . . " 
44 S. E. C., at 651 (concurring in the result). Tipping thus 
properly is viewed only as a means of indirectly violating the 
Cady, Roberts disclose-or-abstain rule.~ 1 
c 
In determining whether a tippee is under an obligation to 
disclose or abstain, it thus is necessary to determine whether 
with notice that an agent is thereby violating his duty to his principal. re-
ceives confidential information from the agent. may be [deemed] ... a con-
structive trustee."). 
"We do not suggest that knowingly trading on inside information is ever 
"socially desirable or even that it is devoid of moral considerations." 
Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 Va. L. Rev. 1, 55 
(1980). Nor do we imply an absence of responsibility to disclose promptly 
indications of illegal actions by a corporation to the proper authorities-
typically the SEC and exchange authorities in cases involving securities. 
Depending on the circumstances, and even where permitted by law. one's 
trading on material nonpublic information is behavior that may fall below 
ethical standards of conduct. But in a statutory area of the law such as 
securities regulation, where legal principles of general application must be 
applied, there may be "significant distinctions between actual legal obliga-
tions and ethical ideals." SEC, Report of the Special Study of Securities 
Markets, H. R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 237-238 
(1963). The SEC recognizes this. At oral argument, the follo~ing ex-
change took place: 
"QUESTION: So, it would not have satisfied his obligation under the 
law to go to the SEC first? 
"[SEC's counsel]: That is correct. That an insider has to observe ,,·hat 
has come to be known as the abstain or disclosure rule. Either the in-
formation has to be disclosed to the market if it is inside information ... or 
the insider must abstain." Tr. of Oral Arg. 27. 
Thus, it is clear that Rule lOb-5 does not impose any obligation simply to 
tell the SEC about the fraud before trading. 
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the insider's "tip" constituted a breach of the insider's fidu-
ciary duty. All disclosures of confidential corporate informa-
tion are not inconsistent with the duty insiders owe to share-
holders. In contrast to the extraordinary facts of this case, 
the more typical situation in which there will be a question 
whether disclosure violates the insider's Cady, Roberts duty 
is when insiders disclose information to analysts. See n. 16, 
supra. In some situations, the insider will act consistently 
with his fiduciary duty to shareholders, and yet release of the 
information may affect the market. For example, it may not 
be clear-either to the corporate insider or to the recipient 
analyst-whether the information will be viewed as material 
nonpublic information. Corporate officials may mistakenly 
think the information already has been disclosed or that it is 
not material enough to affect the market. Whether disclo-
sure is a breach of duty therefore depends in large part on 
the purpose of the disclosure. This standard was identified 
by the SEC itself in Cady, Roberts: a purpose of the securi-
ties laws was to eliminate "use of inside information for per-
sonal advantage." 40 S. E. C., at 912, n. 15. See n. 10, 
supra. Thus, the test is whether the insider personally will 
benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure. Absent 
some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to 
stockholders. And absent a breach by the insider, there is 
no derivative breach. 22 As Commissioner Smith stated in In-
""An example of a case turning on the court's determination that the dis- I 
closure did not impose any fiduciary duties on the recipient of the inside 
information is Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F. 2d 796 (CA2 1980). 
There, the defendant investment banking firm, representing one of its own 
corporate clients, investigated another corporation that was a possible tar-
get of a takeover bid by its client. In the course of negotiations the invest-
ment banking firm was given, on a confidential basis, unpublished material 
information. Subsequently, after the proposed takeover was abandoned, 
the firm was charged with relying on the information when it traded in the 
target corporation's stock. For purposes of the decision, it was assumed 
that the firm knew the information was confidential, but that it had been 
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vestors Management Co.: "It is important in this type of case 
to focus on policing insiders and \Vhat they do ... rather than 
on policing information per se and its possession .... " 44 
S. E. C., at 648 (concurring in the result). 
The SEC argues that, if inside-trading liability does not 
exist when the information is transmitted for a proper pur-
pose but is used for trading, it would be a rare situation when 
the parties could not fabricate some ostensibly legitimate 
business justification for transmitting the information. We 
think the SEC is unduly concerned. In determining whether 
the insider's purpose in making a particular disclosure is 
fraudulent, the SEC and the courts are not required to read 
the parties' minds. Scienter in some cases is relevant in 
determining whether the tipper has violated his Cady, Rob-
erts duty. u But to determine whether the disclosure itself 
"deceive[s], manipulate[s], or defraud[s]" shareholders, 
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U. S. 680, 686 (1980), the initial inquiry is 
whether there has been a breach of duty by the insider. 
This requires courts to focus on objective criteria, i. e., 
received in arm's-length negotiations. See id., at 798. In the absence of 
any fiduciary relationship, the Court of Appeals found no basis for impos-
ing tippee liability on the investment firm. See id., at 799. 
:!:l Scienter-"a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or 
defraud," Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelde1·, 425 U. S. 185, 193, n. 12 (1976)-is 
an independent element of a Rule lOb-5 violation. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 
U. S. 680, 695 (1980). Contrary to the dissent's suggestion. see post, at p. 
7, n. 10, motivation is not irrelevant to the issue of scienter. It is not 
enough that an insider's conduct results in harm to investors; rather, a vi-
olation may be found only where there is "intentional or willful conduct de-
signed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting 
the price of securities." Emst & Emst v. Hochfelder, supra, at 199. The 
issue in this case, however, is not whether Secrist or Dirks acted with 
scienter, but rather whether there was any deceptive or fraudulent con-
duct at all, i. e., whether Secrist's disclosure constituted a breach of his 
fiduciary duty and thereby caused injury to shareholders. See n. 27, 
ir({'ra. Only if there was such a breach did Dirks, a tippee, acquire a _fidu-
ciary duty to disclose or abstain. 
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whether the insider receives a direct or indirect personal 
benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a 
reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings. 
Cf. 40 S. E. C., at 912, n. 15; Brudney, Inside1·s, Outsiders, 
and Infor-mational Advantages Under the Federal Securities 
Laws, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 324, 348 (1979) ("The theory ... is 
that the insider, by giving the information out selectively, is 
in effect selling the information to its recipient for cash, re-
ciprocal information, or other things of value for him-
self .... "). There are objective facts and circumstances 
that often justify such an inference. For example, there 
may be a relationship between the insider and the recipient 
that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention 
to benefit the particular recipient. The elements of fiduciary 
duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist 
when an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a 
trading relative or friend. The tip and trade resemble trad-
ing by the insider himself followed by a gift of the profits to 
the recipient. 
Determining whether an insider personally benefits from a 
particular disclosure, a question of fact, will not always be 
easy for courts. But it is essential, we think, to have a guid-
ing principle for those whose daily activities must be limited 
and instructed by the SEC's inside-trading rules, and we be-
lieve that there must be a breach of the insider's fiduciary 
duty before the. tippee inherits the duty to disclose or ab-
stain. In contrast, the rule adopted by the SEC in this case 
would have no limiting principle. 2'1 
"Without legal limitations, market participants are forced to rely on the 
reasonableness of the SEC's litigation strategy, but that can be hazardous, 
as the facts of this case make plain. Following the SEC's filing of the 
Texas Gulf Sulphur action, Commi~sioner (and later Chairman) Budge 
spoke of the various implications of applying Rule lOb-5 in inside-trading 
cases: 
"Turning to the realm of possible defendants in the present and potential 
civil actions. the Commission certainly does not contemplate suing every 
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IV 
Under the inside-trading and tipping rules set forth above, 
we find that there was no actionable violation by Dirks. ~5 It I 
is undisputed that Dirks himself was a stranger to Equity 
Funding, with no pre-existing fiduciary duty to its share-
holders. ~6 He took no action, directly or indirectly, that in- I 
duced the shareholders or officers of Equity Funding to re-
pose trust or confidence in him. There was no expectation 
by Dirk's sources that he would keep their information in con-
fidence. Nor did Dirks misappropriate or illegally obtain 
the information about Equity Funding. Unless the insiders 
person who may have come across inside information. In the Texas Gulf 
action neither tippees nor persons in the vast rank and file of employees 
have been named as defendants. In my view, the Commission in future 
cases normally should not join rank and file employees or persons outside 
the company such as an analyst or reporter who learns of inside informa-
tion." Speech of Hamer Budge to the New York Regional Group of the 
American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc. (Nov. 18, 1965) (emphasis 
added), reprinted in Budge, The Texas Gulf Sulphur Case-What It Is and 
What It Isn't, Corp. Secretary No. 127, at 6 (Dec. 17, 1965). 
2.1 Dirks contends that he was not a "tippee" because the information he 
received constituted unverified allegations of fraud that were denied by 
management and were not "material facts" under the securities laws that 
required disclosure before trading. He also argues that the information 
he received was not truly "inside" information. i. e., intended for a con-
fidential corporate purpose, but was merely evidence of a crime. The So-
licitor General agrees. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22. 
We need not decide·. however, whether the information constituted "mate-
rial facts," or whether information concerning corporate crime is properly 
characterized as "inside information." For purposes of deciding this case, 
we assume the correctness of the SEC's findings, accepted by the CoUlt of 
Appeals, that petitioner was a tippee of material inside information. 
'~ Judge Wright found that Dirks acquired a fiduciary duty by virtue of 
his position as an employee of a broker-dealer. See 220 U. S. App. D. C., 
at 325-327, 681 F. 2d, at 840-842. The SEC. however, did not consider 
Judge Wright's novel theory in its decision. nor did it present that theory 
to the Court of Appeals. The SEC also has not argued Judge Wright's 
theory in this Court. See Brief for Respondent 21. n. 27. The merits of 
such a duty are therefore not before the Court. See SEC v. Che11e1·y 
Co1p., 332 U. S. 194, 19&-197 (1947). 
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breached their Cady, Roberts duty to shareholders in disclos-
ing the nonpublic information to Dirks, he breached no duty 
when he passed it on to investors as well as to the Wall Street 
Journal. 
It is clear that neither Secrist nor the other Equity Fund-
ing employees violated their Cady, Roberts duty to the cor-
poration's shareholders by providing information to Dirks.:1• 
" In this Court, the SEC appears to contend that an insider invariably 
violates a fiduciary duty to the corporation's shareholders by transmitting 
nonpublic corporate information to an outsider when he has reason to be-
lieve that the outsider may use it to the disadvantage of the shareholders. 
"Thus, regardless of any ultimate motive to bring to public attention the 
derelictions at Equity Funding, Secrist breached his duty to Equity Fund-
ing shareholders." Brief for Respondent 31. This perceived "duty" dif-
fers markedly from the one that the SEC identified in Cady, Roberts and 
that has been the basis for federal tippee-trading rules to date. In fact, 
the SEC did not charge Secrist with any wrongdoing, and we do not under-
stand the SEC to have relied on any theory of a breach of duty by Secrist in 
finding that Dirks breached his duty to Equity Funding's shareholders. 
See App. 250 (decision of administrative law judge) ("One who knows him-
self to be a beneficiary of non-public, selectively disclosed inside informa-
tion must fully disclose or refrain from trading."); SEC's Reply to Notice of 
Supplemental Authority before the SEC 4 ("If Secrist was acting properly, 
Dirks inherited a duty to [Equity Funding]'s shareholders to refrain from 
improper private use of the information."); Brief on behalf of the SEC in 
the Court of Appeals, at 47-50; id., at 51 ("[K]nowing possession of inside 
information by any person imposes a duty to abstain or disclose."); id., at 
52-54; id., at 55 ("(T]his obligation arises not from the manner in which 
such information is acquired .... "); 220 U. S. App. D. C., at 322-323, 681 
F. 2d, at 838 (Wright, J.). 
The dissent argues that "Secrist violated his duty to Equity Funding 
shareholders by transmitting material nonpublic information to Dirks with 
the intention that Dirks would cause his clients to trade on that informa-
tion." Post, at 12. By perceiving a breach of fiduciary duty whenever 
inside information is intentionally disclosed to securities traders. the dis-
senting opinion effectively would achieve the same result as the SEC's the-
ory below, i. e., mere possession of inside information while trading \\'Ould 
be viewed as a Rule lOb--5 violation. But Chiarella made it explicitly clear 
there is no general duty to forgo market transactions "based on material, 
nonpublic information." 455 U. S., at 233. Such a duty would "depar[t] 
radically from the established doctrine that duty arises from a specific rela-
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The tippers received no monetary or personal benefit for re-
vealing Equity Funding's secrets, nor was their purpose to 
make a gift of valuable information to Dirks. As the facts of 
this case clearly indicate, the tippers were motivated by a de-
sire to expose the fraud. See supra, at 1-2. In the absence 
of a breach of duty to shareholders by the insiders, there was 
no derivative breach by Dirks. See n. )!!!, supra. Dirks 
therefore could not have been "a participant after the fact in 
[an] insider's breach of a fiduciary duty." Chiarella, 445 
U. S., at 230, n. 12. 
v 
We conclude that Dirks, in the circumstances of this case, 
tionship bet\\·een two parties.'' Ibid. See p. 7. s11pra. 
Moreo,·er, to constitute a violation of Rule lOb-5, there must be fraud. 
See Er·nst & Ernst v. Hochfelder. 425 U. S. 185, 199 (1976) (statutory 
words "manipulati\'e," "device,·· and ·•contrivance ... connot[e I intentional 
or willful conduct designed to deceiL'e or defraud investors by controlling or 
artificially affecting the price of securities") (emphasis added). There is no 
evidence that Secrist's disclosure was intended to or did in fact "decei\'e or 
defraud" anyone. Secrist certainly intended to convey relevant informa-
tion that management was unlawfully concealing, and-so far as the record 
shows-he believed that persuading Dirks to investigate was the best way 
to disclose the fraud. Other efforts had pro\'ed fruitless. Under any ob-
jecti\·e standard, Secrist received no direct or indirect personal benefit 
from the disclosure. 
The dissenting opinion focuses on shareholder "losses." ''injury," and 
"damages.·· but as the court noted in Fridrich \'. Bmd(ord. 5-12 F. 2d 307, 
318 (CA6 1976), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1053 (1977). there is no clear causal 
connection between inside trading and outsiders' losses: ''Investors must 
be prepared to accept the risk of trading in an open market without com-
plete or always accurate information." In one sense. as market values 
fluctuate and investors act on inevitably incomplete or incorrect informa-
tion. there always are winners and loset·s: but those ,,·ho have "lost" ha,·e 
not necessarily been defrauded. On the other hand. inside trading for per-
sonal gain is fraudulent, and is a violation of the federal securities laws. 
See Dooley. Sllpm, at 39-H. 70. Thus. there is little legal significance to 
the dissent 's argument that Secrist and Dirks created new "\'ictims" by dis-
closing the information to persons who traded. In fact, they prevented 
the fraud from continuing and victimizing many more investot·s. 
82-276---0PINION 
DIRKS u. SEC 21 
had no duty to abstain from use of the inside information that 
he obtained. The judgment of the Court of Appeals there-
fore is 
Reversed. 
JUN 2 7 19aJ, 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Petitioner Raymond Dirks received material nonpublic in-
formation from "insiders" of a corporation with which he had 
no connection. He disclosed this information to investors 
who relied on it in trading in the shares of the corporation. 
The question is whether Dirks violated the antifraud provi-
sions of the federal securities laws by this disclosure. 
I 
In 1973, Dirks was an officer of a New York broker-dealer 
firm who specialized in providing investment analysis of in-
surance company securities to institutional investors. 1 On 
March 6, Dirks received information from Ronald Secrist, a 
former officer of Equity Funding of America. Secrist al-
leged that the assets of Equity Funding, a diversified cor-
poration primarily engaged in selling life insurance and mu-
tual funds, were vastly overstated as the result of fraudulent 
corporate practices. · Secrist also stated that various regula-
1 The facts stated here are taken from more detailed statements set forth 
by the administrative law judge, App. 176-180, 225-247; the opinion of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 21 S. E. C. Docket 1401 , 1402-1406 
(1981); and the opinion of Judge Wright in the Court of Appeals, 220 U. S. 
App. D. C. 309, 314-318, 681 F. 2d 824, 829--833 (1982). 
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tory agencies had failed to act on similar charges made by 
Equity Funding employees. He urged Dirks to verify the 
fraud and disclose it publicly. 
Dirks decided to investigate the allegations. He visited 
Equity Funding's headquarters in Los Angeles and inter-
viewed several officers and employees of the corporation. 
The senior management denied any wrongdoing, but certain 
corporation employees corroborated the charges of fraud. 
Neither Dirks nor his firm owned or traded any Equity 
Funding stock, but throughout his investigation he openly 
discussed the information he had obtained with a number of 
clients and investors. Some of these persons sold their hold-
ings of Equity Funding securities, including five investment 
advisers who liquidated holdings of more than $16 million. 2 
While Dirks was in Los Angeles, he was in touch regularly 
with William Blundell, the Wall Street Journal's Los Angeles 
bureau chief. Dirks urged Blundell to write a story on the 
fraud allegations. Blundell did not believe, however, that 
such a massive fraud could go undetected and declined to 
write the story. He feared that publishing such damaging 
hearsay might be libelous. 
During the two-week period in which Dirks pursued his in-
vestigation and spread word of Secrist's charges, the price of 
Equity Funding stock fell from $26 per share to less than $15 
per share. This led the New York Stock Exchange to halt 
trading on March 27. Shortly thereafter California insur-
' Dirks received from his firm a salary plus a commission for securities 
transactions above a certain amount that his clients directed through his 
firm. See 21 S. E. C. Docket, at 1402, n. 3. But "(i]t is not clear how 
many of those with whom Dirks spoke promised to direct some brokerage 
business through [Dirks' firm] to compensate Dirks, or how many actually 
did so." 220 U. S. App. D. C., at 316, 681 F. 2d, at 831. The Boston 
Company Institutional Investors , Inc., promised Dirks about $25,000 in 
commissions, but it is unclear whether Boston actually generated any bro-
kerage business for his firm. See App. 199, 204-205; 21 S. E. C. Docket, 
at 1404, n. 10; 220 U. S. App. D. C., at 316, n. 5, 681 F. 2d, at 831, n. 5. 
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ance authorities impounded Equity Funding's records and 
uncovered evidence of the fraud. Only then did the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) file a complaint against 
Equity Funding 3 and only then, on April 2, did the Wall 
Street Journal publish a front-page story based largely on in-
formation assembled by Dirks. Equity Funding immedi-
ately went into receivership. 4 
The SEC began an investigation into Dirks' role in the ex-
posure of the fraud. After a hearing by an administrative 
law judge, the SEC found that Dirks had aided and abetted 
violations of§ 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 77q(a), 5 § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S. C. §78j(b),6 and SEC Rule 10h-5, 17 CFR §240.10h-5 
3 As early as 1971, the SEC had received allegations of fraudulent ac-
counting practices at Equity Funding. Moreover, on March 9, 1973, an 
official of the California Insurance Department informed the SEC's re-
gional office in Los Angeles of Secrist's charges of fraud. Dirks himself 
voluntarily presented his information at the SEC's regional office begin-
ning on March 27. 
'A federal grand jury in Los Angeles ubsequently returned a 105-
count indictment against 22 persons, including many of Equity Funding's 
officers and directors. All defendants were found guilty of one or more 
counts, either by a plea of guilty or a conviction after trial. See Brief for 
Petitioner 15; App. 149-153. 
5 Section 17(a) provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities 
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication 
in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
"(!) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or 
"(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a 
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which 
they were made, not misleading, or 
"(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of busine s which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser." 
6 Section 10(b) provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any_ person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of 
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(1982), 7 by repeating the allegations of fraud to members of 
the investment community who later sold their Equity Fund-
ing stock. The SEC concluded: "Where 'tippees'-regard-
less of their motivation or occupation-come into possession 
of material 'information that they know is confidential and 
know or should know came from a corporate insider,' they 
must either publicly disclose that information or refrain from 
trading." 21 S. E. C. Docket 1401, 1407 (1981) (footnote 
omitted) (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U. S. 222, 
230 n. 12 (1980)). Recognizing, however, that Dirks "played 
an important role in bringing [Equity Funding's] massive 
fraud to light," 21 S. E. C. Docket, at 1412,H the SEC only 
censured him. 9 
any facility of any national ecurities exchange-
"(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
curity registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so 
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors." 
7 Rule lOb-5 provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of 
any facility of any national securities exchange, 
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
"(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state 
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security." 
' JUSTICE BLACKMON's dissenting opinion minimizes the role Dirks 
played in making public the Equity Funding fraud. See post, at 3 and 11, 
n. 15. The dissent would rewrite the history of Dirks' extensive investiga-
tive efforts. See, e. g., 21 S. E. C., at 1412 ("It is clear that Dirks played 
an important role in bringing [Equity Funding's] massive fraud to light, 
and it is also true that he reported the fraud allegation to [Equity 
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Dirks sought review in the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit. The court entered judgment 
against Dirks "for the reasons stated by the Commission in 
its opinion." App. to Pet. for Cert. C-2. Judge Wright, a 
member of the panel, subsequently issued an opinion. Judge 
Robb concurred in the result and Judge Tamm dissented; nei-
ther filed a separate opinion. Judge Wright believed that 
"the obligations of corporate fiduciaries pass to all those to 
whom they disclose their information before it has been dis-
seminated to the public at large." 220 U. S. App. D. C. 309, 
324, 681 F. 2d 824, 839 (1982). Alternatively, Judge Wright 
concluded that, as an employee of a broker-dealer, Dirks had 
violated "obligations to the SEC and to the public completely 
independent of any obligations he acquired" as a result of re-
ceiving the information. !d., at 325, 681 F. 2d, at 840. 
In view of the importance to the SEC and to the securities 
industry of the question presented by this case, we granted a 
writ of certiorari. -- U. S. -- (1982). We now reverse. 
II 
In the seminal case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 
S. E. C. 907 (1961), the SEC recognized that the common law 
in some jurisdictions imposes on "corporate 'insiders,' par-
ticularly officers, directors, or controlling stockholders" an 
"affirmative duty of disclosure ... when dealing in securi-
ties." I d., at 911, and n. 13. 10 The SEC found that not only 
Funding's] auditors and sought to have the information published in the 
Wall Street Journal."); 681 F. 2d, at 829 (Wright, J.) ("Largely thanks to 
Dirks one of the most infamous frauds in recent memory was uncovered 
and exposed, while the record shows that the SEC repeatedly missed 
opportunities to investigate Equity Funding."). 
9 Section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78o(b)(4)(E), 
provides that the SEC may impose certain sanctions, including censure, on 
any person associated with a registered broker-dealer who has "willfully 
aided [or] abetted" any violation of the federal securities laws. See 15 
U. S. C. § 78ff(a) (providing criminal penalties). 
10 The duty that insiders owe to the corporation's shareholders not to 
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did breach of this common-law duty also establish the ele-
ments of a Rule lOb-5 violation, 11 but that individuals other 
than corporate insiders could be obligated either to disclose 
material nonpublic information 12 before trading or to abstain 
from trading altogether. I d., at 912. In Chiarella, we ac-
cepted the two elements set out in Cady Roberts for estab-
lishing a Rule lOb-5 violation: "(i) the existence of a relation-
ship affording access to inside information intended to be 
available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness 
of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that in-
formation by trading without disclosure." 445 U. S., at 227. 
In examining whether Chiarella had an obligation to disclose 
or abstain, the Court found that there is no general duty to 
disclose before trading on material nonpublic information, 13 
trade on inside information differs from the common-law duty that officers 
and directors also have to the corporation itself not to mismanage corpo-
rate assets, of which confidential information is one. See 3 Fletcher 
Cyclopedia of the Laws of Private Corporations §§ 848, 900 (1975 ed. and 
Supp. 1982); 3A Fletcher §§ 1168.1, 1168.2. In holding that breaches of 
this duty to shareholders violated the Securities Exchange Act, the Cady, 
Roberts Commission recognized, and we agree, that "[a] significant pur-
pose of the Exchange Act was to eliminate the idea that use of inside in-
formation for personal advantage was a normal emolument of corporate of-
fice." See 40 S. E. C., at 912, n. 15. 
11 Rule 10b-5 is generally the most inclusive of the three provisions on 
which the SEC rested its decision in this case, and we will refer to it when 
we note the statutory basis for the SEC's inside-trading rules. 
12 The SEC views the disclosure duty as requiring more than disclosure 
to purchasers or sellers: "Proper and adequate disclosure of significant cor-
porate developments can only be effected by a public release through the 
appropriate public media, designed to achieve a broad dissemination to the 
investing public generally and without favoring any special person or 
group." In re Faberge, Inc., 45 S. E. C. 249, 256 (1973). 
13 See 445 U.S., at 233; id., at 237 (STEVENS, J., concurring); id., at 
238--239 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment); id., at 239-240 (BUR-
GER, C. J., dissenting). Cf. id., at 252, n. 2 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) 
(recognizing that there is no obligation to disclose material nonpu,blic in-
formation obtained through the exercise of "diligence or acumen" and "hon-
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and held that "a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise 
from the mere possession of non public market information." 
I d., at 235. Such a duty arises rather from the existence of a 
fiduciary relationship. See id., at 227-235. 
Not "all breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a se-
curities transaction," however, come within the ambit of Rule 
10b-5. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462, 
472 (1977). There must also be "manipulation or deception." 
I d., at 473. In an inside-trading case this fraud derives from 
the "inherent unfairness involved where one takes advan-
tage" of "information intended to be available only for a cor-
porate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone." 
In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 
S. E. C. 933, 936 (1968). Thus, an insider will be liable 
under Rule 10b-5 for inside trading only where he fails to dis-
close material nonpublic information before trading on it and 
thus makes "secret profits." Cady, Roberts, 40 S. E. C., at 
916, n. 31. 
III 
We were explicit in Chiarella in saying that there can be 
no duty to disclose where the person who has traded on inside 
information "was not [the corporation's] agent, ... was not 
a fiduciary, [or] was not a person in whom the sellers [of 
the securities] had placed their trust and confidence." 445 
U. S., at 232. Not to require such a fiduciary relationship, 
we recognized, would "depar[t] radically from the established 
doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship between 
two parties" and would amount to "recognizing a general 
duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo 
actions based on material, non public information." I d., at 
232, 233. This requirement of a specific relationship be-
tween the shareholders and the individual trading on inside 
information has created analytical difficulties for the SEC 
est means," as opposed to "stealth"). 
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and courts in policing tippees who trade on inside informa-
tion. Unlike insiders who have independent fiduciary duties 
to both the corporation and its shareholders, the typical 
tippee has no such relationships. 1~ In view of this absence, it 
has been unclear how a tippee acquires the Cady, Roberts 
duty to refrain from trading on inside information. 
A 
The SEC's position, as stated in its opinion in this case, is 
that a tippee "inherits" the Cady, Roberts obligation to 
shareholders whenever he receives inside information from 
an insider: 
"In tipping potential traders, Dirks breached a duty 
which he had assumed as a result of knowingly receiving 
confidential information from [Equity Funding] insiders. 
Tippees such as Dirks who receive non-public material 
information from insiders become 'subject to the same 
duty as [the] insiders.' Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, 
"Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is 
revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant 
working for the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the 
shareholders. The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply 
that such persons acquired nonpublic corporate information, but rather 
that they have entered into a special confidential relationship in the con-
duct of the business of the enterprise and are given access to information 
solely for corporate purposes. See SEC v. Monarch Fund, 608 F. 2d 938, 
942 (CA2 1979); In re Investors Management Co., 44 S. E. C. 633, 645 
(1971); In re Van Alystne, Noel & Co., 43 S. E. C. 1080, 1084-1085 (1969); 
In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S. E. C. 933, 937 
(1968); Cady, Roberts, 40 S. E. C., at 912. When such a person breaches 
his fiduciary relationship, he may be treated more properly as a tipper than 
a tippee. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner· & Smith, Inc., 
495 F. 2d 228, 237 (CA2 1974) (investment banker had access to material 
information when working on a proposed public offering for the corpora-
tion). For such a duty to be imposed, however, the corporation must ex-
pect the outsider to keep the disclosed nonpublic information confidential, 
and the relationship at least must imply such a duty. 
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Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. [495 F. 2d 228, 237 (CA2 
1974) (quoting Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 
(SDNY 1967))]. Such a tippee breaches the fiduciary 
duty which he assumes from the insider when the tippee 
knowingly transmits the information to someone who 
will probably trade on the basis thereof. . . . Presum-
ably, Dirks' informants were entitled to disclose the 
[Equity Funding] fraud in order to bring it to light and 
its perpetrators to justice. However, Dirks-standing 
in their shoes-committed a breach of the fiduciary duty 
which he had assumed in dealing with them, when he 
passed the information on to traders." 21 S. E. C. 
Docket, at 1410, n. 42. 
This view differs little from the view that we rejected as 
inconsistent with congressional intent in Chiarella. In that 
case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the SEC and affirmed 
Chiarella's conviction, holding that" '[a]nyone-corporate in-
sider or not-who regularly receives material nonpublic in-
formation may not use that information to trade in securities 
without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose.'" United 
States v. Chiarella, 588 F. 2d 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978) (empha-
sis in original). Here, the SEC maintains that anyone who 
knowingly receives nonpublic material information from an 
insider has a fiduciary duty to disclose before trading. 15 
15 Apparently, the SEC believes this case differs from Chiarella in that 
Dirks' receipt of inside information from Secrist, an insider, carried 
Secrist's duties with it, while Chiarella received the information without 
the direct involvement of an insider and thus inherited no duty to disclose 
or abstain. The SEC fails to explain, however, why the receipt ofnonpub-
lic information from an insider automatically carries with it the fiduciary 
duty of the insider. As we emphasized in Chiarella, mere possession of 
nonpublic information does not give rise to a duty to disclose or abstain; 
only a specific relationship does that. And we do not believe that the mere 
receipt of information from an insider creates such a special relationship 
between the tippee and the corporation's shareholders. 
Apparently recognizing the weakness of its argument in light of Chia-
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In effect, the SEC's theory of tippee liability in both cases 
appears rooted in the idea that the antifraud provisions re-
quire equal information among all traders. This conflicts 
with the principle set forth in Chiarella that only some per-
sons, under some circumstances, will be barred from trading 
while in possession of material non public information. 16 
Judge Wright correctly read our opinion in Chiarella as re-
pudiating any notion that all traders must enjoy equal in-
formation before trading: "[T]he 'information' theory is re-
jected. Because the disclose-or-refrain duty is extraordi-
nary, it attaches only when a party has legal obligations other 
than a mere duty to comply with the general antifraud pro-
scriptions in the federal securities laws." 220 U. S. App. D. 
C., at 322, 681 F. 2d, at 837. See Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 
235, n. 20. We reaffirm today that "[a] duty [to disclose] 
arises from the relationship between parties . . . and not 
merely from one's ability to acquire information because of 
his position in the market." 445 U. S., at 232-233, n. 14. 
rella, the SEC attempts to distinguish that case factually as involving not 
"inside" information, but rather "market" information, i. e., "information 
generated within the company relating to its assets or earnings." Brief 
for Respondent 23. This Court drew no such distinction in Chiarella and, 
as THE CHIEF JUSTICE noted, "[i]t is clear that § lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 by 
their terms and by their history make no such distinction." 445 U. S., at 
241, n. 1 (dissenting opinion). See ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1603, Comment 
(2)(j) (Proposed Official Draft 1978). 
'"In Chiarella, we noted that formulation of an absolute equal informa-
tion rule "should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of con-
gressional intent." 445 U. S., at 233. Rather than adopting such a radi-
cal view of securities trading, Congress has expressly exempted many 
market professionals from the general statutory prohibition set forth in 
§ ll(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. * 78k(a)(1), against 
members of a national securities exchange trading for their own account. 
See id., at 233, n. 16. We observed in Chiar·ella that "[t]he exception is 
based upon Congress' recognition that [market professionals] contribute to 
a fair and orderly marketplace at the same time they exploit the informa-
tional advantage that comes from their possession of [nonpublic informa-
tion]." I bid. 
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Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a 
son knowingly receives material nonpublic information from 
an insider and trades on it could have an inhibiting influence 
on the role of market analysts, which the SEC itself recog-
nizes is necessary to the preservation of a healthy market. 17 
It is commonplace for analysts to "ferret out and analyze in-
formation," 21 S. E. C., at 1406/8 and this often is done by 
meeting with and questioning corporate officers and others 
who are insiders. And information that the analysts obtain 
normally may be the basis for judgments as to the market 
" The SEC expressly recognized that "[t]he value to the entire market of 
[analysts'] efforts cannot be gainsaid; market efficiency in pricing is signifi-
cantly enhanced by [their] initiatives to ferret out and analyze information, 
and thus the analyst's work redounds to the benefit of all investors." 21 
S. E. C., at 1406. The SEC asserts that analysts remain free to obtain 
from management corporate information for purposes of "filling in the 'in-
terstices in analysis' .... " Brief for Respondent 42 (quoting Investors 
Management Co., 44 S. E. C., at 646). But this rule is inherently impre-
cise, and imprecision prevents parties from ordering their actions in accord 
with legal requirements. Unless the parties have some guidance as to 
where the line is between permissible and impermissible disclosures and 
uses, neither corporate insiders nor analysts can be sure when the line is 
crossed. Cf. Adler v. Klawans, 267 F. 2d 840, 845 (CA2 1959) (Burger, J., 
sitting by designation). 
1
' On its facts, this case is the unusual one. Dirks is an analyst in a bro-
ker-dealer firm, and he did interview management in the course of his in-
vestigation. He uncovered, however, startling information that required 
no analysis or exercise of judgment as to its market relevance. Nonethe-
less, the principle at issue here extends beyond these facts. The SEC's 
rule-applicable without regard to any breach by an insider-could have 
serious ramifications on reporting by analysts of investment views. 
Despite the unusualness of Dirks' "find," the central role that he played 
in uncovering the fraud at Equity Funding, and that analysts in general 
can play in revealing information that corporations may have reason to 
withhold from the public , is an important one. Dirks' careful investigation 
brought to light a massive fraud at the corporation. And until the Equity 
Funding fraud was exposed, the information in the trading market was 
grossly inaccurate. But for Dirks' efforts, the fraud might well have gone 
undetected longer. See. n. 8, supra. · 
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worth of a corporation's securities. The analyst's judgment 
in this respect is made available in market letters or other-
wise to clients of the firm. It is the nature of this type of 
information, and indeed of the markets themselves, that such 
information cannot be made simultaneously available to all of 
the corporation's stockholders or the public generally. 
B 
The conclusion that recipients of inside information do not 
invariably acquire a duty to disclose or abstain does not mean 
that such tippees always are free to trade on the information. 
The need for a ban on some tippee trading is clear. Not only 
are insiders forbidden by their fiduciary relationship from 
personally using undisclosed corporate information to their 
advantage, but they may not give such information to an out-
sider for the same improper purpose of exploiting the in-
formation for their personal gain. See 15 U. S. C. § 78t(b) 
(making it unlawful to do indirectly "by means of any other 
person" any act made unlawful by the federal securities 
laws). Similarly, the transactions of those who knowingly 
participate with the fiduciary in such a breach are "as forbid-
den" as transactions "on behalf of the trustee himself." 
Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U. S. 267, 272 (1951). See Jackson 
v. Smith, 254 U. S. 586, 589 (1921); Jackson v. Ludeling, 88 
U. S. 616, 631-632 (1874). As the Court explained in 
Mosser, a contrary rule "would open up opportunities for de-
vious dealings in the name of the others that the trustee could 
not conduct in his own." 341 U. S., at 271. See SEC v. 
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F. 2d 1301, 1308 (CA2), cert. 
denied, 404 U. S. 1005 (1971). Thus, the tippee's duty to 
disclose or abstain is derivative from that of the insider's 
duty. See Tr. of Oral Ar. 38. Cf. Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 
246, n. 1 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). As we noted in 
Chiarella, "[t]he tippee's obligation has been viewed as aris-
ing from his role as a participant after the fact in the insider's 
breach of a fiduciary duty." 445 U. S., at 230, n. 12. 
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Thus, some tippees must assume an insider's duty to the 
shareholders not because they receive inside information, but 
rather because it has been made available to them improp-
erly.19 And for Rule lOb-5 purposes, the insider's disclosure 
is improper only where it would violate his Cady, Roberts 
duty. Thus, a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the share-
holders of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic in-
formation only when the insider has breached his fiduciary 
duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the 
tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has 
been a breach. 20 As Commissioner Smith perceptively ob-
19 The SEC itself has recognized that tippee liability properly is imposed 
only in circumstances where the tippee knows, or has reason to know, that 
the insider has disclosed improperly inside corporate information. In In-
vestors Management Co ., supra, the SEC stated that one element of 
tippee liability is that the tippee knew or had reason to know "that [the 
information] was non-public and had been obtained improperly by selective 
revelation or otherwise." 44 S. E. C., at 641 (emphasis added). Commis-
sioner Smith read this test to mean that a tippee can be held liable only if 
he received information in breach of an insider's duty not to disclose it. 
/d ., at 650 (concurring in the result). 
'"' Professor Loss has linked tippee liability to the concept in the law of 
restitution that" '[w]here a fiduciary in violation of his duty to the benefi-
ciary communicates confidential information to a third person, the third 
person, if he had notice of the violation of duty, holds upon a constructive 
trust for the beneficiary any profit which he makes through the use of such 
information.'" 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1451 (2d ed. 1961) (quot-
ing Restatement of Restitution § 201(2) (1937)). Other authorities like-
wise have expressed the view that tippee liability exists only where there 
has been a breach of trust by an insider of which the tippee had knowledge. 
See, e. g. , Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (SDNY 1967); A. Jacobs, 
The Impact of Rule 10b-5, § 167, at 7-4 (1975) ("[T]he better view is that a 
tipper must know or have reason to know the information is nonpublic and 
was improperly obtained."); Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial In-
quiry Into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 798, 818, n. 76 (1973) ("The extension of rule lOb-5 restrictions to 
tippees of corporate insiders can best be justified on the theory that they 
are participating in the insider's breach of his fidudary duty."). Cf. Re-
statement (Second) of Agency § 312, comment c (1958) ("A person who, 
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served in Investors Management Co.: "[T]ippee responsibil-
ity must be related back to insider responsibility by a neces-
sary finding that the tippee knew the information was given 
to him in breach of a duty by a person having a special rela-
tionship to the issuer not to disclose the information .... " 
44 S. E. C., at 651 (concurring in the result). Tipping thus 
properly is viewed only as a means of indirectly violating the 
Cady, Roberts disclose-or-abstain rule. 21 
c 
In determining whether a tippee is under an obligation to 
disclose or abstain, it thus is necessary to determine whether 
with notice that an agent is thereby violating his duty to his principal, re-
ceives confidential information from the agent, may be [deemed] ... a con-
structive trustee."). 
2
' We do not suggest that knowingly trading on inside information is ever 
"socially desirable or even that it is devoid of moral considerations." 
Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 Va. L. Rev. 1, 55 
(1980). Nor do we imply an absence of responsibility to disclose promptly 
indications of illegal actions by a corporation to the proper authorities-
typically the SEC and exchange authorities in cases involving securities. 
Depending on the circumstances, and even where permitted by law, one's 
trading on material nonpublic information is behavior that may fall below 
ethical standards of conduct. But in a statutory area of the law such as 
securities regulation, where legal principles of general application must be 
applied, there may be "significant distinctions between actual legal obliga-
tions and ethical ideals." SEC, Report of the Special Study of Securities 
Markets, H. R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 237-238 
(1963). The SEC recognizes this. At oral argument, the following ex-
change took place: 
"QUESTION: So, it would not have satisfied his obligation under the 
law to go to the SEC first? 
"[SEC's counsel]: That is correct. That an insider has to observe what 
has come to be known as the abstain or disclosure rule. Either the in-
formation has to be disclosed to the market if it is inside information ... or 
the insider must abstain." Tr. of Oral Arg. 27. 
Thus, it is clear that Rule 101>--5 does not impose any obligation simply to 
tell the SEC about the fraud before trading. 
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the insider's "tip" constituted a breach of the insider's fidu-
ciary duty. All disclosures of confidential corporate informa-
tion are not inconsistent with the duty insiders owe to share-
holders. In contrast to the extraordinary facts of this case, 
the more typical situation in which there will be a question 
whether disclosure violates the insider's Cady, Roberts duty 
is when insiders disclose information to analysts. See n. 16, 
supra. In some situations, the insider will act consistently 
with his fiduciary duty to shareholders, and yet release of the 
information may affect the market. For example, it may not 
be clear-either to the corporate insider or to the recipient 
analyst-whether the information will be viewed as material 
nonpublic information. Corporate officials may mistakenly 
think the information already has been disclosed or that it is 
not material enough to affect the market. Whether disclo-
sure is a breach of duty therefore depends in large part on 
the purpose of the disclosure. This standard was identified 
by the SEC itself in Cady, Roberts: a purpose of the securi-
ties laws was to eliminate "use of inside information for per-
sonal advantage." 40 S. E. C., at 912, n. 15. See n. 10, 
supra. Thus, the test is whether the insider personally will 
benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure. Absent 
some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to 
stockholders. And absent a breach by the insider, there is 
no derivative breach. 22 As Commissioner Smith stated in In-
22 An example of a case turning on the court's determination that the dis-
closure did not impose any fiduciary duties on the recipient of the inside 
information is Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F. 2d 796 (CA2 1980). 
There, the defendant investment banking firm, representing one of its own 
corporate clients, investigated another corporation that was a possible tar-
get of a takeover bid by its client. In the course of negotiations the invest-
ment banking firm was given, on a confidential basis, unpublished material 
information. Subsequently, after the proposed takeover was abandoned, 
the firm was charged with relying on the information when it traded in the 
target corporation's stock. For purposes of the decision, it was assumed 
that the firm knew the information was confidential, but that it had been 
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vestors Management Co.: "It is important in this type of case 
to focus on policing insiders and what they do ... rather than 
on policing information per se and its possession .... " 44 
S. E. C., at 648 (concurring in the result). 
The SEC argues that, if inside-trading liability does not 
exist when the information is transmitted for a proper pur-
pose but is used for trading, it would be a rare situation when 
the parties could not fabricate some ostensibly legitimate 
business justification for transmitting the information. We 
think the SEC is unduly concerned. In determining whether 
the insider's purpose in making a particular disclosure is 
fraudulent, the SEC and the courts are not required to read 
the parties' minds. Scienter in some cases is relevant in 
determining whether the tipper has violated his Cady, Rob-
erts duty. 23 But to determine whether the disclosure itself 
"deceive[s], manipulate[s], or defraud[s]" shareholders, 
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U. S. 680, 686 (1980), the initial inquiry is 
whether there has been a breach of duty by the insider. 
This requires courts to focus on objective criteria, i. e., 
received in arm's-length negotiations. See id., at 798. In the absence of 
any fiduciary relationship, the Court of Appeals found no basis for impos-
ing tippee liability on the investment firm. See id., at 799. 
23 Scienter-"a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or 
defraud," Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 193, n. 12 (1976)-is 
an independent element of a Rule 10b-5 violation. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 
U. S. 680, 695 (1980). Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, see post , at p. 
7, n. 10, motivation is not irrelevant to the issue of scienter. It is not 
enough that an insider's conduct results in harm to investors; rather, a vi-
olation may be found only where there is "intentional or willful conduct de-
signed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting 
the price of securities." Ernst & Ernst v. H ochfelder, supra, at 199. The 
issue in this case, however, is not whether Secrist or Dirks acted with 
scienter, but rather whether there was any deceptive or fraudulent con-
duct at all, i. e., whether Secrist's disclosure constituted a breach of his 
fiduciary duty and thereby caused injury to shareholders. See n. 27, 
infra. Only if there was such a breach did Dirks, a tippee, acquire a fidu-
ciary duty to disclose or abstain. 
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whether the insider receives a direct or indirect personal 
benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a 
reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings. 
Cf. 40 S. E. C., at 912, n. 15; Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, 
and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities 
Laws, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 324, 348 (1979) ("The theory ... is 
that the insider, by giving the information out selectively, is 
in effect selling the information to its recipient for cash, re-
ciprocal information, or other things of value for him-
self .... "). There are objective facts and circumstances 
that often justify such an inference. For example, there 
may be a relationship between the insider and the recipient 
that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention 
to benefit the particular recipient. The elements of fiduciary 
duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist 
when an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a 
trading relative or friend. The tip and trade resemble trad-
ing by the insider himself followed by a gift of the profits to 
the recipient. 
Determining whether an insider personally benefits from a 
particular disclosure, a question of fact, will not always be 
easy for courts. But it is essential, we think, to have a guid-
ing principle for those whose daily activities must be limited 
and instructed by the SEC's inside-trading rules, and we be-
lieve that there must be a breach of the insider's fiduciary 
duty before the tippee inherits the duty to disclose or ab-
stain. In contrast, the rule adopted by the SEC in this case 
would have no limiting principle. 24 
24 Without legal limitations, market participants are forced to rely on the 
reasonableness of the SEC's litigation strategy, but that can be hazardous, 
as the facts of this case make plain. Following the SEC's filing of the 
Texas Gulf Sulphur action, Commissioner (and later Chairman) Budge 
spoke of the various implications of applying Rule lOb--5 in inside-trading 
cases: 
"Turning to the realm of possible defendants in the present and potential 
civil actions, the Commission certainly does not contemplate suing every 
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IV 
Under the inside-trading and tipping rules set forth above, 
we find that there was no actionable violation by Dirks. 25 It 
is undisputed that Dirks himself was a stranger to Equity 
Funding, with no pre-existing fiduciary duty to its share-
holders. 26 He took no action, directly or indirectly, that in-
duced the shareholders or officers of Equity Funding to re-
pose trust or confidence in him. There was no expectation 
by Dirk's sources that he would keep their information in con-
fidence. Nor did Dirks misappropriate or illegally obtain 
the information about Equity Funding. Unless the insiders 
person who may have come across inside information. In the Texas Gulf 
action neither tippees nor persons in the vast rank and file of employees 
have been named as defendants. In my view, the Commission in future 
cases normally should not join rank and file employees or persons outside 
the company such as an analyst or reporter who learns of inside informa-
tion." Speech of Hamer Budge to the New York Regional Group of the 
American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc. (Nov. 18, 1965) (emphasis 
added), reprinted in Budge, The Texas Gulf Sulphur Case-What It Is and 
What It Isn't, Corp. Secretary No. 127, at 6 (Dec. 17, 1965). 
:!5 Dirks contends that he was not a "tippee" because the information he 
received constituted unverified allegations of fraud that were denied by 
management and were not "material facts" under the securities laws that 
required disclosure before trading. He also argues that the information 
he received was not truly "inside" information, i. e., intended for a con-
fidential corporate purpose, but was merely evidence of a crime. The So-
licitor General agrees. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22. 
We need not decide, however, whether the information constituted "mate-
rial facts," or whether information concerning corporate crime is properly 
characterized as "inside information." For purposes of deciding this case, 
we assume the correctness of the SEC's findings, accepted by the Court of 
Appeals, that petitioner was a tippee of material inside information. 
26 Judge Wright found that Dirks acquired a fiduciary duty by virtue of 
his position as an employee of a broker-dealer. See 220 U. S. App. D. C., 
at 325-327, 681 F. 2d, at 840-842. The SEC, however, did not consider 
Judge Wright's novel theory in its decision, nor did it present that theory 
to the Court of Appeals. The SEC also has not argued Judge Wright's 
theory in this Court. See Bt:ief for Respondent 21, n. 27. The merits of 
such a duty are therefore not before the Court. See SEC v. Chenery 
Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 196-197 (1947). 
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breached their Cady, Roberts duty to shareholders in disclos-
ing the nonpublic information to Dirks, he breached no duty 
when he passed it on to investors as well as to the Wall Street 
Journal. 
It is clear that neither Secrist nor the other Equity Fund-
ing employees violated their Cady, Roberts duty to the cor-
poration's shareholders by providing information to Dirks. 27 
27 In this Court, the SEC appears to contend that an insider invariably 
violates a fiduciary duty to the corporation's shareholders by transmitting 
nonpublic corporate information to an outsider when he has reason to be-
lieve that the outsider may use it to the disadvantage of the shareholders. 
"Thus, regardless of any ultimate motive to bring to public attention the 
derelictions at Equity Funding, Secrist breached his duty to Equity Fund-
ing shareholders." Brief for Respondent 31. This perceived "duty" dif-
fers markedly from the one that the SEC identified in Cady, Roberts and 
that has been the basis for federal tippee-trading rules to date. In fact, 
the SEC did not charge Secrist with any wrongdoing, and we do not under-
stand the SEC to have relied on any theory of a breach of duty by Secrist in 
finding that Dirks breached his duty to Equity Funding's shareholders. 
See App. 250 (decision of administrative law judge) ("One who knows him-
self to be a beneficiary of non-public, selectively disclosed inside informa-
tion must fully disclose or refrain from trading."); SEC's Reply to Notice of 
Supplemental Authority before the SEC 4 ("If Secrist was acting properly, 
Dirks inherited a duty to [Equity Funding]'s shareholders to refrain from 
improper private use of the information."); Brief on behalf of the SEC in 
the Court of Appeals, at 47-50; id., at 51 ("[K]nowing possession of inside 
information by any person imposes a duty to abstain or disclose."); id., at 
52-54; id., at 55 ("[T]his obligation arises not from the manner in which 
such information is acquired .... "); 220 U. S. App. D. C., at 322-323, 681 
F. 2d, at 838 (Wright, J.). 
The dissent argues that "Secrist violated his duty to Equity Funding 
shareholders by transmitting material nonpublic information to Dirks with 
the intention that Dirks would cause his clients to trade on that informa-
tion." Post, at 12. By perceiving a breach of fiduciary duty whenever 
inside information is intentionally disclosed to securities traders, the dis-
senting opinion effectively would achieve the same result as the SEC's the-
ory below, i. e., mere possession of inside information while trading would 
be viewed as a Rule 10b--5 violation. But Chiarella made it explicitly clear 
there is no general duty to forgo market transactions "based on material, 
nonpublic information." 455 U. S., at 233. Such a duty would "depar[t] 
radically from the established doctrine that duty arises from a specific rela-
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The tippers received no monetary or personal benefit for re-
vealing Equity Funding's secrets, nor was their purpose to 
make a gift of valuable information to Dirks. As the facts of 
this case clearly indicate, the tippers were motivated by a de-
sire to expose the fraud. See supra, at 1-2. In the absence 
of a breach of duty to shareholders by the insiders, there was 
no derivative breach by Dirks. See n. 19, supra. Dirks 
therefore could not have been "a participant after the fact in 
[an] insider's breach of a fiduciary duty." Chiarella, 445 
U. S., at 230, n. 12. 
v 
We conclude that Dirks, in the circumstances of this case, 
tionship between two parties." Ibid. Seep. 7, supra. 
Moreover, to constitute a violation of Rule 10b--5, there must be fraud. 
See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 199 (1976) (statutory 
words "manipulative," "device," and "contrivance ... connot[e] intentional 
or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or 
artificially affecting the price of securities") (emphasis added). There is no 
evidence that Secrist's disclosure was intended to or did in fact "deceive or 
defraud" anyone. Secrist certainly intended to convey relevant informa-
tion that management was unlawfully concealing, and-so far as the record 
shows-he believed that persuading Dirks to investigate was the best way 
to disclose the fraud. Other efforts had proved fruitless. Under any ob-
jective standard, Secrist received no direct or indirect personal benefit 
from the disclosure. 
The dissenting opinion focuses on shareholder "losses," "injury," and 
"damages," but as the court noted in Fridrich v. Br·adford, 542 F. 2d 307, 
318 (CA6 1976), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1053 (1977), there is no clear causal 
connection between inside trading and outsiders' losses: "Investors must 
be prepared to accept the risk of trading in an open market without com-
plete or always accurate information." In one sense, as market values 
fluctuate and investors act on inevitably incomplete or incorrect informa-
tion, there always are winners and losers; but those who have "lost" have 
not necessaril~ been defrauded. On the other" hand, inside trading for per-
sonal gain is raudulent, and is a violation of the federal securities laws. 
See Dooley, supra, at 39-41, 70. Thus, there is little legal significance to 
the dissent's argument that Secrist and Dirks created new "victims" by dis-
closing the information to persons who traded. In fact, they prevented 
the fraud from continuing and victimizing many more investors. 
.. 
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had no duty to abstain from use of the inside information that 
he obtained. The judgment of the Court of Appeals there-
fore is 
Reversed. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Petitioner Raymond Dirks received material nonpublic in-
formation from "insiders" of a corporation with which he had 
no connection. He disclosed this information to investors 
who relied on it in trading in the shares of the corporation. 
The question is whether Dirks violated the antifraud provi-
sions of the federal securities laws by this disclosure. 
I 
In 1973, Dirks was an officer of a New York broker-dealer 
firm who specialized in providing investment analysis of in-
surance company securities to institutional investors. 1 On 
March 6, Dirks received information from Ronald Secrist, a 
former officer of Equity Funding of America. Secrist al-
leged that the assets of Equity Funding, a diversified cor-
poration primarily engaged in selling life insurance and mu-
tual funds, were vastly overstated as the result of fraudulent 
corporate practices. Secrist also stated that various regula-
1 The facts stated here are taken from more detailed statements set forth 
by the administrative law judge, App. 176-180, 22~247; the opinion of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 21 S. E . C. Docket 1401, 1402-1406 
(1981); and the opinion of Judge Wright in the Court of Appeals, 220 U. S. 
App. D. C. 309, 314-318, 681 F . 2d 824, 82~33 (1982) . 
. · 
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tory agencies had failed to act on similar charges made by 
Equity Funding employees. He urged Dirks to verify the 
fraud and disclose it publicly. 
Dirks decided to investigate the allegations. He visited 
Equity Funding's headquarters in Los Angeles and inter-
viewed several officers and employees of the corporation. 
The senior management denied any wrongdoing, but certain 
corporation employees corroborated the charges of fraud. 
Neither Dirks nor his firm owned or traded any Equity 
Funding stock, but throughout his investigation he openly 
discussed the information he had obtained with a number of 
clients and investors. Some of these persons sold their hold-
ings of Equity Funding securities, including five investment 
advisers who liquidated holdings of more than $16 million. 2 
While Dirks was in Los Angeles, he was in touch regularly 
with William Blundell, the Wall Street Journal's Los Angeles 
bureau chief. Dirks urged Blundell to write a story on the 
fraud allegations. Blundell did not believe, however, that 
such a massive fraud could go undetected and declined to 
write the story. He feared that publishing such damaging 
hearsay might be libelous. 
During the two-week period in which Dirks pursued his in-
vestigation and spread word of Secrist's charges, the price of 
Equity Funding stock fell from $26 per share to less than $15 
per share. This led the New York Stock Exchange to halt 
trading on March 27. Shortly thereafter California insur-
2 Dirks received from his firm a salary plus a commission for securities 
transactions above a certain amount that his clients directed through his 
firm. See 21 S. E. C. Docket, at 1402, n. 3. But "[i]t is not clear how 
many of those with whom Dirks spoke promised to direct some brokerage 
business through [Dirks' firm] to compensate Dirks, or how many actually 
did so." 220 U. S. App. D. C., at 316, 681 F. 2d, at 831. The Boston 
Company Institutional Investors, Inc. , promised Dirks about $25,000 in 
commissions, but it is unclear whether Boston actually generated any bro-
kerage business for his firm. See App. 199, 204-205; 21 S. E. C. Docket, 
at 1404, n. 10; 220 U. S. App. D. C., at 316, n. 5, 681 F. 2d, at 831, n. 5. 
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ance authorities impounded Equity Funding's records and 
uncovered evidence of the fraud. Only then did the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) file a complaint against 
Equity Funding 3 and only then, on April 2, did the Wall 
Street Journal publish a front-page story based largely on in-
formation assembled by Dirks. Equity Funding immedi-
ately went into receivership. 4 
The SEC began an investigation into Dirks' role in the ex-
posure of the fraud. Mter a hearing by an administrative 
law judge, the SEC found that Dirks had aided and abetted 
violations of § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 77q(a), 5 § lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U. S.C. §78j(b), 6 and SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR §240.10b-5 
3 As early as 1971, the SEC had received allegations of fraudulent ac-
counting practices at Equity Funding. Moreover, on March 9, 1973, an 
official of the California Insurance Department informed the SEC's re-
gional office in Los Angeles of Secrist's charges of fraud. Dirks himself 
voluntarily presented his information at the SEC's regional office begin-
ning on March 27. 
'A federal grand jury in Los Angeles subsequently returned a 105-
count indictment against 22 persons, including many of Equity Funding's 
officers and directors. All defendants were found guilty of one or more 
counts, either by a plea of guilty or a conviction after trial. See Brief for 
Petitioner 15; App. 149-153. 
• Section 17(a) provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities 
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication 
in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
"(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or 
"(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a 
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which 
they were made, not misleading, or 
"(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser." 
• Section 10(b) provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of 
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(1982), 7 by repeating the allegations of fraud to members of 
the investment community who later sold their Equity Fund-
ing stock. The SEC concluded: "Where 'tippees'-regard-
less of their motivation or occupation-come into possession 
of material 'information that they know is confidential and 
know or should know came from a corporate insider,' they 
must either publicly disclose that information or refrain from 
trading." 21 S. E. C. Docket 1401, 1407 (1981) (footnote 
omitted) (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U. S. 222, 
230 n. 12 (1980)). Recognizing, however, that Dirks "played 
an important role in bringing [Equity Funding's] massive 
fraud to light," 21 S. E. C. Docket, at 1412,8 the SEC only 
censured him. 9 
any facility of any national securities exchange-
"(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
curity registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so 
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors." 
7 Rule 10b-5 provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of 
any facility of any national securities exchange, 
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
"(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state 
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security." 
8 JUSTICE BLACKMUN's dissenting opinion minimizes the role Dirks 
played in making public the Equity Funding fraud. See post, at 3 and 11, 
n. 15. The dissent would rewrite the history of Dirks' extensive investiga-
tive efforts. See, e. g., 21 S. E. C., at 1412 ("It is clear that Dirks played 
an important role in bringing [Equity Funding's] massive fraud to light, 
and it is also true that he reported the fraud allegation to [Equity 
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Dirks sought review in the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit. The court entered judgment 
against Dirks "for the reasons stated by the Commission in 
its opinion." App. to Pet. for Cert. C-2. Judge Wright, a 
member of the panel, subsequently issued an opinion. Judge 
Robb concurred in the result and Judge Tamm dissented; nei-
ther filed a separate opinion. Judge Wright believed that 
"the obligations of corporate fiduciaries pass to all those to 
whom they disclose their information before it has been dis-
seminated to the public at large." 220 U. S. App. D. C. 309, 
324, 681 F. 2d 824, 839 (1982). Alternatively, Judge Wright 
concluded that, as an employee of a broker-dealer, Dirks had 
violated "obligations to the SEC and to the public completely 
independent of any obligations he acquired" as a result of re-
ceiving the information. I d., at 325, 681 F. 2d, at 840. 
In view of the importance to the SEC and to the securities 
industry of the question presented by this case, we granted a 
writ of certiorari. --U. S. -- (1982). We now reverse. 
II 
In the seminal case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 
S. E. C. 907 (1961), the SEC recognized that the common law 
in some jurisdictions imposes on "corporate 'insiders,' par-
ticularly officers, directors, or controlling stockholders" an 
"affirmative duty of disclosure . . . when dealing in securi-
ties." I d., at 911, and n. 13. 10 The SEC found that not only 
Funding's] auditors and sought to have the information published in the 
Wall Street Journal."); 681 F. 2d, at 829 (Wright, J.) ("Largely thanks to 
Dirks one of the most infamous frauds in recent memory was uncovered 
and exposed, while the record shows that the SEC repeatedly missed 
opportunities to investigate Equity Funding."). 
9 Section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78o(b)(4)(E), 
provides that the SEC may impose certain sanctions, including censure, on 
any person associated with a registered broker-dealer who has "willfully 
aided [or] abetted" any violation of the federal securities laws. See 15 
U. S. C. § 78ff(a) (providing criminal penalties). 
10 The duty that insiders owe to the corporation's shareholders not to 
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did breach of this common-law duty also establish the ele-
ments of a Rule lOb-5 violation, 11 but that individuals other 
than corporate insiders could be obligated either to disclose 
material nonpublic information 12 before trading or to abstain 
from trading altogether. Id., at 912. In Chiarella, we ac-
cepted the two elements set out in Cady Roberts for estab-
lishing a Rule lOb-5 violation: "(i) the existence of a relation-
ship affording access to inside information intended to be 
available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness 
of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that in-
formation by trading without disclosure." 445 U. S., at 227. 
In examining whether Chiarella had an obligation to disclose 
or abstain, the Court found that there is no general duty to 
disclose before trading on material non public information, 13 
trade on inside information differs from the common-law duty that officers 
and directors also have to the corporation itself not to mismanage corpo-
rate assets, of which confidential information is one. See 3 Fletcher 
Cyclopedia of the Laws of Private Corporations §§ 848, 900 (1975 ed. and 
Supp. 1982); 3A Fletcher §§ 1168.1, 1168.2. In holding that breaches of 
this duty to shareholders violated the Securities Exchange Act, the Cady, 
Roberts Commission recognized, and we agree, that "[a] significant pur-
pose of the Exchange Act was to eliminate the idea that use of inside in-
formation for personal advantage was a normal emolument of corporate of-
fice." See 40 S. E. C., at 912, n. 15. 
11 Rule 10b-5 is generally the most inclusive of the three provisions on 
which the SEC rested its decision in this case, and we will refer to it when 
we note the statutory basis for the SEC's inside-trading rules. 
12 The SEC views the disclosure duty as requiring more than disclosure 
to purchasers or sellers: "Proper and adequate disclosure of significant cor-
porate developments can only be effected by a public release through the 
appropriate public media, designed to achieve a broad dissemination to the 
investing public generally and without favoring any special person or 
group." In re Faberge, Inc., 45 S. E. C. 249, 256 (1973). 
'
3 See 445 U. S., at 233; id., at 237 (STEVENS, J., concurring); id., at 
238-239 (BRENNAN, J ., concurring in the judgment); id., at 239-240 (BuR-
GER, C. J., dissenting). Cf. id., at 252, n. 2 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) 
(recognizing that there is no obligation to disclose material nonpublic in-
formation obtained through the exercise of"diligence or acumen" and "bon-
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and held that "a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise 
from the mere possession of nonpublic market information." 
I d., at 235. Such a duty arises rather from the existence of a 
fiduciary relationship. See id., at 227-235. 
Not "all breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a se-
curities transaction," however, come within the ambit of Rule 
10l:H>. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462, 
472 (1977). There must also be "manipulation or deception." 
I d., at 473. In an inside-trading case this fraud derives from 
the "inherent unfairness involved where one takes advan-
tage" of "information intended to be available only for a cor-
porate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone." 
In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 
S. E. C. 933, 936 (1968). Thus, an insider will be liable 
under Rule 10l:H> for inside trading only where he fails to dis-
close material nonpublic information before trading on it and 
thus makes "secret profits." Cady, Roberts, 40 S. E. C., at 
916, n. 31. 
III 
We were explicit in Chiarella in saying that there can be 
no duty to disclose where the person who has traded on inside 
information "was not [the corporation's] agent, ... was not 
a fiduciary, [or] was not a person in whom the sellers [of 
the securities] had placed their trust and confidence." 445 
U. S., at 232. Not to require such a fiduciary relationship, 
we recognized, would "depar[t] radically from the established 
doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship between 
two parties" and would amount to "recognizing a general 
duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo 
actions based on material, non public information." I d., at 
232, 233. This requirement of a specific relationship be-
tween the shareholders and the individual trading on inside 
information has created analytical difficulties for the SEC 
est means," as opposed to "stealth"). 
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and courts in policing tippees who trade on inside informa-
tion. Unlike insiders who have independent fiduciary duties 
to both the corporation and its shareholders, the typical 
tippee has no such relationships. 14 In view of this absence, it 
has been unclear how a tippee acquires the Cady, Roberts 
duty to refrain from trading on inside information. 
A 
The SEC's position, as stated in its opinion in this case, is 
that a tippee "inherits" the Cady, Roberts obligation to 
shareholders whenever he receives inside information from 
an insider: 
"In tipping potential traders, Dirks breached a duty 
which he had assumed as a result of knowingly receiving 
confidential information from [Equity Funding] insiders. 
Tippees such as Dirks who receive non-public material 
information from insiders become 'subject to the same 
duty as [the] insiders.' Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, 
"Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is 
revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant 
working for the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the 
shareholders. The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply 
that such persons acquired nonpublic corporate information, but rather 
that they have entered into a special confidential relationship in the con-
duct of the business of the enterprise and are given access to information 
solely for corporate purposes. See SEC v. Monarch Fund, 608 F. 2d 938, 
942 (CA2 1979); In re Investors Management Co., 44 S. E. C. 633, 645 
(1971); In re Van Alystne, Noel & Co., 43 S. E. C. 1080, 1084-1085 (1969); 
In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S. E. C. 933, 937 
(1968); Cady, Roberts, 40 S. E. C., at 912. When such a person breaches 
his fiduciary relationship, he may be treated more properly as a tipper than 
a tippee. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 
495 F. 2d 228, 237 (CA2 1974) (investment banker had access to material 
information when working on a proposed public offering for the corpora-
tion). For such a duty to be imposed, however, the corporation must ex-
pect the outsider to keep the disclosed nonpublic information confidential, 
and the relationship at least must imply such a duty. 
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Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. [495 F. 2d 228, 237 (CA2 
1974) (quoting Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 
(SDNY 1967))]. Such a tippee breaches the fiduciary 
duty which he assumes from the insider when the tippee 
knowingly transmits the information to someone who 
will probably trade on the basis thereof .... Presum-
ably, Dirks' informants were entitled to disclose the 
[Equity Funding] fraud in order to bring it to light and 
its perpetrators to justice. However, Dirks-standing 
in their shoes-committed a breach of the fiduciary duty 
which he had assumed in dealing with them, when he 
passed the information on to traders." 21 S. E. C. 
Docket, at 1410, n. 42. 
This view differs little from the view that we rejected as 
inconsistent with congressional intent in Chiarella. In that 
case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the SEC and affirmed 
Chiarella's conviction, holding that "'[a]nyone-corporate in-
sider or not-who regularly receives material nonpublic in-
formation may not use that information to trade in securities 
without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose.'" United 
States v. Chiarella, 588 F. 2d 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978) (empha-
sis in original). Here, the SEC maintains that anyone who 
knowingly receives nonpublic material information from an 
insider has a fiduciary duty to disclose before trading.'5 
16 Apparently, the SEC believes this case differs from Chiarella in that 
Dirks' receipt of inside information from Secrist, an insider, carried 
Secrist's duties with it, while Chiarella received the information without 
the direct involvement of an insider and thus inherited no duty to disclose 
or abstain. The SEC fails to explain, however, why the receipt of nonpub-
lic information from an insider automatically carries with it the fiduciary 
duty of the insider. As we emphasized in Chiarella, mere possession of 
nonpublic information does not give rise to a duty to disclose or abstain; 
only a specific relationship does that. And we do not believe that the mere 
receipt of information from an insider creates such a special relationship 
between the tippee and the corporation's shareholders. 
Apparently recognizing the weakness of its argument in light of C hia-
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In effect, the SEC's theory of tippee liability in both cases 
appears rooted in the idea that the antifraud provisions re-
quire equal information among all traders. This conflicts 
with the principle set forth in Chiarella that only some per-
sons, under some circumstances, will be barred from trading 
while in possession of material nonpublic information. 16 
Judge Wright correctly read our opinion in Chiarella as re-
pudiating any notion that all traders must enjoy equal in-
formation before trading: "[T]he 'information' theory is re-
jected. Because the disclose-or-refrain duty is extraordi-
nary, it attaches only when a party has legal obligations other 
than a mere duty to comply with the general antifraud pro-
scriptions in the federal securities laws." 220 U. S. App. D. 
C., at 322, 681 F. 2d, at 837. See Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 
235, n. 20. We reaffirm today that "[a] duty [to disclose] 
arises from the relationship between parties . . . and not 
merely from one's ability to acquire information because of 
his position in the market." 445 U. S., at 232-233, n. 14. 
rella, the SEC attempts to distinguish that case factually as involving not 
"inside" information, but rather "market" information, i. e., "information 
generated within the company relating to its assets or earnings." Brief 
for Respondent 23. This Court drew no such distinction in Chiarella and, 
as THE CHIEF JUSTICE noted, "[i]t is clear that § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 by 
their terms and by their history make no such distinction." 445 U. S., at 
241, n. 1 (dissenting opinion). See ALI Fed. Sec. Code§ 1603, Comment 
(2)(j) (Proposed Official Draft 1978). 
16 In Chiarella, we noted that formulation of an absolute equal informa-
tion rule "should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of con-
gressional intent." 445 U. S., at 233. Rather than adopting such a radi-
cal view of securities trading, Congress has expressly exempted many 
market professionals from the general statutory prohibition set forth in 
§ ll(a)(l) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78k(a)(1), against 
members of a national securities exchange trading for their own account. 
See id., at 233, n. 16. We observed in Chiarella that "[t]he exception is 
based upon Congress' recognition that [market professionals] contribute to 
a fair and orderly marketplace at the same time they exploit the informa-
tional advantage that comes from their possession of [nonpublic informa-
tion]." Ibid. 
82-27&-0PINION 
DIRKS v. SEC 11 
Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely ~use a~ 
son knowingly receives material nonpublic information from 
an insider and trades on it could have an inhibiting influence 
on the role of market analysts, which the SEC itself recog-
nizes is necessary to the preservation of a healthy market. 17 
It is commonplace for analysts to "ferret out and analyze in-
formation," 21 S. E. C., at 1406, 18 and this often is done by 
meeting with and questioning corporate officers and others 
who are insiders. And information that the analysts obtain 
normally may be the basis for judgments as to the market 
17 The SEC expressly recognized that "[t]he value to the entire market of 
[analysts'] efforts cannot be gainsaid; market efficiency in pricing is signifi-
cantly enhanced by [their] initiatives to ferret out and analyze information, 
and thus the analyst's work redounds to the benefit of all investors." 21 
S. E. C., at 1406. The SEC asserts that analysts remain free to obtain 
from management corporate information for purposes of "filling in the 'in-
terstices in analysis' .... " Brief for Respondent 42 (quoting Investors 
Management Co., 44 S. E. C., at 646). But this rule is inherently impre-
cise, and imprecision prevents parties from ordering their actions in accord 
with legal requirements. Unless the parties have some guidance as to 
where the line is between permissible and impermissible disclosures and 
uses, neither corporate insiders nor analysts can be sure when the line is 
crossed. Cf. Adler v. Klawans, 267 F. 2d 840, 845 (CA2 1959) (Burger, J., 
sitting by designation). 
18 On its facts, this case is the unusual one. Dirks is an analyst in a bro-
ker-dealer firm, and he did interview management in the course of his in-
vestigation. He uncovered, however, startling information that required 
no analysis or exercise of judgment as to its market relevance. N onethe-
less, the principle at issue here extends beyond these facts. The SEC's 
rule-applicable without regard to any breach by an insider-could have 
serious ramifications on reporting by analysts of investment views. 
Despite the unusualness of Dirks' "find," the central role that he played 
in uncovering the fraud at Equity Funding, and that analysts in general 
can play in revealing information that corporations may have reason to 
withhold from the public, is an important one. Dirks' careful investigation 
brought to light a massive fraud at the corporation. And until the Equity 
Funding fraud was exposed, the information in the trading market was 
grossly inaccurate. But for Dirks' efforts, the fraud might well have gone 
undetected longer. Seen. 8, supra. 
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worth of a corporation's securities. The analyst's judgment 
in this respect is made available in market letters or other-
wise to clients of the firm. It is the nature of this type of 
information, and indeed of the markets themselves, that such 
information cannot be made simultaneously available to all of 
the corporation's stockholders or the public generally. 
B 
The conclusion that recipients of inside information do not 
invariably acquire a duty to disclose or abstain does not mean 
that such tippees always are free to trade on the information. 
The need for a ban on some tippee trading is clear. Not only 
are insiders forbidden by their fiduciary relationship from 
personally using undisclosed corporate information to their 
advantage, but they may not give such information to an out-
sider for the same improper purpose of exploiting the in-
formation for their personal gain. See 15 U. S. C. § 78t(b) 
(making it unlawful to do indirectly "by means of any other 
person" any act made unlawful by the federal securities 
laws). Similarly, the transactions of those who knowingly 
participate with the fiduciary in such a breach are "as forbid-
den" as transactions "on behalf of the trustee himself." 
Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U. S. 267, 272 (1951). See Jackson 
v. Smith, 254 U. S. 586, 589 (1921); Jackson v. Ludeling, 88 
U. S. 616, 631-632 (1874). As the Court explained in 
Mosser, a contrary rule "would open up opportunities for de-
vious dealings in the name of the others that the trustee could 
not conduct in his own." 341 U. S., at 271. See SEC v. 
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F. 2d 1301, 1308 (CA2), cert. 
denied, 404 U. S. 1005 (1971). Thus, the tippee's duty to 
disclose or abstain is derivative from that of the insider's 
duty. See Tr. of Oral Ar. 38. Cf. Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 
246, n. 1 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). As we noted in 
Chiarella, "[t]he tippee's obligation has been viewed as aris-
ing from his role as a participant after the fact in the insider's 
breach of a fiduciary duty." 445 U. S., at 230, n. 12. 
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Thus, some tippees must assume an insider's duty to the 
shareholders not because they receive inside information, but 
rather because it has been made available to them improp-
erly.'9 And for Rule lOb-5 purposes, the insider's disclosure 
is improper only where it would violate his Cady, Roberts 
duty. Thus, a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the share-
holders of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic in-
formation only when the insider has breached his fiduciary 
duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the 
tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has 
been a breach. 20 As Commissioner Smith perceptively ob-
19 The SEC itself has recognized that tippee liability properly is imposed 
only in circumstances where the tippee knows, or has reason to know, that 
the insider has disclosed improperly inside corporate information. In In-
vestors Management Co., supra, the SEC stated that one element of 
tippee liability is that the tippee knew or had reason to know "that [the 
information] was non-public and had been obtained improperly by selective 
revelation or otherwise." 44 S. E. C., at 641 (emphasis added). Commis-
sioner Smith read this test to mean that a tippee can be held liable only if 
he received information in breach of an insider's duty not to disclose it. 
I d., at 650 (concurring in the result). 
21) Professor Loss has linked tippee liability to the concept in the law of 
restitution that " '[ w ]here a fiduciary in violation of his duty to the benefi-
ciary communicates confidential information to a third person, the third 
person, if he had notice of the violation of duty, holds upon a constructive 
trust for the beneficiary any profit which he makes through the use of such 
information.'" 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1451 (2d ed. 1961) (quot-
ing Restatement of Restitution § 201(2) (1937)). Other authorities like-
wise have expressed the view that tippee liability exists only where there 
has been a breach of trust by an insider of which the tippee had knowledge. 
See, e. g., Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (SDNY 1967); A. Jacobs, 
The Impact of Rule 10b-5, § 167, at 7-4 (1975) ("[T]he better view is that a 
tipper must know or have reason to know the information is nonpublic and 
was improperly obtained.''); Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial In-
quiry Into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 798, 818, n. 76 (1973) ("The extension of rule 10b-5 restrictions to 
tippees of corporate insiders can best be justified on the theory that they 
are participating in the insider's breach of his fiduciary duty.''). Cf. Re-
statement (Second) of Agency § 312, comment c (1958) ("A person who, 
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served in Investors Management Co.: "[T]ippee responsibil-
ity must be related back to insider responsibility by a neces-
sary finding that the tippee knew the information was given 
to him in breach of a duty by a person having a special rela-
tionship to the issuer not to disclose the information . . . . " 
44 S. E. C., at 651 (concurring in the result). Tipping thus 
properly is viewed only as a means of indirectly violating the 
Cady, Roberts disclose-or-abstain rule. 21 
c 
In determining whether a tippee is under an obligation to 
disclose or abstain, it thus is necessary to determine whether 
with notice that an agent is thereby violating his duty to his principal, re-
ceives confidential information from the agent, may be [deemed] ... a con-
structive trustee."). 
21 We do not suggest that knowingly trading on inside information is ever 
"socially desirable or even that it is devoid of moral considerations." 
Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 Va. L. Rev. 1, 55 
(1980). Nor do we imply an absence of responsibility to disclose promptly 
indications of illegal actions by a corporation to the proper authorities-
typically the SEC and exchange authorities in cases involving securities. 
Depending on the circumstances, and even where permitted by law, one's 
trading on material nonpublic information is behavior that may fall below 
ethical standards of conduct. But in a statutory area of the law such as 
securities regulation, where legal principles of general application must be 
applied, there may be "significant distinctions between actual legal obliga-
tions and ethical ideals." SEC, Report of the Special Study of Securities 
Markets, H. R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 237-238 
(1963). The SEC recognizes this. At oral argument, the following ex-
change took place: 
"QUESTION: So, it would not have satisfied his obligation under the 
law to go to the SEC first? 
"[SEC's counsel]: That is correct. That an insider has to observe what 
has come to be known as the abstain or disclosure rule. Either the in-
formation has to be disclosed to the market if it is inside information ... or 
the insider must abstain." Tr. of Oral Arg. 27. 
Thus, it is clear that Rule lOb-5 does not impose any obligation simply to 
tell the SEC about the fraud before trading. 
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the insider's "tip" constituted a breach of the insider's fidu-
ciary duty. All disclosures of confidential corporate informa-
tion are not inconsistent with the duty insiders owe to share-
holders. In contrast to the extraordinary facts of this case, 
the more typical situation in which there will be a question 
whether disclosure violates the insider's Cady, Roberts duty 
is when insiders disclose information to analysts. See n. 16, 
supra. In some situations, the insider will act consistently 
with his fiduciary duty to shareholders, and yet release of the 
information may affect the market. For example, it may not 
be clear-either to the corporate insider or to the recipient 
analyst-whether the information will be viewed as material 
nonpublic information. Corporate officials may mistakenly 
think the information already has been disclosed or that it is 
not material enough to affect the market. Whether disclo-
sure is a breach of duty therefore depends in large part on 
the purpose of the disclosure. This standard was identified 
by the SEC itself in Cady, Roberts: a purpose of the securi-
ties laws was to eliminate "use of inside information for per-
sonal advantage." 40 S. E. C., at 912, n. 15. See n. 10, 
supra. Thus, the test is whether the insider personally will 
benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure. Absent 
some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to 
stockholders. And absent a breach by the insider, there is 
no derivative breach. 22 As Commissioner Smith stated in In-
22 An example of a case turning on the court's detennination that the dis-
closure did not impose any fiduciary duties on the recipient of the inside 
information is Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F. 2d 796 (CA21980). 
There, the defendant investment banking firm, representing one of its own 
corporate clients, investigated another corporation that was a possible tar-
get of a takeover bid by its client. In the course of negotiations the invest-
ment banking firm was given, on a confidential basis , unpublished material 
information. Subsequently, after the proposed takeover was abandoned, 
the firm was charged with relying on the information when it traded in the 
target corporation's stock. For purposes of the decision, it was assumed 
that the firm knew the information was confidential, but that it had been 
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vestors Management Co.: "It is important in this type of case 
to focus on policing insiders and what they do ... rather than 
on policing information per se and its possession .... " 44 
S. E. C., at 648 (concurring in the result). 
The SEC argues that, if inside-trading liability does not 
exist when the information is transmitted for a proper pur-
pose but is used for trading, it would be a rare situation when 
the parties could not fabricate some ostensibly legitimate 
business justification for transmitting the information. We 
think the SEC is unduly concerned. In determining whether 
the insider's purpose in making a particular disclosure is 
fraudulent, the SEC and the courts are not required to read 
the parties' minds. Scienter in some cases is relevant in 
determining whether the tipper has violated his Cady, Rob-
erts duty. 23 But to determine whether the disclosure itself 
"deceive[s], manipulate[s], or defraud[s]" shareholders, 
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U. S. 680, 686 (1980), the initial inquiry is 
whether there has been a breach of duty by the insider. 
This requires courts to focus on objective criteria, i. e., 
received in arm's-length negotiations. See id., at 798. In the absence of 
any fiduciary relationship, the Court of Appeals found no basis for impos-
ing tippee liability on the investment firm. See id., at 799. 
23 Scienter-"a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or 
defraud," Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 193, n. 12 (1976~is 
an independent element of a Rule 10b-5 violation. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 
U. S. 680, 695 (1980). Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, see post, at p. 
7, n. 10, motivation is not irrelevant to the issue of scienter. It is not 
enough that an insider's conduct results in harm to investors; rather, a vi-
olation may be found only where there is "intentional or willful conduct de-
signed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting 
the price of securities." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, supra, at 199. The 
issue in this case, however, is not whether Secrist or Dirks acted with 
scienter, but rather whether there was any deceptive or fraudulent con-
duct at all, i. e., whether Secrist's disclosure constituted a breach of his 
fiduciary duty and thereby caused injury to shareholders. See n. 27, 
irifra. Only if there was such a breach did Dirks, a tippee, acquire a fidu-
ciary duty to disclose or abstain. 
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whether the insider receives a direct or indirect personal 
benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a 
reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings. 
Cf. 40 S. E. C., at 912, n. 15; Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, 
and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities 
Laws, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 324, 348 (1979) ("The theory ... is 
that the insider, by giving the information out selectively, is 
in effect selling the information to its recipient for cash, re-
ciprocal information, or other things of value for him-
self .... "). There are objective facts and circumstances 
that often justify such an inference. For example, there 
may be a relationship between the insider and the recipient 
that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention 
to benefit the particular recipient. The elements of fiduciary 
duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist 
when an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a 
trading relative or friend. The tip and trade resemble trad-
ing by the insider himself followed by a gift of the profits to 
the recipient. 
Determining whether an insider personally benefits from a 
particular disclosure, a question of fact, will not always be 
easy for courts. But it is essential, we think, to have a guid-
ing principle for those whose daily activities must be limited 
and instructed by the SEC's inside-trading rules, and we be-
lieve that there must be a breach of the insider's fiduciary 
duty before the tippee inherits the duty to disclose or ab-
stain. In contrast, the rule adopted by the SEC in this case 
would have no limiting principle. 24 
24 Without legal limitations, market participants are forced to rely on the 
reasonableness of the SEC's litigation strategy, but that can be hazardous, 
as the facts of this case make plain. Following the SEC's filing of the 
Texas Gulf Sulphur action, Commissioner (and later Chairman) Budge 
spoke of the various implications of applying Rule lOb-5 in inside-trading 
cases: 
"Turning to the realm of possible defendants in the present and potential 
civil actions, the Commission certainly does not contemplate suing every 
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IV 
Under the inside-trading and tipping rules set forth above, 
we find that there was no actionable violation by Dirks. 25 It 
is undisputed that Dirks himself was a stranger to Equity 
Funding, with no pre-existing fiduciary duty to its share-
holders.26 He took no action, directly or indirectly, that in-
duced the shareholders or officers of Equity Funding to re-
pose trust or confidence in him. There was no expectation 
by Dirk's sources that he would keep their information in con-
fidence. Nor did Dirks misappropriate or illegally obtain 
the information about Equity Funding. Unless the insiders 
person who may have come across inside information. In the Texas Gulf 
action neither tippees nor persons in the vast rank and file of employees 
have been named as defendants. In my view, the Commission in future 
cases normally should not join rank and file employees or persons outside 
the company such as an analyst or reporter who learns of inside informa-
tion." Speech of Hamer Budge to the New York Regional Group of the 
American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc. (Nov. 18, 1965) (emphasis 
added), reprinted in Budge, The Texas Gulf Sulphur Case-What It Is and 
What It Isn't, Corp. Secretary No. 127, at 6 (Dec. 17, 1965). 
25 Dirks contends that he was not a "tippee" because the information he 
received constituted unverified allegations of fraud that were denied by 
management and were not "material facts" under the securities laws that 
required disclosure before trading. He also argues that the information 
he received was not truly "inside" information, i. e., intended for a con-
fidential corporate purpose, but was merely evidence of a crime. The So-
licitor General agrees. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22. 
We need not decide, however, whether the information constituted "mate-
rial facts," or whether information concerning corporate crime is properly 
characterized as "inside information." For purposes of deciding this case, 
we assume the correctness of the SEC's findings, accepted by the Court of 
Appeals, that petitioner was a tippee of material inside information. 
26 Judge Wright found that Dirks acquired a fiduciary duty by virtue of 
his position as an employee of a broker-dealer. See 220 U. S. App. D. C., 
at 32fh327, 681 F. 2d, at 840-842. The SEC, however, did not consider 
Judge Wright's novel theory in its decision, nor did it present that theory 
to the Court of Appeals. The SEC also has not argued Judge Wright's 
theory in this Court. See Brief for Respondent 21, n. 27. The merits of 
such a duty are therefore not before the Court. See SEC v. Chenery 
Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 19~197 (1947). 
82-27&--0PINION 
DIRKS v. SEC 19 
breached their Cady, Roberts duty to shareholders in disclos-
ing the nonpublic information to Dirks, he breached no duty 
when he passed it on to investors as well as to the Wall Street 
Journal. 
It is clear that neither Secrist nor the other Equity Fund-
ing employees violated their Cady, Roberts duty to the cor-
poration's shareholders by providing information to Dirks. 27 
27 In this Court, the SEC appears to contend that an insider invariably 
violates a fiduciary duty to the corporation's shareholders by transmitting 
nonpublic corporate information to an outsider when he has reason to be-
lieve that the outsider may use it to the disadvantage of the shareholders. 
"Thus, regardless of any ultimate motive to bring to public attention the 
derelictions at Equity Funding, Secrist breached his duty to Equity Fund-
ing shareholders." Brief for Respondent 31. This perceived "duty" dif-
fers markedly from the one that the SEC identified in Cady, Roberts and 
that has been the basis for federal tippee-trading rules to date. In fact, 
the SEC did not charge Secrist with any wrongdoing, and we do not under-
stand the SEC to have relied on any theory of a breach of duty by Secrist in 
finding that Dirks breached his duty to Equity Funding's shareholders. 
See App. 250 (decision of administrative law judge) ("One who knows him-
self to be a beneficiary of non-public, selectively disclosed inside informa-
tion must fully disclose or refrain from trading."); SEC's Reply to Notice of 
Supplemental Authority before the SEC 4 ("If Secrist was acting properly, 
Dirks inherited a duty to [Equity Funding]'s shareholders to refrain from 
improper private use of the information."); Brief on behalf of the SEC in 
the Court of Appeals, at 47-50; id., at 51 ("[K]nowing possession of inside 
information by any person imposes a duty to abstain or disclose."); id., at 
52-54; id., at 55 ("[T]his obligation arises not from the manner in which 
such information is acquired .... "); 220 U. S. App. D. C., at 322-323, 681 
F. 2d, at 838 (Wright, J.). 
The dissent argues that "Secrist violated his duty to Equity Funding 
shareholders by transmitting material non public information to Dirks with 
the intention that Dirks would cause his clients to trade on that informa-
tion." Post, at 12. By perceiving a breach of fiduciary duty whenever 
inside information is intentionally disclosed to securities traders, the dis-
senting opinion effectively would achieve the same result as the SEC's the-
ory below, i. e., mere possession of inside information while trading would 
be viewed as a Rule lOb-5 violation. But Chiarella made it explicitly clear 
there is no general duty to forgo market transactions "based on material, 
nonpublic information." 455 U. S., at 233. Such a duty would "depar[t] 
radically from the established doctrine that duty arises from a specific rela-
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The tippers received no monetary or personal benefit for re-
vealing Equity Funding's secrets, nor was their purpose to 
make a gift of valuable information to Dirks. As the facts of 
this case clearly indicate, the tippers were motivated by a de-
sire to expose the fraud. See supra, at 1-2. In the absence 
of a breach of duty to shareholders by the insiders, there was 
no derivative breach by Dirks. See n. 20, supra. Dirks 
therefore could not have been "a participant after the fact in 
[an] insider's breach of a fiduciary duty." Chiarella, 445 
U. S., at 230, n. 12. 
v 
We conclude that Dirks, in the circumstances of this case, 
had no duty to abstain from use of the inside information that 
tionship between two parties." Ibid. Seep. 7, supra. 
Moreover, to constitute a violation of Rule 10b-5, there must be fraud. 
See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 199 (1976) (statutory 
words "manipulative," "device," and "contrivance ... connot[e] intentional 
or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or 
artificially affecting the price of securities") (emphasis added). There is no 
evidence that Secrist's disclosure was intended to or did in fact "deceive or 
defraud" anyone. Secrist certainly intended to convey relevant informa-
tion that management was unlawfully concealing, and-so far as the record 
shows-he believed that persuading Dirks to investigate was the best way 
to disclose the fraud. Other efforts had proved fruitless. Under any ob-
jective standard, Secrist received no direct or indirect personal benefit 
from the disclosure. 
The dissenting opinion focuses on shareholder "losses," "injury," and 
"damages," but in many cases there may be no clear causal connection be-
tween inside trading and outsiders' losses. In one sense, as market values 
fluctuate and investors act on inevitably incomplete or incorrect informa-
tion, there always are winners and losers; but those who have "lost" have 
not necessarily been defrauded. On the other hand, inside trading for per-
sonal gain is fraudulent, and is a violation of the federal securities laws. 
See Dooley, supra, at 39-41, 70. Thus, there is little legal significance to 
the dissent's argument that Secrist and Dirks created new "victims" by dis-
closing the information to persons who traded. In fact, they prevented 
the fraud from continuing and victimizing many more investors. 
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he obtained. The judgment of the Court of Appeals there-
fore is 
Reversed. 
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DIRKS v. SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
No. 82-276. Argued March 21, 1983--Decided July 1, 1983 
While serving as an officer of a broker-dealer, petitioner, who specialized 
in providing investment analysis of insurance company securities to insti-
tutional investors, received information from a former officer of an insur-
ance company that its assets were vastly overstated as the result of 
fraudulent corporate practices and that various regulatory agencies had 
failed to act on similar charges made by company employees. Upon pe-
titioner's investigation of the allegations, certain company employ-
ees corroborated the fraud charges, but senior management denied any 
wrongdoing. Neither petitioner nor his firm owned or traded any of the 
company's stock, but throughout his investigation he openly discussed 
the information he had obtained with a number of clients and investors, 
some of whom sold their holdings in the company. The Wall Street 
Journal declined to publish a story on the fraud allegations, as urged by 
petitioner. After the price of the insurance company's stock fell during 
petitioner's investigation, the New York Stock Exchange halted trading 
in the stock. State insurance authorities then impounded the company's 
records and uncovered evidence of fraud. Only then did the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) file a complaint against the company, 
and only then did the Wall Street Journal publish a story based largely 
on information assembled by petitioner. After a hearing concerning pe-
titioner's role in the exposure of the fraud, the SEC found that he had 
aided and abetted violations of the antifraud provisions of the federal se-
curities laws, including § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
and SEC Rule 10b-5, by repeating the allegations of fraud to members of 
the investment community who later sold their stock in the insurance 
company. Because of petitioner's role in bringing the fraud to light, 
however, the SEC only censured him. On review, the Court of Appeals 
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entered judgment against petitioner. 
Held: 
L Two elements for establishing a violation of§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
by corporate insiders are the existence of a relationship affording access 
to inside information intended to be available only for a corporate pur-
pose, and the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take advan-
tage of that information by trading without disclosure. A duty to dis-
close or abstain does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic 
market information. Such a duty arises rather from the existence of a 
fiduciary relationship. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U. S. 222. 
There must also be "manipulation or deception" to bring a breach of fidu-
ciary duty in connection with a securities transaction within the ambit of 
Rule 10b-5. Thus, an insider is liable under the Rule for inside trading 
only where he fails to disclose material nonpublic information before 
trading on it and thus makes secret profits. Pp. 5-7. 
2. Unlike insiders who have independent fiduciary duties to both the 
corporation and its shareholders, the typical tippee has no such relation-
ships. There must be a breach of the insider's fiduciary duty before the 
tippee inherits the duty to disclose or abstain. Pp. 7-16. 
(a) The SEC's position that a tippee who knowingly receives non-
public material information from an insider invariably has a fiduciary 
duty to disclose before trading rests on the erroneous theory that the 
antifraud provisions require equal information among all traders. A 
duty to disclose arises from the relationship between parties and not 
merely from one's ability to acquire information because of his position in 
the market. Pp. ~11. 
(b) A tippee, however, is not always free to trade on inside informa-
tion. His duty to disclose or abstain is derivative from that of the insid-
er's duty. Tippees must assume an insider's duty to the shareholders 
not because they receive inside information, but rather because it has 
been made available to them improperly. Thus, a tippee assumes a fidu-
ciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material 
nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his fiduciary 
duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and 
the tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach. Pp. 
11-13. 
(c) In determining whether a tippee is under an obligation to dis-
close or abstain, it is necessary to determine whether the insider's "tip" 
constituted a breach of the insider's fiduciary duty. Whether disclosure 
is a breach of duty depends in large part on the personal benefit the in-
sider receives as a result of the disclosure. Absent an improper pur-
pose, there is no breach of duty to stockholders. And absent a breach 
by the insider, there is no derivative breach. Pp. 14-16. 
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3. Under the inside-trading and tipping rules set forth above, peti-
tioner had no duty to abstain from use of the inside information that he 
obtained, and thus there was no actionable violation by him. He had no 
pre-existing fiduciary duty to the insurance company's shareholders. 
Moreover, the insurance company's employees, as insiders, did not vio-
late their duty to the company's shareholders by providing information 
to petitioner. In the absence of a breach of duty to shareholders by the 
insiders, there was no derivative breach by petitioner. Pp. 16-18. 
220 U. S. App. D. C. 309, 681 F. 2d 824, reversed. 
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., 
and WHITE, REHNQUIST, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. BLACK-
MUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, 
JJ., joined . 
